YouSaid · the spoken record

Pronk

lines on the record: 230
first: 2004-09-02
most recent: 2006-09-18
sittings or episodes: 10
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“The Security Council may wish to send a small delegation in order to make clear that the international community is watching and will not easily accept any further delay or hindrances by either party. The talks on Darfur in Abuja were only partially successful. An agreement concerning humanitarian access could not be signed. With regard to security, the parties fell back on earlier positions and a stalemate resulted. The main issues - political objectives and future economic development - have not yet been dealt with. This is deplorable. The talks should not concentrate only on humanitarian issues and security questions, which can be addressed elsewhere. They should focus on the political and economic roots of the conflict: political neglect and economic marginalization.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“It now seems, after more than a decade of talking, waiting and betting on two horses, that this is the last chance. The international community should therefore ensure that the momentum is sustained, that it gives the right signal to the parties and that this signal is forceful and united and speaks with one voice. The political momentum is there. On 7 October, Vice-President Taha of the Sudan will meet with Mr. John Garang, leader of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), in Nairobi. They have responded to international pressure to kick-start the resumption of the talks. It is important that they confirm that no earlier agreements will be brought up again. They can define the framework for the final round of the talks, which should lead to a peace agreement before the end of this calendar year.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“The second most important political issue to be solved in the month to come concerns the political talks between the Government and the SPLA. In my previous report, I have mentioned the reasons why these negotiations are crucial for the solution of the conflict in Darfur. The outcome of the north-south peace process - peace, a new constitution, a federal structure for the State, a broad-based Government and differentiation in governance systems - can serve as a basis for a solution for the Darfur conflict. The north- south process is a two-edged sword: success will go far beyond north-south. The failure of this process will endanger Sudan as a whole as well as the region, including many neighbouring countries. All parties should invest their political energy in reaching a final result in these talks.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“That is the responsibility, even the duty, of the Government, but it cannot do it alone. Too much has happened, too many mistakes have been made in the past, too many crimes have been committed for which official authorities bear responsibility, and too much confidence has been lost. For all these reasons, we need a third party, without, of course, allowing the Government to sit back, relax and wait. A third party is needed, and, at present, that is the AU. It can help to protect the people by being present over a wide area, by being seen and by acting as a deterrent. The adjustments necessary for the expanded AU mission were set out in the 28 September progress report of the Secretary-General to the Council (S/2004/763). I hope that the Security Council will support the Secretary-General's proposals in this regard.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“Let me mention the following examples of such tasks: ensuring the safety of displaced persons in the camps; monitoring the behaviour and actions of the police; guaranteeing the safe return of refugees and displaced people to the areas from which they came; preventing others from occupying their lands or seizing their property; overseeing the disarming of fighters, Popular Defence Forces, Janjaweed and other militia; and, last but not least, acting as a buffer between the civilian population and possible attackers. There may be hesitations. Can all of this be done by the AU force as presently foreseen? Maybe, maybe not. Whatever the answer is, it is clear that these tasks have to be fulfilled. Many of these would be primarily police tasks rather than military tasks; police tasks are to protect people.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“This has by now been confirmed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Security Council. In my view, it is very important that steps already be taken to begin the deployment of the extended AU force in the coming weeks. The force needs to be sizeable. It needs to be speedily deployed. It also needs to be a force with a mandate far beyond overseeing the N'Djamena ceasefire agreement. There are many tasks to be fulfilled that are not directly related to insecurity resulting from clashes between the Government and the Sudanese Liberation Army.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“For that reason it is also important that the commission complete a thorough investigation. So, I would reiterate that in the key areas of security and impunity there was no progress. However, there are signs of improvement on the political front. Security Council resolution 1564 (2004) does lay the basis for further progress, both in terms of security and at the negotiating table. It does so in two respects: first, by deciding on an expanded African Union (AU) force; and, secondly, by paving the way for a resumption of political negotiations. I will say something about both these issues. First, regarding the AU, in the mid-September meeting of the Joint Implementation Mechanism, the Government of Sudan announced that it would accept a greater AU presence and welcome more troops and more tasks.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“Initially, they had feared that the report of the commission had already been drafted before it had started its work. However, the Government has expressed its confidence in the Secretary-General, trusting that the mandate and the composition of the commission would ensure its independence. The work of the commission is important, because many violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been committed. Those violations have been widely documented, for instance in the excellent report by the League of Arab States released in May 2004, in reports of human rights non-governmental organizations and in reports from United Nations staff in the field. Many of those reports, however, are ad hoc and unverified; some lack a reference to a specific time or place or fail to name the perpetrators.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“Some people have been arrested, prosecuted and jailed, but the leaders are still walking free. Last week, the Council heard reports presented by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms. Arbour, and the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Mr. Mendez. I will not repeat what they said. I fully agree with their analysis, their conclusions and their recommendations. Without a drastic reversal of the climate of impunity there is no hope for peace. The establishment of the commission of inquiry, as called for in the most recent Security Council resolution on this subject, resolution 1564 (2004), represents a major advance in that respect. In the 17 September meeting of the Joint Implementation Mechanism, the Government of the Sudan said that it welcomed the establishment of the commission.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“Despite the fact that both the Government of the Sudan and the rebel movements have reiterated their commitment to the ceasefire, breaches continued. In the past month we have been engaged in talks to keep such violations under control. Some clashes resulted from deficient implementation of the agreements concerning the initial safe areas. We worked out a procedure to avoid that situation in the future, but the Government has refused to agree to follow it as long as the rebels fail to identify their troop positions. Pragmatic agreements on the ground - for instance to respect the status quo - might help, but ultimately a truly respected ceasefire can come only from the African-Union-sponsored talks in Abuja. A second key area is that of impunity. The Government still fails to bring the perpetrators of atrocities to justice.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“There were attacks by the army, sometimes involving helicopter gunships, though less frequently towards the end of the month. Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) attacks took place with greater frequency throughout the period, but they were directed more against the police than against the army. Those ceasefire breaches resulted not only in losses of life among armed personnel, but also in civilian casualties. Most civilian deaths, however, were caused by militia attacks, some of which were quite atrocious, in the beginning of September. Towards the end of the month militia attacks became less frequent. In the same period, however, armed banditry rose at an alarming rate, endangering both the local population and aid convoys.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“However, as I also said, in some key - and I underline "key" - areas the Government had not met its commitments. It had not stopped attacks by militias against civilians or started to disarm those militias. Moreover, no concrete steps had been taken to bring perpetrators of the attacks to justice, thus allowing human rights violations to continue in a climate of impunity. Today we are one month further along. In that month the achievements of August have not been reversed: in those areas the Government has kept its promises. However, that is not good enough. There was no systematic improvement in people's security and no progress on ending impunity. In September, on the issue of security, we saw the following pattern. There were still breaches of the ceasefire on both sides: attacks and counterattacks, revenge and retaliation.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“Mr. Pronk: As the President said, the Council has before it two reports on the Sudan on the basis of two different Security Council resolutions. Please consider my oral presentation as a summary and not as a substitute for the two reports: the two reports are the major documents. I just want to add a couple of points, highlight some elements and summarize the reports, but I do not intend to replace them. In my presentation to the Council one month ago (see S/PV.5027), I informed members about the progress - and the lack of progress - in the implementation of the requirements set out in Security Council resolution 1556 (2004). There was some progress, I said, in a number or areas. I noted each area separately, in order to pin the Government of the Sudan down on the implementation of what had been promised or agreed.”
2004-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5050 (2004) · source
“Moreover, those estimates have turned out to be too modest, as there are more refugees and displaced persons than expected. And that is in addition to the other financial resources required to build the more robust monitoring capacity I have referred to. Since about two months ago, humanitarian agencies have had free access to Darfur. Apart from logistical bottlenecks, nothing stands in the way of an adequate relief operation. That opportunity should be grasped. Resources have to be at least redoubled. There is much talk about Darfur outside Sudan - and rightly so, because the misery is great. Many missions are visiting Sudan. Again rightly so, because pressure should be kept up. But, as a visiting minister has said, "put your money where your mouth is".”
2004-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5027 (2004) · source
“There are no outbreaks of epidemics, but malnutrition and mortality are still too high. Some improvement is discernible due to the tireless efforts of many people, most of them very young, coming from many different countries in order to provide relief to the victims of this man-made crisis. Humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations have done, and continue to do, a tremendous job. However, we need much more assistance - more resources and people. The financial commitments made thus far do not meet the urgent needs for 2004. We need at least an additional $250 million through the end of this year. The original estimates of what was thought to be necessary have never been covered by an adequate amount of financial assistance.”
2004-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5027 (2004) · source
“Last but not least, peace between the North and the South would, according to the protocols so far agreed, result in a governmental system in Khartoum that would also be comprised of representatives from the South. That would also enhance mutual trust among the parties at the negotiating table for Darfur. Any effort to make the conclusion of the IGAD process conditional on an end to the crisis in Darfur would therefore be counter-productive, with consequences that could further destabilize the country and the region and ultimately prolong the crisis in Darfur itself. I now come to the final point. The humanitarian situation in Darfur is still bleak. There are major gaps in the provision of food, water and sanitation. Many displaced persons are still beyond reach.”
2004-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5027 (2004) · source
“Those talks should at least take place concurrently. Sudan has a history of talks forestalled and promises not kept. Completion of the Naivasha talks would prove that it makes sense to negotiate and that peace negotiations can indeed produce results. Moreover, the outcome of the talks in Naivasha could serve as a model for the talks on Darfur. By that I mean decentralization, a fair degree of autonomy for the regions, power sharing, equality and the co-existence of different tribes and populations within one nation. Constitutional changes resulting from Naivasha could instil confidence among the rebels in the process and provide a feasible political framework for the Government as well.”
2004-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5027 (2004) · source
“While the talks are going on, both parties have to exercise maximum restraint on the ground and fully respect the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. That applies equally to the Government of Sudan and to the rebel movements. International pressure should be applied across a level playing field. Point nine also pertains to negotiations. The crisis in Darfur cannot be seen in isolation from the search for a comprehensive solution in Sudan. A comprehensive solution requires peace between the Government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. That means that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace talks in Naivasha should be resumed quickly and brought to a successful conclusion. A sustainable conclusion of the talks on Darfur requires a settlement between Khartoum and Rumbek, not the other way round.”
2004-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5027 (2004) · source
“I welcome the fact that the parties have been able to agree on an agenda that includes both emergency and long-term concerns: humanitarian, security and political issues as well as social and economic questions such as equal access to land, water and natural resources and the eradication of poverty and the fostering of sustainable development in secure livelihoods. I urge the parties to stay at the negotiating table, even when they feel frustrated or provoked. I also urge them to continue and redouble their efforts and to seek assistance from the African Union and United Nations facilitators and mediators. A political settlement should enable the refugees and displaced persons to return. It is also in their interest that security issues should have a prominent place on the agenda.”
2004-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5027 (2004) · source
“The third element of that minimum package would be many more monitors - eyes, hands, feet, wheels, planes and brains to monitor the situation on the ground. As indicated in the report of the Secretary General, an expanded African Union mission in Darfur provides a path towards that end that is independent from the parties, widespread, neutral, efficient and reliably backed by logistics and resources supplied by the international community. Point eight concerns the negotiations. There can be no end to the suffering in Darfur without a political settlement that leads towards sustainable peace. The search for a political solution is now under way in Abuja, Nigeria. The root causes of the conflict should be addressed.”
2004-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5027 (2004) · source
“A minimum package would be to drastically increase the capacity to monitor security and to maximize its effectiveness. That would mean, first, broadening the monitoring mandate in order to cover the implementation of all agreements, not only those between the Government and the rebels - the Ceasefire - but also those between the Government and the United Nations and its partners. Secondly, after broadening the mandate, that would mean interpreting the concept of monitoring activity more broadly. Monitoring must be more than investigating incidents that have happened. Proactive monitoring will help to prevent such incidents from taking place by being on the spot 24 hours a day wherever such incidents might occur, including in the camps, and by acting as mediator in order to help prevent the escalation of conflict and insecurity.”
2004-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5027 (2004) · source
“It is the responsibility of the Government to protect its people against attacks and violations of human rights. This is the essential message of resolution 1556 (2004); this is the message that we have consistently emphasized in all discussions: any Government, including the Government of the Sudan, has the obligation to do its utmost to protect its citizens. It is incumbent upon the Government to ensure that no attacks on civilians occur, whether the perpetrators are under its influence or not. That message could be followed by another message: we urge the Government, if it is unable to fully protect its citizens by itself, to seek, request and accept assistance from the international community. The seventh point is that such assistance can take various forms.”
2004-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5027 (2004) · source
“On the contrary, the measures taken in the initial areas should serve as a model for Darfur as a whole. Turning to my fifth point, a key concern is the critical breakdown of confidence among IDPs vis-a-vis the authorities. That distrust amongst the displaced rests upon their perception that the Government is behind the terror and the trauma they have experienced. Whether that is true or not, the breakdown of confidence is a fact. It is self-evident that rebuilding this shattered confidence cannot be done by the Government alone. More relief, refraining from direct and indirect pressure on IDPs to return, better management of the camps, conflict mediation, reconciliation and much wisdom are required in order to defuse potentially explosive situations. The sixth point follows directly from that.”
2004-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5027 (2004) · source
“Having said that, it is also important to note that, in the areas that have been chosen by the Government as areas to be made secure and safe within 30 days, the situation has improved. Security in those areas is better than it was one or two months ago. It is also better than the situation outside those areas. It goes without saying that the areas to be made safe and secure should be extended drastically and should ultimately cover the whole area of Darfur under the control of the Government. From the outset, that was the understanding shared by both the United Nations and partners and by the Government. It was also understood that any improvement in the initial areas should not be accompanied by a deterioration of conditions elsewhere. There can be no tradeoff in security conditions.”
2004-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5027 (2004) · source
“Disarming part of the Popular Defence Forces is a laudable step, but it is not the same as disarming all militias, including the Janjaweed, which are under the influence of the Government. Secondly, no concrete steps have been taken to bring to justice or even identify any of the militia leaders or the perpetrators of these attacks, allowing violations of human rights to continue in a climate of impunity. Although some individual offenders have indeed been arrested, an active and systematic strategy to end impunity and to bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates does not yet seem to be in place. My fourth point relates to consequences. All of this means that, despite the progress that I have indicated, there is still much insecurity. The number of people fleeing their homes and villages is still increasing.”
2004-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5027 (2004) · source
“It is self-evident that, with regard to the practical implementation of those steps, there are always going to be some time lags and hiccups. But it has always been possible for the United Nations and partners to discuss and resolve the questions concerned with the Government. In my capacity as Special Representative of the Secretary-General, I have commended the Government for that progress in this short period of the initial 30 days. I turn to the third point. In two key - and I underscore the word "key" - areas, however, the Government has not met its commitments. First, it has not been able to stop attacks by militias against civilians or to disarm those militias.”
2004-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5027 (2004) · source
“They have been able to improve security in some specific areas of concentration of internally displaced persons (IDPs); to cease all offensive military operations in those areas, including any offensive actions against rebel groups, to exercise restraint and avoid retaliation, and to redeploy the armed forces in such a way that they are not in direct contact with IDPs or other civilians - here, in mid-August the African Union Ceasefire Commission informed me that there was no evidence of attacks having been carried out by Government aeroplanes since the signature of the joint communique; to deploy additional police; to begin disarming a sizeable part of the Popular Defence Forces; to lift all access restrictions for humanitarian relief; to announce a policy of voluntary returns only; to refrain from exercising a sovereign right to decide whether return of IDPs is voluntary and appropriate and hand over that right to an authoritative international body; to accept international human rights monitoring and establish national mechanisms to investigate abuses; to mobilize local and traditional leaders to address the conflict in Darfur and enact legislation to strengthen native administration; and, last but not least, to engage in negotiations with rebel movements without preconditions.”
2004-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5027 (2004) · source
“Through that mechanism we were able to maintain pressure on the Government and to offer it help in meeting the initial requirement: to ShOW substantial, irreversible and verifiable progress within 30 days and, in the months thereafter, progress towards full security in Darfur. This has resulted in an approach in stages: first, the formulation of detailed policies by the Government in order to meet that objective; secondly, ensuring that those policies will indeed be carried out by all authorities, including those in Darfur itself; and thirdly, guaranteeing the actual impact on the ground: substantially improved security for the population, and for displaced persons in particular. My second point is that the Government of the Sudan has made progress towards meeting the requirements of the resolution.”
2004-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5027 (2004) · source
“We made clear that the resolution should be interpreted not as an attack on Sudan and its leaders but, on the contrary, as a means of protecting Sudanese citizens who are suffering atrocities. We also made clear that we were willing to assist the authorities in Sudan in meeting the requirements of the resolution. Within the framework of the Joint Implementation Mechanism, the United Nations and partners - including the ambassadors of many countries represented in Khartoum - have been engaged in intensive discussions with the Government of Sudan and in a number of assessment missions. In all those discussions, the United Nations and partners aimed at achieving consensus among themselves, so as to avoid misinterpretation and in order to maintain political pressure.”
2004-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5027 (2004) · source
“Mr. Pronk: As you just indicated, Mr. President, the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 13 to 16 of Security Council resolution 1556 (2004) (S/2004/703) has been made available to members of the Security Council. For that reason, I will confine myself to making a brief oral statement rather than presenting a full survey. I would like to highlight 10 important points on the basis of the report. My first point concerns the process. After the adoption of Security Council resolution 1556 (2004), the Government of Sudan, in a meeting with the United Nations and partners, declared that it would meet the requirements contained in that resolution.”
2004-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5027 (2004) · source