YouSaid · the spoken record

Holbrooke

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676
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1999-09-11
most recent
2001-01-19
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43
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un-security-council

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  1. Last month, Jose Ramos-Horta visited us, and we had an opportunity to hear from him about how the East Timorese are feeling about the pace of reconstruction and transition. Many more people had the opportunity to hear directly from the East Timorese during last week's important donors' conference in Lisbon. We have just heard from Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello about a possible timetable for independence, to take place between 31 August and December of next year - dates proposed by Mr. Gusmao and Mr. Ramos-Horta in Lisbon. I want to associate our Government in the strongest possible terms with that timetable, as proposed, and assuming that the United Nations believes it is appropriate. This would be a historic event, a signal achievement for the United Nations and for the world community.

    2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source

  2. While that is entirely appropriate up to now, it is equally important and imperative, given the tremendous demands we are facing - and all of us in this Chamber know that we are about to meet to receive a new request for Ethiopia and Eritrea, on top of southern Lebanon, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo- that we try to plan long-term for a drawdown. I hope he will be able to inform us about how he intends to do this. We applaud the Special Representative's increasing shifting of responsibility from peacekeepers to civilian police, and then from civilian police to the newly trained East Timorese police and, at some future date, I assume, an East Timorese defence force. This would allow an even faster and deeper reduction in Size. Let me now turn to the question of a date for independence.

    2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source

  3. Vieira de Mello if he would, in the response period, be able to inform us as to when the first major downsizings will occur and what his planned projections and recommendations are. I want to state that the earlier and more visibly he can do this, the better. I would further like to state that my own Government hopes that he can drawdown as quickly as he can, and at the same time, taking into account the very legitimate question of a resurgence of violence by the militia, that the United Nations reserve a capability to reinforce on short notice if a crisis should hit. But he now has over 10,000 personnel in East Timor.

    2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source

  4. First I want to comment on two absolutely critical operational issues. Despite the outrageous events in the camps - and I will mention those in a minute- I want to say how pleased our Government is to note that Mr. Vieira de Mello has reported that the overall security situation is stabilizing and that the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) can downgrade its security classification. We strongly support the efforts of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to downsize the peacekeeping elements- the troops- in UNTAET. It is very important that these plans be codified and made precise, and made public early. I would like to ask Mr.

    2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source

  5. It is now 10 months since we had our historic open meeting in this Chamber to deplore the violence then raging in Dili. On the one hand, I am struck by how much progress has been made - as we heard this morning - particularly as the focus has shifted from emergency needs to developing consultative mechanisms for interaction with the people of East Timor. This is what the United Nations should be doing. In the midst of our enormous difficulties in other parts of the world, I think we should note here that - as in an earlier era, in Cambodia, Mozambique and Namibia- the United Nations is doing its job. While it is not cheap, let the world see that it is worth it. On the other hand, I am deeply frustrated at the situation with the refugees, to which I wish to return in a moment.

    2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source

  6. I want to thank the Special Representative for his briefing, as well as for his leadership at the Lisbon conference last week. You are, Sergio, a testament to the talent and capabilities of the United Nations at its best. I saw in the quarterly Foreign Afiairs recently that the United Nations had sent out the A-team of international technocrats to East Timor. I am not sure technocrat is always a compliment, but I think that you and your colleagues in Kosovo, Bosnia and elsewhere really are in that category, although maybe you do not appreciate being compared to Mr. T. - you have got fewer gold chains on and so on. I think your job is tougher than anything that people can imagine, and I think you are doing a great job. And I have to say that you are still better dressed than I am, to my eternal embarrassment.

    2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source

  7. Thank you, Mr. President, for allowing me to begin this important discussion. This is the first time in four months that Sergio Vieira de Mello has graced us with his presence. As you, Sir, have just said - I echo your comments - he has once again given us an informative and encouraging briefing. This has been an extraordinarily busy month in the Security Council. This will be the last time I will be able to be here this month, because I am leaving for London and Geneva this evening. So I want to thank you, Mr. President, for your extraordinary stewardship in a month which rivalled China's month of presidency in terms of the number of crises confronted, and which equalled China's achievement in steering us through these difficult times.

    2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source

  8. President, I want to thank you again for holding this very important meeting. I hope that we can revitalize the effort, in addition to simply hearing these important reports today.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  9. As all know, I have been critical frequently about the operational structures in Kosovo, and I continue to be critical because I do not think they are efficient enough and I think the system was not adequately conceived and structured from the outset. However, those criticisms, which I make openly, are the criticisms of somebody who is deeply grateful to the EU and to the United Nations for their efforts; who is mindful of the fact, as Carl Bildt pointed out, that the bulk of the money has come from the European Union and not from our own Government; and who deeply appreciates these efforts and makes these comments in a spirit oftotal commitment to their goals. Thus, I hope that Mr. Solana will convey to Brussels our Government's high appreciation for his being here today and for the efforts ofthe European Union. With that, Mr.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  10. I want to stress in closing that the Council's efforts in the Balkans have relied heavily on the strength and support of other organizations, including the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Peace Implementation Council- which Carl Bildt was so deeply involved and helped to establish- and the military contribution made by the Stabilization Force and the Kosovo Force. The EU has played and will continue to play a particularly crucial role. I hope that High Representative Solana will convey to the European Union our deep appreciation of their efforts.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  11. We have a profound responsibility to ourselves, to this institution and to innocent victims everywhere to support them and give them the power they need. I am distressed that countries that supported their establishment now attack them. The combination of justice with political freedom, expressed through free and fair elections, is the key to stability and peace in the Balkans. Justice with freedom: these principles make up the foundation of all democratic societies. They are principles that we are committed to upholding.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  12. I salute the courage of President Djukanovic's Government and I recommit the United States to our support of Montenegro's efforts to build a peaceful democratic society. In regard to the war crimes issue, we should remember that the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, like that for Rwanda, is not some arbitrary institutional creation. I repeat again here today our Government's view that the umbrella of that process should be extended over Foday Sankoh and his henchmen in the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone. These Tribunals and their possible extension to Sierra Leone are created by decisions of this body in this very Chamber. They are vested with the enormous authority of the United Nations.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  13. Let me conclude with some comments about Serbia and Montenegro. My delegation continues to believe that the issue of Kosovo's security will never be truly solved and long-term peace and stability not be possible until the current regime in Belgrade is replaced by one that is more open and more representative. Meanwhile, Belgrade continues to threaten democracy in its sister Republic of Montenegro. These efforts are unacceptable and, in that regard, I am delighted that the Foreign Minister of Montenegro, Minister Lukovac, is here with us today. I met with him this morning and I urge all those who have time to meet with him. He has important ideas and thoughts which all of us should hear.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  14. The people arguing for delay are arguing it for no reason related to the needs of the people of Kosovo, but solely to argue the question of international sovereignty. That is not what municipal elections are about. That is not what they are about, and I hope we can move forward in that regard. I regret that the Serb community has not participated in the registration process, but we cannot allow that process to be held hostage by one group or by people in Belgrade. All the people of Kosovo- there are many ethnic groups there - will have representatives in their administrative governmental structure. If they do not choose to participate, seats will be set aside to protect their interests until they are ready to return as full partners in the political process. I underscore the importance of these events.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  15. We have the means to do it if we have the will. A lot of what is happening in this Chamber undermines that will by diversionary discussions, such as an attempt to reinterpret resolution 1244 (1999) or the hour that we spent on the procedural discussionjust resolved. I support Mr. Kouchner's repeated calls for progress on the missing and detainees. We also need to establish a more representative set of structures of government. The critical step is to give the people more authority over their own destiny. I therefore warmly support the statements of Javier Solana and Carl Bildt that the municipal elections should stay on schedule for October. If they are delayed, it jeopardizes the rest of the structure in Kosovo and we will lock ourselves into a worse situation.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  16. But I do not wish to gloss over the serious security problems which we discussed in our last meeting with Mr. Kouchner present. I am deeply distressed, more than anything else, at any attempt by either ethnic group to impose its will through intimidation and force on the other. I need to repeat, as I said here last time we met on this subject, that, while we condemn unreservedly the Albanian attacks on the Serb minorities now in Kosovo and while we recognize fully what the purpose of this is- a reprehensible purpose - it is not a one-sided story. We must have a full accounting of the 4,000 Albanians who are missing, many of whom I assume are no longer alive, and we must have a resolution ofthese problems. Those who resort to violence on either side of the ethnic line in Kosovo must be forced to stop.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  17. Karadzic is still at large - one of the most dangerous men in the world - and he needs to be brought to justice, as do all the other indicted war criminals. The criminal element is threatening the social fabric of all of Bosnia. So I do not wish to say that progress is undiluted, but I think we should acknowledge it. In Kosovo we face a much more complicated situation as we have heard from our speakers. Now, as we mark the one-year anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), UNMIK, under the brilliant leadership of Bernard Kouchner, has made impressive progress in building an administrative structure responsive to the needs of the people to replace a repressive state structure dominated by the Belgrade authorities.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  18. I think we need to recognize that in the midst of difficulties progress can be made, and as Javier Solana just said in a characteristically upbeat and positive manner, we are making progress. The world's press has long since turned away from Bosnia, so the world does not realize how much progress is being made. But let us recognize that the press turned away from Bosnia because good news is old news, and that is why they are not giving it as much attention as they should. I think all of us should take every occasion to point out that refugee returns to minority areas are up 400 per cent this year and movement is being made. Nonetheless, the forces of darkness still exist in Bosnia. Mostar is still a tragically torn city.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  19. Their commitment to transparency with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and their dealings with the Croatian Democratic Union in Bosnia and their support for dealing with refugee returns have all made a tremendous and positive difference in the region. I wish again today to use this occasion to express our Government's high respect and admiration for the Government in Zagreb. I will be visiting Zagreb next month, and I look forward to having these discussions directly with the Croatian authorities. Let me turn briefly to Bosnia, where we have recently heard in this Chamber reports from the Special Representative, Jacques Klein, and the High Representative, Carl Bildt's successor plus one, Wolfgang Petritsch.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  20. That was the view of the European Union, under the Badinter Commission. I would just reaffirm that today. I consider this discussion a continuation of one of the most important events in recent European and world history, and I think it is a solemn obligation of the Security Council to continue to discuss the Balkans. On the positive side of the ledger, we have recent events in Croatia, where a new democratic Government, headed by people fully dedicated to democratic principles, is moving Croatia rapidly into the community of nations, oriented towards openness and democratic principles.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  21. Four others - Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina- did apply. They were accepted. The reason for this - and I have spent many hours talking with the leadership in Belgrade about this, as has Carl Bildt - is that the Belgrade authorities assert that they are the sole legitimate successor State to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the United Nations has rejected that claim. So the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should - and this has nothing to do with the war crimes issue - follow the request of the Security Council, and they should not be invited to speak when they purport to speak for a successor regime that does not exist. That was the unanimous view of the Dayton signatories, even though Belgrade did sign the Agreement, because they had to make it work. That was the view of the Security Council.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  22. I wish to remind everyone that in Security Council resolutions 777 (1992) and 821 (1993), it was decided that the State known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had ceased to exist and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should apply for membership. Therefore, I do not understand, leaving aside the specifics which led to the vote today, how this situation exists. Tito's old flag is still flying on First Avenue, despite these two resolutions. I consider that a travesty of the United Nations spirit; a flag that represents a nation that the United Nations itself decided did not exist. Yugoslavia is not a member of the General Assembly. We have long urged Belgrade to apply as one of the successor States to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  23. Their statements are extremely important, and although I was unable to hear Carl Bildt's, I am very familiar with it. I have read it. I talked to Carl in advance, and I endorse everything that both men said. Before I turn to my own remarks, I would like to make one additional comment about the procedural vote that just took place. The outcome was correct from every standpoint - legal, political and moral. In addition to my remarks preceding the vote, I need to make one additional point, and I hope that the countries that voted in favour of Mr. Jovanovie's speaking would please note what I am about to say.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  24. I want to thank you, Mr. President, for calling this very important meeting. You have had a very intensive presidency this month, as did Ambassador Wang of China last month. I wish to point out that at this time last week you said there would be a five-minute meeting on Saturday, and it was 11 hours. I hope you have a better weekend than you had last week. I congratulate you on your stewardship. I particularly want to thank you for inviting today statements by the European Union, as given by Ambassador Monteiro, and presentations by my friends and colleagues and our esteemed visitors, Carl Bildt and Javier Solana. I have had the pleasure of working with both of them now for many years. They have both played seminal roles in the history of the Balkans and in European matters.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  25. It would be inappropriate to allow a representative of that Government to use the Council, in a discussion about where we stand on Kosovo and Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), to support the very policies that forced the United Nations to intervene. We recommend that the Council state clearly and unequivocally that it rejects the policies of hatred and war espoused by the Belgrade regime; that it does not tolerate abuses of human rights; and that it fully supports the efforts of the International war crime Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to prosecute all - I repeat, all - those who have been indicted. For this reason, my delegation requests that the proposed invitation be put to the vote. Of course, our country will vote no.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  26. Allowing any representative of that leadership to participate in this or any other meeting of the Council flouts the indictments, undermines the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and sets us on a dangerous moral and legal course that sends the wrong message to the world about what this great body is doing here today and eliminates and undermines the seriousness ofthis gathering, at which I am particularly grateful to see Mr. Bildt, Mr. Solana and other major representatives ofthe world community. There is no room in this debate for a representative of this regime, which continues its repressive tactics at home and its policies of nationalist extremism abroad and which helped fuel four Balkan wars over the last decade.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  27. My delegation must object to the proposal to allow Mr. Jovanovie, or anyone else purporting to represent his Government, to address the Council. We would like to request a vote on this invitation. He represents a Government whose senior leadership has been indicted for war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law. The Tribunal that indicted their leaders was established by the Council itself, with the full support and participation of every member of the Council - including those supporting his participation today.

    2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source

  28. You will recall from our previous work in regard to ending the war in Bosnia that France and the United States never wavered in their support of the war crimes Tribunal, and that without that Tribunal the Dayton Peace Agreement would not have been possible in its present form. I am deeply concerned at attacks on it that have been uttered here today by other delegations. While specific criticisms are always welcome, the charges of bias are not only not proven, they are not accurate. The countries uttering these criticisms were full participants in the Dayton process. They agreed to what was being done, and I do not think that the criticisms are justified, valid or productive. Again, Mr. President, thank you very much for the opportunity to address you and Judge Jorda.

    2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source

  29. We look forward to hearing the views of the Secretariat, the views of Judge Jorda and Carla Del Ponte, and those of other members of the Security Council. We look forward to working in partnership with the Government of Sierra Leone to move forward in this direction. Finally, let me turn to the question of Rwanda. This Tribunal has obviously moved more slowly than any of us are satisfied with, but it has moved, and although we are concerned about some inefficiencies in it - inefficiencies that we have addressed and will continue to address directly with the people responsible- I want to reaffirm our Government's support for it. Mr. President, I thank you for calling a meeting on this issue of immense importance.

    2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source

  30. I want to also note with very high approval that when the Lome Agreement was signed last year the Secretary-General of the United Nations noted in a reservation, as the Secretary-General's representative witnessed the Agreement, that Lome could not be considered an obstacle to the prosecution of those charged with fundamental violations of international humanitarian law. That was an important and far- sighted reservation set down by the Secretary-General and his staff in the Office of Legal Affairs. I commend them for their foresight, and I take note of that reservation with the highest approval from my Government. Our Government is committed to the rapid creation of a vigorous internationally backed mechanism, or the extension of existing mechanisms, to address these grave acts of inhumanity.

    2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source

  31. Zacklin, who I see is with us today, are something that we need to learn more about. I look forward to hearing a serious, sustained discussion of the options before us. My Government would like to do whatever is to be done swiftly and efficiently. Creating a new tribunal probably would not fulfil that criteria, as Mr. Zacklin himself has indicated previously, but some form of international umbrella, as suggested by the President of Sierra Leone and as proposed by many other people here. This is something that I believe must be looked at very positively and with a view towards action at the earliest possible opportunity.

    2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source

  32. In recent weeks, and in recent days, I have had talks with many members of the Council, members of the Secretariat and Carla del Ponte about this important issue. We take note of the fact that, according to well- confirmed press reports, President Kabbah has already addressed communications to the Secretary-General on this issue and that he has asked for the extension of some international war crimes umbrella to cover the people about whom we are talking, the leaders of the RUF. We look forward to hearing the expert views of the Secretary-General and of the experts in the Legal Division on how to proceed. Some form of extension of the international war crimes umbrella to cover these odious people must be undertaken. The actual details, as we have heard in this Council from Mr.

    2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source

  33. President Jorda, while I know that your primary responsibility in addressing us today is to discuss your work in the former Yugoslavia, your presence here reminds us of the important role that justice and reconciliation play in peace processes around the world. Nowhere is this need greater than in Sierra Leone. Mr. President, with your permission, I would like to address that issue, because it is directly related to the subject that we are here to talk about today. As we have discussed in this Council before, no mistake should be made about our Government's attitude towards the leaders of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), who have created this terrible tragedy in Sierra Leone. We do not believe that Sierra Leone can have a peaceful and stable future until they are brought to justice.

    2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source

  34. In particular, we support his two principal recommendations, on the delegation of pre- trial management responsibilities and the designation of ad [item judges to increase trial capacity. Above all, we must ensure that any reforms reinforce rather than distract from the core mandate of the Council. Our task is to strengthen the Tribunal's ability to bring criminals to justice. We would oppose any changes that would weaken the Tribunal's capacity to do the important job set before it. We must ensure that our efforts to streamline the Tribunal do not in any way complicate the ability of the Prosecutor to apprehend those at large.

    2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source

  35. I also want to point out in the clearest possible terms that long- term peace and stability in the Balkans will not be possible as long as the current leadership in Belgrade is in power. Those people who have been indicted also should be brought to justice. My Government welcomes Judge Jorda's proposals on ways to streamline the Tribunal's operations in order to reduce the current backlog and improve the efficiency of the Court. This is vitally important. Much of the criticism that has been directed at the Tribunal's operations has validity. Let us not shrink from the truth, even when it is critical, because we must deal with the problems in order to make the process work.

    2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source

  36. Creating these Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda is an historic achievement. Perhaps they were not perfect in every respect, because they were setting new precedents at every stage, but they are historic, and they must succeed. Our Government is committed to that. Any criticisms we may make- in terms of operations, management, budgets, processes - must be understood at all times within the context of the fact that this is criticism from friends, designed to improve operations. The objectives of the Dayton Peace Agreement, now almost five years old, cannot be fulfilled until the people responsible for these crimes are in the jurisdiction of the war crimes Tribunal and prosecuted. I am delighted that Mr. Krajisnik is now in The Hague, and I await the day when Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Miladic and others will be delivered to The Hague.

    2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source

  37. At the outset, I would like to talk about four things: your work in general, and the Balkans, Rwanda and Sierra Leone specifically, because these issues embrace a core goal of the United States, which is to find every means possible to bring to justice people who might sometimes escape the law if it is left only to domestic purposes. So important is this issue in the eyes of my Government that Secretary of State Albright has created a special position simply for this issue, filled by my friend and old colleague, David Sheffer, who has come up from Washington again today to join us at the Council for the second time in two weeks. He is seated behind me to my right, and I welcome him back to the Security Council again today. The United States remains committed to bringing to justice those responsible for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia.

    2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source

  38. I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for holding this important meeting today. Let me join everyone else in welcoming Judge Jorda to the Security Council. Judge Jorda, I would like to thank you for your presentation. I apologize for being unable to hear all of it, but I will read it carefully. I already have the highlights, and I want to begin by expressing my Government's strong support for your efforts and to take note of the fact that, like our President for the month of June, you come from France, and I am therefore doubly delighted to be bracketed between two such distinguished representatives of the international community and of the Government of France.

    2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source

  39. As we proceed with our discussions today and tomorrow, and as we move forward in the coming weeks, I hope we will all draw inspiration from what Ambassador Greenstock, Ambassador van Walsum and Ambassador Andjaba saw when they made their trip to Kananga a month ago: thousands of ordinary Congolese people lining the streets of that city, deep, deep in the heart of a beleaguered and isolated area, thousands of ordinary Congolese shouting, "Peace, peace, peace". Let us help those people fulfil their hopes and dreams. This, members of the Council and my friends from the Political Committee of the Lusaka Agreement, is the best possible reason for us to continue working for implementation of the Lusaka Agreement and for peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source

  40. In conclusion, let me remind us all that we have come here today to bolster a peace process that, while imperilled, is one to which we are all committed. We have not come here out of a sense of charity, or simply to right past wrongs - although that must be done - but because we all recognize that peace in the Congo and peace and democracy throughout Africa are in the national interests of us all: Europeans, Asians, Americans, others in the Western hemisphere, friends and neighbours alike.

    2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source

  41. At that time the Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe reminded us that our commitment to peace efforts - from the many efforts of the United Nations around the world to our own commitment in the United States, for instance, to the Middle East peace process - must be strong enough to survive numerous setbacks, some of them catastrophic and seemingly fatal. The representative of Zimbabwe warned us that in Africa, like everywhere else, we must be prepared to accept setbacks and not let them deter us from moving ahead. I believe that one should accept good advice, especially when it comes from such an esteemed colleague. Setbacks are, unfortunately, part of any peace process, but they should not diminish our resolve; they should increase it.

    2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source

  42. But those were the borders that the countries of Africa chose to maintain when they became independent. And once having made that decision, the leaders must figure out a way to live within those boundaries. Or, if they wish to change them, they may change them voluntarily, as happened in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere, but not through wars. All of this means that we cannot give up hope. Leadership can make a difference; it must make a difference. Last January, when we embarked on the "month of Africa", we said that 2000 would be the "year of Africa", and you, Mr. President, have set a very high standard by maintaining the attention of the Security Council with respect to these issues.

    2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source

  43. I categorically reject the notion that Africa is not ready for democracy, or that it needs "strong men" or dictators to ensure stability, or that among certain peoples or tribes conflict is inevitable. Such opinions, which we all heard in regard to Bosnia as well, are uninformed and, in subliminal form at a minimum, carry a racist connotation. They were wrong in Bosnia; they were wrong in Kosovo; they are wrong in Africa. Let us also stand together to reject the notion that has gained some prominence among commentators that some States have become "failed States". States do not fail; leaders do. Much is made of the artificial nature of African borders, and many claim that this makes conflicts inevitable. I share the concern about those borders and about the way they were drawn in the late nineteenth century.

    2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source

  44. I heard this in Bosnia; I heard it in Kosovo; I heard it in Viet Nam; and in an earlier era we heard it in regard to the great European Powers, which have finally, after a century of brutality, put their internal differences behind them so that, today, wars in the central part of Europe, once so common, are no longer possible. I hope that we will see, in our lifetimes and in our professional careers, the leaders of Africa reach the same level of achievement. If they do so, they will have done it much faster than the Europeans did, but I hope they can - as Ambassador Levitte so eloquently, but I regret to say unsuccessfully, put it to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi when we were in Addis Ababa four or five days before that war broke out - learn from Europe's mistakes.

    2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source

  45. We cannot allow a situation occur where the ex-FAR and Interahamwe resume their 1995-1996 campaign of terror inside Rwanda. All of this should be done to strengthen Lusaka. Let us recall again that this is not an outside-imposed agreement, but an African initiative: as Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim put it, an African solution to an African problem. There are some who say that Congo's struggle and the slow progress of Lusaka somehow prove that in some places failure is certain - that people are simply predisposed to killing each other.

    2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source

  46. The fact that these groups are still allowed to stay in business is truly unacceptable. They are among the most odious groups in Africa, if not in the world, and they must be dealt with through concerted regional action. Thirdly, a discussion of withdrawing Rwandan and Ugandan forces should not in any way detract from the obligations of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to participate in the national dialogue, to allow other Congolese parties the same right, and to abide by the results of the process. And fourthly, in regard to this point, let us not let this discussion detract from the legitimate need to take into account the security concerns of Rwanda and of Uganda. Those are legitimate - although the explosion of fighting in Kisangani, which has nothing to do with those needs, was extraordinarily lamentable.

    2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source

  47. I think that this recommendation is extremely appropriate, given recent events. That is one of the major things we will be discussing. But, as I support the Secretary-General's position, I would like to underscore a few critical points. First of all, in no way does prioritizing the withdrawal of the forces that fought each other in Kisangani diminish the long-standing call of the Security Council, which is on the record in resolutions, for the withdrawal of all - I repeat, all - foreign forces. We are not in any way, shape or form abandoning Lusaka by accepting, as I hope and believe we should, the prioritization recommended to us by the Secretary-General. Secondly, there is an urgent need for all parties to abandon all support to non-signatory armed groups, particularly the ex-Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR) and Interahamwe.

    2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source

  48. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement is one of the few things standing between order in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its degeneration into warlord-dominated, resource-driven satrapies. Last January, when we in this Chamber sat with the seven Presidents of the region, a commitment was made to redouble our efforts for peace. I hope that that will be the result of this very important meeting that you are chairing today, Mr. President, only one level below the chief-of-State level. In order to bolster the peace process, the Secretary-General has recommended the reordering of some of the Lusaka tasks, particularly the sequencing of foreign troop withdrawals. He suggests that priority be given to the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan forces from the Kisangani area.

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  49. But I must say, in all candor, what my Government has already said publicly. I am obligated and obliged to repeat here in public that we do not believe that the renunciation of the facilitator appointed by the OAU and attacks on the national dialogue can be regarded as anything other than an attack on the Lusaka peace process. If there are differences between any parties in this Chamber and the facilitator, let those be ironed out. But let us not attack the process itself unless we are ready to confront the extraordinary implications of that. I have heard the problems that the Government in Kinshasa has with the national dialogue. May be some of them are justified. But an attack on the process itself can only be regarded as an attack on Lusaka.

    2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source

  50. Without your personal involvement, I think the chances are very high that the fighting would still be going on. As for the fighting in Equateur Province between the armed forces of the Congo and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), that too is a serious problem. It is threatening to bring the war closer to the major population centres. I say it quite frankly today, in the presence of the signatories to the Lusaka Agreement - and, in this case in particular, in the presence of the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the representative of the MLC - that we need to see a willingness on your part to halt the fighting. Let me turn now to the national dialogue. Again, I speak with great respect for the sovereign Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source