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Guehenno

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1,147

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2000-11-14

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2011-05-12

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58

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un-security-council

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1. “The continued hostilities in Darfur serve as a stark reminder that some parties to the conflict are still not prepared to lay down their weapons and commit to the path of dialogue. In addition to prolonging the suffering of millions of civilians in the region and complicating the peace process, continued hostilities will have very negative consequences for the deployment of UNAMID and will distract the mission from implementing its mandate. In that regard, the Council must be prepared for the eventuality that UNAMID may be forced to operate in an environment of continued hostilities, which could significantly complicate our collective efforts to support the implementation of Security Council resolution 1769 (2007) and a future peace agreement in Darfur.”

   2008-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5832 (2008) · source

2. “However, as the Council is aware, UNAMID still lacks critical military aviation and ground transportation assets, which must be urgently generated. We appreciate the United Kingdom's efforts in that regard; however, we still lack the majority of military helicopter units which are required, and some ground transportation units. The Council must be aware that, should offers for those critical capabilities not be forthcoming, additional troops will not be a sufficient substitute. Darfur is a vast area, and we must have the ability to quickly move troops to strategic points. The Secretariat will continue to pursue all avenues to generate those assets, and will consider all credible possibilities.”

   2008-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5832 (2008) · source

3. “As we have said previously, peacekeeping is a round-the-clock job, and the force must have the ability to patrol both on the ground and in the air at all hours. We also require the Government's cooperation in extending visas to the contractors currently providing services to UNAMID troops in Darfur until a new contractor is in place. The bidding process is under way, and we expect to finalize that issue within the shortest possible time frame. In the meantime, UNAMID troop and police contributors must do everything possible to expedite their pre-deployment preparations and arrive at the mission with the required capabilities as swiftly as possible. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations stands ready to provide whatever additional assistance UNAMID troop and police contributors may require in that regard.”

   2008-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5832 (2008) · source

4. “It is important also that UNAMID's force composition should draw upon a broad range of countries, since due consideration must be given to the geographical balance of the force in order to have an operation that is perceived as impartial by the parties. On a more positive note, we very much welcome the progress that we have made with the Government in our consultations on the status-of-forces agreement, which we hope to sign soon. The spirit in which those negotiations have taken place should set the tone for the resolution of all outstanding issues regarding the deployment of UNAMID. In that regard, we must still resolve a number of matters, including full freedom of movement for UNAMID.”

   2008-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5832 (2008) · source

5. “If we are to reconfigure UNAMID into a robust, credible and proactive peacekeeping presence, there are a number of issues which must be confronted as a matter of the utmost priority. We are now at a critical moment in the life of the Hybrid Operation, and additional delay in resolving those issues would have a severely negative impact on the mission. As already mentioned, it is essential that we expeditiously conclude all necessary arrangements to allow for the early deployment of the Thai and Nepalese units. We have already expressed our willingness to prioritize deployment of Ethiopian and Egyptian troops with the understanding that those Asian units would deploy in a timely fashion.”

   2008-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5832 (2008) · source

6. “Ethiopia has indicated that it would be ready to initiate the deployment of its battalion to Darfur within the month of February, and we anticipate that the deployment of the advance party of the Egyptian battalion will begin within the month of March. In light of the continuing discussions that we have had with the Government on the issue of force composition, it is worth recalling that Security Council resolution 1769 (2007) indicates that the force should be "predominantly African in character". To have a force that is exclusively African in character is another matter. There are a number of important reasons why a broader mix of troops is necessary. To obtain the required capabilities will necessitate seeking troop and police contributors from non-African countries for certain capabilities.”

   2008-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5832 (2008) · source

7. “In that regard, the Secretary- General indicated to the President that the United Nations would prioritize the rapid deployment of Ethiopian troops to UNAMID on the understanding that the Thai and Nepalese units would be deployed simultaneously. I should recall that the Thai and Nepalese contingents were ready to deploy on short notice, and the early addition of new contingents remains a desperate need for UNAMID. The issue of force composition is one of the lynchpins to UNAMID's success, and we urgently require a definitive decision from the Government on the inclusion of the Thai and Nepalese units. If we are to deploy those units alongside the Ethiopian troops, we must inform Thailand and Nepal immediately so that urgent pre-deployment preparations can be finalized.”

   2008-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5832 (2008) · source

8. “Siddiq, however, noted that he would be required to further consult with his Government, and we were not able to reach any definitive conclusions on the issues that we discussed. As the Council is aware, the Secretary-General had the opportunity to meet with President Bashir on the margins of the African Union summit in Addis Ababa some days later. There they further discussed a number of outstanding issues, on which the Secretary- General briefed the Council this Tuesday. One of the principal issues that they discussed was force composition, which, as the Secretary-General noted, resulted in some progress with regard to the deployment of key units.”

   2008-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5832 (2008) · source

9. “(spoke in English) Following my visit to Darfur, I travelled to Addis Ababa on 27 January, where African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, Mr. Said Djinnit, and I met with Mr. Mutrif Siddiq, the Chairman of the Government of the Sudan's technical committee for the implementation of UNAMID. We had the opportunity to discuss a number of outstanding matters related to the deployment of the operation, including the issues of UNAMID accoutrements, force composition and the finalization of the status-of-forces agreement. The meeting was constructive, with all sides emphasizing the need to build on recent progress, especially with respect to status-of-forces agreement negotiations. Mr.”

   2008-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5832 (2008) · source

10. “Lute noted a number of significant challenges with respect to bringing UNAMID up to United Nations standards. Among the priorities in that respect is the improvement of UNAMID camps, particularly camp services, and security and force protection measures in order to avoid a repetition of the events of Haskanita. That will be essential for improving troop morale and security, in addition to the Mission's operational effectiveness. At the time of Ms. Lute's visit, a total of 1,256 staff, or 23 per cent of the authorized UNAMID posts, had been deployed to Darfur. The challenges faced by UNAMID staff are many and range from poor living conditions to high staff turn-over due to security concerns.”

    2008-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5832 (2008) · source

11. “to 6 p.m., and is constructing a number of police posts in those areas with a view to maintaining a 24-hour presence. The Force Commander is also exploring options for increasing the presence of forces in key areas. It is important to stress that despite those efforts, the Mission will not be able to meet the high expectations of Darfur's civilians. That is particularly worrying since we risk losing their confidence if we are not able to meet those expectations. Experience in United Nations peacekeeping has shown that the loss of the local population's confidence can deal a severe blow to our efforts. The Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Department of Field Support, Ms. Lute, also visited the Mission in the days prior to my trip. Ms.”

    2008-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5832 (2008) · source

12. “During my visit to the three states that make up Darfur, it became clear that UNAMID is severely under-resourced for the tasks that it was mandated to perform. The number of troops and police and their enabling capabilities currently in the mission area are clearly not sufficient to provide protection for the civilian population in Darfur in the current hostile environment. Nevertheless, UNAMID is exploring ways in which to bring about tangible improvement in the situation with the limited human and material resources at its disposal. For example, the Mission is doing its utmost to adopt a more proactive posture through increased presence, especially in internally displaced persons camps. To that end, the UNAMID Police Commissioner has dramatically increased the number of police patrols, which now take place from 8 am.”

    2008-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5832 (2008) · source

13. “The ongoing violence in Darfur and the border area also poses a significant threat to civilians as the humanitarian community endeavours to provide them with the assistance they require. Continuing displacement, compounded by decreasing humanitarian access and impending crop failures in many areas of Darfur due to late rains, pests and neglect of farms, threatens to create a humanitarian situation that the international community simply does not have the capacity to address. The humanitarian situation will improve only if we see a decrease in hostilities and cooperation on behalf of the armed groups in the area. (spoke in French) I would like to now share with the Council some observations from my trip to Darfur.”

    2008-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5832 (2008) · source

14. “Continuing accusations by both Governments of their support for rebel movements on each side of the border increase the climate of mistrust, fuel tensions between the two countries and once again demonstrate the potential for a conflict of international dimensions in the area. Meanwhile, other disturbing trends are emerging, including the large-scale mobilization and shifting alliances of Arab militia in South Darfur, which has coincided with an increase in direct conflict between rebel movements and pro-Government militia. In addition, the appointment of Musa Hilal to the position of Advisor to the Ministry of Federal Affairs is being viewed by many as an extremely disappointing development, particularly since the Security Council itself has recognized his past involvement in violence in Darfur.”

    2008-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5832 (2008) · source

15. “The recent hostilities between the Government of the Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and its leader, Khalil Ibrahim, in West Darfur and the continued build-up of their forces in the area remains one of our principal security concerns in Darfur. As a result of that situation, the majority of the state of West Darfur remains inaccessible to humanitarian organizations. The situation has been exacerbated by the violence in Chad over the past several days. The potentially destabilizing regional implications of the crisis have been highlighted by numerous media reports of Chadian rebel movements receiving support in the Sudan, on the one hand, and Sudanese rebel movements that have acted in support of the Chadian Government, on the other.”

    2008-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5832 (2008) · source

16. “Mr. Guehenno: Thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Council on Darfur. As the Council may be aware, I travelled to the region from 21 to 31 January in order to Visit, among other missions, the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in the weeks following the transfer of authority and to hold consultations with officials from the Government of the Sudan on the outstanding issues related to the deployment of the Hybrid Operation. My visit to the region was sobering, yet extremely informative, and I would like to provide the Council with some observations from my trip. Before doing so, allow me to provide a brief update on the current security and humanitarian situation in Darfur.”

    2008-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5832 (2008) · source

17. “Without decisive progress on each of those three issues, we will indeed face dire consequences for the international efforts to help the Sudanese bring peace and stability to Darfur.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

18. “In conclusion and returning to UNAMID, we will continue to build on the modest momentum created by the transfer of authority. At the same time, we must move forward with a realistic understanding of the situation we face. War, with cross-border dimensions, is ongoing. Five months after the adoption of resolution 1769 (2007), we do not yet have guarantees or agreements from the Government on basic technical issues. And finally, the Mission itself will not have the personnel or assets in place to implement its mandate for many months, even in the best-case scenario. I appeal to this Council and to all the international community to help on those and all other remaining problems, including the necessary specialized capabilities and equipment, in the political process. That is our collective responsibility.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

19. “The Special Envoys' trip will provide an opportunity to assess the progress of the current unification efforts, as well as the readiness of the movements to participate in an Arusha-style meeting, which would aim to assist the movements in finalizing their unification efforts so as to enable the start of substantive talks. The recent upsurge in fighting in Eastern Chad and West Darfur and the mobilization of JEM. and Sudanese forces around El Geneina are a cause for great concern, however. They send an extremely negative signal with regard to the prospects for a political settlement to the Darfur crisis. For the substantive negotiations to begin, it would also be important that the Government of National Unity agree on a common negotiating team and come well-prepared to the talks.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

20. “Eliasson and Salim, who will be travelling to the Sudan this week for further consultations with the Government and the movements. Following from the unification efforts which took place in Juba and Darfur over the last few weeks, five principal movement clusters have now emerged: Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Unity, SLA-Abdul Shafie, United Resistance Front, JEM-Khalil Ibrahim and SLA-Abdul Wahid. Some of those movements are currently discussing the establishment of a common platform and negotiating team, as well as undergoing internal reorganization and deliberations on leadership structures.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

21. “After the incident, the convoy managed to reach Tine close to midnight and the injured driver is receiving treatment at the Tine team site. I met yesterday with the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations, who confirmed his Government's commitment to ensuring the safety and security of UNAMID personnel and also, more broadly, to the full implementation of resolution 1769 (2007). He also confirmed that the Government would be launching an investigation into the incident and that the United Nations would participate. We welcome those initiatives. The Viability of the Mission depends on ensuring that this never happens again. Finally, I would like to provide a brief update on the ongoing efforts of the Special Envoys, Messrs.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

22. “The convoy, whose movements had been confirmed with the Government and rebel movements in advance, and which was comprised mostly of large trucks which were carrying rations for UNAMID personnel in West Darfur, came under sustained fire from light weapons and rocket-propelled grenades for 10 to 12 minutes. A civilian Sudanese driver suffered seven gunshot wounds during the incident. In that instance, UNAMID troops elected not to return fire and took up a defensive position. After the attack, the UNAMID Deputy Force Commander was telephoned by the Sudanese Armed Forces area commander with responsibility for the area where the incident took place. The area commander confirmed that it was a Sudanese Armed Forces unit which had fired upon the convoy.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

23. “This is an extremely worrying development in light of the potential for those engagements to escalate and assume international, cross-border dimensions. That would have a devastating impact on refugees and displaced persons on both sides of the border, and would inevitably make more complex the international community's current efforts to deploy peacekeeping operations in both countries. 5 The violence in West Darfur presents a fundamental challenge to UNAMID, which is a peacekeeping force not designed to deploy or function in a war zone. That scenario took an unforeseen and deeply disturbing turn on 7 January, when a UNAMID supply convoy of more than 20 clearly marked white vehicles moving at low speed came under fire from Sudanese Armed Forces at approximately 10 pm. as they moved from Um Baru to Tine in West Darfur.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

24. “Media reports, as well as those received from UNAMID, indicate that the Government of Chad may have engaged Chadian rebels in Sudanese territory on a number of occasions. There were also widespread media reports suggesting that the Chadian air force may have bombed locations in the south of West Darfur, where Chadian rebels were believed to have congregated. We are also aware that the Sudanese Permanent Representative sent a letter to the Security Council on 28 December protesting what it referred to as "Chadian attacks against the Sudan", specifically citing air assaults from the Chadian air force on two separate occasions. Recent press reports also quote President Deby as confirming his intention to pursue Chadian rebels inside Sudanese territory.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

25. “Despite the efforts of senior AMIS and United Nations leadership to persuade the commanding military intelligence officer to halt the operation, Major General Bashir, along with five other JEM. representatives, was arrested and taken into custody. Military intelligence authorities justified the arrest of the JEM representative by alleging that he was behind the attack in Seleia earlier that day. This is a worrying development and jeopardizes the integrity of those mechanisms that have been established to bring a cessation to the ongoing hostilities in Darfur. The security situation in Darfur has also taken a serious turn for the worse due to hostilities involving Chadian elements.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

26. “leader Khalil Ibrahim and United Nations officials in the field, Mr. Ibrahim has repeatedly threatened to attack El Geneina, the state capital. The Secretary-General 08-20356 strongly condemned JEM's acts of aggression and bellicose posture. Following the JEM. attack on Seleia, authorities from the Government of the Sudan's military intelligence surrounded the accommodations of Major General Bashir, the JEM. representative to the ceasefire commission in El Fasher. The Government personnel were encountered by the AMIS protection force, which was guarding the premises according to AMIS established practice of providing protection to movement representatives to the ceasefire commission.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

27. “Clashes and retaliatory attacks between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in West Darfur have also led to a number of civilian casualties and the relocation of 283 humanitarian staff from several locations in the state. On 29 December, the Justice and Equality Movement launched an attack on the local police station and Sudanese Armed Forces base in Seleia, a town north of El Geneina. While there are differing reports regarding the intensity of the conflict and casualties incurred, it was confirmed that the JEM. ultimately took control of the town. Four days later, on 2 January, the JEM. seized the Government-controlled towns of Sirba and Abu Suruj, which are also located north of Seleia. Both in the press and in discussions between JEM.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

28. “We very much welcome that and any other initiative that Council members or other Member States would be willing to undertake in that regard. In the meantime, the Secretary-General and the Secretariat continue to pursue all options to fill this critical gap. In that regard, we are in discussions with Ukraine to explore the possibility of transferring tactical helicopters from another mission. We are also exploring proposals from the Russian Federation that would involve providing the airframes to other troop-contributing countries. Even as we apply ourselves fully to accelerating deployment and filling gaps in the force, we are also seeing a dramatic deterioration in the security situation in Darfur.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

29. “I regret to inform the Council that we are now faced with an additional shortfall of one multi-role logistics unit, after a troop- contributing country providing that unit withdrew its offer, and one aerial reconnaissance unit, following the technical determination that the unit pledged did not meet requirements. In order to address these continued gaps in the force, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) convened a meeting with troop-contributing countries on 27 December, during which we highlighted the missing units and requested Member States to provide the required assets. During that meeting, the United Kingdom offered to convene a meeting to focus on the generation of the missing units.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

30. “Those missing units- one heavy and one medium transport unit, three military utility aviation units, namely 18 helicopters, and one light tactical helicopter unit, namely 6 helicopters - will enable UNAMID to move personnel and resources over large areas with the speed required to respond to crises. They will also allow for the rapid resupply of units based in insecure locations. We are already feeling the constraints of those gaps in requirements, as we are now forced to resupply our 08-20356 troops by road. That is time-consuming and will become prohibitively difficult, if not impossible, during much of the rainy season.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

31. “With respect to forthcoming deployments, we expect to have the advance parties of the Egyptian and Ethiopian infantry battalions in Darfur by the end of February, pending the resolution of some outstanding issues, and the remainder of the Chinese engineering unit by March. Most of the enabling units are expected to deploy before June 2008. Five remaining battalions are scheduled to deploy in the latter half of the year. Our deployment challenges continue to be compounded by the shortfalls that we are facing in a number of critical areas. Since our last briefing to the Council, we have not received offers for the essential transportation and aviation assets.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

32. “The recce Visits by troop-contributing countries to Darfur, as well as the usual memorandum of understanding negotiations and the submission of lists of all personnel and equipment to be deployed to the theatre, are not moving fast enough. In addition, as we go through routine memorandum of understanding negotiations with troop contributors, some have begun to set conditions for their participation that will prevent us from accepting their contributions. These include proposals to limit operations to day-time hours and to restrict movements to those in the immediate Vicinity of UNAMID military bases. If we were to accept those conditions, the mission would lose the capacity to implement its mandate in any credible manner.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

33. “While the advance party of the Chinese engineering company and the formed police unit from Bangladesh are currently in theatre, the great majority of the military and police components of the mission are made up of units and personnel that had served with AMIS, including the two additional battalions from Nigeria and Rwanda, which arrived in November. In total, there are currently just over 9,000 uniformed personnel in UNAMID. We are doing our utmost to ensure that the new UNAMID units deploy to Darfur as swiftly as possible. Nevertheless, it is clear that those deployments must move more quickly if we are to have a material impact on the situation in the first half of this year.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

34. “The Secretary-General spoke by telephone with President Al-Bashir over the weekend. This will be followed by technical discussions before the two of them meet at the African Union Summit. We will continue to do our best to handle these issues with the Government of the Sudan. But obviously, with each passing week, we face the prospect of further delay in fully establishing the mission. As indicated in our last briefing to the Council on UNAMID, at the moment the mission is effectively a re-hatted AMIS, with few additional troops or police having arrived in the mission area since the transfer of authority, on 31 December.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

35. “The Government takes the position that the outstanding issues I have listed are technical and should be resolved on that basis. We fully agree, and we believe that there is no good reason that those issues should persist ad infinitum, especially in the light of the adverse impact they are having on the deployment of the mission and the implementation of its mandate. While high-level consultations between the Secretariat and Government officials will continue on these issues, a final resolution will come through a discussion of practicalities in Khartoum and on the ground in Darfur. To that end, Mr. Adada and his senior staff have made themselves available, without condition, to work with Government counterparts. In an effort to resolve these issues, consultations are ongoing with the Government of the Sudan.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

36. “Retaining the green beret for African troops and the blue beret for non-Africans, which has been the Government's suggestion, would effectively establish two distinct forces with separate identities. It would also undermine the unity of the force and is contrary to the fundamental principles of the United Nations. While rapid progress is required on those issues, it is also important to point out that the Government has released communications equipment that was impounded in NyaIa and is also permitting UNAMID to use the El Obeid logistics hub as a staging area. We hope that those developments will help to create momentum that will lead to a resolution of the more significant blockages, which I have just described.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

37. “As I indicated earlier, the Government is also reopening the issue of UNAMID accoutrements. In the hours before the transfer-of-authority ceremony, Government officials informed Joint Special Representative Adada and Force Commander Agwai that it would not agree to the re-hatting of the AMIS personnel. Nevertheless, we proceeded with the re hatting, in keeping with the agreement reached with the AU on the question of accoutrements and on the basis of our understanding that the Government had accepted the blue beret during the Security Council's Visit to Khartoum on 17 June 2006, when they accepted the Hybrid Operation without conditions. As Council members are aware, the Government accepted the 3 deployment of a hybrid force, which means one force with a single identity.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

38. “Medili will give particular attention to working with the Government to finalize the status of forces agreement. On the matter of 24-hour operations, and night flights in particular, the Government has made clearance for those flights contingent upon the United Nations upgrading of national airport facilities. While we are ready to provide assistance in that regard, airport rehabilitation is a time-consuming undertaking and not an operational requirement for UNAMID to be able to fly at night. The AU-United Nations Mission is now established as per the mandate given to it by the Security Council and must be able to operate freely 24 hours per day. With respect to land, we have not yet been able to finalize the agreement with the Government on a suitable piece of land in El Geneina.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

39. “With regard to the status of forces agreement, the Government had agreed that they would be ready to begin consultations on 13 December. However, to date no interlocutor has been made available to take forward those discussions. It is important that this critical legal arrangement be finalized as soon as possible, and that the result be a credible text, which will enable the mission to fulfil its challenging function. Our latest report from Khartoum is that negotiations will begin on Saturday. It will be important to move quickly in order to make for the lost time. To help accelerate this work, we will be strengthening our SOFA negotiation team through the deployment of Assistant Secretary-General Hocine Medili, who has been appointed UNAMID Deputy Joint Special Representative for Operations and Management. Mr.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

40. “However, I can now report to the Council that the Government has verbally rejected the Nordic unit. The loss of this engineering capability will have serious consequences for the speed of our deployment and also for the ability of UNAMID to carry out the small-scale infrastructure rehabilitation, for instance improving air strips, which would have facilitated deployment and would also have been of direct benefit to all those who live in Darfur. We are now assessing how best to fill this very regrettable gap. (spoke in English) Let me take this opportunity to thank the Nordic countries, which have worked very hard and have spent money to prepare this contribution. We are keen to explore opportunities to deploy this engineering unit in 08-20356 another peace operation, where it could make a very useful and important contribution.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

41. “During the briefing on 13 December, following the meeting with the Sudanese officials that took place in Lisbon on the margins of the European Union-Africa Summit, we reported to the Council that the Government of the Sudan had agreed to hold follow-up meetings with UNAMID leadership in Khartoum in order to resolve all outstanding issues. While a number of such meetings have taken place, they have not yet yielded the required results. As the Council is aware, for more than three months now we have been engaged in discussions with the Government on the composition of the UNAMID military component. While the Government has expressed its objections to the deployment of units from Thailand and Nepal, as well as a combined Nordic engineering unit, no formal or written position on those troop contributors has been forthcoming.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

42. “In this spirit, I have to report to the Council that a number of the outstanding issues which have been undermining our efforts to deploy UNAMID have not yet been resolved. Many of these are directly dependent on the outcome of discussions with the Government, including final confirmation of the composition of the force, the finalization of the status-of-forces agreement (SOFA), the provision of land for the mission, clearance to function 24 hours per day, and also an unequivocal agreement on the accoutrements for military and police personnel of UNAMID.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

43. “The event was marked by a small ceremony in El Fasher, which was attended by the leadership and personnel of UNAMID, the leadership of UNMIS and a Government delegation led by the Governor of North Darfur. During the ceremony, the African Union and United Nations flags were raised side by side, and a symbolic number of personnel exchanged their green AMIS berets for the blue beret of UNAMID. Those symbolic acts underscored the partnership linking the 08-20356 African Union and the United Nations in Darfur and signalled the new level of responsibility which the United Nations and the Security Council now bear for the success of the peacekeeping effort in that troubled place.”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

44. “The report of the Secretary-General (S/2007/759) is before the Council and is self-explanatory. My briefing today will therefore focus on the major challenges and impediments which we continue to face in our ongoing effort to deploy the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), including in particular the grave deterioration of the security situation which has taken place since we last briefed the Council on 13 December last year. I will supplement the presentation on UNAMID with a brief update on the activities of Special Envoys Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim. I am pleased to report that since the last briefing, transfer of authority from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to UNAMID took place on 31 December 2007 in accordance with Security Council resolution 1769 (2007).”

    2008-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5817 (2008) · source

45. “Our concern is that the repetition of such problems and then their amplification, as described in the briefing today, could seriously delay or hamper the UNAMID mission itself.”

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

46. “A second aspect is the hesitation sometimes of troop contributors themselves, as they delay the load list, as we call it, that is, a document that we need to organize logistics. They sometimes seem to hesitate about when to deploy. A third set of issues has been the kind of issues that have been mentioned with regard to UNAMID in terms of cooperation with the Government of the 07-61468 Sudan, which sometimes has been there and sometimes has not. I am thinking of delays in giving visas for reconnaissance missions that need to happen, delays in providing the land for the units to deploy. It is all of those factors that end up delaying significantly the deployment of the heavy support package.”

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

47. “Mr. Guehenno: There was only one real question that was raised, which was on the delays in the deployment of the heavy support package. The delays in the heavy support package are quite revealing of the broader issues that we face in the overall deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), of which, in a way, the heavy support package is just one early phase. There is not one single explanation for those delays; there is a combination of explanations. First, in some cases, capacities that were announced by troop contributors, upon verification by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, were actually not available or were not the ones that had been requested.”

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

48. “While the African Union and the United Nations will continue to press the parties to make progress in their negotiations, our efforts to deploy a capable peacekeeping operation that is able to fulfil its mandate and to help the parties implement the outcome of their negotiations require the Security Council's continued engagement, as well as the active support of the Government of the Sudan.”

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

49. “Finally, in a new and disturbing development, two rebel movements, the Justice and Equality Movement and a grouping of factions of the Sudan Liberation Army, have made threats against the Chinese elements of the peacekeeping force. That is totally unacceptable, and it is being addressed with the utmost seriousness by the Secretariat and by the African Union Mission in the Sudan, which will be dedicating additional force protection to the area where the Chinese unit is deployed. Our ability to end the suffering in Darfur is, indeed, ultimately linked to the political process.”

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source

50. “During the Secretary-General's visit to the Sudan in September, President Bashir gave him personal assurances that his Government would facilitate the deployment of UNAMID. Over the past few weeks, the Government's reluctance to facilitate the practical preparations for UNAMID, as well as the public statements made by its senior officials, call that commitment into question. The Government of the Sudan has an important responsibility to positively influence the public's attitudes towards UNAMID and the United Nations. We also believe that troop contributors require and deserve unequivocal assurances that their efforts to contribute to the implementation of resolution 1769 (2007) are welcome.”

    2007-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5784 (2007) · source