YouSaid · the spoken record

Olhaye

lines on the record: 631
first: 1993-01-29
most recent: 2013-10-22
sittings or episodes: 73
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Given the obvious level of mistrust still existing between the two sides, the number of post- election questions raised concerning the last elections, and the lack of disarmament at that time, the Council must make certain that the Secretary-General and UNAVEM II have the manpower and support they require to monitor effectively the cease-fire process and the elections. Nevertheless, we will all be guided by the political will demonstrated by the Angolans themselves. Only when there is evidence that the cease-fire is holding and that concrete steps are being taken towards national reconciliation can the international community be expected to undertake all the measures needed to assist the Angolans effectively. Without political will and good faith, the whole process remains precarious and unstable.”
1994-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3477 (1994) · source
“Undoubtedly, at this point they will take their cue from him, which makes it all the more imperative for him to step forward. There will be much to do in separating the forces and disarming them, in reconstituting the army and the government, and in completing the arrangements for the final phase of the 1992 election process. Fortunately, by resolution 952 (1994) we have laid the ground for a sufficient United Nations presence in Angola during the initial peace phase to avoid some of the shortcomings that plagued our efforts in the last peace/elections phase.”
1994-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3477 (1994) · source
“No doubt because we have travelled the peace-accord road in Angola before - twice before, in fact, the last time all the way to elections - some reservations are evident. Clearly, there is need for assurances that the fighting has indeed halted and that the cease-fire called for is taking hold. In addition, while, through his support staff and through communiques, Mr. Savimbi has indicated his support for the Accord, there is little doubt that his physical presence and his approval in person are necessary to allay the lingering concerns harboured by his army and his supporters. Heavy fighting right up to the day of signing will, it is hoped, not compromise Mr. Savimbi's ability to convince his forces to lay down their arms and begin the actual process of national reconciliation.”
1994-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3477 (1994) · source
“We have read with great interest the report of the Secretary-General of 4 December on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM ID, and his assessment of the situation in that country. Together with his letter dated 7 December 1994 addressed to the President of the Security Council, the report reinforces the feeling that the situation in Angola has turned the corner, and that there is a real desire on the part of everyone to complete the difficult journey to a cease-fire, peace, national reconciliation and stability. If that is indeed the case, the draft resolution before us, by which we would extend the mandate of UNAVEM II and expand the scope of United Nations assistance to Angola during its initial transition phase, deserves to be supported.”
1994-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3477 (1994) · source
“My delegation is very pleased to welcome to the Security Council the Minister for External Relations of Angola, Mr. Venancio De Moura; I thank him deeply for his very important statement. Equally, we are delighted to see in our midst Maitre Alouin Blondin Beye, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. We wish to express our deepest appreciation to Maitre Beye, who, throughout these protracted and most difficult negotiations, has demonstrated courage, rare wisdom, dedication and tenacity. The historic agreement signed at Lusaka, Zambia, on 20 November 1994 between the Government of Angola and the Unido Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) evidences the encouraging developments that have taken place in Angola.”
1994-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3477 (1994) · source
“This draft resolution, initiated by members of the Non-Aligned Movement in the Security Council, simply says: Let us do what we wanted to do in the first place, and do it now.”
1994-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3475 (1994) · source
“My delegation therefore feels that the effort to constrain the Serb war machine needs to continue with maximum effort. Resolution 820 (1993), particularly paragraph 12, contains the authority and provisions, as well as the spirit, of what the draft resolution intends, namely, totally to shackle the Serb war-making capability. It is difficult to imagine objections to such a move in the light of recent Serb assaults in Bihac and Sarajevo and across the borders of Bosnia. Unless this violent, unreasonable and now contemptuous force is checked, we may face the very real possibility of a serious escalation of hostilities involving many more players in and around the Balkans. Had we simply implemented the provisions of our previous resolutions resolutely from the beginning, clearly we would not be where we are today.”
1994-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3475 (1994) · source
“What is unsettling at this juncture are the lessons of history, which call for the preparation of a revised final proposal encompassing new conditions thought to be more favourable to the Serbs. Predictably, the Bosnian Government will be heavily pressured to accept the proposal, which they probably will, only to have it rejected yet again by the Bosnian Serbs. There will follow a period in which their behaviour is confrontational and aggressive, causing a reconsideration of the proposal, and the process continues to repeat itself until eventually there will be very little left for the Bosnian Government to concede. There may, in fact, no longer be a Bosnia. Very simply, my delegation believes the Council can intervene to halt this process, and that honour demands that we simply do what we have already said we are going to do.”
1994-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3475 (1994) · source
“And, right on schedule, there is growing sentiment, it seems, to adjust the international peace plan to make it more attractive again to the Serbs. Obviously, anything done to make the final plan more attractive would simply amount to rewarding the Serbs for their aggression, to which, along with numerous other things, the Council has time and time again declared its firm opposition. The stark truth is that the Bosnian Serbs have defiantly embarked upon a course of embarrassing the Council, UNPROFOR, the United Nations and NATO - in fact, the entire international community. The odd thing is that in so many ways and for so long this has been accepted. The only difference is that we are now clearly poised to accept the invincibility of the Serbs, and the consequences are unquestionably disastrous.”
1994-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3475 (1994) · source
“Particularly galling about the conflict in Bosnia has been the transparent manner in which the United Nations arms embargo has with our knowledge so singularly affected the Bosnian Government, leaving virtually unscathed the military capability of the Serbs. The dramatic turnaround and assault on Bihac is a result of this continuing arms imbalance, combined with the incursion and participation across Bosnia's international borders of Croatian Serbs and Serb-armed Muslim renegades. Not surprisingly, Bihac is ready to fall. There are murmurings, growing louder, which say that Bihac cannot be saved, that the United Nations and NATO can do nothing to reverse the Serb assault and that the situation is apparently hopeless.”
1994-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3475 (1994) · source
“Then, in order to seize the initiative from the United Nations or the international peacemakers, the Serbs embark upon a programme of outrageous and confrontational behaviour designed to shatter the apparent unity and resolve of the Council or the apparently united front of the peacemakers, throwing policy into confusion and causing recriminations between members, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), until all is in disarray. Once again, it seems the way out of this mess is sought in yet another form of concession to the Serbs by way of failure to implement clear Council resolutions or by the revision of peace proposals. Bihac fits this mould perfectly.”
1994-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3475 (1994) · source
“Each episode commences with the ceremonial laying down of the gauntlet, usually in the form of a clear and forthright Council resolution or a newly revised final peace plan laden with implicit punishment for dissenters and fully supported by the drafting Powers. Without fail, or at least usually, the Government of Bosnia accepts the resolution or the proposal and places the ball in the court of the Serbs, who, equally without fail, reject it.”
1994-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3475 (1994) · source
“My delegation is very pleased to welcome you, Sir, as our current President. We are certain that with your obvious dedication and tenacity you will provide the leadership and guidance the Council needs in these controversial times. We also wish to express our deep appreciation for the very capable and skilful manner in which Ambassador Madeleine Albright of the United States directed the affairs of the Council last month at such a high level of productivity and accomplishment. One must marvel at the consistent manner in which the pattern of events in Bosnia never changes, never surprises and remains so absolutely predictable.”
1994-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3475 (1994) · source
“It is an embarrassment to have the presidential building shelled in a so-called "safe area". Clearly, the Serb intention is to inject further discord into international efforts to bring peace. Their defiance must be firmly dealt with, and they must be made to understand that this behaviour will gain them nothing. The Croatian Serbs must realize as well that their military participation in Bosnia can only lead to their inclusion in enforcement actions. We therefore welcome the resolution just adopted to extend the provisions of resolution 836 (1993) onto Croatian territory.”
1994-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3461 (1994) · source
“We will soon lose the ability to restrain any of the players from seeking to benefit or strengthen their positions by acting unilaterally, thus forcing the hand of the United Nations and everyone else. The multi-pronged attack on the Bihac safe area has become yet another litmus test of the will and intentions of the United Nations and the Contact Group. Others will certainly be drawn into the conflict, making prospects for settlement even more remote. As a first step, a weapons-exclusion zone around the Bihac safe area must be declared and strongly enforced. In addition to being a no-fly zone, this zone must exclude aircraft, missiles, anti-aircraft guns, tanks and all other heavy weapons. The weapons-exclusion zone around Sarajevo must also be enforced.”
1994-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3461 (1994) · source
“To accompany such a direct challenge with aircraft, missiles and napalm bombs while at the same time allowing the Bosnian Serbs passage through Croatian territory, is totally unacceptable. The shelling, bombing and firing into the United Nations- declared safe area of Bihac that have been reported are likewise unacceptable. We can only wonder why in this conflagration the timely call for a strong air response against these forces as a show of resolve and determination on the part of the United Nations has not been heeded by UNPROFOR. The total contempt contained in these actions for the "safe-area" declaration, the no-fly zone resolution and Bosnia's territorial integrity is stunning, even if predictable and expected. As we know, events are moving and changing at an ever accelerating rate.”
1994-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3461 (1994) · source
“As we are all aware, the situation in the Bihac area, designated by the United Nations as a safe area has become very grave owing to the combined attack of the Croatian Serbs across the border of Bosnia and Herzegovina and with the Bosnian Serb forces. In its last statement before the Council, my delegation predicted that Serb forces and leadership would resort to outrageous and confrontational behaviour in a bid to throw the Contact Group mediators and the Council into disarray, unable to do firmly what we had announced we could do in such circumstances. The involvement of Croatian Serbs into Bosnia, a move which certainly tipped the balance in the confrontation between the Bosnian Government forces and the Bosnian Serbs, is bad enough.”
1994-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3461 (1994) · source
“Some sort of deal is increasingly seen as the only way. If we were to strengthen the hand of the Government of Bosnia now, we would only increase the sense of realism the Serbs must eventually come to accept. The lifting of the arms embargo must, therefore, be seen in the wider context of hastening the peace process. Prolonging the impasse, the agonies, the frustrations and hopelessness of one party to the peace process definitely defeats the very basis of fair play and undermines credibility.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption2 (1994) · source
“Now that the situation in Bosnia is fluid and the outcome less predictable, the perpetration of criminal acts against humanity may, in fact, be punished C a consideration upon which any would-be violator must reflect. In such a case, the mere issuance of an arrest warrant by a sitting tribunal would certainly act as a deterrent. 67 The present draft resolution, with its built-in time frame of six months before enactment, affords ample time for renewed diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution. Recent events indicate growing defections in the Serb army, with more and more people ready to lay down their arms in exchange for an ordinary life. There is evidence of an increase in desertions from the so-called Serb Republic and a weakening of will. At least among the general public, "compromise" is the new buzz word.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption2 (1994) · source
“Clearly, total victory through naked aggression and the gun no longer appears possible. The Council can strengthen this reality and thus the logic of settlement by lifting the arms embargo against the Government of Bosnia as proposed in the draft resolution before us. While some fear such a step now in the face of Bosnian advances could panic the Serbs and provoke them, my delegation feels that wild, unexpected behaviour is the norm for the Serbs to panic the mediators, and in any case would be less effective now. As a precaution, we support the call for the Secretary -General to continue planning for the orderly and safe deployment of UNPROFOR personnel that might, as a consequence, become necessary. Another step my delegation would stress is to move with all reasonable haste to expedite the work of the war crimes Tribunal.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption2 (1994) · source
“It is understandable, in this light, that the Bosnian Government should become disenchanted with the pace of events and reliance upon the words and actions of others and seek to make a more direct impact. The result has been the widespread redressing of the military imbalance forced upon them by Serbs throughout this long, 31-month war. Oddly enough, it grew out of the safe area of Bihac and has spread. The widely held notion of Serb invincibility has withered in the face of that age- old military equalizer, lack of supplies, a situation the Bosnians have faced throughout the conflict. The ability of the Serbs to dictate the pace and direction of events unilaterally has weakened, fortunately affording the international community a genuine opportunity to force a real solution.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption2 (1994) · source
“Designated safe areas remain almost uninhabitable human ghettos incapable of virtually any type of self-sufficiency. The threat of dwindling supplies is matched only by that of the threat to life created by constant shelling and sniper fire. This situation prevails even in the capital of Sarajevo, where safety, access and supplies are minimal, and the threat by the Serbs to resume the shelling of the city has again become a reality. With the coming of winter, the airport closed and the blue access road shut at will, prospects for difficult times ahead are real indeed. Nevertheless, aside from the resolutions calling for a lifting of the arms embargo as it applies to the Bosnian Government and the threat of tightening sanctions against Yugoslavia, little has been done directly against the Bosnian Serbs.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption2 (1994) · source
“Pressure has also been brought to bear through yet another General Assembly resolution this year calling for the Security Council to lift the arms embargo as it applies to the Government of Bosnia, a resolution stronger than the one adopted last year. Consequent on the Bosnian Serb rejection of the Contact Group's proposals we have a draft resolution introduced by a member of the Contact Group also calling for a lifting of the arms embargo as it applies to the Bosnian Government, including the Bosnian Croats. Combined, these measures are a clear reflection of mounting international opinion against the intransigence of the Bosnian Serbs in refusing to accept a solution that seems more than fair. In addition, international opinion has been hardened by the confrontational pattern of events in Bosnia.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption2 (1994) · source
“Similarly, it has weakened the position of some who would symp athize with them. Rejection has also confronted Yugoslavia with some hard choices in the face of a certain tightening of United Nations sanctions, leaving little choice but to impose and strengthen its own embargo against the Bosnian Serbs. While the last report of the International Conference Mission to Yugoslavia on the border-closure measures concludes that Yugoslavia is continuing to meet its commitments, a judgement we still hold in abeyance, it would probably indicate that resupplying the Bosnian Serbs will certainly be far more difficult than in the past.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption2 (1994) · source
“There have been numerous disingenuous attempts at negotiating an end to the war in Bosnia, with agreements openly flouting Council resolutions on not rewarding aggression, on protecting designated safe areas, on respecting cease-fire deadlines, and more. Yet, as evidence of their rapacious appetite for seizing even more Aethnically cleansed@territory, the Bosnian Serbs have simply found new ways to prolong this war, perhaps in the expectation C one well supported by events in Bosnia C that they could expect additional concessions. Unfortunately, they may have played their hand with too little regard for the possible action of other parties. The outright rejection of the 51-49 per cent proposal of the Contact Group has further turned opinion against the Bosnian Serbs, hardening the attitude of many who seek an end to this conflict.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption2 (1994) · source
“In our view, it had all the manifestations of a material breach of the main Security Council resolutions on this subject - in particular, resolutions 687 (1991) and 833 (1993). We demand that Iraq immediately complete its withdrawal of all military units recently deployed in the direction of the border with Kuwait. From now on, we believe, there is only one avenue available to Iraq - namely, that of seeking peace and learning to live peacefully with its smaller and weaker neighbour, the Kuwaiti nation. How that is to be achieved depends solely on Iraq, which must demonstrate peaceful intentions in concrete fashion and unequivocally to the international community. We believe that Iraq could do so, but it must have the necessary willingness and resolve. That is all it takes.”
1994-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3438 (1994) · source
“At the outset I congratulate you, Sir, most warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the current month. We are confident of your abilities and that the Council is in good hands. We also wish to express deep gratitude to Ambassador Yafiez-Barnuevo for successfully and capably guiding the work of the Council last month. My delegation deeply regrets Iraq's recent hostile and provocative intentions, which triggered worldwide outcry and condemnation. There is no doubt that my country did not hesitate to condemn these unjustified threats and intimidation against the people of Kuwait and against Kuwait's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence. This latest action was by no means an innocuous southward drive for training or for a change of climate.”
1994-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3438 (1994) · source
“To reward such behaviour would violate the remaining honour the United Nations retains in this whole episode. My delegation will therefore find it very difficult to lend its support to any draft resolution calling for the partial lifting of sanctions at the present moment.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“In view of the unabated belligerence and _ total defiance of the Bosnian Serbs and their persistent pursuit of the abhorrent practice of "ethnic cleansing", sanctions against them are clearly imperative, and my delegation therefore will support the relevant draft resolutions before us. However, we have many grave problems and doubts with respect to the draft resolution calling for partial lifting of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro in advance of actual performance and demonstration of good faith. We have found little consolation in the reports of new violations, particularly the hundreds of military flights at night. The consummate arrogance of their timing to coincide with the Council's consideration of this draft resolution is a measure of the contempt in which these people hold the international community.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“Will steps be taken to remedy the onerous military and humanitarian imbalance? Will the former Republic of Yugoslavia recognize Bosnia within its current borders? Will the former Republic of Yugoslavia agree to cooperate with the international war crimes Tribunal and surrender identified suspects for trial? Will Bosnia's safe areas and exclusion zones be more effectively protected, particularly in the light of the heightened aggression? Will the siege of Sarajevo and other safe areas be broken? These are some of the crucial issues that ought to have been substantially addressed before embarking on this fortuitous exercise of easing sanctions, an exercise which we find very troubling, untimely and unjust.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“Although he finally agreed to an initial 135 "viewers" as we may call them - since he finds the terms "monitor" or "observer" politically incorrect - this is a far cry from the 4,000 military monitors that the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) feels are necessary, or even the minimum 800 it says could perhaps do the barest minimum job if they had complete freedom of action, which the 135, working through the police of the former Republic of Yugoslavia, do not. One of the draft resolutions before us calls for the partial lifting of sanctions against the former Republic of Yugoslavia as a reward for its promise to enforce new sanctions against Bosnian Serbs. We hope that becomes a certainty. But what will the Bosnian Government receive in return for its prompt acceptance?”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“Hence the stunning proposal to reward Milosevic and the rump Yugoslavia in advance for their promise to strictly enforce the sanctions against fellow Serbs in Bosnia. Certainly, with his credentials, Milosevic should be required to perform prior to payment. And, remarkably, he initially expected us to take his word on the enforcement, rejecting outside monitors or observers.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“But, worst of all, the resumption of "ethnic cleansing" in several areas, driving out thousands of Muslims through rape, terror, brutality, detention and forced labour, is a cause for deep consternation. Even the Red Cross has labelled the situation as intolerable, abominable and a negation of the roots of humanitarian law. With history as their guide, the Bosnian Serbs obviously seek to panic the international community. They intend first to draw attention away from their rejection of the settlement plan and then to make us attempt to appease them with yet another offer. After all, with over 50 resolutions adopted but seldom enforced, the official acceptance of the territorial settlement proposed by the Contact Group naturally faces a similar fate.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“The Bosnian Serbs have begun with a predictable display of wild, outrageous confrontation, turning off all services to Sarajevo - where there is now no water, gas or electricity - and resuming sniper attacks and the shelling of civilians and of the airport, thus continuously disrupting and obstructing humanitarian-aid flights and visits by notables such as the Pope and the Defense Secretary of the United States. We might add to this long list the closing of the "blue route", the only access road for United Nations convoys. We might also mention the defiant movement of heavy weapons into weapons-exclusion zones, and the open violation of the ban on flights in the no-fly zones.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“The Contact Group has fashioned a land settlement plan which, although flying in the face of nearly every Council resolution condemning aggression and the acquisition of territory by force as unlawful and totally unacceptable, nevertheless awards the Bosnia Serbs 49 per cent of the land of Bosnia. In the expectation, no doubt, that the difficult party would be the Bosnian Government, the message was sent that terrible consequences would befall the side that refused this final proposal. Almost unexpectedly, the Bosnian Government accepted the proposal, while the Bosnian Serbs rejected it outright. We are now witnessing the familiar repetition of history and events in Bosnia.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“At the outset, Sir, I wish to congratulate you most warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. We are confident that your sound diplomatic skills will continue effectively to guide us. Equally, we would like to express our deep gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Yuliy Vorontsov of the Russian Federation, for the exemplary manner in which he conducted the work of the Council last month. With over three years of hostilities in Bosnia behind us, it is still impossible to discern patterns of action by the major players and to anticipate what, if anything, to expect next.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“But even its departure will not end the story, as the Secretary-General alerts us, for, with the economy and the infrastructure destroyed, large amounts of humanitarian assistance and international involvement will be needed in the long term, the cost of which mounts with each additional day of military rule. That is precisely what this resolution attempts to thwart.”
1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source
“The United Nations must retain its determination, its creativity, its capability and, of course, its means, or the future could become increasingly unpredictable - which means unsafe. My delegation found it possible despite certain lingering doubts and apprehensions to support the resolution, for some action is no doubt critically necessary. The illegal de facto regime has adopted a policy of worsening the situation in a highly visible way, and it continues to weaken, and wreak havoc upon, world resolve and determination. It expects then to fashion a solution to its own taste.”
1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source
“This resolution and the action it contemplates, however, raise a number of issues that it would be wise for the Council to reflect upon. After a period of ascendancy following the end of the cold war, democracies are coming under increasing pressure from many quarters. As in Haiti, we must not waver in our determination to assist them whenever possible and wherever practicable. We must also reflect upon the growing pattern of reliance upon ad hoc multinational intervention forces to mitigate or resolve conflicts or conflict-induced humanitarian crises. Should the United Nations continue to encounter difficulties in assembling the manpower and resources necessary to address such situations, as we have seen in Haiti and other places, we could face the prospect of diminishing credibility.”
1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source
“Following the Secretary-General's lead, the resolution expands on the third option he proposes and authorizes a multinational force under Chapter VII to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure of the leadership of the Haitian police and military. The aim is simple: the return of the legitimate Government of Haiti - that of President Aristide - and the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement. Initiated following a request from the legitimate Government of Haiti, the resolution calls for a multinational force with a clearly defined goal: that of creating and maintaining a secure and stable environment so as to bring about the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement. It is to be succeeded by an expanded force of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) once peace has been restored.”
1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source
“Its defiance of the United Nations embargo and sanctions, its expulsion of the monitors from the Organization of American States and the United Nations and its having reneged on the Governors Island Agreement are all vivid testimony to its none-too-hidden agenda. In all events it is not prepared in any manner for a retum of the legitimate Government, which the international community is just as determined will return. The course set is that of collision. As the Secretary-General explained in his report of 15 July (S/1994/828), Chapter-VII intervention by the United Nations is not possible owing to the lack of resources and to the contemplated time period that would be necessary to assemble a force - if this could be done at all.”
1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source
“The violence against their own people has become so prevalent, widespread and obvious that even the awesome spectacle of so many Haitians fleeing their own country on the dangerous open seas can scarcely reflect the extent and magnitude of the brutality of those authorities. Such has been the mounting impact on so many countries in the region that the crisis is clearly a threat to regional peace and security. By its many attempts to thwart the will of the international community, to say nothing of that of its own people, the military junta has clearly demonstrated that it has no desire to leave.”
1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source
“Today we adopted a resolution on the situation in Haiti, based upon two recent reports of the Secretary-General updating us on the ever-worsening events there and presenting the Council with clear and unmistakable options for its consideration as it strove to reach a workable decision. This is not a simple resolution at all, its complexity undoubtedly mirroring both the reality on the ground and the emerging policy consensus with respect to Haiti We are very grateful, however, to the sponsors of the resolution for their efforts and their skill, and for the patience and understanding they have demonstrated throughout the negotiation of the terms of the resolution. 22 There is really nothing that needs to be said about the military authorities in Haiti.”
1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source
“My delegation will therefore support the draft resolution before us and agrees with the conclusions of the Secretary-General in his letter of 19 June 1994 to the President of the Security Council on the offer of some Member States to cooperate with UNAMIR and the Secretary-General in Rwanda.”
1994-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3392 (1994) · source
“My delegation supports this initiative as the only viable alternative during the interim period while we await UNAMIR and civilians continue to suffer and die. Let us be clear: We are not choosing sides, but simply reacting to the reality that both sides appear unwilling to accept a cease-fire or to take meaningful steps towards this end. It might even be a different story were this a clash restricted to military combatants, with limited civilian losses. However, on the contrary, civilians appear to be the prime targets. To those who would say that this intervention will only make matters worse, we can only ask how that could be possible. For those who continue to push for complex forms of inaction, we can only say that the rest of humanity probably feels at this point that anything would be better than what is.”
1994-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3392 (1994) · source
“In this unacceptable situation, certain Member States led by France have volunteered to establish a temporary multinational operation in Rwanda aimed at the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk. While the Secretary-General projects this operation to be in place for a minimum of three months, it would cease at the full deployment of UNAMIR's forces, so its time frame is limited. Presumably, it would be doing nothing more than UNAMIR itself, were it in a position to deploy in a timely manner. Moreover, it is virtually ready now. For us, therefore, the unfounded suspicions, distractions and irrelevant and regrettable politics grounded in the ultimate power struggle in Rwanda have not had a place in our decision.”
1994-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3392 (1994) · source
“But as we know, there has been no cease-fire and combat has continued, as have the lawlessness and the massacres of civilians. Attempting to redress the situation, the Council, by resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May, increased the authorized force level of UNAMIR to 5,500 troops. Since then we have witnessed the agonized efforts of the Secretary- General to find these 5,500 troops, to agree on their arms and equipment, and to work out logistics, transportation and the manner of their deployment once on the scene. Concurrent with these negotiations and preparations, thousands of hopeless civilians have reportedly died each day and will continue to do so until an expanded UNAM IR is in place, hopefully in three months' time.”
1994-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3392 (1994) · source
“My delegation has made no effort to disguise its shock, disgust and disbelief at the relentless aberration and genocidal firestorm destroying Rwanda and its human population. In what has become a killing spectacle virtually monopolizing our screens, the daily repetition of helplessness and desperation now weighs heavily on our human patience and values. Notwithstanding the ominous foreboding in the Secretary-General's report of 20 April 1994, the Council elected to reduce the size and mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in the faint hope that the fighting and carnage would somehow cease and the parties could be brought to the negotiating table. This was the basis of our resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994.”
1994-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3392 (1994) · source
“The crime may lie, in fact, not in the violations of human rights and the killings, but in the fact that this can and perhaps will happen again, and we will be just as ill-equipped to deal with it then as we are now. We have spent much time in organizing a response to the situation in Rwanda, and time is critical My delegation, having noted its deep concerns, nevertheless supports the present draft resolution as a way to get things moving. We must once again appeal to the Rwandan parties on the basis of the effect it would have on them and their neighbours if they halted the killing and the destruction of their country and if they returned to the negotiations.”
1994-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3388 (1994) · source
“We must suppress the factors that are creating victims, and this may come down to a question of the willingness and resolve of the international community to act meaningfully in this crisis. Who and what can make a real difference here? That is the bottom- line concern. If there is a lesson to be learned from this incredibly violent episode, it may be that, as has been noted many times by a distinguished former senior official of the United Nations Secretariat, the United Nations must have a force not defined by national politics, a standing multinational force at the disposal of the Security Council. It is an unbelievable travesty for Rwanda to burn while the United Nations fiddles.”
1994-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3388 (1994) · source