YouSaid · the spoken record

Holbrooke

lines on the record: 676
first: 1999-09-11
most recent: 2001-01-19
sittings or episodes: 43
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Similarly, if Iraq meets the full range of obligations mandated in the Council's resolutions, the Council can make a decision regarding the lifting of sanctions. We are not seeking an excuse to use force. We would welcome a favourable Iraqi response to this resolution. It should be clear to all that Iraq holds the key to its own re-entry to the community of nations. Iraqi compliance with the Security Council's resolutions, at any time between the liberation of Kuwait and today, would have prompted the Council to reconsider sanctions. Instead, Iraq has hewn to the path of concealment and prevarication and non- compliance. At the same time, we have no illusion that the Iraqi regime is likely to change its spots in order to reap the proffered benefits of cooperation and compliance.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“Obviously delineation of the tasks will draw heavily on the previous work of UNSCOM, the most comprehensive and authoritative work to date on the status of Iraq's compliance with its arms control obligations. Equally obvious is the fact that these "key" tasks comprise a subset of the full range of disarmament obligations which Iraq would have to fulfil in order for the Council to consider permanent lifting of sanctions. Let me state, as clearly and simply as I can, the basic United States position. If Iraq fulfils the key remaining tasks and meets the requirements set forth in this resolution, then the Council, including the United States, can decide whether to recognize that cooperation and compliance by suspending sanctions.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“The United States will support no resolution which alters that fundamental principle. This omnibus resolution commits the Security Council to take certain steps if there is compliance from Iraq. And, again, there is no lack of clarity in this resolution about the sequence of events. Iraqi compliance must precede all else, as the Security Council has stated in the many resolutions on arms control and disarmament in Iraq which it has adopted since Iraq's brutal occupation of Kuwait in 1990. That is the standard which we will look to the new Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC to uphold. Among the important responsibilities which the Executive Chairman will need to address early on is articulation of the "key remaining disarmament tasks" which Iraq must complete.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“As in the past, we expect UNMOVIC to act on the Council's behalf in providing a strong and independent voice requiring punctilious cooperation and compliance from Iraq. The United States will provide full support to the new Executive Chairman, whose role as the head of an independent and professional UNMOVIC will be central to the future of Council-mandated disarmament activities in Iraq. Similarly, we will offer our full cooperation and support to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as it resumes its Council-mandated activities in Iraq in tandem with UNMOVIC. Today's resolution does not raise the bar on what is required of Iraq in the area of disarmament, but it also does not lower it. The Council set an exacting, but reasonable and realistic, standard in resolution 687 (1991), and Iraq must meet that standard.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“Under this resolution, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC will remain the fully responsible and independent head of an organization which is a subsidiary organ of the Security Council. As with Ambassadors Ekeus and Butler, the Council has afforded the new Executive Chairman flexibility to seek expertise and advice from many sources; but he, or she, also like those two predecessors, will exercise full authority over the composition, structure, operation and critical judgements of UNMOVIC, subject to policy direction which this Council may decide to give. As in the past, we expect UNMOVIC to employ objective and fully qualified experts in relevant fields, without undue reference to nationality or past organizational affiliation.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“Ambassador Richard Butler sustained the operation and logged enormous successes - including documentation of Iraq's previously undisclosed programme to weaponize VX nerve agent - despite growing Iraqi interference and disruption. At this juncture, let me express appreciation to the entire UNSCOM. staff, who have rendered an invaluable service to the international community over the last eight years. They have remained hard at work over the past year despite Iraq's refusal to permit in-country inspections and monitoring. The new Executive Chairman will be fortunate to inherit a sound and seasoned organization, with an irreplaceable database and an expert staff who are ready to return to work and complete their mandate. We also thank Charles Duelfer for his years of commitment to UNSCOM's important achievements.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“We call upon Iraq to cooperate fully with early resumption of the complete range of mandated disarmament and monitoring activities, which have been in abeyance due to Iraqi non-cooperation and non-compliance. We look forward to the Secretary-General's appointment of a suitably qualified candidate, with Council support, to become the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC. He or she will have big shoes to fill. Ambassador Rolf Ekeus built the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) from the ground up, harnessing the highest level of technical proficiency in service of the Council's mandate. During his tenure, Iraq's concealed biological weapons programme was brought to light.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“That is because the fundamental problem remains. Iraq has not complied with the disarmament requirements of the post-Gulf-War resolutions. The unimpeded operation of United Nations arms inspection teams on the ground in Iraq is essential. Accordingly, the United States attaches great importance to the provisions in this resolution calling for establishment of a reinforced monitoring and inspection effort in Iraq. The resolution creates the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to implement an existing mandate which remains robust and fully consonant with the line established by the Council in resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991) and others.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“Bearing in mind the need to be vigilant regarding dual-use items, the United States is prepared to accept such measures, particularly in the areas of safety and environmental impact, on the basis of that humanitarian standard. The Council has never put any prohibition on the religious practices of the Iraqi people and we fully support the provisions in this resolution to exempt from sanctions air travel by Hajj pilgrims. No measure in this resolution should be seen as a step towards any broader relaxation of the air embargo imposed under resolutions 661 (1990) and 670 (1990), however. The United States continues to oppose easing the strictures on air travel, as this would greatly complicate the task of sanctions enforcement. The area of arms control is central to this resolution, just as it is central to the entire Iraq issue.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“We fully support the Council's continuing effort to make the programme more efficient and more effective and it is for that reason that we support the humanitarian measures included in this resolution. The oil-for-food programme is based on a simple principle. Iraq is authorized to export oil in order to generate United Nations-controlled revenue used primarily to benefit the Iraqi people. The measures in this resolution retain, at every step in the Council's consideration of this issue, that fundamental linkage between Iraqi oil exports and humanitarian benefit to Iraqi civilians. Similarly, measures intended to improve Iraq's ability to produce and export oil remain linked to the documented need for assistance to the Iraqi people.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“We took a leading role in formulating the oil-for-food programme from its original conception shortly after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991. We take satisfaction in the success of this important humanitarian effort, which has brought about a significant improvement in living conditions for the civilian population in Iraq. We recognize and appreciate the United Nations Secretariat's management of the oil-for- food programme, the largest humanitarian assistance effort in United Nations history. In particular, Mr. Benon Sevan and his colleagues in the Office of the Iraq Programme deserve our gratitude for their accomplishments in a very demanding situation.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“Overall, we support the resolution because it will advance central objectives - objectives of the Council which the United States fully shares - in three main areas: arms control, humanitarian assistance and the issues relating to Kuwait. Let me start with Kuwait, the victim of Iraqi aggression and destruction on a staggering scale. This resolution will initiate a redoubled United Nations effort to achieve satisfaction and closure on missing persons and stolen property. We look forward to cooperating in every possible way to support the efforts of the special envoy whom the Secretary-General will appoint to address these issues. On humanitarian issues, the United States has demonstrated a sincere and enduring interest in the welfare of Iraqi citizens living under the tyranny and misrule of Saddam Hussein.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“Similarly, we note the role of the other early supporters - Argentina, Canada and Namibia - that were profoundly important in establishing and supporting the overall structure and approach of this new resolution. Finally, we commend the extraordinary contribution you, Sir, and your Government have made in steering this resolution through months of complex debate and negotiation to a successful outcome today. We thank you for that. Many observers thought it could not be done. Without Ambassador Greenstock's professionalism and fair-minded leadership, it would not have been done. I would now like to turn to some of the key provisions of this resolution and briefly relate why the United States supports them.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“As one of the two initial co-sponsors of the Anglo-Dutch draft, he played a crucial role in sustaining the resolution as it evolved towards today's vote. We also wish to recognize the early contribution of Ambassador Danilo Turk of Slovenia, whose intellectual creativity provided some of the key concepts embodied in this resolution. The United States also acknowledges the strong, positive role played by the five elected members that will depart the Council at year's end: Bahrain, Brazil, Gabon, Gambia and Slovenia. By becoming early supporters of this measure, they exercised leadership on a challenging issue of overriding international concern. It is fitting that the Council was able to bring this complex resolution to fruition during the present Council term.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“Before commenting on a few key provisions of the resolution, I would like to acknowledge, on behalf of the United States, several individuals whose extraordinary contributions helped make this resolution possible. First, as many other colleagues have done this morning, we commend the leadership of Brazil's former Permanent Representative, Ambassador Celso Amorim, whose able management of the assessment panels provided the Council with not a blueprint, but a valuable point of reference. Many of the provisions of this resolution are drawn directly from the recommendations of those panels. We thank Ambassador Amorim and his colleagues in the mission of Brazil for this important contribution. Ambassador Peter van Walsum of the Netherlands earns our admiration every day for his expert management of the Iraq sanctions Committee.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“The vote today was not unanimous, but no member asserts that Iraq has met its obligations under the Council's resolutions. N0 Council member argues that Iraq has disarmed as required. No Council member would say that Iraq has met its obligations to Kuwait or to the families of the missing. We expect all members of the Council, regardless of their vote on this resolution, to join in pressing Iraq for full and immediate implementation. The United States supports this resolution because it provides a serious response on a serious issue. It is consistent with past resolutions. It is clear, it is reasonable and it can be implemented. As in the past, the United States will closely monitor Baghdad's response to this new resolution. Compliance or non-compliance with this resolution will be simple for the Council to measure.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“What is required of Iraq could not be more clear: First, that it cooperate fully with the oil-for-food programme in order to maximize and optimize its benefits for all the people of Iraq; secondly, that it cooperate fully in meeting the humanitarian obligation to account for missing persons and return stolen Kuwaiti property; and thirdly, in the disarmament area, that it allow weapons inspectors to return, re-establish ongoing monitoring and verification and fulfil key remaining disarmament tasks. These derive from the unmet requirements set by the Security Council in resolution 687 (1991) nearly nine years ago. In fact, this resolution represents nothing less than a reaffirmation by the Council, after a period of assessment and review, of its fundamental consensus on Iraq.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“An enormous amount of patience and hard work went into shaping this resolution over the past year, and its adoption today marks a profoundly important moment for the Security Council. Every member of the Council made important contributions to this resolution, including those who did not vote in favour. The resolution was adopted with a large majority of Council members voting in favour, and it has the full authority of the Security Council behind it. It was adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and Iraq is obliged to comply with its provisions. The United States looks to Iraq to act without delay to facilitate the implementation of this resolution.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“I hope that as a result of this meeting we will be able to accelerate, intensify and clarify what it is that we will be asked to approve. That requires a lot of staff work internally, and our Government is prepared to do that. Again, Mr. President, I wish to express my very profound appreciation for what you have done. I know that you had all of this planned before. I said that January would be the month of Africa for the United States in the Security Council. I think you have effectively proved that December is also a month of Africa under your skilful and visionary presidency.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“Miyet is with us today, because I think that there is a general message here, certainly for my Government and, I believe, for many others, which is that we want to vote for the resolution, but we need to know what we are voting for: the mandate, the size and the costs. There are many different ideas kicking around right now, and reasonably so; this is a very difficult problem. But I urge the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to continue the consultations it has been having with many Governments here, including our own. I have heard some Ambassadors represented here - as well as some of our colleagues who have not spoken but who are attending this meeting and have the deepest vested interest in this issue, because their countries are in Central Africa - express confusion as to what the project is.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“Let it be clear for my Government - and, I believe, for every Government here - that there is going to be support for peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There is no question about it. Everyone here is conscious of Rwanda, particularly on a day when the United Nations has courageously issued a report of self-criticism for the second time in a month, and I congratulate the Secretary- General and his colleagues for that candour and courage. The issue therefore is not whether we are going to support peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I repeat, it is not whether our country will support it - I believe the nation-States here are going to support it - it is not whether, it is when and how. I am very glad that Mr.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“I will be brief, and I wish to comment on what I think has been another excellent discussion on three levels. First, with respect to style, I am deeply impressed by the informality here. I think it is what the founding fathers of the United Nations - there were no founding mothers, I regret to say - had in mind, and I congratulate you, Mr. President, and your colleague from London for that. Secondly, I am interested in what I think is an emerging consensus on most aspects of the problem here, and therefore I wish to focus on a point that I will return to repeatedly in the coming weeks, as will my colleagues. I think Ambassador Andjaba of Namibia put it very well in his characteristically eloquent and forceful statement. This goes to the question of what we are going to approve.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“President, are still here, and that you have spent two full days with us. I hope that your schedule will permit you to rejoin us in January. Your personal involvement and leadership, together with that of Ambassador Greenstock, has been a signal contribution to the placing of an absolutely essential emphasis on Africa and on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which this Organization is obligated to do.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“They will come to New York, they will hold meetings and hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee here in New York for the first time in history, and they will ask permission to come and visit with Council members individually and collectively. And because this issue - the Democratic Republic of the Congo - will be so high on the agenda, it will be a natural focus. So we have an opportunity to work together in the next six weeks on this critical issue. I also want to mention the Southern African Development Community, which is playing a vitally important role; I did not mean to neglect it. But the organizational arrangements must be clearly worked out. I would like to reserve the opportunity to respond in more detail as this debate continues. I am delighted that you, Mr.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“If members will bear with me a moment, I can assure them that such an approach - and this will be our major emphasis in January during the American presidency of the Security Council - will better enable us to gain international support for this process, domestic support in our own countries, and, in my particular case, support from the Congress of the United States. I might add in that regard, and I can tell members this morning what many of them have already heard informally, that during the month of January we will be visited in New York for the first time ever by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, led by Senator Helms and Senator Biden.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“We really need to know that, and with all due respect, I believe it is imperative that we have a more intense planning effort involving the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the nations on the Security Council and other potential major troop contributors, and other countries that will be asked to contribute money. This is very complicated - much, much more complicated than Timor or even Kosovo, and once we start down this path, the relationship between the JMC and MONUC, or its successor, the relationship between the OAU and the United Nations, the command and control situation on the ground, the mandate, the size, the costs, the backup all need to be known. We should not vote a resolution until we know what we are voting for.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“Let me state again, as I did quite openly to my friends here in the Security Council and to the leaders of the African States which I visited - and I spoke to every person who signed the Lusaka Agreement - that the statement that the United States is dragging its feet is true. We are dragging our feet right now, but not because we are opposed to peacekeeping in Congo. We are dragging our feet because we want a peacekeeping operation, and we want to get it right. We cannot afford an operation which is not right, and there are many things to sort out here. The Under-Secretary-General a moment ago said he could not yet give us precision on the composition and structure of the peacekeeping force.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“We deeply and profoundly hope that he will accept it and that movement in that direction will be rapid. As I said in my speech in Pretoria, the United States would find it difficult to move forward in support of peacekeeping absent a facilitator to work on the political component, which is so critical. On the Joint Military Commission (JMC), I want to state again that during our trip last week, we delivered $1 million to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for the Joint Military Commission and had extended talks with General Lallali, who is in charge of that effort. We would like to repeat what was said so often yesterday - that the JMC, the OAU, the United Nations and MONUC must work more closely together. The United States has been occasionally charged in recent days with dragging its feet on peacekeeping in the Congo.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“In that sense, I strongly endorse the Under-Secretary-General's emphasis on Lusaka. Having been involved in a few peacekeeping negotiations myself and observed many others, I can say that the Lusaka Agreement is a really superb agreement. It is well-written and well-thought-out, and, most importantly, it was done by the parties themselves, under their own leadership in the region. This is a lot more than I can say for Bosnia or East Timor. Having said that, I think we need to recognize that this agreement is being widely disregarded or even violated, and we are delighted at the nomination of President Masire as the facilitator. This was one of the main efforts that I engaged in during my trip, and it is very gratifying that he has been offered the job.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“Miyet on his briefing and address the concerns of many of my colleagues here in the Security Council on this issue. In our trip, we were accompanied by Senator Feingold, the ranking Democrat on African affairs in the United States Senate. I mention that because, as members are aware, under our system of Government it is Congress that pays the bills, and under our system of Government we will need to have their approval for American contributions to any peacekeeping efforts. We have achieved that in Kosovo and East Timor with difficulty, and in Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic. We look forward to getting congressional approval next year for an action in the Congo. But it is important, as I have said repeatedly, to get it right. We cannot repeat the tragedies of Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“I wish to thank Mr. Miyet for his excellent opening statement. As he mentioned, I am just back from Africa, and I would like to reply based on what I observed, building on our excellent meeting of yesterday. I would like to try to observe yesterday's five-minute rule again and reserve the right to talk again later, because I believe that the most valuable conversation we could have this morning would be a real exchange of views on an issue which I believe will be as important for the future of the United Nations next year as Kosovo and East Timor were this year. I might add, based on considerable personal experience in Kosovo and East Timor, this one will be more complicated by far than East Timor and no less complicated than Kosovo. With that as an opening remark, let me compliment Mr.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“I wanted to respond on that immediately so that there would be no misunderstanding between us and your great country and you, personally.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“Until a facilitator is chosen, until the Joint Military Commission, the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations go in the direction which Ambassador Fonseca, Ambassador Qin, Ambassador Dejammet and others have stressed, toward the right relationship, we would be making a mistake which could be disastrous for the future of the United Nations and peacekeeping. So I want to associate myself with your sentiments and explain to you - so that no one in this room thinks there is a real problem - that we will move in that direction. But we need to get it right. I speak only for the United States here, but that was the essence of the message I carried on behalf of our country to ten nations last week and which we will look forward to discussing under the Presidency's direction in more detail tomorrow.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“I want to praise you for your comments and I want to make one important explanation because, to a very considerable extent, we are part of the reason for this delay in the United Nations peacekeeping. I would just like to repeat to my dear friend from South Africa what I said to President Mbeki and President Mandela, President Mugabe, President Museveni and President Kabila on this issue, and to stress our country's situation. It is true the Lusaka Agreement was signed on 10 July, and we will debate this in detail tomorrow, but it is either being ignored or violated in every significant provision. I want to reaffirm to you personally, as I did to your President, that our country will support peacekeeping. But we must get it right.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“Our tentative intention is to build on this important meeting today and on the meeting tomorrow, and to hold, particularly in the latter part of January, an intense series of public and private Security Council meetings that will focus heavily on the problems of the area - those that I have just mentioned, as well as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, an issue which I look forward to addressing further tomorrow. I hope that high-level representatives from capitals will join us for those discussions next month, and that they will involve real achievements, not just talk. Thank you, Mr. President, for calling this important meeting.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“I strongly endorse the proposal made by Ambassador Qin Huasun, on behalf of the People's Republic of China, that the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity spend more time consulting the Security Council. Finally, I should like to say a word about the American presidency next month. As we announced in a speech in Pretoria, the United States will use the opportunity provided by the American presidency next month - the first month of the new millennium - to emphasize Africa.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“On Burundi, we are delighted that President Mandela is taking over the effort. I had an extremely good talk with him on this issue, and I think he will make a real difference. On Angola, we, like Ambassador Qin Huasun, look forward to working closely with Ambassador Fowler in the sanctions Committee. For our part, the United States is going to redouble its efforts on sanctions, and we look forward to learning more from Ambassador Fowler about how the United States can better contribute to this effort. In closing, let me say that, as the Secretary-General said, much more attention is required in the Security Council on Africa. I share his view that it should be effective.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“We cannot turn away from it; it is a legitimate part of our discussions here in the Security Council. It is the destigmatization of AIDS that needs to be dealt with most vigorously. Of the 10 countries we visited, I felt that only one - Uganda - was fully on board on destigmatization. I am told that Senegal, too, has done an excellent job. Every other country we visited acknowledged the problem and had programmes to deal with it. Indeed, President Mbeki was wearing the AIDS ribbon when I met with him. We are concerned about this issue, and I hope to address it further next month when the United States holds the presidency of the Council. I should like to refer to the wars of Africa. I will reserve comment about the Democratic Republic of the Congo until tomorrow.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“The number one problem that we encountered on our trip - the number one problem that Africa must deal with, among all the other problems that we are here to discuss - is the question of the spread of HIV/AIDS. I cannot stress enough how serious it is. The Secretary-General has boldly and courageously been headlining this issue for many years. Indeed, it was Kofi Annan, personally, who asked me to take a look at this issue a long time ago. I am grateful to him for making that request. I must say, here in the Security Council, that this is not just a health issue: it is a security issue and it is an economic issue. It is an issue that will not go away. In the past 12 months, more than 10 times as many people have died of AIDS in Africa as from all the wars in that great continent.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“I will try to follow your five-minute rule, Sir. I apologize for leaving the meeting briefly, but I believe it was necessary - indeed, essential - for me to speak in the General Assembly on the passing of President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia. I want to praise the United Kingdom for calling this important meeting, and to say that I have just returned from a trip to Mali, Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Rwanda, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Niger. I look forward to discussing issues relating to the Congo in more detail at tomorrow's meeting. I should like to make a few brief observations in the spirit of informality which the President has so correctly imposed on us today.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“True, in many places, particularly places such as the Balkans or the Congo or Rwanda, it is tempting to argue that future conflict is inevitable, that things have to get worse before they can be resolved - and I do not deny the fact that this was true in East Timor, Bosnia and Kosovo. But I hope it is not always going to be the case. Here, I think particularly of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other areas in Africa, including Burundi. Hatred often seems too deep, brutality too prevalent and the memories of injustice too raw, which leaves people with the feeling that nothing can be done. But we must not give in to the seduction of moral disgust, followed by neglect and then by empty posturing and hand-wringing.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“To this end, the United Nations must effectively tap into its expertise and its other resources, and dedicate them to conflict prevention. And to this end, the entire United Nations system, particularly the Member States, should support the Secretary-General's efforts to strengthen and mobilize resources for conflict prevention activities. The United States will welcome a ministerial- level meeting on conflict prevention during next year's Millennium Assembly. It is vital that the Security Council, the Secretariat and all United Nations Members play an active role in ongoing efforts to prevent international conflict.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“Equally important is the need for effective measures to combat the illicit trade in commodities - such as small arms and, especially in Africa, diamonds - that helps to prolong these conflicts and that is cynically promoted by regional warlords and local authorities. Without prejudice to the right of legitimate self-defence, we urge States to enact voluntary national moratoriums on the sale of small arms and light weapons to conflict areas. We invite our partners to work with us and with the diamond industry to develop a certification mechanism to combat the illegitimate trade in diamonds that has done so much to fuel and finance conflict, particularly in Africa. To fulfil its purpose and historic promise, the United Nations must maintain a leading role in preventing wars and other tragedies.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“Better coordination with the United Nations will only strengthen the capabilities of these groups. Secondly, international development and financial institutions are playing a growing role in the planning and implementation of conflict prevention activities. The United Nations should inform the international financial institutions of potential crisis situations so that they can respond appropriately. Thirdly, we should work together to enhance the capability of the United Nations to recruit, train and deploy international civilian police. Anyone here who has been in Bosnia or Kosovo knows that no issue is more important to the future success of those missions. The same will be true in East Timor.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“And I would point out that when Ambassador Andjaba's mission took off, no one thought it would do as well as it did. And that leads me to make a rather fundamental point, which is that sometimes one must take chances to achieve peace, as my friend Mr. Andjaba and his colleagues did two months ago. Having seen East Timor today, I can say that he can be proud of what he started. Both the complexity and volume of recent crises demonstrate the need for coordinated and broader responses. The United Nations cannot simply act alone. To maximize effectiveness, we should augment existing efforts. First, regional and subregional organizations in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe have successfully addressed local crises before they escalated into conflict.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“Here at the United Nations, the Secretary-General plays an important role in identifying and mitigating potential conflicts. The United States continues to encourage him to intercede in deteriorating situations as soon he feels it is possible to do so and to keep the Security Council informed of his actions, his views and his recommendations. The Security Council should also become more deeply engaged. The lessons of East Timor, and in particular Ambassador Andjaba's superb mission, in which he was accompanied by several other people here, was instrumental in coordinating the international response. The Security Council should not hesitate to deploy similar missions to other conflict situations, if we think they can make a difference.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“Those of us who have the ability to prevent conflicts have a moral, political and indeed at times a strategic obligation to do so. The risks and dangers of acting do not justify simply doing nothing. Therefore, we must focus on the tools needed to mitigate tensions and commit ourselves to early, preventive action. Above all, we need a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention. The promotion of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, equal economic opportunity and market-based economic systems provides the surest path to long-term global stability and development. We have seen over the weekend a dramatic step forward in the longstanding, ancient quarrels in Ireland under this kind of patient, careful negotiations, encouraged and stimulated in this case by my friend and colleague George Mitchell.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“In Bosnia, the United Nations did not succeed, and it had to turn the process over to other organizations. It is our responsibility to address the underlying causes of conflict. The international record has been less than exemplary. I would, however, commend the Secretary-General for the brave and courageous report on Srebrenica, which illustrates both the tragedy and the leadership of the United Nations, and its willingness to deal honestly with what happened there. Rwanda as well deserves to get similar examination, as another recent tragedy where we could have, and should have, done much more, much earlier, to prevent the conflict and the horrendous bloodshed that followed. Ultimately, government leaders must answer for their actions.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“Those people should not remain in those camps, otherwise all the good words spoken in this meeting today will be meaningless in an area of the world where the United Nations has undertaken massive responsibilities. These challenges, like those in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and many other war-torn places, remind us how common war and Violence remain. As we approach the question of how to prevent armed conflict, we must be clear on the distinction between its causes and its consequences. Much of what United Nations agencies such as the UNHCR do is to deal with the consequences, as do most of the non- governmental organizations. The Security Council deals both with consequences and, I would hope, increasingly would address conflict prevention by dealing with the causes. In East Timor, this took over 20 years.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“I regret to say that there has been a massive public information failure on the part of the refugee effort in West Timor. There has been no effective effort to counter the propaganda that is being spread. I mention this in a meeting on the issue we are here to discuss for a simple reason: we can talk generalities as long as we want, but here is a specific example of where the United Nations is performing magnificently in East Timor, but, I regret to say, has not yet done what it needs to do in West Timor. We have worked closely with them, we tape-recorded messages by Bishop Belo and Xanana Gusmao, which are now being distributed in the camps, and I urge everyone involved in this situation to work hard to get those camps open.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source