YouSaid · the spoken record

Pronk

lines on the record: 230
first: 2004-09-02
most recent: 2006-09-18
sittings or episodes: 10
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“The international community would also be wise to support those efforts, including with material assistance on an experimental basis, in order to make clear that home-grown reconciliation is valued, even if it takes place in a different way than it does elsewhere in the world. It is also clear that such reconciliation will have to include those who refused to take up arms and - last but not least - the victims of war and violence. Can all this be done? The time is ripe to renew and redouble our efforts. The climate is improving. There is a north-south comprehensive peace agreement. We have witnessed positive reactions, both in Rumbek and in Khartoum. We are also seeing positive reactions among the people, in both the north and the south - albeit sometimes mixed with hesitation based on scepticism and earlier experience.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“On the contrary, although the current negotiating process between the Government and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) should proceed, it would be useful to start thinking about including tribal leaders in the search for political solutions even before reconciliation has taken place. That may include tribes that have thus far been beyond the control of the Government or the rebel movements and that have been fighting to protect their own interests. Parallel to such broader talks, reconciliation efforts will have to be continued, broadened and intensified.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“It will also require serious political talks between the Government and the rebel movements, more serious than have taken place thus far. They will have to agree on a declaration of principles that addresses the core issues of power and wealth-sharing. Moreover, it is time to prepare a national conference including all political opponents in order to reach a consensus about the modalities of a peaceful future for the country, thereby integrating the Darfur peace talks into the wider process of peacemaking in the Sudan and making peace in Darfur sustainable. However, the Darfur talks themselves should not wait until such a national conference is feasible.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“In order to protect both people and their land, those third-party troops have to be everywhere that violence may erupt: in the locations that I mentioned earlier - demilitarized areas and unsafe roads - but also in and around all displaced people's camps, in all towns and villages under threat and in all areas where refugees and displaced persons would want to return. It is an enormous task, but the recent history of Darfur shows that without such an independent and neutral protection force, women and children, older persons, returnees and unarmed persons belonging to adversary tribes will not be safe. In the longer term, security, safety, peace and stability should be home-grown and sustained without outside help. But it is clear that it will be quite some time before that is a reality.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“The strengthening of the AU force on the ground has proved to be effective, not only in performing monitoring tasks but also, more importantly, in protecting the civilian population through a combination of deterrence, mediation and good offices. By its presence and its actions to mediate and forestall violent actions, the AU force, which is itself currently under threat of attack, has done more than any other outside agent to improve the security situation on the ground. The AU has not been able to put in as many forces as originally hoped, and they need help from the international community to make it happen. We need to do whatever is required to accelerate the rate of deployment and to ensure that we have more AU troops on the ground in order to guarantee the parties' commitment to agreements and to dissuade attacks.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“However, it is not credible to wait half a year after the commitment made to the Secretary-General in the joint communique of early July. The Government would be wise not to wait for the publication of the report of the Commission of Inquiry, and to show that not only the international community but also the Government itself wants to seriously address crimes, maintain human rights and put an end to impunity. Many of those eight steps require active and adequate third-party involvement to patrol roads - as I mentioned - clear flights and protect demilitarized areas. That third party is the African Union.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“Such actions deprive tribes of their usual source of livelihood and provoke tribal militias into attacking the civilian population. The Government, in turn, should control and restrain those militias, either through force or through tribal reconciliation. In addition, joint action involving the Government, the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the African Union should be planned, in order to stop banditry and the bandits. Eighth, the Government should make haste in arresting those responsible for major violations of human rights and crimes against international humanitarian law. It should do so whether those perpetrators are J anjaweed or not. The Government has often declared that that could not be done easily overnight. That is to be granted.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“Fifth, the parties must identify practical means to ensure that the basic survival needs of their forces are met, including food supplies for the combatants, without violating the ceasefire. That would stabilize the situation, diminish the urge to steal, loot and kill and make the rendering of relief assistance to people without weapons less dangerous than it has become during the past month. Sixth, the Government should make a new start by disarming the Popular Defence Forces, as announced in August of last year. It should provide the names and numbers of those disarmed to the AU and store weapons in safe locations, with AU oversight. Seventh, the rebel movements should commit themselves not to block or disrupt peaceful seasonal movements of nomadic tribes and their cattle.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“Fourth, in order to show their good will, the Government and the rebel movements should all withdraw behind reasonable and well-defined lines, such as those that prevailed on 8 December, before the commencement of road-clearing operations by the Government. Each should give up the positions it has taken and declare that it will not occupy the positions given up by the other party. Thereafter, the AU could move in to protect the areas concerned. That would be the beginning of a demilitarization of parts of Darfur. The parties should also communicate full details of their troop locations to the AU Ceasefire Commission and declare their willingness to agree on a plan of separation of forces, to be drawn up by the Commission.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“Third, after Nairobi, both the Government and the rebel movements should exercise full restraint: no attacks, no retaliation. The Government should refrain not only from bombing - which it had already said it would do - but also from carrying out military flights over rebel-held positions. The Government should also refrain from further so-called road-clearing operations. In turn, the rebel movements should refrain from attacks on the police and on towns and infrastructure. The AU could assist by patrolling roads and clearing flights before they take off in the direction of rebel- held areas. That would result in both more protection and less suspicion.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“First, de-link the talks on the political future of Darfur from those concerning security and humanitarian access. Concentrate the Abuja talks on the future political configuration of Darfur, including questions relating to the sharing of power and wealth. Pursue those talks whether the ceasefire is kept or not, and concentrate the talks relating to security and humanitarian access in the AU Ceasefire Commission and in the Joint Commission. Second, empower the Darfur ceasefire institutions in the same way as the north-south ceasefire institutions that resulted from the agreement in Nairobi. That means making the assessment of whether or not the ceasefire has been breached independent from the parties and enabling those institutions to make binding recommendations that should be implemented unconditionally.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“In turn, the rebel movements may perceive the north-south agreement as an indication that they have been marginalized further or as proof that an intensification of military activities would be the only option for them to be taken seriously as a party in political talks. Both perceptions would be false, both reactions dangerous. Both have to be countered by pressure, reason and the offering of an alternative. The comprehensive agreement will remove some of the stumbling blocks and pave the way for an approach that can help the parties to break through the vicious circle. The parties must be persuaded by a combination of pressure and assurances from influential Member States that it is truly in their interests to respect the ceasefire and to pursue a settlement through peaceful means. Let me offer some suggestions for such an approach.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“Among those on the ground in Darfur responsible for the recent aggression, there are some who perceive the conclusion of North-South peace as providing cover for their actions, offering them a brief window of immunity from international criticism on their behaviour in Darfur. Government forces may be tempted to think that, after the signing of the north- south agreement, for which they have received much praise, the international community would not dare to put the implementation of that Agreement at risk. That could lead to the suggestion that now is the time to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“Standstill is regress and regress produces a vicious circle: meagre results at the negotiating table, no implementation, more insecurity, less willingness to talk, no results and so on. From now on, that can change. It ought to change. Now that the bridge has been crossed in Nairobi, the road towards security and agreement in Darfur lies open. It is high time to take that road in earnest. Will that be done? In the long term, the signing of the north-south peace agreement offers opportunity for Darfur and will improve capacity to solve the conflict. However, I do not exclude the possibility that the signing of the Agreement will be followed in the short term by an intensification of violence in and around Darfur. Why?”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“Talks between the parties on Darfur have not yielded concrete results or much narrowing of the gap on the issues concerned. Despite regular statements to the contrary, the parties have yet to commit in practice to the implementation of the humanitarian ceasefire. The delay in reaching agreement between Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement has also produced a stalemate in the talks on Darfur. This applies both to the implementation of the Ndjamena ceasefire agreement and to the Abuja talks on the political dimension of the conflict. This stalemate at the negotiating table has led to a worsening of the security situation on the ground, and that, in turn, has not contributed to the willingness of the parties to engage in a dialogue on the root causes of the conflict and on political objectives and reform.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“At the same time, the total number of persons to be helped is still increasing, due to recent displacements following the fighting in November and December, and, as a result of the fighting, it is now even more difficult to reach them than before. The fighting now affects humanitarian work more frequently and more directly than bureaucratic restrictions ever did, with fatal, tragic consequences. The road-clearing operation launched by the Government in December in order to make the roads safe for traffic, including commercial traffic, and the transport of fuel and food for the markets, as well as for humanitarian purposes, resulted at first not in more safety but in less. The looting and pillaging continued; banditry is on the increase; trucks have been stolen at gunpoint and some drivers killed.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“The volume of assistance and access has expanded over the past six months, but the number of conflict-affected people has increased as well, leaving many still beyond the reach of assistance and, consequently, short of food, water, sanitation and shelter. The objective is to meet the international standards for humanitarian assistance per capita - say, for instance, around 2,000 calories per capita per day. In mid-2004, we were far below those standards. Towards the end of the year, we were close to meeting them for food, nutrition and health services, though not for water, sanitation or shelter.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“Refugees are not returning in sufficient numbers to allow the planting of crops to sustain their families for the coming year. The restriction on freedom of movement is causing livestock to be lost on a huge scale. The armed groups are rearming and the conflict is spreading outside Darfur. Large quantities of arms have been carried into Darfur in defiance of the Security Council decision taken in July. December saw a buildup of arms; attacks on positions, including air attacks; raids on small towns and villages; increased banditry and more looting. New rebel movements are emerging and launching attacks in the area of oil facilities in West Kordofan. We may move into a period of intense violence unless swift action is taken and new approaches are considered. That is all the more necessary in the light of the poor humanitarian situation.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“The fighting in Darfur must be stopped, the conflict must be resolved and the people affected must be able to return to their homes. At the beginning of this new year, the security situation in Darfur is still bad. The humanitarian situation is poor. Regarding humanitarian access, the picture is mixed. Politically, Darfur finds itself at a stalemate. Let me elaborate on each of those dimensions of the crisis. On security, new problems came into focus in December. Violence, hitherto a source of fear on the fringes of centres for internally displaced persons and in conflict areas, is seeping into the camps themselves and directly affecting humanitarian workers. Some national staff members of non-governmental organizations have been abducted and are still missing; others are harassed. The internally displaced persons continue to suffer.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“It is hard to imagine that the peace dividends promised by the Nairobi Agreement will be reaped without an end to the suffering in Darfur. International aid will not flow and, more importantly, in the Sudan itself the achievements will turn out to be vulnerable. As long as there is war in some part of the country, resources will be spent on weapons, not welfare; investors will be reluctant; entrepreneurs will hesitate; young people with brains and initiative will want to leave the country; displaced people will wander around. Peace is indivisible in the Sudan as well, however large and diversified the country may be. Thus, after the conclusion and signing of the comprehensive peace agreement between north and south, there can be no question as to what the priority tasks for 2005 should be.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“Peace has been proclaimed, and now the Sudanese themselves, together with their partners in the international community, are going to make it work. Can such a scenario also apply in Darfur? Yes, it can. It must. We can make it work. As a matter of fact, the question is two-fold: first, how would further fighting in Darfur impact the implementation of the north-south peace agreement, and, secondly, how can the achievement of peace between the northern and southern Sudan be used to improve the climate for talks to end civil war in Darfur? The first question has already been answered by many members of the Security Council in their statements at the historic meeting of the Council in Nairobi in November last year.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“Displaced people and refugees will need to return and participate in the economy and in society, claiming a share in the resources, including land. Former battlefields will have to be demined so that there are no no-go areas in a time of peace. Other southern militant groups that did not participate in the peace talks will have to be incorporated in new structures that were created without them. And people's expectations concerning welfare, growth, education and other social and economic needs have to be met. All those tasks are as much a risk as they are a challenge. Failure may endanger stability and feed new conflicts. Anyway, the first step has been taken and its importance cannot be overestimated. There is no room for cynicism. An end has come to the century's longest war in Africa, with the largest number of victims.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“The peace agreement is the result of political talks at the negotiation table. A war can be ended other than by winning and defeating the enemy. A war - a civil war also - can be ended by talking one's way out of it, by negotiating with former enemies and accommodating mutual concerns, by closing the book and by not focusing anymore on past divisions and past splits but on future diversity in unity and unity in diversity. That is what happened in Naivasha and was confirmed two days ago in Nairobi. Of course, the agreement is not the end of everything. An agreement at the negotiation table marks the beginning of a long and arduous process of peacebuilding within society itself. There will be many stumbling blocks on the road ahead. Former combatants will have to be disarmed and demobilized.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“Mr. Pronk: The Council has before it the report on the month of December, which was drafted by us quite some time ago: it is now 11 January. I will try to concentrate in particular on an update in the light of developments, in particular since the end of the month. Like some members of the Council, I flew straight to New York from Nairobi, where I participated in the signing ceremony of the comprehensive peace agreement between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. That was a milestone. It heralds the definitive end of nearly four decades of brutal conflict. Hundreds of thousands of people have been killed. Four million have been uprooted and displaced. More than half a million have had to take refuge in neighbouring countries. The people of the Sudan can be congratulated.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“It is the obligation of movements that consider themselves as wouldÂ»be governments, which are bound by the same principles of humanitarian law as formally recognized Governments. It is also the duty of the international community to consider further action if the action taken so far proves to be insufficient.”
2004-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5071 (2004) · source
“The humanitarian catastrophe of 2003 and of the first six months of this year was allowed to happen because the international community had not yet decided to act. With the adoption of two Security Council resolutions on Darfur, that has changed. If the sorrow continues, it is despite those resolutions. If, for instance, displaced persons protest and the police and military shoot innocent civilians despite the United Nations presence, a drama would develop for which the United Nations would be blamed. If, for instance, members of militias or paramilitary groups attack unarmed civilians, a massacre would result, despite the fact that the protection of civilians was the essential objective of the Security Council. That would be a catastrophe. The protection of people is the obligation of the Government of Sudan.”
2004-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5071 (2004) · source
“The message to the SLM/A, the Justice and Equality Movement and all other armed groups is that their rebel status does not exonerate them from a moral obligation towards their people. On the contrary, as political leaders, they are responsible for civilian protection as much as the Government of Sudan. The Security Council may wish to consider creative and prompt action to ensure effective implementation of the terms it set in earlier resolutions regarding the protection of civilians and to warn all parties that they will all, without exception, be held accountable for such violations. Again, the meetings of the Security Council foreseen for mid-November in Nairobi provide a major opportunity in that respect. In conclusion, action is required.”
2004-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5071 (2004) · source
“If you do not, or if you do not do so in time, you will lose it." The third prong of this political strategy is to ensure that political leaders - the official ones as well as the self-elected ones - are held accountable for ongoing violations of agreements and further misery. The Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions on the Sudan this year, primarily because of increasing concern regarding the fate of the civilian population. Political leaders on any side who deny the facts on the ground, neglect the sorrow of poor and vulnerable people living in areas under their control and use delaying tactics in negotiations and in implementation procedures are acting irresponsibly.”
2004-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5071 (2004) · source
“Therefore, negotiators at the north-south talks should commit themselves to working together to resolve the Darfur conflict immediately after the signature of the comprehensive agreement, for instance by strengthening and underpinning the political process already under way in Abuja. The Council may therefore wish to make clear that it will not tolerate any further delay in the finalization of a comprehensive north-south peace agreement and a political resolution of the Darfur crisis. The Council's message to the parties should essentially be as follows: "Fulfil your commitments and you will have our support.”
2004-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5071 (2004) · source
“The international community should ensure that the momentum is sustained and should give the right message to the parties with a single, strong voice. There is now, more than ever, an urgent need for firm pressure on all parties to finalize the agreements and move into the implementation phase. As we have seen in past cases, the final stage can be the most difficult, with new challenges emerging up until the last moment. This final stage has to be completed, ultimately, around the end of this calendar year. Negotiators owe this not only to the people affected by the north-south conflict, but also to the population elsewhere in the Sudan, particularly in Darfur.”
2004-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5071 (2004) · source
“In Nairobi, the Government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement met again in October, and some new agreements are close at hand. I have, in previous statements, listed reasons why the outcome of the north-south peace process - peace, a new constitution, a federal structure for the State, national differentiation and a broad-based Government - can serve as a model and basis for Darfur. It now seems that this round of talks has a good chance of being completed. However, a very tough final bone of contention - the financing of the southern army - still has to be resolved. Parties seem reluctant to move. Members of the Security Council could offer their good offices to help resolve that last issue, so that Vice-President Taha and Mr. Garang could meet each other halfway; thus neither of the two would lose.”
2004-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5071 (2004) · source
“The Government and the rebel movements must comply with Security Council resolutions and with the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement, rather than make their compliance mutually conditional. They should implement fully and immediately the agreement reached on humanitarian access, whether that agreement has been signed or not. They should put their political objectives at the centre of their deliberations, rather than focusing on issues, such as humanitarian access and security, that are essentially non-negotiable. The Security Council meetings in Nairobi could bring the parties to realize that the international community expects them to negotiate in good faith and adopt, before the end of the year, a declaration of principles, as well as a time frame and a detailed agenda for further negotiations on political issues.”
2004-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5071 (2004) · source
“The second element of the three-pronged approach is the speeding up of all negotiation processes. Political talks between the Government and the various movements are proceeding. There is light at the end of the tunnel, but it seems as if the tunnel is getting longer and longer. Political solutions are important in themselves; they are also urgently needed in order to get a grip on the security situation on the ground. Three months ago, there were not yet any talks between the Government and the rebel movements in Darfur. They have now started. They were paralysed in the last round because parties were focused on the wrong issues. At the negotiation table in Abuja, there is still reluctance, distrust, internal division, lack of capacity to negotiate and no sense of urgency.”
2004-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5071 (2004) · source
“Secondly, there must be a speeding up of all negotiation processes. Thirdly, political leaders - the official ones as well as the self-elected ones - must be held accountable for ongoing violations of agreements and further human misery. First, the deployment of the expanded AU force is already taking place. However, the present upsurge in violence and the trends that I indicated require an even speedier deployment of those forces in order to enable them to be everywhere they are needed - that is, in any area where the insecure situation may get out of control and explode. I would advise members of the Security Council to consider all possibilities for more financial and logistical support to the AU to ensure that its forces can be present wherever they are required to fulfil their tasks.”
2004-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5071 (2004) · source
“Now they now are getting something similar in return: thefts of cattle and the blocking of the necessary camel tracks to dry areas, resulting in illness of the animals and thus in a threat to their own livelihoods. Right of access to scarce common natural resources is being denied. Those resources are even scarcer owing to pressure from increased human and animal populations and also to a decrease in the quality of those resources as a result of climate change. The result is a fight between economic lifestyles drawing on the same natural resources, leading to survival of the fittest and death for the weakest. Can that situation be reversed? It can be reversed only by a three-pronged approach. First, a third-party force - the AU - must be deployed to effectively deter violations.”
2004-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5071 (2004) · source
“Some commanders provoke their adversaries by stealing, hijacking and killing. Some seem to have begun acting for their own private gain. They now control so much territory that they must either take responsibility for the needs of the people therein - and become political leaders - or else turn to preying on the civilians in areas they control by force - in which case we may soon find Darfur is ruled by warlords. If those negative trends are not reversed, it is a recipe for disaster. If the fighting continues, the crops will fail and the whole population of Darfur will become dependent on humanitarian assistance. Many livelihoods are at stake. It started two years ago, when some Arab tribes drove other tribes out in order to get more Lebensraum for themselves and their cattle. It was pure ethnic cleansing.”
2004-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5071 (2004) · source
“As October turned into November the situation deteriorated and tension rose to a level unprecedented since early August: fighting is breaking out in more and more places; parties are provoking one another; militias are ganging up; and governmental authorities are not able to exert a moderating influence or they respond with untimely and even counterproductive measures. Darfur may easily enter a state of anarchy - a total collapse of law and order. The conflict is changing in character. The Government does not fully control its own forces. It co-opted paramilitary forces and now it cannot count on their obedience. The genie is out of the bottle and cannot be pushed back in. The border lines between the military, the paramilitary and the police are being blurred. Within the rebel movements, there is a leadership crisis. There are splits.”
2004-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5071 (2004) · source
“The situation has become very tense during the last couple of days, more tense than at any time since the adoption of the first Security Council resolution on Darfur in July 2004. An armed group, said to be members of SLM/A, looted a large number of camels from Arab tribes and kidnapped 18 civilians from a passenger bus in the area around Zalingei, west Darfur. That gave rise to an ultimatum by the militia, which threatened to attack not only SLA forces, but also the civilian population and displaced persons.”
2004-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5071 (2004) · source
“The Council is aware of the tragic death of two humanitarian aid workers caused by a landmine - a criminal, cowardly act against people who had come to help. In general, agreements reached with the Government are kept. For instance, they agreed on full and unhindered access for humanitarian assistance. However, they are backsliding on their agreement that displaced persons will not be forced to return or to relocate. Recently, in south Darfur, families of displaced persons were forced, in the middle of the night, to leave the place where they had sought refuge. That should stop immediately, and the forcibly uprooted displaced people should be helped to get back to their freely chosen places of refuge. So, overall, instability has increased in October with more insecurity and violence than in September.”
2004-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5071 (2004) · source
“The United Nations is awaiting verification from the African Union (AU) Ceasefire Commission on reports that aircraft flown in those attacks discharged their weapons against ground targets. The Government, however, has denied that action and stated that it has given instructions to the military not to do so. In the beginning of the reporting period, large- scale attacks on civilians by militia did not take place. However, towards the end of the month, the threat of large-scale attacks had increased considerably. Cases of banditry and abduction are rising, hampering the delivery of humanitarian aid. Two new rebel groups have arisen and another new threat - that of landmines - has emerged to threaten humanitarian operations and civilians in Darfur.”
2004-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5071 (2004) · source
“Since the first Security Council resolution on Darfur - resolution 1556 (2004) - three months ago, there has undoubtedly been progress on the political front, but it is not yet paying off because in Darfur itself the situation has greatly deteriorated. The report before the Council today identifies a number of trends in events during October. Both the Government and the rebel movements violated the ceasefire, and it seems that the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) was responsible for the greater number of such violations in October. The SLM/A is seeking to claim a wider area of control in Darfur and are strengthening its logistical and fighting capacity. The Government is also trying to extend the territory under its control by attacking with mixed forces made up of military, police and militia.”
2004-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5071 (2004) · source
“Mr. Pronk: The report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan in October presents a hybrid picture. There is progress on the political front, but regression on the ground. The progress is slow, and the regression is alarming. The divergence between the two trends is also getting wider. Political agreements reached at the negotiating table may come too late to stop the rising violence and human suffering in the towns, villages and settlements in the field. I am afraid that the situation in Darfur may become unmanageable unless greater efforts are made both at the negotiating table and on the ground. The meetings of the Council planned for mid- November in Nairobi provide an excellent opportunity to get such robust measures started. Is that necessary? Yes, it is.”
2004-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5071 (2004) · source
“Finally, build confidence between groups that, owing to the present conflict, oppose each other or are being told by their leaders that they must oppose each other because the other party is the enemy. Prevent the conflicts in the Sudan from turning into general antagonism between people with different religions or different ethnic backgrounds. Once the struggles in the Sudan are perceived as a clash between cultures - Arabs against Africans, the Sudan versus the West, Islam versus the rest - they will become unmanageable and spread to other places. So de- escalate rather than escalate; seek dialogue rather than confrontation. It is in that spirit that we are trying to fulfil our mission.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“Combine pressure on the regime with adequate monitoring and a fair degree of trust and acknowledgement of good performance. Make the process of change indigenous. Leave no room for options other than complying with the demands of the international community. However, at the same time, make clear that a Government that keeps its promises, negotiates seriously with its opponents and lives up to agreements can be a respected partner in the international community. Aim not at regime change but at regime character change: in the interest of the regime itself, cause a change in the regime's character, which will then be embedded in a new structure, together with all other forces in the Sudan that were hitherto excluded.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“Provide that aid in addition to humanitarian and development assistance. Avoid competition for resources; there is no trade-off. We are confronted with today's worst humanitarian crisis. It is a man-made conflict that, if not properly addressed, could create the conditions for a widening regional or even global confrontation. Sixthly, put pressure on the current political leaders to change their policies towards the above objectives. External political pressure helps; that is one of the experiences gained from the past three months. Such pressure must be constructive, with no mixed signals or messages that create the impression that whether a regime does or does not comply would be irrelevant because the regime has to be changed anyway.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“The people of all areas of the Sudan - members of rebel movements, tribal leaders throughout the country, opposition groups in Khartoum or in exile, religious leaders, civil society, women's groups and, last but not least, the young, the generation that will have to build a new Sudan - will have to be included in a national process. Start a process of restoring confidence, reconciliation and consensus-building before rushing into procedures that are not owned by the Sudanese people themselves. Fifthly, make the solution of the conflicts in the Sudan an African project. Help the African Union to realize that project. Provide the Union with all the resources needed, including financing, logistics, implementation capacity, training, expertise and, if requested, personnel.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“There were already more than 4 million Sudanese refugees and displaced persons before the outbreak of the conflict in Darfur. They were the victims of a forgotten war. There are now an additional 1.4 million in and around Darfur. In that part of the country, the number of conflict- affected people comes close to 2 million. That figure may rise to 3 or 4 million if the civil war continues and renders domestic agriculture and food production impossible. Those are staggering figures, demanding a serious effort - not ad hoc or short-term, but sustained. Fourthly, aim for a comprehensive political solution. Use the breadth of the agreements reached in the north-south protocols as a basis for the solution of the conflicts elsewhere in the Sudan.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“All three elements are necessary; none of them are sufficient in themselves. Do not limit international action to an end-of-pipe approach, that is, helping the victims but allowing the causes of the drama to continue. Secondly, we must create the conditions for a swift transition from relief and protection towards rehabilitation, capacity-building and development. Partner countries, donors, United Nations agencies and NGOs must work towards the next phase as soon as possible. Create a perspective for development that can be sustained from within; otherwise, the Sudan would be doomed to become a country of beggars, a potential theatre for external forces aimed at international destabilization. Thirdly, increase financial assistance.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“Secondly, the constitutional and the institutional framework of the country should reflect the existing diversities within the nation and provide for a fair degree of regional autonomy, which will help the country to not fall apart. Thirdly, an economic development policy based upon a fair distribution of the country's resources and directed towards poverty reduction and sustainable development should be the primary objective. How can the international community help to meet these conditions? It can do so by following a long-term strategy that is comprehensive, unified and well-focused. I venture the following. First, we must follow a tripartite approach - provide adequate humanitarian assistance, ensure security and protection and address the root causes of the conflict.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“There will not be any improvement in Darfur if there is no agreement guaranteeing political inclusion and sustainable development for all. Exclusion and maldevelopment were at the origin of the north-south conflict. This caused the rebellion in Darfur and the conflicts elsewhere in the country, including east Sudan. In order to reach a comprehensive and sustainable solution of the Sudanese conflicts, three conditions should be met. First, political leaders, including the Government, should care for their people, protect them, guarantee their rights as citizens and human beings and provide them with the chances for a decent life. Care for the weak and care for the poor seems to be a scarce commodity in Khartoum.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source