YouSaid · the spoken record

Guehenno

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2000-11-14
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2011-05-12
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58
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un-security-council

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  1. Ultimately, a strategic decision on the part of the Government of the Sudan is necessary if we are to achieve our common goal: peace and security in Darfur and, indeed, in all of the Sudan. Should the anticipated discussions fail to clear the path for the deployment of an effective force, the international community will be confronted with hard choices: do we move ahead with the deployment of a force that will not make a difference, that will not have the capability to defend itself and that carries the risk of humiliation of the Security Council and the United Nations and tragic failure for the people of Darfur? Five months ago in Khartoum, the Council received President Bashir's agreement on African Union-United Nations plans for a peacekeeping operation in Darfur without preconditions.

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  2. There are privileges and immunities associated with the wearing of the blue beret and United Nations insignia that are simply non-negotiable to troop-contributing countries. In order to overcome the current uncertainty, the Secretary-General is discussing with Chairperson Konare how to further engage the Sudanese authorities at the strategic level. Extensive and detailed technical explanations have been provided repeatedly, including at a high level, to the Government of the Sudan, and the remaining - and fundamental - differences cannot be attributed to a lack of consultations. That is why the Secretary-General is also reiterating his appeal to Council members and key regional leaders to make additional concerted efforts to persuade the Sudanese authorities to support the deployment of an effective UNAMID force.

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  3. The Council will appreciate what such provisions would do to the ability of a force commander to respond to an unforeseen crisis that required rapid and robust action in defence of civilians. We were also surprised to see remarks in the media in which the Sudanese Government revisited the question of UNAMID accoutrement. That issue was discussed with the Sudanese Foreign Minister when the Council visited the Sudan in June 2006, with the clear request that the Mission's accoutrement would be determined on the basis of the 5 June 2007 joint AU-UN report on the Hybrid Operation. On that basis, we have been making preparations for United Nations personnel to wear a blue beret with a United Nations insignia and an AU patch on their sleeve to reflect the joint nature of the operation.

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  4. The Government's text includes proposals that, our experience has shown us, would make it impossible for the mission to operate, in particular with regard to freedom of movement of personnel and the integrity of its communications. While this is not the forum for a detailed discussion of the document, it is useful to note that the Sudanese text includes a provision for the Government to "temporarily disable the communications network" in case of security operations by the Government in exercise of its sovereign rights. There is also a proposal requiring UNAMID to provide "advance notification to the Government for all staff, troop and asset movements related to UNAMID".

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  5. If the Government does not immediately give us the land we need, we will have to hold back some units. Moreover, local authorities in El Obeid have asked UNAMID to stop using the El Obeid logistics base because "it was created to serve the United Nations Mission in the Sudan". As the Council is also aware, we are in the process of negotiating a status-of-forces agreement with the Sudan. On 2 November, we transmitted to the Government a draft agreement that had been agreed with the African Union and was based on the model status-of-forces agreement approved by the General Assembly. On 13 November, we received an alternative text from the Government.

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  6. The speedy and effective deployment of UNAMID also depends on the Government's cooperation with regard to facilitating the acquisition of land and flight operations rights for United Nations aircraft. Joint Special Representative Adada has informed us that he has still not been able to obtain the authorization of the Sudanese Civil Aviation Authority for the deployment of six helicopters to El Fasher. UNAMID has also not been given permission to fly at night. But the mandate to protect civilians does not end at sunset. The mission has still not received land in El Geneina and Zalingei, and the Government has impounded UNAMID communications equipment at the El Fasher airport for weeks. The land issue is particularly critical, since units are beginning to deploy.

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  7. In the meantime, all other ongoing preparations continue, including pre-deployment visits. As Council members are aware, it is critical that, once identified, all troop-contributing countries initiate preparations for deployment as rapidly as possible. Every delay or suspension of pre-deployment activity will have a direct and negative impact on the readiness of troops to deploy to UNAMID in the early stages of 2008. It is in that context that we are deeply concerned by public remarks being made by Sudanese Government officials calling into question the African Union-United Nations approach in finalizing force composition. Those remarks, particularly in the absence of a formal response from the Government on this issue, create serious uncertainty with regard to the Government's commitment to the deployment of UNAMID.

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  8. Following my discussions with the Government, a special task force, led by the DPKO Military Adviser, travelled to Cairo and Addis Ababa from 19 to 22 November to ascertain the possibility of accelerating the deployment of the Egyptian and Ethiopian battalions selected for UNAMID. We were pleased to receive the confirmation of the Governments of Egypt and Ethiopia as to the availability and readiness of their respective battalions to deploy as early as possible following the transfer of authority, beginning with the deployment of advance elements in January 2008. Reconnaissance operations by both countries will take place in the first half of December: Ethiopia from 1 to 6 December, Egypt from 8 to 13 December. Their actual deployment, however, will also require accelerated logistics and airlift preparations.

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  9. And finally, the Nordic offer of a composite engineering unit gives UNAMID critical capabilities to set up the mission logistically and enable other units to come in, particularly those with less than ideal self- sustainability. We had planned for the unit to deploy as early as possible in January, and, once it provides this early impact, it will be drawn down over the latter part of 2008. It is a surge-enabling capacity to launch the mission effectively. Its exclusion would present a serious loss for UNAMID's ability to establish and consolidate its presence quickly in an area as vast as Darfur. That said, together with the African Union, we have made a sincere effort to address the Sudanese concerns related to the perception of the force.

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  10. As I informed the Council in my briefing on 14 November, there are no alternatives for the inclusion of the non-African units. First, the Thai battalion - well-trained and fully equipped - was selected based on its readiness to deploy to Darfur in early January. It will be essential for UNAMID to have an effective deterrent and self-defence capacity as close to the transfer of authority as possible. On that basis, the battalion must absolutely be retained. Secondly, Nepal is the only country to have offered a special forces company for the overall UNAMID force reserve, a vital element which allows a robust reserve response to threats against the mission. The Haskanita incident highlights that need.

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  11. We believe that the troop-contributing countries which have been identified and the package transmitted to the Government of the Sudan are, under the political constraints we have had to address, best positioned to undertake the arduous peacekeeping work which lies ahead in Darfur. While we have not received a direct response, the Government has made clear, and made public, its reluctance to accept certain non-African units in the force, citing concerns regarding the maintenance of public perceptions of the African character of the force as well as an inability to provide security guarantees to certain non-African elements. Three units in particular have been singled out: the infantry battalion from Thailand, the force reserve/special forces and sector reserve companies from Nepal and the Nordic engineering company.

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  12. In identifying troop contributors we have therefore focused on ensuring that they have the required capabilities and are able to deploy in a timely manner. We have also sought to assemble a balanced force, which would unquestionably meet the African character criterion referred to in resolution 1769 (2007) and whose impartiality would be beyond reproach, whether it is from the rebels' perspective or that of the Government of the Sudan. From among the pledges we have received, the African Union and the United Nations put together a list in accordance with those priorities and transmitted it to the Government of the Sudan on 2 October.

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  13. But more troops will not replace military aviation, and they would also require more logistic support, more land and more water and would likely not appear in Darfur until late 2008. Another suboptimal last-resort measure would be - if I may use the word - to "borrow" those capabilities from other missions. While we are taking all options into account in making contingency plans, it is important to stress that our initial plans reflected minimum requirements and do not allow for such flexibility. As the Council is aware, it has been our highest priority to assemble a force which is able to implement the mission's mandate and in so doing to protect the people of Darfur and indeed to protect itself.

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  14. (spoke in English) Nevertheless, we are facing serious gaps in UNAMID force requirements in spite of our best efforts, including by the Secretary-General himself. Five weeks before the transfer of authority, UNAMID is still short of critical mobility capabilities: one heavy and one medium transport unit, three military utility aviation units - that is 18 helicopters - and one light tactical helicopter unit - that is six helicopters. In addition, as a result of pre-deployment visits, pledges for one reconnaissance company were withdrawn; consequently, the gap in capability has grown since my last briefing. If no appropriate offers for those missing units are identified by early 2008, it may become necessary to revert to the Council to consider options to mitigate the lack of air mobility. That may require an increase in troops.

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  15. We also expect the Police Commissioner and one of his Deputies, the Military Chief of Staff of General Agwai, all Sector Commanders and Deputy Sector Commanders, the Deputy Chief of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), as well as some 75 per cent of all staff officer positions serving in the Force and Sector headquarters to be deployed by the end of December. Finally, and pending the provision of the final load lists that accompany the deployments, including logistics and airlift preparations, the deployment of the following heavy support package units is scheduled to commence in January 2008: the main body of the Chinese engineering unit, the Multi- 6 Role Logistics Unit and Sector Reserve Company from Bangladesh and the Level II hospital from Nigeria.

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  16. Since the report was submitted, the first elements of the heavy support package for AMIS have been deployed to Darfur: the l40-strong Formed Police Unit from Bangladesh arrived in Nyala on 21 November and an advance party of 135 personnel from the Chinese engineering unit arrived in Nyala on 24 November. These deployments are encouraging and we expect the advance party of a second Formed Police Unit from Nepal to arrive in the mission area on 15 December, followed by its main body on 7 January. Approximately 100 individual police officers will arrive in December, in addition to the 56 already deployed.

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  17. A summary of preparations for the transfer of authority from the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) to UNAMID was presented in the Secretary- General's most recent monthly report (S/2007/653), which reflects our efforts in a number of areas, including the establishment of initial operating capability for UNAMID headquarters, completion of staffing for the Interim Force and Police Headquarters, the shift to a three-sector structure, the appointment and deployment of senior leadership and the ongoing logistical arrangements required to support UNAMID personnel.

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  18. Secondly, the deployment of UNAMID is facing fundamental challenges in the areas of force generation, the final identification of the force composition and a number of bureaucratic impediments. I would like to focus my remarks today on the ongoing actions to address these issues and to highlight the implications of any failure to address them in a timely fashion. I would also like to apprise the Council of the challenges we must address in our discussions with the Government of the Sudan on the negotiations of the UNAMID status-of-forces agreement.

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  19. We are at a crossroads in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) deployment process. Many of the issues are familiar, and they continue to be extremely sensitive. First among them is of course the security and humanitarian situation on the ground, which remains very worrying, as was just described by Mr. Eliasson. Joint Special Representative Adada and Force Commander General Agwai are involved in intensive discussions with the Government to address the situation in the Kalma camp. It is critical to ensure that the disarmament of that camp complies with international humanitarian standards since it will set a precedent for securing other camps in Darfur.

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

  20. If we are to be effective in implementing that resolution, it is crucial that we share a common understanding of the factors that affect the role of women and their capacity to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security. We must also commit to identifying ways in which our different roles at the national and international levels can link together in an integrated and effective manner. Only together can we truly ensure the protection and empowerment of women in conflict.

    2007-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5766 (2007) · source

  21. That in turn requires laws that incorporate women's rights and a judicial system accessible to victims of sexual violence. While it is the national Government's responsibility to ensure such accessibility, our missions have a role to play - as defined in their mandates - in monitoring remaining obstacles to women's access and in developing capacity-building programmes for human rights and judicial institutions. (spoke in English) Combating sexual violence requires a multiplicity of actors carrying out a multiplicity of actions in coordination and in coherence. I would urge that this approach be applied across the range of actions envisaged in resolution 1325 (2000).

    2007-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5766 (2007) · source

  22. As part of our efforts to address discrimination against women, we must clearly stress the assignment of women to senior civilian positions, as I noted, as well as to military and policing posts, so as to encourage local women in the countries where we are deployed to assume lead roles and to promote the development of a non-discriminatory system once the mission leaves. One example I would note is that the Liberian National Police received three times the usual number of female applicants in the month following the deployment of the Indian all-female police contingent to which I referred earlier. More women in a police force must be accompanied by a strategy to improve policing as a service equally accessible to women.

    2007-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5766 (2007) · source

  23. The fourth element of an effective and comprehensive strategy is the role our missions can play in facilitating and assisting national efforts to reform institutionally discriminatory structures, including rule of law institutions and the legal framework, in States where we have a presence. Such efforts appropriately reflect the impact of such structures in perpetuating sexual violence by ignoring them. In addition, those efforts underscore the fact that a coherent strategy to combat sexual violence must incorporate a thoughtful understanding of sexual violence in conflicts. If there is no such understanding of the problem, there can be no effective campaign against it. It is therefore a question of addressing the issue both in the short term and in the long term if we truly seek to resolve it.

    2007-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5766 (2007) · source

  24. At the same time, I know that we should not overstate the protection we can provide and that, even where each person protected represents a victory over the horror of sexual violence, we must be aware that the protection we offer will always be limited. When I think of our future deployment to Darfur, I am well aware that the reinforcement of troops there and the deployment of Blue Berets alone will not bring an end to sexual violence and the terrible crime of rape, given the extent of the territory to be covered, and that we will have to take action on all fronts in the fight against sexual violence and abuse. We cannot rely exclusively on military protection.

    2007-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5766 (2007) · source

  25. I have no doubt that, with the backing of the Council and interested Member States, special representatives can play a very important and decisive role in their advocacy, dialogue and good offices with the host countries and Governments concerned. Thirdly, our missions can play a key role in providing preventive physical protection, for example, through their daily patrols. Such actions should be coordinated with preventive and victim's assistance programmes, including those carried out by other mission components, such as the United Nations country team, national actors and non-governmental organizations. In some locations in which we are deployed, such modest patrols can make the difference between life and death and act as a deterrent to rape, abductions and other forms of torture.

    2007-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5766 (2007) · source

  26. (spoke in French) Sitting here today, I wish to stress that a first element of an effective strategy is the importance that the Security Council attaches to both understanding the impact of sexual violence on the maintenance of peace and security and to ensuring that the mandates and resources given to peacekeeping missions take into account the tragic situations faced by women and girls who suffer in conflicts and that they provide for the protection of civilians, including the special needs of women and girls. The second element of an effective strategy is the political leadership of the United Nations, through the special representatives of the Secretary-General on the ground, in eliminating sexual violence.

    2007-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5766 (2007) · source

  27. While rape is used as a weapon of war in situations such as those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Darfur, addressing that war crime requires going beyond political compromise and power- and resource-sharing agreements. Instead, combating rape and other forms of sexual violence calls for concerted, robust and ongoing action on the part of national actors and the international community alike at every level of engagement.

    2007-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5766 (2007) · source

  28. 07-55817 If we look, for example, at the range of interventions necessary to address rape and other forms of sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations, it becomes clear how pressing is the need for such a concerted and integrated approach. Though DPKO is committed to combating sexual violence, we can start to truly address it in the field only with the help of the national authorities, the United Nations country team, and bilateral and non-governmental organization partners. The need for a truly United Nations-wide approach to that underscores the need for a strengthened United Nations gender architecture, as recommended by the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence.

    2007-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5766 (2007) · source

  29. I would suggest, however, that it is time to review that fragmented and disparate approach to the implementation of the resolution. We know that resolving conflict requires a multifaceted and interlinked approach. If we are therefore to empower women in that process, our efforts will also have to be integrated. Coherent and effective implementation first requires that we more fully understand the relationship between protection and empowerment in all their aspects, as set forth in the resolution, and that we understand how that affects the role and contribution of women to the maintenance of peace and security. Strategies must thereafter be developed that incorporate a range of mutually reinforcing and coordinated activities aimed at the full implementation of the resolution.

    2007-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5766 (2007) · source

  30. There are currently several related policies before the General Assembly for consideration, including one on assistance to the victims of alleged abuses by United Nations personnel. In addition, earlier this year, DPKO adopted a welfare and recreation policy. It has also provided for guidance on the design and implementation of welfare and recreation measures and facilities to improve the wellness and the working and living conditions of all United Nations peacekeeping personnel. The theme of today's debate is "Towards coherent and effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2005)". In the past seven years our strategy has been to focus on the implementation of the individual parts of the resolution. To that end, we have indeed made progress in the implementation of our responsibilities.

    2007-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5766 (2007) · source

  31. I should also like to draw the attention of the Council to the composition of the new standing police capacity, nearly 25 per cent of which is female. I recognize that we still have far to go in expanding the role and contribution of women in our operations. Nonetheless, the momentum towards achieving greater balance is building. I again urge Member States to work closely with us in putting forward suitably qualified female candidates ready and willing to serve in peacekeeping operations. Most importantly, in the context of this debate, I would like to reiterate our ongoing implementation of zero tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse that may have been committed by United Nations personnel. We have continued to take significant measures and have deployed additional resources to address sexual exploitation.

    2007-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5766 (2007) · source

  32. Since February, the number of women serving in senior civilian positions has increased by almost 40 per cent. As the Council is aware, last week, Ms. Margrethe Lszsj was appointed as Special Representative of the Secretary-General to lead the United Nations Mission in Liberia, along with Ms. Henrietta Mensah-Bonsu as Deputy for Operations and the Rule of Law. Female deputy heads of Mission were also recently appointed in the Sudan - where, Ms. Ameerah Haq was named the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Humanitarian Coordinator and Resident Coordinator - and in Burundi, where Ms. Bintou Keita was appointed as the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General. I am particularly pleased at the appointment of Commissioner Agatha Lele as Senior Police Adviser in Burundi.

    2007-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5766 (2007) · source

  33. That included the upgrading of the post of gender adviser to the P-5 level, as a reflection of the skills and experience required to lead the team's work in backstopping and providing policy advice to the field and all divisions and offices within DPKO and the Department of Field Support. Similarly, as I have mentioned to the Council before, we are committed to increasing the number of women serving in the field in civilian leadership positions and in operational military and police roles. The Secretariat has therefore taken concrete steps to strengthen its capacity to identify suitably qualified senior women, including through the establishment within the Department of Field Support of a small dedicated capacity focused on senior leadership appointments.

    2007-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5766 (2007) · source

  34. Both Departments at Headquarters continue to oversee the joint DPKO-Department of Field Support action plan on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) through the interdepartmental task force on gender. Such task forces are also being replicated in the missions, with the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) having most recently re-established its gender task force in August, in order to further strengthen its gender mainstreaming across all sections of the mission. The gender team at Headquarters has been bolstered through the recent realignment process.

    2007-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5766 (2007) · source

  35. In turn, January saw the deployment, for the first time, of an all-female police contingent to a United Nations peacekeeping operation, when an Indian formed police unit took up duties with the United Nations Mission in Liberia. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) also continued to take steps to implement resolution 1325 (2000) in the past year. Last November, DPKO adopted a policy directive on gender equality in United Nations peacekeeping operations that obliges all uniformed and civilian staff to ensure the equal participation of women, men, girls and boys in all peacekeeping activities. DPKO and the Department of Field Support are now translating that policy into action, including through the development 3 of initiatives such as guidelines for political affairs officers on how to mainstream gender in their work.

    2007-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5766 (2007) · source

  36. Mr. Guehenno: I am very pleased to be able to brief the Council once again at this year's open debate on resolution 1325 (2000), on women, peace and security. In 2007, we have seen a number of significant advances in the contribution of women to the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding. Some of those advances have taken place in countries in which peacekeeping operations are deployed and also represent initiatives in how the United Nations goes about peacekeeping. For instance, in Haiti's municipal election this year, 25 women were elected mayors, as compared to six in 2000. That was due, in part, to the collaboration of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti with national partners to provide coaching for female candidates.

    2007-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5766 (2007) · source

  37. We are grateful for the Security Council's steadfast support for a settlement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has been demonstrated, among other things, by the Council's numerous visits to the country. We trust that the Security Council will remain actively involved in reinforcing and consolidating the input of the many bilateral and multilateral actors.

    2007-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5616 (2007) · source

  38. Early disengagement following elections elsewhere resulted in the resumption of conflict a few years later, requiring a new, costlier international intervention. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the natural, yet still developing, pole of stability in the troubled region of Central Africa. The resolution of the crisis in that country will benefit Africa more than solving any other of the continent's current conflicts. Moreover, if Africa's worst conflict can be overcome, then other conflicts can be overcome as well. We are confident that our partnership with the European Union and other stakeholders will serve this strategic goal.

    2007-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5616 (2007) · source

  39. The Government will continue to be assisted in rebuilding a State free from corruption that ensures the rule of law and good governance, protects human rights and civil liberties, encourages participation and pluralism, conducts major security sector reform and is committed to reducing poverty. The continued engagement of the international community is also required to help the Democratic Republic of the Congo complete a comprehensive electoral process, with local elections due in the second half of this year. We are looking forward to close cooperation with the European Union and other parties on all these fronts. The achievements of the Democratic Republic of the Congo will be at risk if the international community, or the Congolese people, repeat some of our past mistakes.

    2007-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5616 (2007) · source

  40. We welcome the progress achieved at the summit meeting of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, which took place on 14 and 15 December in Nairobi, and we look forward to the implementation of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, which will no doubt assist in further stabilizing the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi. MONUC stands ready to support the newly elected Government as it begins to address the many challenges facing the country, including completing the transitional agenda and implementing the provisions of the new constitution, particularly in regard to strengthening national unity, fostering the democratic process and embarking on a comprehensive governance reform agenda.

    2007-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5616 (2007) · source

  41. MONUC continues to encourage the Government to find a peaceful and comprehensive solution that will address the causes of this still- simmering conflict in the eastern part of the country, and in that connection has facilitated the establishment of working groups to implement the agreements reached, with a view to resolving the underlying issues. In Ituri, a new ceasefire between the FARDC and the National Integrationist Front, led by Peter Karim, was agreed upon on 2 January after fighting had broken out near the town of Fataki at the end of December. The situation remains very tense, with the United Nations conducting robust operations in support of Government troops.

    2007-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5616 (2007) · source

  42. In the meantime, fighting between the Forces Armees de la Republic Democratic du Congo (FARDC) and the renegade forces of Laurent Nkunda in North Kivu has subsided over the last few days, and discussions, with the assistance of the United Nations, are being held between representatives of both sides. While the situation is still volatile, the Government of Rwanda reported that it was facilitating discussions between representatives of the FARDC and the Nkunda group in Kigali. On 4 January, an agreement was reached in principle to form mixed FARDC brigades by merging the Nkunda forces with other soldiers presently deployed in North Kivu.

    2007-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5616 (2007) · source

  43. The events of the last few months have produced a new positive dynamic in the country. On the 30 December, President Kabila appointed Mr. Antoine Gizenga, former presidential candidate in the first round of the elections, as Prime Minister. Mr. Gizenga is currently consulting on the formation of a Government, which is expected to be completed this month. At the end of December, the National Assembly elected Mr. Vital Kamerhe as President of the National Assembly, along with six other members of the National Assembly bureau. All seven are members of President Kabila's Alliance for the Presidential Majority.

    2007-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5616 (2007) · source

  44. All international partners should take great pride in having supported the Congolese people and its institutions in successfully passing this milestone. MONUC has been the largest and most expensive United Nations peacekeeping operations in the world, with thousands of troops and over 100 aircraft. Five peace accords involving African countries, more than 35 Security Council resolutions, African Union and Southern African Development Community involvement, $500 million in international electoral funding and strong support from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have all contributed to the success of the peace process. The European Union in particular has played a crucial role at several critical electoral junctures over the last several years.

    2007-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5616 (2007) · source

  45. Only a few years ago, few observers believed that the Democratic Republic of the Congo would be able to rise to the challenge of ending the conflict and holding its first democratic elections since 1960. 5 The credit for those elections goes to the Congolese people, who conducted themselves throughout with patience, courage, great dignity and determination. Their desire for change has been the main driving force of the electoral process. Credit is also due to the Independent Electoral Commission, which operated in a war-torn country with little or no infrastructure, poor communications and limited transportation. Despite criticism, pressure and occasional threats from different quarters, the Electoral Commission carried out in full its historic mission.

    2007-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5616 (2007) · source

  46. In that regard, we welcome the support of the European Union mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC) and the European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL), which continue to make very important contributions in the areas of security sector and police reform. (spoke in English) It is difficult to overemphasize the significance of the electoral process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to which the United Nations and the European Union, together with many other Member States, have contributed. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the many individual member States of the Council, and in particular South Africa, for their outstanding support to that vital endeavour.

    2007-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5616 (2007) · source

  47. The joint implementation of resolution 1671 (2006) produced many positive lessons, including the importance of early coordination at the technical level and of mutual understanding of each organization's concepts and procedures. We have already started drawing such lessons together, and we will continue to work together to determine how we can build on that experience in planning other operations in the future. The United Nations Secretariat is determined to fully exploit the strategic and operational potential of partnerships with various multilateral organizations, including in the very important area of security sector reform.

    2007-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5616 (2007) · source

  48. The excellent cooperation that developed between EUFOR and MONUC and between the United Nations Secretariat and the general secretariat of the Council of the European Union serves as an example for future cooperative efforts. I should also emphasize that that cooperation included operational military aspects as well as the logistical support provided by MONUC to EUFOR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The deployment of EUFOR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was a further demonstration of the European Union's ongoing strong support for the United Nations throughout the Congolese peace process, especially during difficult moments. In that connection, we all recall Operation Artemis.

    2007-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5616 (2007) · source

  49. That cooperation was particularly effective following the violent incidents in Kinshasa last August. EUFOR's presence was also an important element in the deterrent role played by United Nations military and police forces on the ground, which in turn supported the Congolese national police. In that connection, more than 40,000 Congolese police were trained by MONUC to help create a secure environment for the electoral process. While acknowledging the outstanding effort of the European Union, we should also like to note with appreciation the generous assistance of Germany, which provided the operational headquarters for EUFOR in Potsdam. We should also like to take this opportunity to note the sizable number of troops 07-20483 deployed to EUFOR by the Governments of Germany and France.

    2007-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5616 (2007) · source

  50. The presence of EUFOR was quite valuable during the critical period of the elections, at which time the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the United Nations Development Programme joined their efforts with other international actors and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Independent Electoral Commission to organize and carry out this complex undertaking, which was the largest electoral exercise that the United Nations has ever supported since the inception of the Organization. EUFOR complemented MONUC's massive effort by adding its extra capacity and flexibility and by helping to address security challenges and any potential escalation that could have arisen from developments in the country.

    2007-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5616 (2007) · source