YouSaid · the spoken record

Olhaye

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631
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1993-01-29
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2013-10-22
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un-security-council

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  1. measures to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid by all necessary means. It would represent a serious misreading of the Council's intentions by the Serbs and could only further damage and retard their eventual acceptance into the world community. Naked aggression simply cannot be seen to succeed, The broad future political dimensions of Bosnia have in fact been already determined, as attested to by the signature of the Serbs themselves to the nine constitutional principles. This will be a single, independent State, and at this point, efforts designed to unilaterally alter this fact or the country's boundaries by force of arms and acts against humanity will not be allowed. It is this aspect of the situation that makes the killing and suffering so tragic.

    1993-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3200 (1993) · source

  2. Should the Serbs refuse to sign the plan, they could then pursue their objectives only by a return to their inhuman policy of "ethnic cleansing" and by increasing their crimes against humanity: the detention camps; the heavy bombardment of population centres, as we are now witnessing in Srebrenica; and the denial of humanitarian aid to the suffering. It is inconceivable that they could harbour any illusions regarding the world's almost~certain violent reaction to a return to such a heinous state of affairs. At the very least, in addition to the restrictions in the present resolution - which most certainly will wreak further havoc on the Yugoslav economy - as well as the recently approved no-fly-zone enforcement, there would have to be'a redressing of the arms imbalance between the adversaries and.

    1993-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3200 (1993) · source

  3. In banning the transshipment of supplies through Yugoslavia and the movement of goods along the Danube and by impounding all Yugoslav aircraft, rolling stock and trucks, the resolution will certainly bring economia activity to a near-halt. Placing a freeze on Yugoslav international financial assets will make the leaders of that country realize, if nothing else, that the world is now indeed very serious. They can have few illusions about the Council's determination to bring peace to Bosnia. We hope that they do not continue to believe that events in other parts of the world will somehow conspire to protect them from the inevitable course of justice, and that such events do not lead them into serious miscalculations or to' underestimate the Council's resolve.

    1993-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3200 (1993) · source

  4. By setting a firm time period of nine days for the Serbs to respond, it leaves little doubt as to what that response should be. The resolution again recognizes the source of the Bosnian Serbs' intransigence, namely, the leadership of Serbia and Montenegro. Without its provision of manpower, supplies, logistics and military equipment, we feel they would have long ago signed and implemented the Vance-Owen plan. Consequently, the teeth of the resolution are aimed at Serbia and Montenegro. The consequences for Yugoslavia under the resolution just adopted by the Council are so far the most severe and may effectively seal off that country from the world's economy, finance, commerce and the easy movement of people.

    1993-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3200 (1993) · source

  5. My delegation would like to add its firm Support to the resolution just adopted by the Council seeking to severely tighten economic sanctions and trade embargoes specifically on Serbia and Montenegro, By its terms, breadth and tone, it represents a' clear expression of the firm resolve, impatience and unity of the world community to bring this terrible chapter of recent history to a swift close.. This can be brought about by the simple addition of two signatures to the Vance-Owen peace plan, which the world now in effect demands from the Serbs. The resolution perhaps signals a halt to the endless, protracted good-faith negotiations of the past, so often converted into a mechanism for attempting unilateral changes in the underlying situational factors.

    1993-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3200 (1993) · source

  6. With peace and stability, Mozambique will be able to contribute to and to enjoy this process, a fact of which both jeaders so far appear well aware.

    1993-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3198 (1993) · source

  7. As W have stressed before, the full use of local manpower and administrative expertise should be a priority for the United Nations and the international relief agencies, both as a way of involving Mozambicans in the development process and of creating maximum employment and income injection into the economy, Bearing in mind the magnitude of tasks involved in Mozambique and the logistical problems which have occurred to delay the implementation of some key activities, it is all the more imperative that President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama meet to maintain and strengthen the desire for peace and their mutual confidence in the total effort and in each other. This is a pivotal period in the history of that region of Africa - a window of opportunity for development which must be seized.

    1993-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3198 (1993) · source

  8. We are happy to see that the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination has begun its activities as outlined by the Rome meeting on humanitarian assistance, and that it is preparing a consolidated humanitarian assistance programme for 1993-1994. The goals of assisting resettlement by promoting essential services at the local level ~ road repair, agricultural production, water supply and sanitation, health care and education, and so on ~ and to open up the long isolated RENAMO areas appear well focused.

    1993-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3198 (1993) · source

  9. We hope the multiparty conference scheduled for 20 April to discuss the draft electoral law is able to complete it and that it can then be approved by the Assembly to enable the Government to set up the National Elections Commission. All this is necessary to begin the actual election process and to hold elections, and it is of clear concern that both the proposed election date of October 1993 has proved to be impossible and that no alternative timetable has been substituted. Such a matter cannot be left hanging, and we urge all parties to work diligently to confirm new dates. Combined with the cease~fire and the disarmament of Mozambique will be the problem of providing immediate humanitarian aid to the many returning refugees, displaced persons, demilitarized soldiers and the general poor.

    1993-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3198 (1993) · source

  10. At the same time, we support the efforts of the Secretary-General in his continuing to press those members who have promised military units to put them in place expeditiously. We could then press fo1 measures to establish the combined military force contemplated under the quidance of the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force. We also fully support the steps outlined by the Secretary-General to move forward urgently with demining, particularly of critical roads and fields, and throughout the country in general. Development will be slow indeed in movement, settlement and agriculture until this problen is overcome. Progress in the electoral process would be a strong confidence -builder for all concerned.

    1993-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3198 (1993) · source

  11. We are particularly hopeful at the fact that the proposed date of May 1993 for the full deployment of ONUMOZ military units is on the way to being met and that a status-of-forces agreement can be concluded with the Government immediately. The absence of this agreement is a needless nuisance and a hinderance to the mobility and effectiveness of ONUMOZ. We are also concerned by the sluggish pace of demobilization, concentration and assembly. We hope that the leadership of RENAMO can be persuaded to modify its refusal to begin the assembly and demobilization of its troops until substantially all United Nations forces are deployed, for the continued presence of armed military units is clearly a danger.

    1993-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3198 (1993) · source

  12. However, as we all realize, though pivotal, the purpose of the General Peace Agreement and the presence of ONUMOZ is not to rely totally on this basic desire as'a solution to Mozambique's many problems. The goal is both to strengthen this desire and to make it physically, militarily and logistically impossible to thwart. For this, it is dependent upon the actions and measures taken by the parties in Mozambique and the United Nations. From this perspective, my delegation must add its voice to those expressing deep concern at the pace - or lack of pace - of the implementation of several crucial elements of the General Peace Agreement and the ONUMOZ mandate.

    1993-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3198 (1993) · source

  13. There is perhaps no better overview of the situation in Mozambique and its daunting complexity than the draft resolution before us, which touches upon so many diverse areas. It also underscores the manner in which these issues are interrelated, so that a delay in the implementation of one invariably hinders the progress of another. But above all, to the credit of all parties in Mozambique and as a message to everyone, there has been a clear desire for peace and a willingness to abide by the spirit of that objective. Troubling though they may be, therefore, it is perhaps against this background that the unending delays, false starts, non-starts and missed dates should be viewed.

    1993-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3198 (1993) · source

  14. Allow me at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. Your rare diplomatic and negotiating skills are serving us very well indeed in our deliberation of the many complex and pressing issues before the Council. We also wish to express our deep gratitude to Ambassador Terence O'Brien of New Zealand for his effective and inspiring leadership last month. My delegation wishes to express its high appreciation for the thoroughness, clarity and forthrightness of the Secretary-General's report on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). There is no question that it will enable members of the Council better to understand events in that country and to make more effective contributions to policy guidelines.

    1993-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3198 (1993) · source

  15. We feel that it must deter them from the nature and level of their aggression; otherwise they risk the further involvement of the world community in this tragic conflict. Certainly, the arms imbalance which has all along favoured the Serbs can only be called further into question should they be permitted to employ the air to further their ambitions. Hence, however late, the significance of our decision today, which goes a long way towards confronting this intransigence - indeed, a stubborn defiance - with a united stand.

    1993-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3191 (1993) · source

  16. The lack of enforcement mechanisms in many of our resolutions has permitted the intransigent party to act with impunity, unafraid of any consequences of its deeds, That is why my delegation considers this draft resolution on violations of the ban on military flights in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a landmark in the Bosnian conflict. It is the first real step towards addressing the actions of the aggressors in this conflict and draws a clear line beyond which further disregard of our efforts and positions will not go umanswered. It is an indication of the growing impatience of the world community with the intransigence of the Serbs and can only act as a powerful symbol of its new resolve.

    1993-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3191 (1993) · source

  17. With the acceptance of the Vance-Owen peace plan by all parties to the violent conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina - save of course by the Serbs - the way is now open to realize a cease-fire and peace in that abused country. We have not been in this position before, and a clear message must be sent that the moment will not be lost. Too often in the past, we have witnessed an increase in hostile actions by the Serbs at the very moment when negotiations were thought to be progressing in good faith.

    1993-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3191 (1993) · source

  18. We hope a mechanism can be created for the utilization of such diverse talents towards better attainment of the inseparable national and international goals.

    1993-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3188 (1993) · source

  19. This has to be done by the Somalis themselves - every one of them. The vital question we face is the manner in which this can best be achieved. It is a matter of concern, not only to the Somalis themselves, but to the world community, given the sensitivity of the issue. My delegation remains optimistic that available skilled and trained Somali manpower could be lured to participate in the reconstruction of their shattered country. Thousands of such professionally qualified people, who had been forced to flee the country, are everywhere waiting for an opportunity to return. An atmosphere of welcome, a concerted effort to employ their skills, must pervade the operations of the United Nations and international agencies.

    1993-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3188 (1993) · source

  20. | Perhaps our role in Somalia is at bottom to provide a secure basis for its re-emergence institutionally. Undoubtedly, the Somalis who have been spared the ravages of war, of death and starvation are profoundly thankful for the efforts of the international community. They anxiously anticipate a return to normality, to peace and personal safety, which will lead to a genuine re-emergence of political expression and participation. Perhaps Ambassador Oakley summed up well the yearnings of the ordinary Somali: "From now on the people of Somalia will have the power, and that power will not come from the barrel of the gun", We believe this can be achieved. In the final analysis, reconstructing Somalia will entail many critical choices which will determine its political, economic and social destiny.

    1993-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3188 (1993) · source

  21. Somalia is in many ways a modern anomaly, a land with no effective mechanism for governance. No operational institutions of any kind exist - financial institutions, government offices, schools, hospitals, police, military or political organs of government. It is in key respects a non-State. The civil strife dealt a deadly blow to the long history and tradition of a single race sharing the same land, customs, foods, language and religion. However, Somalia does offer positive encouragement. There are few long-standing irreconcilable ideological differences, or obvious widespread discrepancies in living standards. Clearly, in Somalia we have witnessed a political and social collapse manifested in human and material destruction. But the underlying perception remains, the sense of "nationhood".

    1993-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3188 (1993) · source

  22. We believe the draft resolution we are about to adopt sufficiently reflects the mandate, as well as the resources, desired by the Secretary-General to fulfil his responsibilities. Particularly noteworthy is the attention given to matters of transition and coordination between the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and the expanded United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), the continuing need to realize full and effective disarmament and pacification, to refocus our priorities from purely humanitarian aid to rebuilding and reconstruction, and to help the Somali people achieve political governance. The emphasis devoted to questions of de-mining, the return of refugees and the integration of Somali civil society in nation-building highlights a complex picture of what has to be done to bring Somalia to being a 'country.

    1993-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3188 (1993) · source

  23. Equally, we wish to express our deep gratitude to the more than 20 countries that, through a United States initiative, mounted the decisive humanitarian intervention to confront widespread insecurity, lawlessness and extortion, and to enable the humanitarian agencies to reach and care for the dying, starving and malnourished. This unprecedented humanitarian intervention underscored the international community's response to Somalia's long agony, when inadequate and protracted multinational measures failed to make any significant impact on the ever-deepening anarchy and ignominious deprivation. Thanks to the impressive coordination of military and civilian efforts, remarkable results have been achieved within a short period. As indicated earlier, my delegation found the Secretary-General's report most informative and clarifying.

    1993-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3188 (1993) · source

  24. I wish warmly to congratulate you, Sir, on assuming the presidency of the Council for this month. You have demonstrated effectiveness and rare personal skills in conducting our work. May I also pay my sincere tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Ahmed Snoussi of Morocco, for the exemplary manner in which he executed his responsibilities last month. We wish to record our sincere appreciation for the vision and determination demonstrated by the Secretary-General in elaborating bold and far-reaching measures, as contained in his report (S/25354) of 3 March, to return Somalia to being a safe and functioning entity.

    1993-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3188 (1993) · source

  25. We are heartened, however, by the spirit of goodwill and commitment demonstrated by the Council during the negotiations of the draft resolution we are about to adopt, and we have every reason to believe that the Secretary-General, in the light of the ongoing talks in Addis Ababa, will not only seize the opportunity to apply intense pressure to bring about an early cessation of hostilities, but may also, in due course, reflect upon the possibility of remodelling the existing mandate into a peace-keeping option, given the endemic mistrust that may continue to persist even if agreements are reached.

    1993-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3168 (1993) · source

  26. Any harm inflicted upon such vital infrastructures cannot but be treated as unwarranted and deliberate sabotage punishable under law. The country is, as we all know now, slowly sliding into anarchy and violence, reminiscent of Somalia's irretrievable mayhem and tragedy, which will undoubtedly for ever remain a scar on humanity. We sincerely believe the international community has seen something in Somalia which is not altogether impossible in Angola. We can scarcely afford to be seen as washing our hands of or abandoning Angola at this juncture in its tragedy.

    1993-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3168 (1993) · source

  27. In this respect, we put our faith in the delegations' in Addis Ababa negotiating a framework to this end, trusting that they will not fail in their efforts to succeed in order to carry the country out of the present grave predicament. We are indeed highly disturbed by the involvement of foreign forzes in Angola, in total violation of the inviolability of Angola's borders, national integrity and sovereignty. The alleged interference can only perpetuate the misery and destabilization of a nation that has already had enough share of its own misfortunes. We strongly warn those who are easily tempted to plunge into Angola's internal civil war that there is no substitute for good-neighbourliness. We view with the gravest concern UNITA's relentless push towards sensitive national economic outlets.

    1993-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3168 (1993) · source

  28. We deeply share the Legitimate concerns expressed by the Secretary-General over the intense and ever escalating fighting that now embraces all parts of Angola following the rejection of the election results of last September by UNITA, which then resorted to fighting. As one eyewitness has put it, "It was never bad as this, even at the height of the cold war." The situation is further complicated by the unprecedented political assassinations, which can only further deepen Angola's agony. Let us be frank - this is not a war that either side can win in this way, and it is bound to be long and costly unless both parties head the call of the international community to cease fighting immediately.

    1993-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3168 (1993) · source

  29. Hence we saw the creation of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), an expression of the international community's complete commitment to the peace process in Angola. The United Nations Mission in Angola, under the able leadership of Margaret Anstee, has played a key role in ensuring the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to it by this Council, within the bounds of possibility, in the light of the inherent and inescapable constraints - shortage of time and inadequate resources and authority. The meeting of the Council today is therefore deemed very crucial to consider the comprehensive and timely report of the Secretary-General on Angola, for which we are indeed grateful.

    1993-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3168 (1993) · source

  30. 'Taken together with the preceding 14 years of guerrilla wars against Portugese rule, the pact in effect put an end to 30 years of bloodshed that killed and maimed hundreds of thousands of people and ruined the economy of an otherwise potentially rich country. This happy ending of a sordid saga of one of Africa's longest enduring wars and East-West rivalry on the continent was, however, greeted with a mixture of joy and scepticism, given the brutal impact of the war in general, and the deep-rooted bitterness and mutual mistrust of the sides in particular. Everyone involved in those long and complicated negotiations never underestimated the tenuousness of the cease-fire, as well as the awesome task of successfully managing the period of transition to democratic rule.

    1993-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3168 (1993) · source

  31. Let me at the outset, Sir, join, on behalf of my delegation, those who have complimented you on your assumption of the presidency for this month. Your sound leadership qualities and fortitude under intense pressure have been in evidence during this time. Let me also express our admiration and respect to your predecessor, Ambassador Gharekhan of India, to whom we wish every success in his new undertaking. It was on 31 May 1991 in Lisbon that the Government of Angola and the leadership of UNITA formally signed a historic peace accord to end 16 years of gruesome and destructive civil war.

    1993-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3168 (1993) · source