YouSaid · the spoken record

Pronk

lines on the record: 230
first: 2004-09-02
most recent: 2006-09-18
sittings or episodes: 10
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“So far, as of mid-2005, only 40 per cent of that figure has been committed. Our programmes are underfunded. I call on all donors to fulfil their pledges and to increase them. The humanitarian situation in south Sudan is very fragile. Not to address it wholeheartedly would betray the expectations of millions and jeopardize the chances of making peace sustainable - until at least six years from now, when people will have to choose, by referendum, either unity or separation. Creating a perspective for the millions of people on the ground who have suffered for decades is the joint responsibility of political leaders in the Sudan and of the international community. Can we create a similar perspective for the people in Darfur? It seems that the ceasefire is being kept by the parties. The AU force has helped to establish greater stability.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“Some troop-contributing countries have delayed their contributions, necessitating others who depend on them to do likewise. The total lack of infrastructure in south Sudan, together with heavy rains, creates difficult problems. However, we believe that full deployment will be possible towards the end of October. In the meantime, we are doing our utmost through our good offices to help steer the process towards prudent conflict management. We have decided to give the highest priority to facilitating voluntary returns of displaced persons and refugees in the upcoming dry season. In that period, we expect about 600,000 of them to return. We will establish way stations and provide a minimum package of assistance. We need many more resources. Our revised work plan for 2005 amounts to nearly $2 billion.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“Leaders of the Misseriya tribe, while protesting against the outcome of the arbitration, have declared that it is their intention to refrain from attacks on Dinkas and on returning refugees. I call on all to respect the arbitration and to enter into a peaceful dialogue on how to implement the decisions. All parties should be aware that this is the first test case for the sustainability of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Much will depend on the way this is going to be handled, not only in Abyei but also in south Sudan as a whole, the Nuba Mountains, the Blue Nile region and Darfur, as well as in the east. The United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) also faces tremendous tasks ahead. We are deploying our peace monitoring military capacity steadily, although we are meeting a number of difficulties.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“The proper and smooth functioning of those institutions is crucial. Peace will be challenged on the ground by the presence of the Lord's Resistance Army, by other armed groups that have not yet decided to lay down their arms and integrate themselves into the new structures and by tribes that resist what has been agreed. A first major challenge to the parties is posed by the findings of the Abyei Boundary Commission. As stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, its arbitration is definitive and binding. But, as always, that arbitration has created winners and losers. The Presidency has published the Commission's report and is currently studying the findings.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“However, that means that the Government, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and all other parties, including the international community, should do their utmost to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in full and without being affected by events on the ground or on the sidelines and not allowing powers in the dark or grumbling spoilers to harm the letter and the spirit of the Agreement. That is a tall order for both parties. They can achieve it by establishing without delay the mechanisms that have been agreed upon in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Ceasefire Joint Military Committee has already been established, and it is functioning well. However, the Ceasefire Political Committee and the Assessment and Evaluation Commission still have to be set up.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“Both parties have made some steps towards better conflict management and confidence- building. Here too, reaching an agreement before the end of the year may become a reality. Last year we said that the road to peace in Darfur and elsewhere in the Sudan runs through Naivasha. That indeed seems to be the case. The spirit of Naivasha is affecting parties throughout the Sudan. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement has had a snowball effect. In Cairo, in Abuja and in the east, texts were drafted that reflected the spirit of peace, diversity, democratization and power-sharing - which are at the core of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“The leadership of the African Union, in particular the efforts by the mediator, Salim Ahmed Salim, was solid and effective. It led to the signing of the declaration of principles that will form the basis for future talks. The talks could be finalized before the end of this year. There also seems to be more confidence in the peace process among commanders of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) on the ground. Further confidence-building is necessary, but there is light at the end of the tunnel. Talks to address the conflict in the east have yet to start. Violence has increased in the east since the beginning of this year. However, contacts with both the Government and the Eastern Front indicate that there is a willingness to address this conflict through negotiations.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“The state of emergency was lifted - of course, with the exception of Darfur and the east. Censorship was lifted as well. For the first time, newspapers did not have to get clearance in advance from military intelligence for every article they intended to publish. The fifth round of Abuja talks has made progress, unlike previous rounds that were hijacked by violent incidents on the ground in Darfur. The talks proceeded without disturbance. Parties - that is, the Government, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice Equality Movement (JEM) - negotiated seriously and with flexibility, discussing political issues rather than procedures and minor issues. International partners were united in exerting pressure, and were able to avoid sending contradictory messages.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“But the Agreement was meant to be the beginning of a comprehensive peace to be won throughout the Sudan, and also a commitment to make that happen. Quite a few things are happening. In Cairo, an agreement was reached between the Government and a number of opposition parties that had joined forces in the National Democratic Alliance. Their leader, Al- Mirghani, who had previously been in exile, is now a political partner. The leader of the Umma party, Al- Mahdi, who had been ousted by the military coup that had formed the basis of the present Government, returned as well. Al-Turabi, the leader of the Popular Congress Party and the intellectual force behind that coup, who was later jailed by the present regime, was released from jail. He started directly to use his newly won freedom by criticizing the regime.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“Never before had more people gathered together in the centre of Khartoum in order to show their political belief that peace and unity were within reach. One day later, the Government of National Unity was constituted, with a new Presidency that included Bashir, Garang and Taha. The statements they made were future-oriented and referred to peace, democracy and citizenship. Their body language was a clear expression of joy and confidence that was visible to spectators throughout the Sudan and outside it and that said, peace is here to stay. Of course, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is not really comprehensive. It deals with only one conflict, albeit the longest civil war in Africa, with the highest number of casualties. Quite a few parties were excluded from the talks in Khartoum as well as in the rest of the north and the south.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“It also gave a comprehensive mandate to the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to help implement the peace agreement and to help address the root causes of the conflicts in the Sudan. It is now one year later, mid-2005. Things have changed; 2005 could become the year of decisive change. It started with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the north and south in Nairobi on 9 January. In April, a delegation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) came to Khartoum and was welcomed wholeheartedly. For many of them, it was their first visit in more than 20 years. A new constitution was drafted and approved in Khartoum as well as in Rumbek. In July, John Garang himself went to Khartoum. His going was a triumph that was witnessed by a million people.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“Mr. Pronk: About a year ago, in June 2004, the Security Council decided to task a United Nations mission to prepare for the monitoring foreseen in the Naivasha Agreement and to support the implementation of a peace agreement, once signed, between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army. One month later, the Council adopted its first resolution concerning Darfur in order to put an end to the mass killings and the crimes against humanity committed since early 2003. In the 12 months that have passed since then, the Council has intensified its involvement and added pressure in order to conclude the Naivasha negotiations and to solve the conflict in Darfur.”
2005-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5231 (2005) · source
“In Darfur, it should be possible to reach such an agreement after 10 months, starting in February, with the adoption of a declaration of principles, an agenda and a road map for talks ending by the close of 2005. Vice-President Taha alluded to this. This would mean that on the Sudan's day of national independence - 1 January 2006 - the Sudan could be one of the first countries in Africa to look back in peace on half a century of independence after colonial rule: a fully sovereign nation, living in peace. That is a much more rewarding achievement than the independence of a State torn by internal wars that threaten the future of the nation, the State and the people.”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“Although a peace agreement will not be sufficient, it will be necessary. We cannot solve the problem overnight, but we should be able to stop the violence and the suffering within the shortest time possible. That is why very close cooperation between the United Nations and the AU is required to ensure that the robust third party force can stop anybody, can halt any force or agent displacing or killing innocent people. A robust third party force is a buffer between the parties and, also, between combatants and civilians. With the help of such a third party force, the international community could enable the parties in the Sudan itself to achieve a peace agreement. There has been political momentum since 31 December 2004. In Nairobi, the Peace Agreement, to which we just referred, was signed after 10 years of negotiations.”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“Without them, political talks will continue to be frustrated by developments in the field, by manipulated insecurity and by violence that undermines the credibility of the negotiating parties. We will have to break through that vicious circle of violence on the ground, talks in jeopardy, renewed violence, breakdowns in talks and so on. Quiet on the Darfur front can make that happen. I appeal to all parties concerned - the African Union, as well as members of the Security Council - to find a creative way to expand the present third party force into one that can stop all attacks. Peace will take a long time. The Peace Agreement, followed by better governance, will not be sufficient; it will have to be followed by many years of sustainable development, reconstruction, rehabilitation, reconciliation and reform, just like in southern Sudan.”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“I repeat what I said last month: we need them in and around all camps of displaced people - 1.5 million people, a huge number to protect - on all roads along which commercial, humanitarian and civilian transportation takes place, in all zones to be demilitarized, in all areas where the displaced and refugees will have to return in order to secure their lives, their land and their property. That is a huge task that requires a robust force - one that is trusted by the victims. But protection by deterrence cannot be achieved by a force consisting of 1,000 or 3,000 military and police, however well qualified and dedicated they may be. We need many more, and we need them fast.”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“Members of the Council will remember that I have more than once referred to the need to deploy a robust third party force - big, broad and quick. The mandate of the AU force is broad enough, and its interpretation by the commanders on the ground is flexible and creative. But the force is not big enough, and its deployment is too slow. Even if we had all the planned troops on the ground in Darfur towards the end of February, it would not be sufficient to stop the violence. We need a robust third party force from outside to stop a ruthless third force from within. We need them in any area where violence has taken place and where violence may erupt.”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the north and the south has been signed and seems to be holding. That augurs well for an effort to extend its spirit to Darfur and to apply time, energy, experience and negotiating capacity to the Darfur conflict. Finally, there is another piece of good news. The peace support force of the African Union (AU) is doing a good job. I have met highly professional military personnel who are dedicated to their mission, committed to assisting the victims of war, willing to be proactive and to take risks, not staying in their barracks or behind their desks noting and reporting what has gone wrong, but going out in order to prevent things from getting worse. The troops sent by the African Union are so good that we need many more of them.”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“Undoubtedly, there are warlords among them; undoubtedly, they are divided among themselves for ideological, political and tribal reasons or because of the internal struggle for power. However, I have encountered rebel leaders who care. They are sceptical and full of mistrust, but they care about their people. That is the basis for serious talk. In my previous presentation to the Council, I made a number of proposals to render the talks more effective, for instance by delinking the security talks from the political ones and by strengthening the powers of the ceasefire institutions. I call on the parties to study seriously such proposals or to find other ways that guarantee that these talks get a serious chance to succeed. There is more good news.”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“We urgently need a breakthrough. Any lasting solution requires political negotiations in good faith between the parties that are determined to represent the interests of the people, however different their perception of these interests may be. The good news is that the Government has shown a willingness to negotiate - toughly, but seriously - on the basis of principles concerning the sharing of power and wealth that resulted in the Naivasha Peace Agreement. The Government recently confirmed its commitment to such talks. President Al- Bashir and Vice-President Taha - again today - have made it quite clear that the objective is peace through negotiations, in Darfur and elsewhere in the Sudan. The other good news is that quite a few leaders of the rebel movements really do care about the people whom they claim to represent.”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“The mass killings have stopped, but the pattern has not changed: attack, counter-attack, collective punishment, retaliation and systematic violence - less between the combatants themselves than against the people. During my visit to Darfur 10 days ago, I saw the dramatic consequences of the tribal or ethnic cleansing of dozens of villages carried out by the militia during the month of January. The cleansing has continued, carried out by third forces, and these have not been stopped. They can be stopped only by a third party force. After six months, we can only come to the conclusion that the Government has not stopped the violence; it has not brought the perpetrators of the violence - the instigators, not the petty combatants - to justice. After six months of going to and fro, we must conclude that there is a stalemate.”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“There are forces in the back in the Sudan - not inside the Government, yet powerful - that have the capacity to spread terror on the ground, waging war against innocent people, women and children, who are denounced as different and told to leave the places where they were born and live and never come back. The Commission of Inquiry has come to the conclusion that it is not genocide. But the Commission has also concluded that the mass violations of human rights were no less serious than genocide. The Commission also stated that the atrocities that started in 2003, which it was entrusted to investigate, continued during the investigation period itself. That means that it will be difficult to declare that the wrongdoings are a thing of the past and that everything is different and better now. That is not the case at all.”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“In December, the Government took matters into its own hands by declaring a road-clearing operation in south Darfur that took the character of an operation to cleanse the whole area - 20 kilometres to the left and to the right of the roads. One result was the breakdown of the talks. Another result was that the clearing operation generated a climate that made the militia that got involved feel that they could get away with murder - attacking villages on a large scale, openly declaring that they would not stop before having attacked all of them. The Government did not stop them. Perhaps the Government lacked the capacity to do so. The militias are strong and well organized, and there seems to be a sort of invisible hand behind their actions.”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“The Darfur conflict resembles the conflict between north and south, the conflict in eastern Sudan - exposed last week in a violent eruption in Port Sudan - and the conflicts in the north, in Kordofan, and in central Sudan. All of these were economic, cultural, sometimes religious, sometimes ethnic or tribal, and resource-driven, as well as political. And all of these conflicts are compounded by power games and bad or less-than-democratic governance. No wonder that progress has come very slowly, if at all. During the past six months, some progress has been made. But often it was like taking two steps forward and one step back, and often it was worse: one step forward, two back - a net regression. In my statement to the Council on the November report, I spoke about the risk of sliding back into lawlessness and anarchy.”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“It is not a confrontation between religions, but fundamentalist religious groups have severely exacerbated the conflict. It is also a political conflict between elites and the deprived, between traditional leaders and the new generation contesting their authority, between leaders who arose from within their communities and an administration that has been appointed by the State in an effort to modernize administrative rule and to consolidate power. The conflict in Darfur is also the result of a failure to ground the Sudanese State - which came into being after independence from colonial rule - in the democratic thrust of the whole nation. The Sudan is not a failed State - far from it. It is, as yet, a failed nation, or an adolescent nation, or many nations together in one huge territory, held together by force.”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“It certainly has some of the characteristics of a confrontation between Arabs and Africans. History has seen that confrontation flare up more than once. But it is also a struggle for survival between economic lifestyles - peasants and nomads - and the borderline between those two is not the same as that between Arabs and Africans. The economic struggle has environmental dimensions. There is population pressure and economic pressure - related to cattle raising, for instance - and competition for ever scarcer resources, such as land and water. To that extent, the Darfur conflict is not new. The economic struggle is age-old, and the cultural clashes in Darfur are likewise. It has some of the characteristics of a class conflict, with age-old rulers who claim to own their servants, whom they consider to be inferior.”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“Undoubtedly, the situation is not as bad as during the first half of 2004, when large-scale killing and mass displacements took place. Undoubtedly, the Government has kept quite a few of its promises. Pressure from the international community and the presence on the ground of African Union military observers have had some effect, but not enough. What is the reason for this stalemate? Have we not done enough? Did we do the wrong things? Or is the conflict so complicated that reaching peace requires much more time? The conflict in Darfur is very complicated. It has political, economic, environmental and cultural dimensions. It is more than a civil war between a Government and rebel movements. It also encompasses a multitude of tribal conflicts - inter- tribal, as well as intra-tribal and clan fights.”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“However, some rebel groups have impeded humanitarian work by looting cars and trucks and by putting pressure on, or even abducting, national staff of humanitarian organizations. Many of those actions have severely reduced delivery of assistance. The number of civilians affected by conflict has continued to grow at a rate that has outpaced the ability of humanitarian agencies to provide for all of their basic needs. Inability to reach those in need is due, in large part, to the fighting, but it is due also to rising banditry and to interference from armed forces on both sides. Humanitarian workers are increasingly subjected to threats and intimidation by forces from both sides, in addition to facing random danger from military action, banditry and armed robbery. This is a dismal picture.”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“The Government has shown willingness to make progress in the political talks on Darfur. However, fighting on the ground continues and the ceasefire has not been kept. Those responsible for atrocious crimes on a massive scale still go unpunished. Militias continue to attack, claiming that they are not party to any agreement. The Government has not stopped them. Over this period, the rebel movements have become less cooperative in the talks. They too have breached the ceasefire time and again. Their attacks on police increased and often seemed intended to invite retaliation. Those attacks and provocations have, at times, impaired humanitarian access. Later, the attacks on the police diminished.”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“Since then, monthly reports have been submitted to the Council on the progress, or lack thereof, regarding security and the humanitarian situation in Darfur, and regarding the political talks. After half a year, it is appropriate to look back and try to review and evaluate the present situation in the longer-term perspective. That has been done in the report. I would like first to summarize the findings. Over the past six months, performance by the Government of the Sudan in complying with its commitments and obligations has been uneven. Humanitarian access in Darfur has improved due to the lifting last summer of restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, action on human rights, in particular measures to end impunity, have fallen short of what the Government agreed to and what the Security Council has demanded.”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“Mr. Pronk: Last Friday I was able to introduce the report (S/2005/57) before the Council relating to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the north and the south (see S/PV.5119). In that report and in my introduction, Vice-President Taha and Mr. Garang were congratulated on that great achievement. A number of suggestions are also made with regard to carrying out the mandate of the United Nations mission foreseen to carry out the tasks the parties envisioned for the United Nations in the peace agreement. Today I would like to confine myself to the second report (S/2005/68), which is before the Council; the report on Darfur. Members will remember that half a year ago the Council adopted its first resolution on Darfur, resolution 1556 (2004).”
2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source
“Let me conclude by citing the central recommendation of the Secretary-General in his report: that the Security Council, acting under chapter VI of the Charter, authorize the deployment of a multidimensional United Nations peace support operation with a mandate to assist the parties in achieving a sustainable peace in Sudan through its good offices, and in aspects of security, governance, humanitarian assistance and development.”
2005-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5119 (2005) · source
“Here, there must be common objectives, mutual consultation and coordination and no overlap of the mission with activities of the United Nations country team, but complementarity and cooperation. That is what the Secretary-General has emphasized in his report: a comprehensive and unified approach; peace and development, from the inside and as autochthonous as possible, that is, only facilitated - not managed - from the outside.”
2005-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5119 (2005) · source
“We intend to regularly reassess and review tasks and priorities in the light of changing circumstances through the years. We will have to show a clear awareness of the impact of all foreign activities on Sudanese society, boosting those with a positive impact, such as the use of local resources - including local manpower and womanpower in combination with capacity-building and training - while also avoiding negative consequences such the distortion of the local economy or the spread of HIV/AIDS. A comprehensive approach does not require a completely new structure for the United Nations mission. On the contrary, many United Nations institutions, agencies, funds and programmes present in Sudan have developed a lot of expertise and have built an impressive capacity that should be used to its fullest extent, in a unified manner.”
2005-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5119 (2005) · source
“It is their nation, their peace and their future, but they will have to be helped from outside. That is what they expect and we will have to meet that expectation. As I have said, in order to render peace sustainable, the Government and the people of Sudan will have to choose a comprehensive approach. That means addressing all causes of conflict - none excluded - in a holistic and balanced way, avoiding new distortions. The peace support operation will have to follow the same pattern: comprehensive and balanced. It is not the task of the United Nations to carry out functions that can better be fulfilled by the Sudanese themselves. The support operation will have to be catalytic, not turnkey. That is why we are aiming at a relatively light footprint.”
2005-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5119 (2005) · source
“That will require good economic and political governance, predominance of the rule of law, the reform of State institutions, a new constitution, the guaranteeing of human rights, further democratization, an all-inclusive national development policy and the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals, including for the poorest parts of the country. Not only peace, but also development, is indivisible. In a country where one in four children dies before the age of 5 - in south Sudan - there is not much chance for survival, let alone for the realization of people's expectations beyond a ceasefire and a peace agreement. That is an enormous challenge for a nation that is rebuilding itself 50 years after having become independent following a long period of colonial rule. The people of the Sudan have to do all this, basically, themselves.”
2005-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5119 (2005) · source
“The report also refers to the return and reintegration of displaced persons and refugees - 4 million of them - which must go hand in hand with the reintegration of demobilized soldiers and the provision of some kind of support to the local population that has stayed in the region and must share its resources - such as land and water - with the returnees. The reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure, the recovery of production capacity, the rehabilitation of social structures, reconciliation between former opponents, the reduction of poverty, reassurances that the population's basic needs will be met from now on: all of that is part of a comprehensive approach aimed at replacing ad hoc relief from the outside with sustainable development from within.”
2005-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5119 (2005) · source
“They may become frustrated, protest, mobilize constituencies and resort to violent action. For all those reasons, it is important that the peace process be as comprehensive as possible. The report submitted to the Council by the Secretary- General therefore refers to, for example, demining so that farmers can till their land and children can play in peace. It also refers to the disarmament and demobilization of combatants and to the reform of the security sector, which so far consists of both regular troops and members of paramilitary and militia groups.”
2005-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5119 (2005) · source
“To support the peace process and to render peace sustainable, it will not be enough to monitor the ceasefire and to help in avoiding breaches of the Agreement; it will also be necessary to help take away possible reasons for the parties to the Agreement to return to violence. And it will be necessary to remove the incentive for others in the Sudan to seek a solution to their problems through force. Those others could be people in other parts of the Sudan who feel oppressed, marginalized or neglected. That would apply to, for instance, groups in eastern Sudan, but also to the very poor and to tribes or other sections of the population that consider themselves discriminated against. They may feel that their expectations following the Peace Agreement are not being met.”
2005-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5119 (2005) · source
“Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1564 (2004) requested the Secretary-General to incorporate into the mission contingency planning for Darfur. That has been carried out in accordance with the Council's welcoming the lead role of the African Union in the search for political and security solutions to the conflict in Darfur. It is essential that the mandate for the future United Nations mission in the Sudan take account of all these efforts to achieve peace in Darfur so that we can see progress towards a sustainable solution through a well-fused and broadly supported strategy. Earlier, I mentioned risks. One of them is that violence could return if the causes of the conflict are not addressed.”
2005-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5119 (2005) · source
“If solutions are not found to the conflicts in Darfur and elsewhere in the Sudan, any peace support operation limited to south Sudan would be affected by the consequences of those conflicts. As has been said many times, peace in the Sudan is indivisible. Both President Al-Bashir and Chairman Garang have, time and again - in particular since the signing of the Peace Agreement - made clear that they understand that finding solutions to the conflict in Darfur and similar conflicts in other parts of the Sudan is now a clear objective for 2005. That underlines the importance of the national conference provided for in the Peace Agreement. The indivisibility of peace in the Sudan also has consequences for the United Nations peace support operation.”
2005-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5119 (2005) · source
“Professional planning requires that they will have to be assisted by an enabling force of some 5,000 and a protection force of approximately 4,000, all included in a total number of 10,000 personnel. In the light of the circumstances, that is a relatively lean deployment. We are ready to send them to begin their work on the ground as soon as we have the necessary status of forces agreement. I would like to express, on behalf of the Secretary-General, our thanks to the countries that have already committed troops to the intended peace support operation. That will make it possible for us to initiate the first phase of deployment as soon as we have the mandate and a status of forces agreement. None of the Member States that have responded positively to the Secretary-General's appeal with adequate capacities have been excluded.”
2005-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5119 (2005) · source
“We have had a functional mission headquarters on the ground for a number of months; we have developed detailed plans for the establishment of an institutional framework for the United Nations in south Sudan; there have been consultations and briefings with both the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on those issues since July last year; and the logistical and operational plan to deploy just over 10,000 troops for monitoring and verification has been developed in detail. The core of that consists of 750 military observers. They will have to carry out a difficult task in a wide area of 1,000 by 1,250 kilometres with very poor communications.”
2005-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5119 (2005) · source
“We are now almost one month into the six-month pre-interim period, and, of course, we cannot afford to lose any time in taking important decisions on implementation. Moreover, the environment for implementation in both the pre-interim and interim periods contains risks and challenges. Some of these were mentioned by the Secretary-General in his report (S/2005/57). The need to provide political solutions to the problems in Darfur is one clear example, but there are many more. Those problems are bound to increase if there is delay or disappointment in slow implementation. That is why we have already taken steps to avoid delay. We have prepared measures to support the parties in their implementation of the Agreement through planning and preparations carried out under the mandate of the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS).”
2005-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5119 (2005) · source
“With the initialling of the agreements on 31 December 2004 and the signature of the Peace Agreement on 9 January 2005, the parties started the clock running on a demanding timetable that lays out a road map to the implementation of the Agreement according to a number of fixed milestones. By sticking to their commitment to sign on time, the parties have created a valuable political momentum that must be harnessed to keep implementation moving forward on schedule through the pre-interim period up to 9 July and into the interim period of the following six years. All of that means that both the parties and the international community, which has helped them in the period up to the Peace Agreement, have to work very hard in order to sustain the momentum.”
2005-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5119 (2005) · source
“Of course, it goes without saying that the work of the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies will continue after that point. While the agreements signed in Nairobi detail the implementation of the Peace Agreement, some areas still remain to be agreed. This process will be completed by the new presidency of the Sudan, which is to be formed following the acceptance of the new constitution, which is being drafted at this moment. The presidency will be composed of President Al-Bashir and Vice-Presidents Taha and Garang. When they signed the Agreement in January 2005, the parties put a few remaining issues, such as the size of the armies, into the hands of the presidency. This means that a considerable amount of work remains to be done in the months ahead.”
2005-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5119 (2005) · source
“The signing of the Agreement marks the start of the six-month pre-interim period. This six-month pre- interim period will be followed by a six-year interim period, in the middle of which, according to the agreement, national elections will be held. At the end of the interim period, almost six and a half years from now, the population of south Sudan will settle the question of the status of south Sudan in a referendum to decide between unity and secession. The Secretary-General recommends that the United Nations Mission in the Sudan will work for a further six-month period after the referendum to help the Government ensure that the results are implemented. The successful implementation of those results will mark the exit point for the peace support operation.”
2005-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5119 (2005) · source
“Mr. Pronk: Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1547 (2004) and 1574 (2004), in which the Council asked the Secretary-General to submit, as soon as possible after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, recommendations on the size, structure and mandate of a United Nations operation that would be established in support of the implementation of the Agreement. The parties are to be congratulated on the wisdom and statesmanship they displayed in reaching the Agreement and on succeeding in bringing the talks to a close by the end of the year, in accordance with the commitments they gave at the historic meeting of the Security Council in Nairobi, Kenya, held, as the members of the Council may remember, in November 2004.”
2005-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5119 (2005) · source
“Yesterday, the same Government followed this up by declaring, before the meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council in Libreville, that it is willing to withdraw its force to the pre-S December positions. All of this is positive. It is not yet much; nor is it definitive. It could easily fade away. But it is a sign that it is justified to hope and expect that the spirit of Nairobi will affect Darfur. The political momentum is there. It is fragile; it could easily be spoiled. Taking advantage of that momentum requires innovative action, consensus among all international actors, steady cooperation, perseverance and a well defined common strategy. The second stage of the war between the north and the south lasted two decades. Why should we allow the war in Darfur to last more than two years?”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source
“We are seeing the parties exercise a certain restraint. Contrary to many people's expectations, the Sudan Liberation Army did not launch an attack on the day of the signing of the peace agreement. From Christmas to that particular day - Sunday - it was relatively calm in Darfur on all fronts. Last week, despite earlier breaches of the ceasefire, all parties declared that they would respect days of tranquillity to vaccinate all children in the Sudan under the age of five against polio. And this weekend, the Government declared that it would be willing to reconsider some of its previous hard-line positions, thereby reaching out to the rebel movements.”
2005-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5109 (2005) · source