YouSaid · the spoken record

Guehenno

lines on the record: 1,147
first: 2000-11-14
most recent: 2011-05-12
sittings or episodes: 58
sources: un-security-council

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“UNAMA's preparations for the electoral registration process have continued, and last month the capacity to pursue that process was significantly enhanced beyond the four-person team with the approval of the supplementary budget that established the Electoral Unit. Six Regional Coordination Officers have now been recruited and are being deployed into the regions, where they will undertake an on-the- ground needs assessment of the situation as it now exists and determine the practicality of the current work plan. Due to the lack of an Afghan counterpart and the timing of the election, UNAMA has had to plan on the assumption that most of the electoral registration would have to be done directly by United Nations staff, international and local.”
2003-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4774 (2003) · source
“It reasoned that it would first wish to learn about the population's expectations of its provisions and that consideration of the current draft as it now stands could limit the dialogue. A draft Constitution, which takes into account the results of the public consultation and the views of the full Commission, will be circulated in September. Meanwhile, a working group appointed by the President has been discussing options for the organization of the Constitutional Loya Jirga. Recommendations will be finalized and forwarded to the President later this month. Logistical and security arrangements are being discussed among Government representatives, UNAMA, international representatives and the international security forces. Their complexity should not be underestimated.”
2003-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4774 (2003) · source
“The Commission also initiated discussions with the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission on areas of the Constitution relating to the judiciary. In Kabul, reconstruction of the High Court and the Property Deeds Office is already under way with United States support. I would now like to turn to the Constitutional Review Commission, which formally started public consultations on 6 June. Teams of three Commissioners will lead the consultations with elders, local shuras and ordinary citizens in all 32 provinces of Afghanistan, as well as with the refugee community in Iran and Pakistan. The first five teams were sent to Mazar, Gardez, Jalalabad, Kunduz and Bamyan on 10 June. The Commission has decided not to circulate the current draft of the Constitution, which was prepared by the first Drafting Committee and which is incomplete.”
2003-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4774 (2003) · source
“Yet that area also requires the greatest investment of time in order to train lawyers, build the judiciary and public confidence in it, and bolster its position with respect to other State institutions. As part of its overall work plan, which includes determining which laws are currently in force and surveying and developing the human, technical, and logistical needs of the justice sector, the Judicial Reform Commission took several steps this past month. The Ministry of Justice has begun to compile and index national laws with participation of foreign experts. Law revision has been initiated in the fields of criminal law and criminal procedure, as well as on judicial organization, which are crucial areas for the establishment of the rule of law.”
2003-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4774 (2003) · source
“Their staff, with the support of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), has undertaken joint monitoring and investigations of human rights violations as well as the organization of educational and other promotional activities. During the public consultations on the Constitution and initial preparations for next year's elections, and through its capacity to monitor human rights abuses, it is expected that the offices of the Commission will play an important role in the Civic education process. Of all the elements of the peace process, re- establishing the rule of law and, in particular, the justice sector, is one of the most important areas for long-term stability.”
2003-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4774 (2003) · source
“For example, Ismael Khan has already signalled his unwillingness to yield any authority to Kabul and has refused, for the moment, to resign one of his posts. The Government and the international community must send a strong signal that the signatories will be held accountable for their pledges. (spoke in English) The overall human rights situation continues to be negatively affected by extortion by local commanders, arbitrary detentions and the general lack of the rule of law. This remains a source of instability and diminishes the credibility of the Government. As part of the response, the seven satellite offices of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission are now fully operational.”
2003-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4774 (2003) · source
“The Minister of Finance has since secured the transfer of customs revenues from several provinces, including $20 million from Herat's Ismael Khan. The Minister of Finance also continues to visit other provinces to seek the transfer of funds and put in place an automatic transfer mechanism. At issue is the gradual collection by the Government of $200 million that is anticipated for the budget. To date, $40 million has been collected. This infusion of new cash has enabled the Government to pay some of the overdue salaries of its civil servants and Afghan National Army troops. However, regular remittances will be the real test of the provinces' compliance with the Government's directive. Unfortunately, there are already signs that written agreements do not necessarily translate into tangible action.”
2003-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4774 (2003) · source
“In a determined effort to assert the authority of his Government, President Karzai summoned 12 of the country's most powerful governors and regional commanders to Kabul on 20 May, threatening to resign if he failed to secure their full cooperation. The persons brought together committed themselves to implementing a l3-point decision of the National Security Council, which seeks, among other things, to forbid the recruitment of private militias and military action unauthorized by the central Government, to reaffirm the ban on any individual holding both a military and civilian post and to dissolve some extragovernmental bodies; it also provides for administrative powers for its implementation. The National Security Council decision also requires that all governors transfer provincial income to the central Government.”
2003-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4774 (2003) · source
“First, regarding relations between the centre and the periphery, some 18 months since the Bonn Agreement and the establishment of the Interim Authority, the authority of the Transitional Administration beyond Kabul is still, unfortunately, too limited. The majority of provincial authorities continue to act with an autonomy that denies the Transitional Administration the means to implement its national development plan. Yet the population expects the Afghan Administration to improve the economic situation and the security environment, which would give the Afghan Administration its credibility. It is clear that the patience of the Afghan population is wearing thin.”
2003-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4774 (2003) · source
“Over the past month, some positive progress was made. Most notably, President Karzai took resolute action towards establishing and affirming the Government's authority in the provinces. We have also seen the commencement of public consultations on the Constitution, and planning for the electoral process is now in its final stages. But the security situation remains a serious impediment to progress and is a major risk to the entire process. Solutions exist for this problem, but resolving it will require the strong commitment of the Afghan authorities and the international community. Before turning to the issue of security and its influence on the Bonn process as a whole, I wish first provide the Council with an overview of recent developments in a number of other areas.”
2003-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4774 (2003) · source
“Members of the Council will recall the words of Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Representative of the Secretary- General for Afghanistan, in his briefing to the Council on 6 May. He described the significant progress made in the Bonn process, but he also warned against the security environment in Afghanistan and of the threat posed by the prevailing security situation to the gains made. The emphasis on drugs in Afghanistan which you, Sir, have designated for this meeting is indeed welcome, given the importance of the issue to the immediate and long-term stability of the country and the region. Mr. Costa, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, will be focusing more specifically on that issue, and I will provide an update on the situation in Afghanistan since the last briefing.”
2003-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4774 (2003) · source
“Nevertheless, we believe that is our duty to always plan for the worst case and that the recent developments in Titnor do warrant the adjustments that we have put before the Council.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“We are not sure that at this stage it has really built the capacity in a way that allows the Timorese to deal with the range of contingencies with which they may be confronted To conclude, I would just like to note that the figures that are being discussed should be compared to what is being done in other theatres of operation. When I think that the present military force in Timor-Leste is approximately one sixth of the force that NATO deems prudent to keep in Kosovo, I think that the adjustments that we are suggesting reflect just a prudent approach to a situation where some elements remain murky. The size and nature of the threat will require further, continued review.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“Let me just say in this Chamber that what we are doing at the moment is less ambitious, although we believe quite professional, than what has been done in other missions - for instance, in the Balkans. At the moment, the Timorese police get three months in the police academy, three months of in-service training and then six months of thematic training. One of the modules is crowd management and control. We get some bilateral support in those various activities. In that respect, I would like to mention the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP), the United States bilateral initia ve that assists very actively in all modular training initiatives. All that is important, necessary and useful.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“Our concern is that the two threats can of its consideration of the item on its agenda. combine and our duty is always to provide for the worst-case scenario. The two threats can be mutually reinforcing and we see our efforts with respect to the The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m. police, on the one side, and the military on the other as not exclusive, but also mutually reinforcing. We have been asked for more details on what we plan for the police. I think, on that, we will be prepared, if the Council so wishes, to have another meeting of police-contributing countries to brief them in detail and to answer any questions that they might have on what we plan for the police.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“It would be the closure of a window of vulnerability that we see opening with changed security circumstances. The point was made that the issue is more of a police issue than a military issue. In our view, actually, there are two distinct threats. There is, indeed, a problem that has to be dealt with by police means. Nobody challenges the need - and I will come back to this in a minute - to strengthen our efforts to build the capacity of the Timorese police. At the same time, when, in the follow-up to the latest incidents, our troops found 1,000 rounds of ammunition in the midst of the jungle at an abandoned camp site, we do not see There are no further speakers on my list. The that as a police operation. We see that as definitely of a Security Council has thus concluded the present stage military nature.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“I could also have reiterated what the report says on the good relations that have developed between Timor-Leste and Indonesia and which were confirmed by the representatives of the two countries. This is indeed a very important element that can help in the future, including in addressing potential threats. Nevertheless, we feel it is our duty to look at all aspects, including the bad news. Nobody likes to revise their own plans, and if the Secretary-General decided to put the report before the Council it is because we felt that it was indeed necessary to put all the facts before the Council. I think the first consideration for us - and I would like to stress this - is to close a window of vulnerability while the Mission draws down and Timor-Leste builds up. This is not an open-ended commitment; this is not an open-ended freeze.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“As for the situation today of the international terrorist threat with respect to Timor-Leste, while we do remain concerned about the risk of terrorism, we have not seen evidence that suggests imminent specific threats, although a considerable level of heightened alert is being maintained, particularly in Dili. We think that, for the future, what is important, again, is that any relevant information be immediately shared with the Timorese authorities. Let me now turn to the questions and remarks raised by several delegations, both on the analysis of the situation and on the recommendations we are making. Of course, we did not ignore the good news. This morning, I referred to the conclusion of the agreements between Australia and Timor-Leste.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“The representative of Mexico asked about the situation of terrorism with respect to Timor-Leste. The United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) is working with the Government of Timor-Leste and with the relevant specialized branch of the United Nations to assist the Government in strengthening its ability to address terrorism. At the same time, I have to stress that further assistance from Member States will be essential, including in the sharing of information and in developing training capacities. As we all know, in the matter of terrorism, intelligence gathering is of critical importance and Timor-Leste needs the support of the international community in that respect.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“These programmes include reconstruction plans, with an emphasis on the employment of ex-combatants and of unemployed youth. Further national capacity- building programmes will focus on justice, on police and on public administration. The next major meeting of development partners should take place in June. I would stress that, over the past three years, $580 million have been provided by development partners for the development of Timor-Leste. At the same time, it has also to be noted that Timor-Leste remains one of the least developed countries, with less than $500 per capita income per year. We very much hope that the development of mineral resources - about which we had good new this morning - will open a new era. In the meantime, continued support by Member States remains essential to the stabilization and development of Timor-Leste.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“Mr. Guehenno: I will first answer two specific questions that were put to me by the Ambassador of Chile and the representative of Mexico. The Ambassador of Chile asked about the national development plan. I would say that this plan continues to provide the road map for Timor-Leste's development and for support by development partners. Every month, there is a meeting chaired by the Vice- Minister of Finance with the development partners to monitor the progress of the implementation. Apart from those monthly meetings, there are specific special meetings that take place to look at the strategy. Most recently, the Government met with development partners in Dili in December. That meeting focused on and supported a number of programmes that support stability in the long and short terms.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“We hope that, in the midst of competing demands, the Security Council can continue to ensure that Timor-Leste gets the resources and attention that it needs and can bring to fruition the extraordinary efforts it has made to date.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“Or, as is strongly supported by military expertise here and in Dili, should the international community lean towards prudence and make the additional effort suggested here? These recommendations are presented on the premise that it is easier and less expensive to pre-empt a problem than to try to fix a problem after it has occurred. The cost that is implied would be modest compared to the $1 billion to $2 billion that the international community has spent in Timor-Leste over the past three years. However, we believe that this additional effort could help secure the much larger investment that has been made to date. Members of the Security Council, together with troop contributors and other Member States, have already made an outstanding contribution to Timor- Leste.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“This included the information obtained since the report, during UNMISET's efforts to find the attackers in Bobonaro, when peacekeepers came across a campsite with considerable military equipment, including firearms, nearly 1,000 rounds of ammunition and military packs. We are here seeking to provide the Council with the information it needs, and with recommendations that we believe appropriate. In the light of past experience, we would urge that the Council consider the following key questions. In a fragile but unclear situation, should the international community continue to seek a more "minimalist" approach, which was first mooted in the more optimistic pre-independence period?”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“The development of these resources is of cardinal importance for Timor- Leste's economic future. But the hope that this progress implies could be undermined unless security issues are resolved. The decision before the Security Council is a difficult one. As I mentioned, much about the new threat groups in Timor-Leste - their scale, sources of support and motivation - remains ambiguous. But it is already apparent that they exceed the capability of regular police - either international or Timorese. Furthermore, the information that we continue to receive has generally increased, rather than allayed, our concern.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“I would like to note that the report does not propose deferring the operation's withdrawal date, nor does it propose a new overall strategy; this remains the establishment of a sustainable Timorese structure that can maintain security after UNMISET leaves. But a premature downsizing of the Mission could imperil that strategy, as the security situation could rapidly deteriorate, and the development of Timorese capacity could suffer. While my remarks today have necessarily focused on the problems that remain, I wish also to draw to the Security Council's attention a major positive development. This is the conclusion of the agreements and legislative processes in Timor-Leste and in Australia that should pave the way for exploitation of mineral resources in the Timor Sea.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“At the same time, as a short-term measure to strengthen the Mission's operational capacity to deal with the threat posed by armed groups, the report proposes a delay in the downsizing of the military component and its reconfiguration in key areas, including increasing mobility. It may be useful to note that the last time the peacekeeping operation faced significant armed activity was nearly a year ago, when the operation included over 5,000 troops. The report also underlines the importance of the reduction of restrictions on military components by troop- contributing countries. Finally, the report suggests deployment of a formed police company, which would help the Mission to deal with civil disturbance and crowd control.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“For these reasons, the report to the Security Council includes two kinds of recommendations. First, the report proposes an enhancement of the Mission's ability to support development of the Timorese police. This will entail recruitment of personnel with the ability to train in such areas as crowd control, police administration, finance, logistics, forensics, tactical operations, border security and community policing, and a renewed emphasis on human rights training. It suggests retaining a higher number of police advisers in districts where Timorese police have assumed responsibility for patrolling. Furthermore, UNMISET police, in coordination with donors, will also be working with the Government to develop its strategy to follow up recommendations of the report of the Joint Assessment Mission.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“It could force the Mission to make undesirable choices; thus, if the military had to assist in dealing with a further riot in Dili next August, this would likely require relocation of forces from the west that would open the door to infiltration by threat groups on an opportunity basis. This is assuming that the level of problems stays the same; it does not factor in the risk that such downsizing could in itself encourage greater problems, by sending the wrong signal to potential troublemakers. As for the international police, it currently has no remaining crowd-control capability. At the same time, it lacks the specialized training capabilities that are required to ensure the most effective, rapid and thorough development of its Timorese counterparts.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“According to the original plans for the operation, further downsizing in the middle of this year would see the removal of around 750 infantry, primarily those located in the south-west. With only 2,580 infantry in the military component at present, this is a reduction of around a third in the very capacity needed if UNMISET is to respond effectively to armed groups. This would make it difficult to maintain the regular and frequent presence in rural areas that is crucial to obtain information on evolving threats. It would inhibit UNMISET'S ability to concentrate its forces in response to threat groups.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“These kinds of tasks are not best suited for the Timor-Leste defence force (Falintil-FDTL) in terms of its mandate, its equipment or its present training. Nor is it realistic to propose that the Timorese police (PNTL) assume a substantially greater role in addressing these most difficult types of security challenges for another year. Seeking to rely upon these agencies prematurely, or in ways that are inappropriate, could compromise their training, set bad precedents and harm their standing in the community. At the same time, the downsizing plans that were prepared nine months ago, at a far more peaceful time, would make it increasingly difficult for UNMISET to give the Timorese agencies the time they need to develop fully.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“First, there have been threats and incidents of civil disturbance, the most significant being the destructive riot in Dili on 4 December last year - although there have been other riots, including one in Baucau in November. Secondly, there has been a rise in armed groups in rural areas, particularly in the west of the country. Prominent activities carried out by such groups are the killings in Ermera on 4 January and in Bobonaro on 24 February. Much about these groups remains unclear, but they appear to be driven by a blend of political and criminal motivations and to be drawing on a variety of sources of support. The report then identifies obstacles to increased reliance upon the Timorese capacity to address such threats.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“This is not a general report on progress towards implementation of the mandate; that report will be forthcoming at the end of April or beginning of May, as UNMISET's first year draws to a close. This is, rather, an effort to sound an alarm at a critical time, to indicate to the Council a number of worrisome developments and to recommend, in good time, what we consider realistic and prudent adjustments of UNMISET'S troop-reduction plans so as to reflect a situation on the ground that has changed and to protect the considerable investments that the international community has made in Timor-Leste. (spoke in English) The report of the Secretary-General notes that the success story in Timor-Leste appears to be threatened by two types of developments in the security environment.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“I should like once more to express our sincere condolences to the Government of the Republic of Korea and to the families of the victims. I should now like to turn to the report and to examine its key recommendations and their underlying logic. In much of the information that we have communicated to the Security Council over the past three and a half years - first on East Timor and then on Timor-Leste - we have been able to cite remarkable successes. Those have included the establishment of a public administration, two peaceful elections and Timor-Leste's independence nearly a year ago. Unfortunately, the report before the Council today has a different focus.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“I welcome this opportunity to introduce to the members of the Security Council the special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) (S/2003/243). Before presenting the report, however, I wish to formally express the Secretariat's regret and sadness at the news of the tragic loss last week of five UNMISET Blue Helmets from the Republic of Korea. As Council members may be aware, those young soldiers lost their lives when they were swept away in a swollen river in the Oecussi district. Three of them drowned as a result of their brave efforts to rescue their compatriots. This tragic accident reminds us of the perils that our dedicated peacekeepers face every day; it reminds us of the tremendous sacrifices that they and their families make and of the enormous debt we owe to them.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“We are doing that through the implementation of what we call Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) - that is, we are instructing United Nations personnel in Afghanistan to follow strict procedures with respect to transit from one place to another - such as from their residences to the places where they work - so as to minimize risk for our people in Afghanistan.”
2003-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4711 (2003) · source
“The representative of China asked us how we could reduce attacks on United Nations personnel. I think there are two answers to that question. One is of a general nature. Attacks on United Nations personnel are only one disturbing aspect of the general security situation in Afghanistan. Everything that is done to reform the security sector - to consolidate local politics throughout Afghanistan through institutions, not through the power of the gun - will have a positive impact on the security of our people. That being said, the other response that we can give is that we must take precautions.”
2003-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4711 (2003) · source
“Ambassador Nishimura referred to me the comments of the representative of Chile about lessons learned from other experiences with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). There are many lessons indeed; I would focus on two of them. One is the question of financing, which is a perennial problem with any DDR programme and a concrete example of the importance of a sustained international commitment to Afghanistan. The other lesson - and I think this morning's discussion has been an illustration of this - is that there must be a close link between the DDR programme and the reform of the security sector; they really go hand in hand. So I think that more and more coordination between those two facets of the consolidation of peace in Afghanistan is welcome.”
2003-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4711 (2003) · source
“Indeed, the challenges are considerable, and this morning's discussion shows that, as far as improving security is concerned, there is still a long way to go. But was it realistic to have an Interim Administration two weeks after the Bonn Agreement? Was it realistic to have an Emergency Loya Jirga a few months later? I think that, ever since the beginning, we have been under a very tight timetable; that was a political decision. Thus far, we have met the various deadlines, and I think that is a tribute to the political will of the Afghan people - and also to the sustained commitment of the international community. If that political will and the commitment of the international community remain what they should be, then perhaps we will not say that it is unrealistic to have elections.”
2003-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4711 (2003) · source
“The obstacles will be of the same kind as those encountered in the creation of the Afghan national army: the questions of funding and of balanced representation among the various ethnic groups within the police and, generally, the question of how to improve the security situation. That is something that we have been discussing this morning. The police in a pacified Afghanistan will necessarily take the lead role vis-a-vis the army. We are not quite there yet. There is also the question of extending the national police beyond Kabul, and I think that will certainly be one of the most delicate and most important questions in moving peace-building forward in Afghanistan. (spoke in English) The Permanent Representative of Angola asked whether it would be realistic to have elections in 2004.”
2003-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4711 (2003) · source
“Mr. Guehenno: The representative of the Russian Federation asked whether we had been approached by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). We have not. We have heard from press reports that such an idea might be considered, but thus far I am not aware of any North Atlantic Council decision with respect to Afghanistan. (spoke in French) The representative of France asked about the forthcoming decree concerning the police. As we understand it, the decree will provide information about the size of the police and border police forces, about the restructuring of the Ministry and about the creation of a road police as part of the transformation of the police structure in Afghanistan. What will the obstacles be?”
2003-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4711 (2003) · source
“While the international community can and must provide support, in the end the success of the reform project depends on the Afghans themselves. In the months ahead, the political underpinnings of security sector reform must be strengthened by the deeds and words of the Transitional Administration. The police, army and intelligence service are still viewed by too many Afghans as politically biased. The chances of successfully reforming the security sector will be much enhanced if the statements of Afghan authorities on national reconciliation are demonstrably upheld. I would like to thank you, Sir, once again for focusing our attention on the important issue of security in all its dimensions. I look forward to a fruitful discussion on this topic, which, in the end, underpins the entire Bonn process.”
2003-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4711 (2003) · source
“Success therefore requires a great deal of cooperation, and I am pleased at the way the lead nations for each subsector and UNAMA have coordinated their efforts in Kabul. But the resources needed to carry out security sector reform are greater than those that the designated lead nations can provide on their own. For that reason, I would like to re- emphasize that those countries are working to attract and coordinate the assistance of others in their respective sectors. I urge Member States to provide the necessary financial and material support. The United Nations has established four trust funds for contributions to the police, the justice sector, DDR and the payment of salaries and the provision of non-lethal equipment to the Afghan national army.”
2003-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4711 (2003) · source
“We estimate that $20 to $40 million in various alternative livelihoods, infrastructure and employment generation projects should be available in the near to medium term. The magnitude of this problem is extremely well documented in a study on the opium economy released last month by the United Nations International Drug Control Programme. The study estimates that gross income from opium production at the farm level may have been as high as $1.2 billion in 2002. This is more than half of what the Government expects in total international aid. All the activities under the rubric of security sector reform are closely linked to each other and to other critical political and economic developments under the Bonn process.”
2003-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4711 (2003) · source
“The newly appointed Interior Minister, Ali Ahmad Jalali, has displayed a promising readiness to reform the police. Efforts are also being intensified to support the border police, which has just been moved from the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of the Interior. Norway and other Nordic countries have expressed an interest in pushing that process forward. President Karzai and the Minister are also working on a draft decree to set the course of reform for the police and border guard, much as the 1 December decree did for the army. The counter-narcotics effort has been spurred recently by the Government's active poppy eradication campaign in the five core poppy-producing provinces. As mentioned, this law enforcement effort has created some tensions and will need to be accompanied by convincing alternative livelihoods programmes.”
2003-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4711 (2003) · source
“If those processes succeed, implementing the others, and the Bonn Agreement in general, will be much easier. While we hope that strong signals and actions at the national government level will help build confidence among various factions that must be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated, it is also clear that the political support needed to complete the DDR process will probably have to be built, carefully and gradually, from region to region across the country. In terms of international support, a conference on DDR was just held in Tokyo on 22 February, and I am sure that we will hear more about that shortly. As local militias are drawn down, a reformed national police will have to be created to provide the foundation of law and order across the country.”
2003-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4711 (2003) · source
“Success will also depend on creating fully representative institutions of central government. The upper echelons of the Ministries of Defence and the Interior must reflect the regional and political diversity of the country, and they must be seen to work together in the interest of national unity. Only this will build the necessary trust in the national character of the new security forces. The decision on 20 February to effect changes in 17 high-level positions in the Ministry of Defence is therefore a welcome development and a strong signal of the Government's determination to create a truly national army. The creation of the army, the phasing out of factional militias and the effective demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants constitute the linchpin of security sector reform.”
2003-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4711 (2003) · source
“The security sector must be able to provide minimal conditions of stability to ensure that the Constitutional Loya Jirga and the national elections are meaningful and credible. Confirming this assessment, President Karzai has said that the reform of the security sector is his priority in the coming months. Success will depend on a comprehensive, integrated approach that addresses the linkages between the security subsectors and unites the efforts of international actors and Afghan leaders at every level. For example, the creation of the new army and police is linked to the successful reintegration into civilian life of the members of existing security forces. That will require political consensus at the local and national levels and international commitment to deliver the required assistance.”
2003-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4711 (2003) · source
“The challenges of reforming the Afghan security sector are significant: the national army needs to be built, factional armies need to be dissolved, and assistance needs to be provided to help ex-combatants reintegrate into civilian life. A national police force needs to be created, the rule of law re-established, the justice sector rehabilitated, and the cultivation of and trafficking in illicit drugs countered. Finally, the bloated and intrusive internal intelligence structures must be reformed so that they no longer inspire fear among the people that they are expected to protect. Security sector reform is made all the more urgent by the complex political activities planned for the next 16 months.”
2003-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4711 (2003) · source
“Despite a general sense of concern about security conditions across the country, I am pleased to note the smooth handover of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command from Turkey to Germany and the Netherlands on 10 February. I would like to thank Turkey for the leadership provided over the past seven months by General Hilmi Akin Zorlu and his staff, as well as for the professionalism and dedication that has been, and continues to be, demonstrated by the officers and soldiers of the 22 Member States that contribute to ISAF. I also thank, Mr. President, your Government and that of the Netherlands for assuming joint command under General Norbert van Heyst.”
2003-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4711 (2003) · source