YouSaid · the spoken record

Pronk

lines on the record: 230
first: 2004-09-02
most recent: 2006-09-18
sittings or episodes: 10
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“We must mend our own shortcomings and provide a future United Nations operation in Darfur with a robust mandate and a strong force, not just to preserve lives, but to ensure that all Darfurians can choose to live wherever they want to and that their children can look forward to a future that their parents were denied.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“In order to address all of this, it is essential that we engage in consultations with the Government of the Sudan. By doing so, we can allay fears, correct perceptions and, on the basis of the United Nations Charter, make clear that the extension of the United Nations presence in Sudan is not an infringement on the country's sovereignty. The consent of the Government of the Sudan in the transition to United Nations operations - hopefully following a peace agreement in Abuja - will greatly advance the cause of peace in the Sudan. Two months ago, in this Chamber, I said that hope, although a noble concept, has its limits.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“Whoever is on the ground and whenever the transition takes place, a substantial strengthening of the present peacekeeping forces in Darfur is required as soon as possible. Public reaction to the transition in the Sudan, at present, may not be very positive. Several demonstrations, sermons in the mosques and media sound-bites indicate a carefully orchestrated campaign against United Nations operations in Darfur. During my visits to Darfur, I found a genuine desire for peace amongst all spectrums of the population. I also found the audiences misinformed. Many Sudanese people were confused about the United Nations, its Charter, its principles and its objectives. People expressed genuine fear of the Iraq scenario being repeated in the Sudan.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“Thirdly, we must have a robust peace force, large enough to be everywhere it is needed, strong enough to deter any attack, and with a mandate broad enough to meet all possible threats, with staying power, and long enough to instil confidence amongst all people in Darfur, including potential returnees. The performance of the African Union peace force with limited resources has been more than commendable. Now that the African Union Peace and Security Council has decided, in principle, to support a transition to a United Nations operation in Darfur, the international community must provide all necessary resources to preserve the lives and aspirations of the people in Darfur. We must take steps to augment the African Union, concurrent with planning for the transition.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“First, there must be the swift conclusion of an agreement in Abuja on power and wealth-sharing, followed by an all-inclusive Darfur-Darfur dialogue between all stakeholders, including civil society, to make it sustainable. Secondly, there must be a new ceasefire agreement that can hold. That requires unequivocal language in the agreement, firm implementation provisions and procedures, clear sanctions on violations, and a chair representing a strong peacekeeping force to ensure that all violations are addressed fully, in a timely manner and impartially. A so-called humanitarian ceasefire, guaranteeing humanitarian assistance and relief workers' access to victims, is not sufficient. A comprehensive ceasefire should guarantee that the victims themselves are protected and that no new victims are made.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“Demands laid down in Security Council resolutions are brushed aside. The N'Djamena ceasefire agreement is violated day after day. Both parties know that those violations will be noted, but neither discussed nor addressed, let alone sanctioned. The ceasefire does not function; the Joint Committee does not meet. The sanctions foreseen with the establishment of the Security Council Panel of Experts exist only in theory. Our strategy should focus on two objectives: peace and protection - peace between the warring parties, and the protection of unarmed civilians, in particular against movements that do not bother to sit at the table and talk peace. Three steps are necessary.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“In January, I proposed that we would need to change our strategy because it had failed. There was no peace agreement and the killings continued. Two months later, the situation remains the same. In the J abal Marra, fighting between the Government and the Sudan Liberation Army continued and intensified up to and including this weekend. Along the border with Chad, the tensions heightened; it is a no-go area for humanitarians. In South Darfur, militias continue to cleanse village after village. The Government has not disarmed them. On the contrary, African Union commanders on the ground openly speak about continued support for militias from forces allied to the Government. Rebel movements are more and more fragmented, fight each other, form new alliances and break them, and alienate themselves from their representatives in Abuja.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“That decision, resulting from cooperation between the international community and the local authorities, implies that they can stay where they are rather than being threatened with the destruction of their dwellings and with having to start all over again somewhere in the desert. I now want to make a number of comments concerning Darfur. The Darfurians continue to yearn for peace. Killings, rapes and abuses of human rights, in direct violation of the agreements and Security Council resolutions, constitute a threat to peace in the Sudan as a whole, for peace is indivisible. Since my last brief, I feel no joy in adding the towns of Sharia and Graida to Aro Sharow, Tama, Abu Sorouj, Tawila, Labado, Hamada and Khor Abeche, which all stand witness to cruel atrocities, terror, killings and rape. That is a list of shame.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“We hope that it will have a concrete effect on the ground. We also hope that neither the recent law on non-governmental organizations nor the practices of the Sudanese national security forces will overshadow that positive development. Another positive development concerns displaced persons in and around Khartoum. The plight of those people has been tragic. Many of them are extremely poor, deprived of assistance, and without an income enabling them to buy the minimum necessary. Last week, the Wali of Khartoum announced that there will be no more forced relocation of internally displaced persons.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“That is mainly due to local authorities. The Government has shown the will to cooperate. In the wake of the publishing of the infamous cartoons, there were demonstrations across the Northern Sudan also, but the Sudanese reaction to that issue was much more moderate compared to protests in other Muslim countries. Demonstrations were peaceful and controlled and the authorities were successful in preventing attacks on individuals on the basis of their nationality. I am also pleased with the extension of the moratorium on measures curtailing humanitarian assistance. That, as members may remember, was negotiated for the first time in July 2004 between Secretary-General Kofi Annan and President Bashir. It has now been extended to January 2007 throughout the Sudan. That enables us to plan and implement assistance better.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“While on the one hand there is a need to create space for a political solution, on the other we must strengthen our capacity to protect and defend and to confront LRA support mechanisms within and outside of Sudan. I am pleased to announce that we have reached 80 per cent of our envisaged deployment in the south. In the light of the precarious security situation just described, we need full capacity soon. Cannibalization of any forces from southern Sudan would be tantamount to sending the watchman home in the afternoon. I am pleased to announce that we have successfully concluded the Status of Forces Agreement with the Government. Implementation of the Agreement - for example, freedom of movement and United Nations Radio broadcasts - will indicate its success or failure. There is much harassment of United Nations staff on the ground.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“Since January, we have monitors in the contested area of Hamesh Koerieb, following an incursion of paramilitary combatants in the area. The SPLA has been granted an extension of stay for a couple of months. UNMIS has been able to maintain the status quo. However, if the Council further postpones a decision, violence may flare in the east. A third concern is the continuing presence of the LRA in southern Sudan. This has forced UNMIS to maintain a high security alert that restricts many operations. The LRA continues to loot and to kill the local population. Since the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments at the end of last year, LRA attacks have increased. Humanitarian workers have been killed. Three attacks on compounds in Yambio, Yei and this weekend again in Yambio took place.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“In May last year UNMIS was able to facilitate a gentleman's agreement between the Government and the eastern front not to attack each other anymore. Both expressed their willingness to start talks about talks. Since then, other international facilitators and mediators entered the scene. This resulted in an indefinite postponement of even the beginning of talks. These should have produced a certain result before the withdrawal of SPLA from the east, which should have taken place before 9 January. In December of last year, the Security Council was asked to extend the UNMIS mandate beyond the SPLA redeployment in order to help avoid an armed confrontation between the SAF and the eastern front. The Council has not taken a decision. This is limiting our capacity to monitor and mediate.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“Our prompt and unified response has enabled us to prevent escalation. However, tension is mounting. It is not clear to what extent the redeployment of the SAF and the SPLA has taken place in practice. On paper, the CPA intermediate targets have been met, but there are indications of troop movements not notified in advance and not accounted for. We have started an overall audit of all locations and all movements, but we depend upon the cooperation of the parties. The fact that Sudanese monitors, both northern and southern, who accompany UNMIS monitors cannot, according to United Nations rules, be paid a fee is affecting their cooperation and diminishing our monitoring capacity. A second concern is the east.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“Since mid-2005 we have witnessed an increasing number of violent incidents in the south, sometimes tribal, sometimes related to the other armed groups, sometimes resulting from clashes between nomads and farmers or between returning internally displaced persons and local populations, sometimes due to attacks by dissatisfied, unpaid soldiers who went looting, and sometimes as a result of local disputes that turn into a tribal or political confrontation. So far, UNMIS, with the help of the tripartite CPA structure - the CJMC, the Area Joint Military Committees (AJMCs) and the Joint Military Teams (JMTs) - has been able to contain such violence. We applied a unified approach that brings together the military, police and civilian components, including the humanitarian, human rights, protection, demining, DDR and local experts.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“These include the situation in the east, the disclosure of all SAF and SPLA dispositions, the formation of the joint integrated units, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the status of the border between north and south, in particular the so-called three areas of Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei. These issues cannot be solved by holding separate bilateral talks with the SPLA and the SAF; they have to be dealt with within the official CPA institutions. One of those institutions is the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC), chaired by the UNMIS Force Commander, which meets every fortnight in Juba. So far, 20 meetings have taken place. The CJMC has been the most active and most successful CPA institution.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“Moreover, the Government has severely curtailed our freedom of movement in the Abyei area and has informed us that UNMIS should operate only to the south of a line drawn by the Government. In our view, this is a violation of both the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the CPA. Moreover, it hampers our ability to monitor troop movements in one of the most contentious areas. We hope that this issue will be resolved at the forthcoming meeting of the Ceasefire Political Committee (CPC) next week. After a prolonged delay, the CPC met for the first time on 20 February. It decided to meet once a month. In addition to Abyei, other pending issues will have to be discussed.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“Former SSDF commanders who were persuaded to stay within the Sudanese Armed Forces rather than joining the SPLA - persuaded with money and weapons - are rumoured to have planned this attack. New convoys of former SSDF soldiers and their families have left Khartoum and passed through the highly contentious area of Abyei on their way to the south. The United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) has been able to mediate and monitor a safe passage. However, the situation is still tense. No action has been taken so far against the perpetrators, who continue to roam the area. The security mechanism envisioned by the CPA to counter such issues is the joint integrated units, which to date are still not functional. This is a matter of great concern.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“The disarmament of ex- combatants has not yet started. The incorporation of other armed groups is not taking place smoothly. The situation requires a substantial and secured increase in financial resources for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). Following the decision of Paulino Matip - the leader of the former South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), the other southern rebel movement - to integrate his forces into the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), a decision based on a provision in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, we have begun to witness violent clashes between rival factions. In the Abyei area, a convoy of unarmed passengers was ambushed, and more than 20 were killed and more than 30 injured.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“Their clearance, necessary to enable people to live safely, has not started. Disarmament of combatants has yet to begin. The city of Juba, already short of water and power, is receiving more and more people. Sanitation is deplorable. Diarrhoea and cholera are on the rise. Many villages can hardly sustain the increasing number of their inhabitants because food production is insufficient. The reconstruction and development deficit in the south is the greatest challenge to peace. If it is not addressed, people will ask what difference peace has made to them. Frustration will mount. Violence will increase. After the war, there will be plenty of weapons for those who want to grab the scant resources in order to survive. The security situation in the south already shows signs of deterioration.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“The commitments made by both the north and the south to ensure transparency and accountability, as well as good financial and economic governance, augur well for a development policy which will not only benefit the leaders and the middle class but will also help fight poverty. In Paris, the Government of the Sudan went further than just making promises. Last year's accounts were made transparent, and this year's budget was disclosed. This is essential so as to translate peace into a tangible peace dividend through poverty reduction and sustainable economic development. Southern Sudan suffers from severe poverty. Its population lacks basic necessities. Since the signing of the Peace Agreement, no tangible reconstruction has taken place. People are returning, but they lack the means to reintegrate. There are mines everywhere.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“President Bashir, speaking to a southern audience in Juba, showed enlightened leadership when he stated that the people in the south would be free to vote for secession in the referendum, five years from now, and that he would prefer secession to another war. From his side, Vice-President Kiir put to rest the political dispute on oil by declaring, during the first Meeting of the Sudan Consortium in Paris, that there is no longer any substantial disagreement on the sharing of oil between the north and the south. The Consortium Meeting in itself, held on 9 and 10 March, was very successful. The two parties, led by Salva Kiir, united to participate as the Government of National Unity. That was an encouraging sign.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“Mr. Pronk: I will first make a number of remarks on the basis of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) mandate, and, in the second part of my briefing, I will elaborate on aspects concerning Darfur. The implementation of the CPA is still on track. However, forming commissions - and quite a number of these commissions have been established - is just the first step. Success or failure will be judged by their performance. Both the National Congress Party and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement have respected the letter of the Agreement, but on the ground there is an increasing climate of mistrust between the two parties. Mutual trust can be restored through visionary leadership.”
2006-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5392 (2006) · source
“The ultimate responsibility lies with the perpetrators, but we should do more to stop them, to end impunity and to offer prospects to the children of Darfur that they can live without fear. We hoped that there would be peace at the end of the year. Did we do more than just hope? Hope is a good thing, but it has its limits.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“It should be supported by sanctions - sanctions on troop movements which are not in accordance with the agreement; sanctions on arms deliveries; and sanctions against those who have caused atrocities, and in particular those who have instructed others to do so - not only foot soldiers, but commanders and those political leaders who were responsible for the carnage of 2003 and 2004 and who refuse to stop the atrocities of 2005. Many people have paid lip service to the need for peace. Looking back at three years of killing and cleansing in Darfur, we must admit that our peace strategy so far has failed. All we did was pick up the pieces and muddle through, doing too little too late.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“That has not been done, despite demands laid down in Security Council resolutions. The force should stay long enough to provide confidence - at least three to four years after the reaching of a peace agreement. Its financing should be guaranteed all along. It should have a broad mandate - broad enough to deter non-compliance. It should be an integral element of a unified approach towards Darfur, with humanitarian, political, police, legal, human rights, reconstruction and economic development instruments.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“Since I gave my last briefing to the Council, the villages Aro Sharow, Tama and Abu Sorouj should be added to Tawila, Labado, Hamada and Khor Abache - all of which have witnessed cruel atrocities, terror, killing and rape. It is no wonder that internally displaced persons and refugees do not dare to return. They do not trust anybody anymore. Only international guarantees such as those provided by the African Union can help. The force which is necessary to provide such guarantees should be big - much bigger than the present one. It should not be on call but in place, present everywhere where people may be attacked. It should be strong, able to defend itself, able to deter attacks on civilians and able to disarm militias and the Janjaweed, which should have been disarmed by the Government in the first place.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“The African Union has done an admirable job, but the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has not been provided with adequate resources and adequate means to prevent attacks. We deplore the death of young African soldiers who went to Darfur to help save the lives of innocent civilians but who became targets themselves. The security situation in Darfur is chaotic. The perpetrators of the 2003 and 2004 violence have attained their goal: many areas have been cleansed. They have free passage in the countryside. Millions of villagers sitting in camps are too afraid to leave. Terror continues. At least once a month groups of 500 to 1,000 militia, on camels and on horseback, attack villages, killing dozens of people and terrorizing others, who flee.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“Only when the fighting has stopped will the parties, together with others who did not take up arms but who have a real stake in the development of their part of the Sudan - tribal leaders, civil society, representatives of displaced people, intellectuals and others - be able to reach a fair, inclusive and sustainable agreement on governance, power, wealth, land, water and economic development. Those who did not take up arms and have watched the parties failing in Abuja should be given the right to participate in a meaningful Darfur-Darfur dialogue, which should begin soon. Any agreement, whether in Abuja or in El Fasher, will be sustainable only if the international community assists in guaranteeing security.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“The parties should not adjourn for an eighth round, but should instead conclude an agreement for the sake of the people they claim to represent. Parties negotiating in Darfur could learn from the way by which the north-south Peace Agreement was reached in Nairobi. Before everything else in Nairobi, a sustained and lasting ceasefire was agreed upon. In southern Sudan the fire ceased, not only on paper but also on the ground. That made it possible to continue negotiations for a fair distribution of power and wealth, which is the core of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The same thing should also happen in Darfur.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“Thanks to international assistance and the commitment of humanitarian workers on the ground - who deserve our admiration - malnutrition and mortality figures have decreased considerably. However, that decrease cannot be sustained in an environment of insecurity, which results in less and less access for humanitarian assistance. All of us will have to reconsider the strategy for achieving peace in Darfur. The parties, having missed the 31 December deadline, will now have to commit themselves to reaching an agreement during this, the seventh, round of talks. At the beginning of the seventh round they pledged that it would be the last and that it would end before 31 December 2005. The least they can do now is to stop the clock.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“Moreover, they are a threat to the sustainability of peace in the south. The deadline set at Abuja to reach a peace agreement on the matter of Darfur before the end of 2005 was not met. The parties have failed. The passing of the 31 December deadline was ignored and went unnoticed. One cannot avoid the impression that the parties have lost all sense of urgency and do not really care about deadlines. They talk but do not achieve results. Chairman Salim did everything he could to get the parties to end the talks with an agreement, but the parties shied away. One wonders whether negotiators really care about the fate of the 3 million war-affected people, more than 2 million of whom live in camps for displaced persons and refugees.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“The unity option should get a real chance when people exercise their right to vote in the referendum. However, the Government in the north should do everything to make that attractive. It can do so by guaranteeing a fair share of power, resources and income to the people of the south for expenditure and investment in water, infrastructure, schools, jobs, agriculture, housing and health care for all the people who for decades were deprived of such things. Unequal distribution of power and wealth was also one of the causes of the war in Darfur. There is not yet peace in Darfur. Peace is indivisible. The continuing violence, killing, rape and human rights violations are not only a tragedy for the people of Darfur, they also violate the requirements set out in resolutions of the Security Council.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“Making unity the attractive option is part of the mandate that the Security Council has given to the Mission. We are trying to do that by focusing in particular on poverty reduction and on sustaining peace, minority rights, human rights and constitutional rights. In the referendum, people will be free to decide either for unity or separation. If, six years after the conclusion of the Peace Agreement people are less poor, have more rights and live in peace throughout the country in a still-united Sudan, they may consider it attractive to stay together as one nation, albeit with two systems. The SPLM. leadership would be wise to show that they have not decided otherwise, that is, to opt for separation whatever the developments in the next five years.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“The international community and its institutions - including all countries investing in and buying from the Sudan, along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) exerting its mandate to assess economic and financial governance - have a political and an economic interest in the full and fair implementation of that agreement on oil. The upcoming meeting in March of the Sudan Consortium, to be led by the World Bank, will be a good opportunity to discuss that, in order to settle the matter and to avoid having possible differences of opinion lead to a real dispute. Matching the cynicism in the south, there are suspicions in the north that the SPLM. does not really want to give unity a chance in the referendum to be held six years after the conclusion of the Peace Agreement.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“The sense of optimism among the people of the south is therefore low. They have also become suspicious. Many are losing their belief in the north's sincerity regarding giving the south a chance to develop beyond peace. The parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement have agreed that 50 per cent of oil revenues and the resulting income would accrue to the south. However, there is no transparency. The Khartoum authorities have been reluctant to provide answers to all questions regarding oil. People in the south are becoming less and less confident that the Agreement's essential element on the sharing of wealth will become a reality.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“The Government and the eastern rebel movements had agreed to start discussions leading to peace talks facilitated by the United Nations in the third quarter of last year, but thereafter the United Nations was sidelined. The parties agreed to Libya as a facilitator, but talks have yet to start - even though the redeployment deadline of 9 January 2006 has passed. This is creating a void with the potential for new armed conflict, violating the gentlemen's agreement between the parties, facilitated by the United Nations in the middle of last year, not to attack each other. Finally, the attacks of the Uganda-based Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) on civilians and humanitarian workers in the south are paralysing our activities in a considerable part of the south. The situation there directly threatens the potential peace dividends.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“That is a major risk. There is peace, indeed. Where is the peace dividend? Conflicts emerge out of tribal disputes and also with people returning to their villages. UNMIS, through timely reaction in an integrated fashion, has been able to defuse some of those conflicts with the cooperation of the authorities. However, there will be more conflicts. We have such concerns in Abyei, one of the transition areas, where the Missiriya and the Dinka on the ground have learned to live together but where uncertainty about the future status of the region continues to pose a threat. In the east, close to the Eritrean border, a confrontation may arise as soon as the SPLM. withdraws to the south, as it has committed itself to do under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“The peace process must become more inclusive, incorporating other political parties and civil society. The security laws must be brought into line with the constitution. The disarmament, demobilization and consequent reintegration of the combatants is yet to commence. The return of displaced persons and refugees has started, but we lack the resources to support the return. The rehabilitation and development of agriculture in the south, of its economy, its towns and its villages, including water, education and health systems, has yet to start. The capacity of the new Government of Southern Sudan is still limited. Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, return, rehabilitation and capacity- building all require more international financial support. Without such support, the expectations of the people in the south will not be met.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“As a matter of fact, the Joint Ceasefire Committee - the only United Nations-led institution - has been the most successful Agreement institution. It started convening shortly after the Security Council adopted resolution 1590 (2005) in March last year mandating the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to monitor the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It has met 15 times and has been able to reach consensus on most issues regarding the interpretation and implementation of the ceasefire paragraphs in the Agreement. The talks between the SPLM. and the other armed groups in southern Sudan are proceeding very well. That could pave the way for the integration of all combatants, either into one of the armies or into civil society. Of course, a lot still needs to be done.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“In the space of one year two new constitutions have been adopted - one for the Sudan as a whole and one for southern Sudan. Two new Governments had been formed. All of the institutions that had to be established on the basis of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement have been established. Some have hardly met, while others are facing political disputes. However, the spirit of the Agreement stands tall. The redeployment of the Sudanese army away from the south has started. The target of 30 per cent redeployment within one year has more or less been accomplished. The United Nations has instructed the forces on both sides to provide notification of all movements seven days in advance, and so far there have been only minor violations of those instructions.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“Mr. Pronk: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for having given me this opportunity to brief the Council on the current situation in the Sudan, including in Darfur. One year after its signing in Nairobi, on 9 January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) stands firm. Its implementation, although slow, remains on track and is moving forward. The tragic death of John Garang, the leader of the south, less than a month after he had been sworn in as the new Vice-President of the Sudan, was a major blow. It caused consternation and delays, but neither party has found a reason to deviate from the Agreement, which was his legacy. On the contrary, parties realize that they depend on each other and that they have to move forward.”
2006-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5344 (2006) · source
“We have heard them in Khartoum, and they have been heard in Addis, in Abuja, in Nairobi and in New York." Let us proceed to discharge our duties and to accomplish the mission which we undertook a year ago.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“It is worth quoting him, too: "The people of the Sudan who took to the streets, congratulating, blessing, hailing and calling for more processions such as the ones that filled the towns of the Sudan was the strongest signal, culminating in a historic gathering that brought forth no words - but that, I am sure, was the strongest speech given during those celebrations. And when the people speak during such occasions, then the leaders have to keep silent and proceed to discharge their duties and accomplish their mission - and here, by the grace of God, do we endeavour to do so." That is quite a commitment. When listening to that speech, many in the audience in Khartoum must have thought: "The people in Darfur have spoken, too.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“Everyone in the Sudan - in Khartoum, in El Fasher and in Juba - can watch, see and assess whether this commitment will be turned into reality. Those in Addis, in Nairobi, in Abuja and in New York who have made it possible for the process to result in such commitments and agreements can see to it that this reality will not fade away. The new second Vice-President, Ali Osman Taha, who had made a place for John Garang as the first Vice-President of the Sudan, referred in his speech to the overwhelming welcome by the people of Khartoum for Garang at his homecoming.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“Moreover, we have to look ahead to what will have to be done, if the Darfur peace agreement is signed, to follow up on it. People will have to return to their areas of origin, but they will do so only when they feel secure. That will require a further expansion of the AU force. Planning for such an expansion should commence soon. On the day of the inauguration of the Government of National Unity, beautiful words were spoken. President Bashir spoke of a new era. He sketched its contours in language that inspired many people: "We give you good tidings of more freedom, democracy and consultation. Our commitment to the people of Darfur is to set right all grievances and hostilities that befell any citizen, from whatever party, on the basis ofjustice and the rule of law". That is more than a promise; it is an assurance. Everyone heard him.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“The battle against poverty, following the fight for peace, will require decades of sustained effort by the Sudanese people and by the international community. Ongoing reconciliation, as well as the management of conflicts between nomads and farmers, will require a great deal of political attention and resources for compensation and development. The international community started to address the Sudanese problem with a comprehensive strategy a year ago - at last. That strategy consisted of humanitarian, political and military chapters. Some successes have become manifest. A change in strategy is not required. However, an intensification of that strategy, persistence and a commitment to add an economic chapter to it are crucial.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“Do not arrest only foot soldiers who have killed and raped; arrest also their commanders and their leaders who instructed them to do so. Only then can impunity be ended. Only then will the present reconciliation efforts result not merely in dissipating a dark past but also in opening a new era in which such crimes cannot be repeated. All in all, there is room for optimism, but we must be realistic. The situation is fragile - utterly fragile. The wounds inflicted on millions of people during a lengthy period of neglect, exclusion, injustice and bad governance cannot be healed overnight. Democratization and the guaranteeing of human rights require more than an agreement between leaders and fighters. Poverty is extreme, more so than in nearly all other countries of Africa.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“Attacks can flare up. Militia have not been disarmed. Arbitrary arrests and the inhumane treatment of prisoners are still taking place. Rape also continues. A new Government policy to help the victims of rape and to investigate crimes of rape has been adopted, after long and intensive discussions with the United Nations, but its implementation is still deficient throughout Darfur. The Government has commenced a process of reconciliation between tribes. That is laudable, and some results have become manifest. However, it cannot be a substitute either for a political agreement or for official legal action. The Government has finally established a court to deal with crimes against humanity, but so far only a few cases have been brought to court. Here, too, there is a call on the Government: go forward speedily and go higher up.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“They have done an admirable job, a highly professional one, with great dedication. Militia attacks on villages have decreased. The humanitarian situation in the camps has improved. The monthly number of deaths due to violence is still high, much too high - 100 to 300 - but it is substantially lower than in the period before the adoption of the first Security Council resolution on Darfur, in July last year, when mass attacks had led to mass killings. According to a preliminary study done by the World Health Organization (WHO), the crude mortality rate now is 0.8 death per 10,000 people per day in the whole of Darfur, as against more than 1.5 more than a year ago. The halving of the mortality rate has brought it below the official emergency threshold. Still, the situation is delicate. Banditry has increased and has become ferocious.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source