YouSaid · the spoken record

Guehenno

lines on the record: 1,147
first: 2000-11-14
most recent: 2011-05-12
sittings or episodes: 58
sources: un-security-council

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“On the operational front, UNMIK and KFOR established a senior crisis team to coordinate policy and security actions in response to the crisis, which focused on re-establishing a safe and secure environment, immediately launching efforts to apprehend and investigate those involved in the violent actions and to ensure a rapid return to stability and normalcy. Let me take this opportunity to thank the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the speed and determination with which it responded to the crisis and for the additional troops that were provided on short notice as part of the collective effort to re-establish safe and secure conditions for Kosovo's population and the international presence there. I also welcome NATO's intention to retain the additional troops in Kosovo.”
2004-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4942 (2004) · source
“As the events were unfolding, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Holkeri, immediately moved on a number of fronts in an effort to stem the spread of violence. On the political front, in close coordination with the Commander of KFOR, he convened Kosovo's leaders and asked that, as a first step, they call for an immediate cessation of the violence. To reinforce this message publicly, Mr. Holkeri made a number of statements in the Kosovo and international media calling for calm. Consultations with UNMIK's partners and with Member States' liaison offices on the ground were held throughout the crisis.”
2004-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4942 (2004) · source
“The steps taken by the leaders of Kosovo's Provisional Institutions are commendable and necessary and should be supported, although they came late and only under outside pressure, but they are not enough. What is clearly needed is for Kosovo's leaders to identify those officials - at both the local and the central levels - who may have provided active backing or passive support to the extremists and who may have used these events to further promote intolerance in Kosovo. Kosovo's leaders must leave no doubt of their wholehearted commitment to tackling and confronting extremism and extremist positions, including within their own ranks, and to holding those politicians responsible and to disciplining those civil servants who may have played an instrumental role in fomenting or participating in the violence.”
2004-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4942 (2004) · source
“Subsequently, representatives of the three main Kosovo Albanian parties, along with representatives of the Turkish, Bosniac, Egyptian and Ashkali communities, signed an open letter to the people of Kosovo condemning the violence and calling for mutual respect among all of Kosovo's communities. The PISG have also committed funds and logistic support for the reconstruction effort, including for the rebuilding of destroyed or damaged religious buildings or monuments. It should be noted that, during and immediately after the violence, the authorities in Belgrade played a constructive role in collective efforts to stem the violence and stamp out any extremist reaction. We welcome in particular the fact that Belgrade has regretted the burning of the mosques and has pledged to rebuild them.”
2004-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4942 (2004) · source
“Moreover, there were reports of cases in which members of veteran groups of the Kosovo Liberation Army participated in the violence. Only following the strong reaction and pressure by the international community did the leadership of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government come to realize that attempting to justify the violence was unacceptable. While representatives of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government did move to condemn the violence, their statements largely failed to expressly condemn the attacks on the Kosovo Serb community.”
2004-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4942 (2004) · source
“While Prime Minister Rexhepi should be commended personally for his public pronouncements and actions and his calls for an end to the violence, the Kosovo Government issued a statement which focused on the drowning of the Kosovo Albanian children and assumed it was caused by Serbs and was a result of inter-ethnic hatred. As mentioned earlier, this claim was unsubstantiated at that time and still is. Others within the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, including Government ministers and municipal assembly presidents, initially condoned or justified the violence. A statement issued by the Assembly focused on parallel structures rather than on the evolving violence. With regard to non-governmental actors, Kosovo Albanian civil society generally failed to take a responsible stand against the ethnic violence.”
2004-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4942 (2004) · source
“UNMIK has responded to the crisis and, together with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, has moved to ensure the urgent distribution of humanitarian assistance and to gradually stabilize the conditions of the displaced. The United Nations country team assumed the lead in managing and coordinating the humanitarian response to the current crisis. The priority now is to assist those of them who are prepared to return. The initial response by the leadership of Kosovo's Provisional Institutions was ambivalent.”
2004-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4942 (2004) · source
“UNMIK is working on establishing assessment teams, led by international heritage experts appointed by UNESCO and the Council of Europe and comprising both Serb Orthodox experts and officials of the Ministry of Culture of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). Equally regrettable was the retaliatory burning of mosques by Serb extremists in Belgrade and in other parts of Serbia. The violence has completely reversed the returns process, which prior to the recent events had shown signs of limited but encouraging progress. The total number of persons displaced as a result of the wave of violence is 4,100 people, which is more than the total number of returns for 2003.”
2004-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4942 (2004) · source
“Two of these have been listed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as major sites of universal significance and a third is listed as a site of regional significance. The attacks were therefore attacks not simply against places of worship, but against Kosovo's cultural heritage, Kosovo's common collective memory, of which the Serb Orthodox church - as we can see from the exhibition now at the Metropolitan Museum of Art - is an important part. It was an attack against our own collective heritage and many of these sites had remained untouched for centuries through various conflicts.”
2004-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4942 (2004) · source
“For instance, in Vucitrn, in the southern Mitrovica region, the Ashkali neighbourhood in which Kosovo's returns process was officially launched, was entirely burned, displacing some 300 individuals who had returned to Kosovo over the past two years. Similarly, a Kosovo Serb village Svinjare, also in the southern Mitrovica region, was completely destroyed. Perhaps most disturbing and reprehensible, mobs looted, burned and damaged or destroyed 36 Serbian Orthodox churches, monasteries and other religious and cultural sites. Of these sites, 30 are Orthodox churches, two are Orthodox monasteries, one is the Episcopal residence of the Serbian Orthodox bishop, one is an Orthodox theological school and one is an Orthodox Serbian cemetery. The places of worship that were attacked date as far back as the fourteenth century.”
2004-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4942 (2004) · source
“(spoke in English) The onslaught led by Kosovo Albanian extremists against Kosovo Serbs, Roma and Ashkali communities was an organized, widespread and targeted campaign. Attacks on Kosovo Serbs occurred throughout Kosovo, in larger cities such as Pristina and anilane, as well as in small villages such as Belo Polje in the Pec region, where groups of Kosovo Serbs had recently returned and had planned to rebuild their lives in Kosovo. Properties were demolished, public facilities such as schools and health clinics were destroyed, communities were surrounded and threatened and residents were forced to leave their homes. The inhabitants of entire villages had to be evacuated and, following their departure, their homes were burned to the ground.”
2004-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4942 (2004) · source
“The potential for further violence there continues and sporadic attacks continue to occur, including attacks against international staff and the Kosovo police presence. The worst of those occurred on 23 March, when a Ghanaian UNMIK police officer and an Albanian colleague of the Kosovo Police Service were killed when a group of Kosovo Albanian uniformed men fired on their police patrol vehicle. Seven individuals have been subsequently detained by UNMIK following that attack. In a separate attack, in Mitrovica on 24 March, a Kosovo Serb threw a grenade at a KFOR checkpoint and slightly injured two KFOR soldiers. That individual was subsequently arrested by other Kosovo Serbs and handed over to UNMIK Police.”
2004-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4942 (2004) · source
“The results of these two days of violence in Kosovo speak for themselves: 19 persons died; 954 civilians were injured in the course of the clashes and rioting that occurred in Kosovo; 65 police officers of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 58 Kosovo Police Service Officers and 61 KFOR personnel were injured; approximately 730 houses, nearly all of which belonged to Kosovo minorities - basically Serbian - were burned or damaged; more than 150 vehicles, including 100 UNMIK vehicles, were destroyed or severely damaged; KFOR itself had one armoured personnel carrier and three other vehicles destroyed. The situation throughout Kosovo is currently quiet, though it remains tense.”
2004-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4942 (2004) · source
“Inflammatory and often biased media reporting on both incidents contributed to raising tensions. The demonstrations that followed the incidents that I have just referred to, although apparently spontaneous at the outset, were quickly taken over by organized elements with an interest in driving the Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo and threatening the international presence in Kosovo.”
2004-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4942 (2004) · source
“My briefing to the Council this morning will focus on the widespread violence that racked Kosovo in March, the responses to that violence and the implications of those events. As the Council is aware, the violence appears to have been directly sparked by a series of events in the days preceding the clashes, which raised the level of tension between the Kosovo Albanians and the Kosovo Serbs. In particular, the shooting of a Kosovo Serb youth on 15 March in the village of Caglavica, near Pristina, and the death by drowning of two Albanian children in the Ibar River on 16 March - the body of a third Albanian child believed also to have drowned has yet to be found and the circumstances of the drowning have not been established - were a catalyst for the violent acts that ensued.”
2004-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4942 (2004) · source
“I would like to conclude, in that respect, on the importance of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), without which the strength of Afghanistan will be considerably undermined. So I think that if we want to consolidate security in Afghanistan, we have to work on several fronts. The major contribution made by Operation Enduring Freedom in the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban is to be commended. The efforts of the international community to build the Afghan national army are important. The role of the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in stabilizing the region is essential. The contribution of Japan and other countries to DDR is vital to the stability of Afghanistan.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“Mr. Guehenno: Let me say how pleased we are that so many delegations have stressed the importance of security for Afghanistan. Security has many facets in Afghanistan, and I would like to clarify that, indeed, the threats of Al Qaeda and the Taliban remain a great source of concern. We have seen the effects of such threats on our staff. I would like to clarify that when we talk about extremist elements, we indeed refer to such elements as Al Qaeda and the Taliban. It is unfortunately also clear that security in Afghanistan has many facets and that dealing with the question of factionalism, to which I referred again in today's briefing, is also important for the stabilization of the country. The unfortunate events in Herat, to which I referred, are an illustration of the dangers of factionalism for peaceful elections.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“Therefore, I wish to join the voice of the United Nations to President Karzai's recent appeal to NATO and the coalition to increase deployment of international forces in order to help the Afghan Government fulfil its commitment to hold free and fair elections. These elections will demonstrate the international community's solidarity, which thus far has been evident in support of Afghanistan. Let us not forget that we will judged by the quality of the outcome.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“By June the newly trained units of the Ministry of the Interior could be deployed in larger numbers to help create an environment that is more conducive to the free operation of parties and independent candidates. The provincial reconstruction teams are also expected to continue to play a positive role in facilitating DDR operations and deterring interference. Nevertheless, the Afghan and international security forces currently deployed in Afghanistan have limited capacity, and they will be overextended if they have to assume the immense task of supporting a credible election process that is acceptable to all.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“This disarmament process will also be in keeping with the legal requirements of the new political party law, which mandates the clear separation of political formations from their military wings as a precondition for their participation in the electoral process. In that context, I would like once again to underscore the need for adequate international security assistance to support the efforts of the Afghan Government in the electoral process and to protect that process from both factional threats and attempts to simply terminate it. The Afghan national army will be able, we all hope, to become actively involved in deterring all factional violence, as it is doing now in Herat, and to ensure the monitoring of heavy weapons cantonment, as it is doing today in Mazar-e-Sharif.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“(spoke in French) Without substantial improvements in the security situation, the elections will be threatened. The work plan provides for the intensification of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) efforts to encompass 40 per cent of current militia and the cantonment of all heavy weapons by this June. Success in DDR programmes will depend to a great degree on the leadership of the Afghan Government. It is now absolutely vital that that goal be achieved. This has indeed been a long-standing priority project, and progress made towards its achievement will boost the Government's authority and legitimacy and that of all political leaders who have committed themselves to its success.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“At the request of the Government of Afghanistan, we are prepared, jointly with the Afghan Human Rights Commission, to monitor closely the implementation of political rights across the country in the hope that this will increase opportunities and incentives to achieve these benchmarks. However, the vast majority of Afghans remain convinced, above all, that elections require prior disarmament. The fighting that broke out in Herat two weeks ago underscores the threat that factional rivalries pose to the exercise of credible, free and fair elections. If factional military forces continue to be a dominating feature of the political scene, they are bound to curtail the political liberties necessary for truly civilian politics and a credible election. They must not be allowed to do so.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“While not downplaying the importance of those challenges, I would nevertheless like to stress here the very pressing, short-term demands that now face the country if Afghanistan is to achieve the next stage of the Bonn process - that is, national elections. As Mr. Arnault said in Berlin, the response to the registration process so far provides evidence of the Afghans' strong desire to participate in the political process. In the work plan annexed to the Berlin declaration, the Government has agreed to take a number of steps to help ensure freedom of expression and political organization, a level playing field for political parties and their candidates, a neutral civil service and military, freedom of the press and equal access to it.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“That is a clear reminder of how far Afghanistan has to go, of how important the timely disbursement of pledges can be, and of the amount of work that the Afghan Government must do to ensure that even those very meagre expectations of a peace dividend are met. The conference also highlighted the challenge of combating what the Secretary-General has called the rising tide of the drugs economy. Opium production in Afghanistan in 2003, estimated at 3,600 tonnes produced on 80,000 hectares, will represent a further increase above the already high 2002 figure - a figure that generated an income equivalent to over half of Afghanistan's national income. Turning back this tide will take a concerted effort, as well as patience, but the immediate efforts of the Afghan Government on the eradication front must also be supported.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“The importance of raising the remaining funds required should not be underestimated, however. We hope that this early generosity also implies that donors recognize that the rest of the funding must be found soon if the tight electoral time frames are to be met. The achievements that I have mentioned are truly impressive. However, their full impact will be felt only if we capitalize on the momentum of Berlin to ensure that the peace process receives the support it needs. The tasks still facing Afghanistan remain daunting. I will not elaborate here on the huge challenges on the reconstruction and development front, except to stress, as some of my colleagues did in Berlin, that the ambitious level of growth and assistance sought by the Afghan Government would still deliver a per capita income of only $500 by 2015.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“That agreement expresses the resolve of the region to combat the terrible threat that drug trafficking poses to Afghanistan, its neighbours and the world beyond. In the margins of the intergovernmental conference, two other important meetings were held. A meeting of Afghan civil society members provided a set of useful recommendations to the Afghan Government. A donor meeting for the elections was also held at which donors provided pledges of some $68 million, against the needs of some $135 million, for the presidential and parliamentary elections to be held in September in Afghanistan and for the refugee communities in Pakistan and Iran. This result is significant in that it provides sufficient funds for critical start-up costs and procurement for electoral activities.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“Above all, that generosity suggests a level of continuing donor confidence in Afghanistan that is a credit to President Karzai's leadership and his Government's effective handling of the funds committed so far. The conference also approved a comprehensive work plan, annexed to the declaration, providing us all with a blueprint for international cooperation with the Afghan Government. The work plan, endorsed by the Afghan Cabinet, provides clear benchmarks and targets to be met in the political, security and economic spheres over the coming months and years. Also agreed in Berlin was a strong framework for regional cooperation in countering narcotics by Afghanistan and its neighbours.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“The presence in Berlin of some 25 ministers and numerous other high-ranking Government officials is a clear signal of the international community's continuing resolve to assist the Afghan Government and see the peace process through to its completion, to a point when peace and stability are firmly established and economic development is on track. The Berlin declaration, adopted by the participants, provides a clear statement of vision for this remarkable partnership, and the proof of it was clearly offered by the very generous pledges that the Government received. The $4.4 billion committed for the current fiscal year was over 100 per cent of the amount that had been sought, and the $8.2 billion committed for three years represented 69 per cent of the funds requested for that period by the Ministry of Finance.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“Jean Arnault, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and we in the Secretariat are extremely grateful for the very effective collaboration that we enjoyed with our co-Chairs - the Afghan Government, Germany and Japan - at all levels. The achievements of the conference are numerous, and I do not want to steal the thunder of the Permanent Representative of Germany by detailing them all. However, I believe that the conference reasserted the unity of purpose and long-term commitment that have been a hallmark of the international community's engagement in Afghanistan.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“Mr. Guehenno: In the light of the very successful conference on Afghanistan held last week in Berlin, it is fitting that the Security Council should take stock of what was achieved at the conference and what now lies before us in terms of capitalizing on the momentum gained in Berlin to complete the Bonn process successfully. First, let me reiterate our deep thanks to the German Government for the outstanding preparation and organization that went into the holding of the conference. The leadership of the German Government in putting the conference together was absolutely critical to its success. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Mr.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“The support of the Council will be of critical importance in reminding the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the High Representative has just said, of the scope and nature of Bosnia and Herzegovina's international obligations to implement the IPTF's decisions.”
2004-03-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4920 (2004) · source
“Unfortunately, neither our support nor the actions of the High Representative have been sufficient so far to resolve that question. The courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as we were just reminded, have ordered the reinstatement of at least one former officer deemed unsuitable to serve the people of that country. As a result, and at the request of the High Representative, legal experts from the United Nations and international agencies operating in Sarajevo, including the Office of the High Representative, have been engaged in discussions to identify a workable course of action.”
2004-03-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4920 (2004) · source
“It is indeed important to recall that the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina were and remain under an obligation, which is binding under international law, to give effect to those decisions. I would like to take this opportunity to confirm that the United Nations Secretariat very much shares Lord Ashdown's view on the political importance of the challenges to the outcomes of the vetting process. We also firmly endorse his view on the need for an early solution. To that end, while the United Nations no longer has a mandate to act in the area of police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we have sought to provide every form of assistance to Lord Ashdown since he first brought those challenges to our attention last year.”
2004-03-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4920 (2004) · source
“Mr. Guehenno: I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for giving me this opportunity to express full support for what the High Representative just said, specifically with respect to ongoing efforts by former police officers in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be reinstated by the courts. Those police officers had been deemed unsuitable to serve in the police force of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Commissioner of the International Police Task Force (IPTF). Let me recall that the Commissioner's decisions followed an exhaustive two-year vetting process undertaken in accordance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace, resolutions of the Security Council and the decisions of the Madrid meeting of the Peace Implementation Council.”
2004-03-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4920 (2004) · source
“It is our hope that the Security Council will give the fullest consideration to the proposals outlined in the Secretary-General's report. Those proposals represent a modest additional effort as compared to what has already been done, but we believe that they could play a decisive role in consolidating all that has been achieved so far.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“In a number of areas, the decisions and actions taken by the Timorese political leadership will be crucial to the validity of these proposals, as is noted in the report. The Secretariat therefore intends to provide an additional report before the end of the present mandate that will update and fully inform the Council so that it can take its decisions accordingly. It is doubtful whether any nation has ever advanced as rapidly as Timor-Leste along the path to self-sufficiency. This has permitted a swift downsizing in the international presence, as reflected in the charts attached to the Secretary-General's report. Clearly this illustrates the dynamic which underlies the transfer of responsibility to the authorities of Timor-Leste. Nonetheless, there are always limits to what can be achieved in so short a period of time.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“It is our hope that the proposals put forward today will assist in achieving consensus on those tasks which the United Nations Mission will be able effectively to carry out after 20 May 2004, and on the best way to do so, on the basis of the report and in a manner that meets with the full support of the host country. The Security Council's ultimate decisions on support to Timor-Leste after 20 May 2004 will need to take into account developments on the ground between now - that is, mid-February - and May. There may be changes in the security situation, progress in the development of Timorese capability, and additional provisions relating to bilateral assistance from which Timor-Leste could benefit.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“In extremis, it could help Timorese security agencies to respond to security threats by providing support in such areas as logistics, transportation, communications and information, in regard to which they will certainly require assistance for the next 12 months. (spoke in French) Member States have shown their keen and shared desire to continue to provide effective assistance to Timor-Leste. However, there are a number of different ideas on how best to do so. That is why we have submitted this report well in advance of the time when the Security Council must take its decision, on 20 May 2004.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“Its primary role would be to provide security, protection and extraction for United Nations personnel - in particular our military liaison officers, but also police and civilians. At the same time, that presence would help respond to the priority goal of the Timorese leadership, as conveyed in Prime Minister Alkatiri's letter to the Secretary-General, that a continued international military presence be provided to promote calm at a time of potential volatility. By maintaining a high level of visibility through regular patrols and civil-military cooperation, that component could help limit the destabilizing effect of too abrupt a downsizing exercise.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“The requirement for their presence could be reviewed in December, against progress in border arrangements and the development of necessary Timorese capacity. This proposal brings an additional requirement - the need to incorporate a realistic strategy for the protection of those officers who will deploy, unarmed, in an uncertain environment in which local response capacity is still limited. It is our responsibility as managers to measure very carefully the risks faced by the men and women provided by our Member States; the importance of appropriate precautions has been all too clearly demonstrated over the past year. In this context, it is proposed that a small formed military presence, with aviation and support, be retained after May 2004; this component would number 308 personnel in total.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“While the Border Patrol Unit has assumed its responsibilities, and while the Timorese armed forces (F-FDTL) have continued to develop, both institutions remain thinly stretched, and further clarification of their responsibilities is essential. In addition, the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Service remains considerably behind schedule. In this context, an essential role continues to be played by military observers, who are monitoring developments within a potentially volatile area and are supporting close relationships between Timorese and Indonesian border personnel. It is therefore recommended that a small group of 42 military liaison officers could be retained along the border to discharge similar functions for a further year after 20 May 2004.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“At the same time, it is urgent that the leadership of Timor-Leste develop the necessary legislative and policy frameworks, which will clarify the basis for cooperation between the armed forces and the police, in particular with regard to back-up in the case of civil disturbance. Finally, progress in the area of external security and border control has benefited greatly from the statesmanlike commitment that has been shown by the Indonesian and Timorese leadership. However, agreement on the border and on practical arrangements for its management has not yet been reached, and the potential for tensions or destabilizing actions remains within communities in the western districts. At the same time, the creation of structures and relationships on the ground requires further time.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“However, the Timorese leadership has indicated its strong preference for the exercise of full executive authority in policing after May 2004, and it would be logical that operational responsibilities in this area, as in others, be undertaken by Timorese forces, in order to preserve a single line of command. We undertook an extensive review of the capacity of the Timorese anti-riot unit and concluded that its preparation should be adequate by 20 May 2004. For those reasons, we concluded that the better course would be to redouble our training efforts through the end of the current mandate and to retain an advisory presence after that date.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“International assistance will remain crucial for a further 12 months after 20 May 2004 to ensure the police service's effective functioning and to reinforce professional values and skills. As reflected, this would be based upon the continued deployment of 157 civilian police advisers after May - down from the current figure of 200 - with staffing requirements to be reviewed by the end of the year. Further adjustments should also be possible to accommodate bilateral assistance that materializes on the ground before the end of April, when our proposals will be finalized. We also gave extensive consideration to the possibility of UNMISET's retaining an operational role in responding to civil disturbance. We share the analysis of some Member States that such problems could indeed occur.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“Today - just 21 months later - the Timorese police force, now numbering 3,024, has assumed responsibility for all daily, routine patrolling throughout the country. That includes the assumption of responsibilities along the border area, where they are playing a key role under difficult circumstances. The United Nations has retained daily operational responsibilities only in the area of crowd control, in order to afford the Timorese riot unit the time it requires to undergo additional intensive training before 20 May 2004. As reflected in the report, the international police contingent now includes only this 125-officer formed police unit and approximately 200 officers who are advising and discharging residual headquarters functions. For all the progress that has been achieved, the creation of law enforcement agencies takes time.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“I would like also to note that, as indicated in the Secretary-General's report, the great majority of those who have been indicted remain outside the country. Close cooperation among Member States will be essential to ensure that all those who are responsible are brought to justice. Turning to UNMISET's programme in support of internal security and law enforcement, the establishment of an effective and professional police force has been, and remains, a core objective of the United Nations involvement in Timor-Leste. It is also an area where, despite inevitable frustrations at the complexity of the task, notable progress has been achieved. When UNMISET began, approximately 1,800 Timorese police officers had been trained and deployed, and the contingent of 1,250 United Nations police had responsibility for all executive policing functions.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“However, as indicated in the Secretary-General's report, a number of trials will remain pending by 20 May 2004 and further indictments are in the process of preparation, including those related to the killing of two local United Nations staff. Continued international assistance is crucial for this process, which gives expression to the Security Council's determination that such crimes will not be perpetrated with impunity and helps to reduce the risk of tensions among the Timorese population, while strengthening confidence in the justice system. The support we have proposed will permit completion of serious crimes cases at the trial level and progress at the appellate level, in particular with relation to the 10 priority cases.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“The Government has launched an intensive discussion on means to ensure a smooth transition after that assistance ended. The recommendations to the Security Council in support of the conduct of serious crimes investigations and proceedings would allow progress in an area where much has already been done. As reflected in the Secretary-General's report, 81 indictments have now been issued, with 369 indictees. A total of 48 convictions have resulted - two having been issued in the past two weeks - as well as one acquittal. Thirteen of these were related to the 10 priority cases, while trials with regard to two further priority cases are ongoing and are expected to conclude by May 2004.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“We believe that this additional year of support would make a meaningful difference in enabling the country to reach the threshold of self-sufficiency. However, for the reasons that I mentioned, there are real limits to what can be achieved, and some further long-term assistance may be required even after this period. For that reason, the responsibilities of civilian advisers will include the identification of alternative solutions by which to continue support, if that remains necessary after this year has ended. Already, since the report was issued, the Government has convened a workshop with UNMISET and development partners where it presented plans based on the clear understanding that those advisers, if approved, would conclude their assignment in May 2005.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“Skills have increased steadily, and civil servants are effectively discharging many functions on a daily basis. But as recognized in the Secretary-General's report, further assistance is crucial for two broad reasons. First, it is necessary to support the continued development of Timorese capacities and to ensure the country's functioning during that process. This is particularly urgent in those areas that are critical to long- and short-term stability, such as the Ministries of Finance and the Interior, the Office of the Secretary for Defence and the justice system. Secondly, preparation of civil service legislation has barely begun. International assistance is crucial for the formulation of the policy and legislative frameworks that will provide secure foundations for the country's future development.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source