YouSaid · the spoken record

Pronk

lines on the record: 230
first: 2004-09-02
most recent: 2006-09-18
sittings or episodes: 10
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“It has to be brought together; it is all related to economic, land, water and other specific issues. We have also to discuss returns and to set an example - not an overall return for each and every body at the same time, but a start to the process regionally, locally, in order to show, with the help of protective forces, that it does work and that those people can go back and start to produce their own food again, so that confidence is built gradually. I would give that process a number of years. Darfur and the addressing of the root problems cannot be solved in a year or two. It will take as many years as we are giving to the United Nations Mission in the Sudan in the framework of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. That is at least seven years.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“I wish it would have been possible for the United Nations to lead the Darfur-Darfur dialogue. I have always asked, in our internal discussions, for the United Nations to be given the political lead on Darfur and the African Union the military. The Darfur-Darfur dialogue would have been different. We must also deal with reconciliation. It is extremely important. The tribal dimension in Darfur is underrated in its effect and its importance. There are major tribal problems. I can say, for instance, that in July the biggest number of casualties - people dead - were not the result of attacks by the parties on civilians; 150 people were killed because of a tribal conflict that was not related in any way to the war in the South Sudan. As is so often the case, dozens upon dozens of deaths are the results of tribal conflict. It is underestimated.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“Secondly, it is extremely important to deal with the root causes of the problem in Darfur, so we have also to talk with the people - Arabs, Arab tribes, nomads - whose interests are also at stake. If they do not think that their interests are going to be preserved, that is again a source of conflict. That has to be addressed in the Darfur-Darfur dialogue. The preparations and the whole dialogue have not yet started. It is necessary to do that as soon as possible with all groups, not only those that have taken sides, and particularly with the others that would find a reason to continue to use their weapons rather than to find a solution that is related to other land-tenure systems and to the sharing of water. All those issues have to be brought into that framework.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“It would come into effect only after the invitation is not accepted, but at a certain moment I think it will be necessary, given the present political configuration, to think about what is possible and, at the same time, effective. We have been very disappointed by the African Union over the past couple of months, and what I have said about the Ceasefire Commission adds to that, because it is being led by the African Union. But it is not inherently weak; it can be much better. It can be helped, also, to be much better, as it was in the last couple of months of 2004 and in 2005. It can be improved again. Predictions for the longer run, very briefly, only make sense if, in the short term, such changes are accepted.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“Another possibility is major support, financed out of the United Nations budget, not by going around from one capital in the North to another capital in the North to beg. Major United Nations structural support for the African Union in order to make it really effective is also a possibility. I think the Government would accept that - an African Union force, but very strongly embedded in United Nations support that is secured for the long run, with all the expertise necessary, but still called an African Union force. That would be a face-saving device for the Government of the Sudan. It comes close to what I proposed to the Security Council one and a half years ago at the same meeting - a joint African Union/United Nations operation. That is only plan B.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“If the Government does not accept the invitation - "accept the invitation" is the language used - it might be useful to begin thinking ahead already, because to ask every time for another month of the presence of the African Union is not in the interests of the people over there. They are scared in Darfur. There are, of course, also other options. You can define transition. What type? The Security Council has the right to my advice, even if it is not exactly the same language which it has laid down in the resolution. Chapter VIII is difficult, I know, but Chapter VIII is a possibility. It is a possibility on the basis of the Charter. The Government, I am certain, will accept Chapter VIII. It has made that clear already.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“Even the friends of the United Nations and the friends of the CPA - Vice-President Taha was here in this Chamber a year ago - have made a very clear anti-transition statement. Those who are in favour of the transition in the Sudan have no power whatsoever. Mini Minawi is used up. He has no power. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement speaks but will not make it a political issue, and the Government's opposition - the other parties - do not have the people on the streets, and the Government knows that. The consent will not be given very easily, so we have to talk, even with people who have carried out or were responsible for atrocious things in the past. I think it would be wise to think ahead.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“Taha, the likes of which was certain to happen eventually, as a signal, is a phenomenon that has spread fear throughout Khartoum. There are groups that will attack the Government if the Government says "yes" to the big Powers of the world. Those groups are there and are coming, so there is also some legitimate fear. Devilish things have happened in Africa, but you have to negotiate. You have to analyse the underlying structural forces - I just mentioned some of them - in order to get consent. You must try, rather than just say you have to accept. It does not work. If you study all the statements made by all the leaders in the Sudan since about 10 February, they have been consistent. You cannot accuse the Government of the Sudan of not having been very clear and consistent. It says no, and it gets more and more support for that "no".”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“Let me play devil's advocate. The Council must understand Khartoum. How does one get their consent? Either one must make the offer attractive in the present situation, or in some other way. First, here is how to make it attractive. A consultation - a negotiation, because they are an equal partner - might also result in a package, whereby they accept the transition and they get, for instance, commitments: economically, debt relief; trade, lifting of the sanctions; security, staying in power and security cooperation. The Government of the Sudan is anti-United Nations and anti-West in terms of peacekeeping, not only because they are angry, but also because there is fear of radical groups which will attack the Government itself. The beheading of Mr.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“The Council said under the presidency of the United Kingdom that there would be consultation and that there would not be any force against the consent of the Government. This means that the Council will have to acquire that consent. It will not acquire that consent by repeating that they have to consent. That is not politics. So, make it attractive. Everybody thinks at the moment that the next meeting between a specific aide from one country and a diplomat from another country will perhaps create that consent. It will not. The underlying factors at the moment have to be analysed. Why does the Government of the Sudan not give its consent? Whether you like it or not, analyse the underlying factors. The Government of the Sudan bears responsibility for devilish, atrocious acts, especially in 2003; less now, but in particular during the past.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“Make the force as robust as possible. That is the terminology I have always used in the Council, without saying that it should be from the African Union or from the United Nations. Members will remember the terminology that I have always used: Robust, strong, big and broad. Broad mandates like the one outlined in resolution 1706 (2006), which is a good, broad mandate, are better mandates for a force than previous mandates. A bigger force must be mandated - 17,000 or 18,000 - and it must be deployed everywhere. Regarding the discussions on the transition, I ask members to accept my advice from the field; they have the right to my advice. Resolution 1706 (2006) "invites" (para. 1) the Government to give its consent to the transition.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“This year, understandably, nearly all of the talk was about the force, the robust force, and the specific form of the force. But had to be done on the ground in order to get the people behind the peace agreement gradually receded beyond the horizon. De-link: support the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS). AMIS can be a good force; they were in the beginning. They are less so at the moment for quite a number of reasons. Do not ask me to elaborate. Support for AMIS can, of course, be made conditional upon the transition, but then you do not de-link it. A very strong force must be on the ground as soon as possible in order to protect the people. If supporting AMIS is dependent on the acceptance of the transition, the force will be postponed because the transition will not be easily accepted. So de-link; and do it.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“In order to get the people to accept the DPA, the Janjaweed should be stopped. And that is not happening - the contrary is true. This brings me to the question of the de-linking. I use that word for a number of reasons. De-link what you have to do today from what you have to do tomorrow. I use today and tomorrow nearly literally. Today we must address these points, which I have mentioned, relating to broadening, a truce and reform of both the Ceasefire Commission and the DPA. Why the need for de-linking? The most important thing is peace on the ground. You get a peace agreement in order to facilitate a peace on the ground, and you get a robust international force in order to monitor a good peace agreement. Make the robust force the instrument, not the objective. It is an instrument to reach an objective.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“The representative of Ghana is quite right that money is important for these people. However, the most important reason why the people on the ground do not believe in the DPA is their fear of the Janjaweed. That is the overriding issue. If you go into the field - to the Jebel Marra or the camps - the people always ask, "What about the Janjaweed and the DPA?" They will do anything to stop the Janjaweed. It is true. The Government says that it is not true, but there are indications that quite a number of the Janjaweed have been incorporated into the security force. That may be good or not good. It is a specific way to disarm. In any case, the people on the ground, who have always said that everything is one and the same body, think that this is still the case. This is extremely important.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“To bring the others on board, put international pressure on him to take a step backwards in order to give others some room. It might be helpful. That is not a violation of the DPA because nowhere does it say that one person should have all those positions. It could be done differently. You could play with the numbers with regard to the groups in the councils: instead of 20, make it 25 and so forth. Playing with the numbers merely to renegotiate some other numbers without really changing the overall agreement is always possible. This is also face-saving for leaders of those other movements, who have to inform their own constituencies that some talks have taken place and that they got something, so that it is now really worthwhile to sign the agreement. Then, of course, there is the disarmament of the Janjaweed.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“It is a small amount of money. Thirty million dollars for, I would say, 2 million refugees and internally displaced persons is not enough. But in the DPA it is said that the initial figure is $30 million. So if you raised it to $200 million, bringing us to a reasonable amount of money per family, even in their own view, you would not violate the DPA because it only said "initially" $30 million. So you can be creative; you could easily use some of the international money designated as reconstruction funds, for example, for a purpose like this. Secondly, how can we bring about further improvement? I think Minni Minawi should, with his faction, take a step backwards. He occupies many positions: he is Senior Assistant to the President and Chair of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority as well - if it starts. He has it all.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“And the aim, of course, is to achieve peace on the ground. Bring all of them on board - in the Ceasefire Commission and in all the other committees. The more you say that they should stay out of all the institutions of the DPA, the more the constituency of all these groups will lose faith in the DPA. It is a self-fulfilling prophecy at the moment. That is why you have to broaden this process. This also means that although the DPA is a good text in itself, you have to start talking again, and you have to find a way to start talking without calling the talks a re-opening. Such a diplomatic trick can always be found. But you must add a number of issues without reducing what is in the DPA. What are some of those issues? The representative of Ghana mentioned compensation and wealth. As for compensation, I definitely agree.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“This means that you also have to bring all the other groups into the Ceasefire Commission. Some of them did not want to sign, but they did not fight. They said that they would abide by previous agreements, from N'djamena onwards. We had quite a number of agreements, and they did abide. One did not - a new group, the New Redemption Front (NRF) - and they carried out an attack in West Kordofan. That was truly a very bad start to the month of July. But, as I said, since then they are constantly being attacked. Now it is an all-out war between the Government and that new movement. You have to talk with them: they have power, they have weapons, and they want to talk. But if all you do is to tell them that they must first stop and then can join, it is not going to happen, whether you like it or not.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“And it must be authoritative, as the CJMC is in the south: it has had dozens of meetings. Parties come, and they fight in the meetings. That is definitely what you have to do. But then they reach a kind of conclusion, and we see implementation. We send our monitors through the whole of south Sudan, and they raise issues. The system is tripartite, and if one of the parties does not show up for some reason, we leave. In the Ceasefire Commission, the parties can say, "Well, we do not have monitors". That is not a tripartite system. The monitors cannot go to see, question and investigate what is going on in Darfur. The Ceasefire Commission is also in a coma. That is the answer. It has to be improved and renewed. Otherwise, fighting and violations will continue, and nothing will be implemented.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“Very often, when he arrives by plane at Al-Fashir, they say "Oh, the meeting is not taking place; it has been postponed because the Government is not yet ready", or whatever. This has happened four times. If the meeting takes place and if he raises an issue, he is silenced. The United States, also an observer at the Commission, is also being silenced. The European Union, as a member, does not protest against the silencing of the United Nations in the Ceasefire Commission. The Commission is dead in its present form. I am withdrawing my Deputy Force Commander from the meetings, because he cannot speak anyway. He is not allowed to raise issues. That is the answer to the question. The Ceasefire Commission has to be reformed, renewed, to make it independent and fully representative for everybody who is fighting to get a ceasefire.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“The Janjaweed disarmament plan is, of course, the most important thing, but the word has hardly been mentioned. It was presented by the Government - late - but at least there was a plan. That plan should have been discussed, addressed and approved - or disapproved and then improved through the Ceasefire Commission. It has not been discussed so far in the Commission. But it is the most important issue. The United Nations is only an observer. I myself was in Abuja in order to get the United Nations as a member, but the international community was not interested. So we are an observer. I send my Deputy Force Commander, who is not just any person, to the Commission meetings - assuming they take place.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“I presented six options to solve the problem: subcommittees, et cetera. They were all rejected. The DPA says that Darfur should be brought into a system of demilitarized zones, buffer zones and neutral zones. This zoning should be done by the Ceasefire Commission. There was no zoning exercise whatsoever. It ought to have started before a specific deadline. The deadline meant nothing anymore. Every deadline was simply shifted aside. There was no zoning. Instead of the zoning, which ought to have been based on the status quo on the date of the signing, parties started to increase their own zones by fighting. And they could do so, because nobody said that it should not be done or that it was a violation: they did not meet, or if they met, the issue could not be raised by the parties because they themselves were doing it.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“This was exactly the same situation as in the Ceasefire Commission after the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004. The whole idea was to build something new. But it was not new; it was the same. That was the first problem. The second problem was that after they started meeting, six weeks later, the two signatories, the Government and Minni Minawi, were brought together, and they became allies. They said that all the others should first sign and then they could join. So you had ceasefire violations of the previous agreements as well, which had been signed by Abdul Wahid and others. They could not be discussed at the meeting, because half of the parties to the fight were not allowed to be present. You are being attacked, but you must sign first and then you can participate in the meeting. Of course, they did not do this.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“When we got the mandate for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) from the Security Council in resolution 1590 (2005) of 24 March 2005, I instructed the UNMIS Commander to call for the first meeting of the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC) on 24 March - right away. The Ceasefire Commission did not meet after the signing of the DPA. It was postponed and postponed and postponed. That was the first major blunder. There were no meetings - but there were violations. The Minni Minawi faction attacked the Abdul Wahid faction, and it later withdrew; there was conflict between G19 and the Government. None of these violations were ever addressed: there was no meeting. So the message was that you can violate without being sanctioned.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“They all related to what I said about the short- term plan, the delinking and the longer run. Let me try to focus on these three issues. First, members of the Security Council will remember that for the short run - and this means between now and the end of the year - I said to broaden the basis of support and secure a truce, because there is more and more fighting at the moment. Reform the Ceasefire Commission, get a better Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and avoid a collision course. The question was addressed to me of how the Ceasefire Commission came about. Agreement was reached on 9 May.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“Mr. Pronk: There was a question concerning the south, which is, of course a question concerning the country as a whole. It concerned the elections provided for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. There is no concrete reason to expect that they will not take place. However, nobody is preparing for them. We need a census before elections, and preparations for the census are lagging so far behind that it will be a big problem to have the elections take place in time. It is being discussed politically at the moment; so far it is not being discussed in the institutions. We are preparing for elections within our mandate, but we cannot organize or start elections; we can only facilitate and support them. I thank delegations for their questions concerning Darfur.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“If we do that, we can work out a plan for the period thereafter. On the basis of our experience on the ground, we will be more than happy to share with the Council our views on the contours of such a plan for the longer term. The five points, therefore, are: get everybody on board; establish a truce; reform the CFC; resume talks to improve the DPA; and get off the collision course, both within the Sudan as well as internationally. In short, de-link what should be done today to save the DPA from tomorrow's actions to get a renewed and fully robust peace force on the ground.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“A transition to a United Nations force has to be made attractive to the Sudanese leadership in order to get its support. That also requires trust, confidence-building and time. It requires that those in favour of a transition and those against it should refrain from the present collision course. It also requires that the present African Union force stay until the consent is acquired. The African Union is less effective than it was a year ago, but its presence is essential. The departure of the African Union would leave the people in the camps unprotected and vulnerable to anyone who would wish to harm them and resume the cleansing of 2003 and 2004. Those are five essential conditions to revive the DPA and bring it out of its coma. Together they would form a plan for the short-term - say, until the end of the year.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“The Council has also invited the consent of the Government to that deployment. From its side, since February the Government has also been crystal clear. It is against the transition. That is unwise. UNMIS has proven to be a fair and effective peacekeeper in the southern Sudan. We can and will do the same in Darfur. The United Nations does not deserve the insinuations from the Sudanese political leadership in power. We do not intend to recolonize, nor are we laying a carpet for others to do so. We do not have a hidden agenda. Our only aim is to protect the people, while respecting the sovereignty of the Sudanese nation. Secretary-General Kofi Anan has clearly said that "without the consent of the Sudanese Government, the transition will not be possible". However, getting the consent of the Government requires consultations.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“The DPA in its present form, even though it is theoretically a good agreement, will not get adequate support beyond those who have already signed. We will have to start new consultations, but we must avoid labelling those consultations as a reopening of the peace negotiations. We must talk, add, improve and give an opportunity to those who feel excluded and form at least one third of the population of Darfur. We must get their interests guaranteed, on paper as well as in reality. That is the fourth condition for bringing the DPA out of its coma. There is a fifth condition. The Security Council, in adopting resolution 1706 (2006), made it crystal clear that the international community wants a transition from the present African Union peacekeeping force to a United Nations force.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“The tragedy is that none of the violations has been addressed in the CFC. It simply does not function. It has been hijacked by the signatories, it is not well chaired, non-signatories have been excluded, and the United Nations has been silenced. In the southern Sudan, the CJMC is one of the most important pillars of the CPA. If it were taken out, the CPA would be paralyzed. That is exactly the present state of the DPA, so the third condition is to start addressing the violations of the DPA through a renewed, fully representative, but authoritative CFC. Since the DPA does not function, violations remain unsanctioned. Most people in Darfur have lost faith in the DPA. Many did not have it from the beginning. We should be realistic.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“Since its signing, the DPA has been violated day after day, week after week. There was a rise in violence after the signing of the DPA. The use of rape as a tool of terror is frequent and again on the rise. The attackers show little mercy towards women and children. Villages are being attacked and bombed in the middle of the night. White helicopters are being used to support the offensive operations of the Sudan Armed Forces. The freedom of movement of humanitarian and other United Nations workers has been severely curtailed and violence against them stepped up. Twelve of them have been killed just in the past two months. The situation in and around the camps remains precarious, and violence by militia against internally displaced persons, including women, is brutal and degrading.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“After the signing of the DPA, parties which did not sign were excluded from the institutions, in particular from the Ceasefire Commission (CFC). That, too, was wrong. They were told: First sign, then talk. That further split the rebel movements. There are now five to seven different groups, including the National Redemption Front, which in July launched an attack in West Kordofan. We have condemned that attack. Sadly, it provided the Government with an excuse for continuous attacks and air raids under the pretext that the civilian population had to be protected. However, it is an outright violation of the DPA. We need a truce. That is the second condition for bringing the DPA out of its coma. Mini Minawi can play a role, maybe, in mediating between his present and his former allies in order to finally get peace on the ground.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“Had they continued negotiating another year, the outcome would have been more or less the same. In hindsight, maybe we should have taken more time - not to get a better agreement, but in order to bring on board all parties. Only the Government and the Mini Minawi faction of the Sudanese Liberation Movement have signed. Abdul Wahid's faction did not sign. They should have. They were wrong, but they took a political decision to stand aside. That does not make them terrorists. Abdul Wahid's people, most of them Furs, the largest African tribe of Darfur, stood aside, but they have not reverted to fighting either. They have kept the earlier agreement that they had signed, so we have to bring them on board. That is the first condition for bringing the DPA out of its coma.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“Intentional delays - often more than eight months long - in clearing critical equipment through customs at Khartoum airport are severely impacting our operations. Our monitors have not been given full access to detention facilities, in particular those run by national security. All in all, that hinders the work mandated to us by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which was signed by the Government, and is a violation of the status-of-forces agreement. I now turn to Darfur. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is only four months old, but it is nearly dead. It is in a coma. It ought to be under intensive care, but it is not. It is a good Agreement. The peace talks resulted in a balanced text, somewhere in the middle of the extreme positions taken by the Government and the rebel movements.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“Since the adoption of the Constitution, in mid- 2005, the Sudanese press has become politically more diversified and agile, using its rights and freedoms, as it should do in a country striving for democracy. During my last brief I commended the Government for concluding the status-of-forces agreement. However, I cautioned that the implementation of the agreement would indicate its success or failure. I am not so positive any more. The authorities continue to arrest and detain UNMIS national staff members. Recently two international staff members were also manhandled and arrested. The Government has refused to allow any broadcasts by UN Radio in northern Sudan, including Darfur. It has restricted United Nations access in Abyei.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“Thousands of families have been forcibly relocated to places that have no basic services. This inhumane treatment is a violation of international humanitarian law. It is also far below what was expected after the adoption of the new Constitution. I am alarmed at the recent kidnapping and beheading, in Khartoum, of Mr. Mohammad Taha, editor-in-chief of the Sudanese newspaper Al-Wifaq. This brutal murder has been claimed by Al-Qaida. True or not, the style of execution is alien to the Sudanese environment and is indicative of a foreign presence. Other journalists have received similar threats. This is an attack on freedom of expression. This heinous crime can roll back any progress made in liberalizing the media through forced self-censorship. That would be a setback.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“There has been a crackdown on political freedoms in the country, with heavy-handed tactics used against peaceful demonstrations by the opposition and by civilians protesting against Government policies. Human rights violations, in particular by the State security forces, have not decreased. No progress has been made in bringing national security laws into line with the new Constitution. As stated during my last briefing, I had commended the decision of the Governor of Khartoum to cease all forced relocations from the IDP camps around Khartoum. I am pleased to announce that he has stood by his decision. However, last month, the authorities in the neighbouring state of Gezira began demolishing the houses of a large community in the Dar Assalam camp, using overwhelming force.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“The Border Committee has yet to undertake any substantive work. This task is urgent because the absence of a clearly delineated border has consequences for the redeployment of forces, the distribution of oil revenues, JIU formation, the elections and, eventually, the referendum. Progress in the peace talks between the Government of Uganda and LRA is a reason for hope. LRA has agreed to bring together its forces - which turned out to be much larger than we had expected - in assembly areas in southern Sudan. If the present cessation of hostilities lasts, peace can be brought to northern Uganda, and this will have a significant spillover effect in the region, including in the Sudan. The State security structure in northern Sudan continues to harass and intimidate all opposition to the Government.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“Instead of acting as a political body that solves political questions, CPC has become a legalistic club preserving the status quo. It has acted merely as a secretariat that steers every contentious issue towards the Presidency, where the outcome has been no different. 3 No progress has been made on the issue of Abyei. As a result, Abyei remains devoid of any governance structure, leaving the people without any formal policing, public sanitation or health services. Abyei is the test case for CPA implementation. In the key area of oil, the parties continue to disagree on the status of the National Petroleum Commission. The calculation and subsequent distribution of oil revenues lack the transparency needed to ensure fairness and accuracy. The demarcation of the north-south border remains unresolved.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“The NCP has accepted CPA in letter but seems to ignore it in spirit. It continues to stall the functioning of almost all critical institutions of the CPA and has not accepted, to this day, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) as an equal partner. The isolation of SPLM. ministers who are part of the Government of National Unity has created an asymmetry in the Government, thereby relegating "making unity attractive", which is part of our mandate, to a distant dream. This asymmetry has also caused every important issue to be put on the back burner. We had high expectations of the long-awaited Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC), which to our disappointment has turned out to be a forum that has yet to resolve a single one of the issues forwarded by CJMC.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“The UNICEF "Go to School" campaign has provided school supplies to 1.6 million southern Sudanese schoolchildren. However, coverage stands at only half of the funding for this year's requirements as presented in our work plan. This also affects our capacity to provide services for returning refugees and displaced people. An estimated 160,000 people returned between January and July this year. With the end of the rainy season approaching, large numbers of returnees will be in urgent need of basic services. In the coming year we shall need more funds for relief and return and for reconstruction and development. The people in southern Sudan are still heartbreakingly poor The performance of the National Congress Party (NCP) within the Government of National Unity is not encouraging.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“At the same time, there is a need for international assistance in security-sector reform. The formation and training of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) is way behind schedule. There has been a rise in cases of indiscipline in SPLA. International help, from a number of countries, which I do not have in my United 06-52553 Nations mandate, is urgently required to train the SPLA into a professional and democratic army. Southern Sudan remains in urgent need of reconstruction and developmental assistance. The absence of basic facilities like water, sanitation, health care and education has now forced the people to question what difference peace has made in their lives and those of their children. Some progress has been made. Between January and June this year, over 300 kilometres of roads have been cleared of mines and repaired.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“On the contrary, we have had to deal with it throughout southern Sudan - tribal conflicts, land and water disputes, cattle looting, an abundance of arms, fights between settlers and nomads, youth unemployment and crime and a lack of discipline among unpaid soldiers, in addition to the presence of the other armed groups and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). However, our presence in southern Sudan has helped. In cooperation with the government of Southern Sudan, our military, together with the humanitarian and the civilian elements of the mission, has been able to prevent escalations. Any cannibalization of forces for diversion to another part of Sudan, therefore, will have consequences for the peace in southern Sudan. UNMIS, the nightwatchman, should not be asked to pack up and go somewhere else in the afternoon.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“In a number of areas in the south, commanders of the former alternative movement, the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), have refused to abide by the joint Juba declaration, adopted earlier this year, which provides for their integration into the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Many people in the south suspect that the north is still supporting these commanders in order to destabilize the south, to control disputed areas and oil fields and to create uncertainty about the border. Six months ago, I highlighted the factors behind the ongoing violence in the south. Since then, the violence has not decreased.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“With the cooperation of the government of Southern Sudan, United Nations Radio Miraya - Radio Mirror - started broadcasting 06-52553 at the end of June 2006 and is being well appreciated throughout southern Sudan. The Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC) remains the cornerstone of the Peace Agreement. Chaired by the United Nations, it is the best- functioning institution of the CPA. The redeployment of the forces is on track. On 9 July 2007, all Sudanese armed forces will have to be withdrawn from the south. I have no reason to expect that this will not happen. However, the presence of the so-called other armed groups poses a threat. The Other Armed Groups Collaborative Committee envisioned in the CPA has started meeting, but the actual alignment status, composition and location of these groups remains vague.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“The government of Southern Sudan, which with limited resources has been working hard to transform southern Sudan from a war-torn region into a region with a functioning administration has done a good job. The Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly meets regularly and is a forum for healthy debate and accountability. President Kiir has reshuffled his cabinet and his administration in order to enhance good governance and abate corruption. His recent ZOO-day action plan is a courageous effort to engender a culture in public service that is action-oriented and puts the needs of the people at the forefront. The political environment has encouraged relatively free media.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“They have informed us that they expect to sign an agreement before the commencement of Ramadan, and that is very soon. Concerns, however, remain: an asymmetry of the talks between a strong Government of the Sudan and a weak Eastern Front, and a possible disconnect between the leaders of the Eastern Front and their constituencies on the ground. Moreover, the talks should not take the shape of negotiations between the Government of the Sudan and the Government of Eritrea about, but Without, the people of the east. Their true participation is essential in order to restore security and to tackle the root causes of the conflict. As for the south itself, CPA implementation in southern Sudan, although slow, remains on course.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“The withdrawal of the United Nations from the east has sent a strong signal to the people of the Sudan that the United Nations came to eastern Sudan upon the invitation of the Government, accomplished its task and left. There was no hidden agenda to occupy or to colonize, as is the ongoing rhetoric about the United Nations vis-a-vis other parts of the country. We continue to monitor the Eritrean-mediated talks between the Sudanese Government and the Eastern Front, which, at last, began in Asmara three months ago. They are taking place without the United Nations and without others as international observers. That is different from the north-south talks in Naivasha or the Darfur talks in Abuja, but the parties have the right, and they deserve the opportunity, to try to reach an agreement all by themselves.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source
“Mr. Pronk: I last briefed the Council half a year ago, in March (see S/PV.5392). At that time, I said that the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the north and the south was on track. It still is. However, it is a bumpy ride, and the train can easily derail. The peace is fragile, and the confidence gap between the north and the south is widening. I am glad to report that the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) has completed almost 100 per cent - exactly 99 per cent - of its deployment in southern Sudan. We have fulfilled our mandate in eastern Sudan and have withdrawn the troops from the area. The authorities have given 2 assurances that United Nations humanitarian and development efforts will continue unhindered.”
2006-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5528 (2006) · source