YouSaid · the spoken record

Vassily Nebenzia

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656
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2020-04-16
most recent
2021-05-26
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80
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un-security-council

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  1. We welcome the establishment of a joint coordination mechanism in Niamey between the G-5 Sahel and other military presences in the region. We hope that the current difficulties associated with the coronavirus will be temporary in nature and that the Joint Force will be able to resume operations in the near future. We are convinced of the importance of further coordinated steps on the part of both Africa and the international community aimed at combating terrorism in the Sahelo-Saharan region. We support the initiative of the African Union to develop a plan for the deployment of the African Standby Force there. We note the timely decision of the West African Monetary and Economic Union to adopt an action plan to finance the fight against terrorism in the region through 2024.

    2020-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/515 (2020) · source

  2. This state of affairs creates fertile ground for the radicalization of the population. In this regard, the countries of the region must be assisted in effectively opposing the expansion of extremist ideology, begin to address the severe socioeconomic problems, strengthen State institutions and foster a culture of respect for human rights. We support the efforts of the G-5 Sahel States to deploy the Joint Force to combat terrorism and organized crime. It seems that in a relatively short period of time it has already become an important element of regional security. We are pleased to take note of information on several successful counter-terrorism operations carried out by the Joint Force in the reporting period. Improved planning and coordination between military units expanded the scale and duration of operations.

    2020-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/515 (2020) · source

  3. We thank Under-Secretary-General Jean-Pierre Lacroix and the representative of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mauritania, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, for their briefings. We agree with the alarming assessments of the situation in the Sahel. Security threats in this part of Africa remain high. Against the backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic and the related quarantine measures, terrorist activity has again intensified, and drug trafficking and organized crime are expanding. Unfortunately, we are receiving almost every week tragic reports of heinous terrorist attacks. The pandemic has led to serious humanitarian consequences for the region, which was in a difficult situation long before the current crisis. Schools are closed, and more and more people need food and medical care.

    2020-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/515 (2020) · source

  4. I also wish to commend the thousands of Blue Helmets of the United Nations peacekeeping missions and pay tribute to the peacekeepers who have made the ultimate sacrifice for the re-establishment of international peace and security.

    2020-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/514 (2020) · source

  5. In the light of the interactive format of our meeting today, I would like to ask Force Commanders of MINUSMA and UNMISS a specific question: are there any signs of attempts to use COVID-19 as a pretext to hinder positive developments on the ground, or even political processes? We also wish to stress the stabilizing role of UNDOF in the Syrian Golan in reducing tensions and in preventing incidents and escalations between the parties to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement of 1974. We will continue to assist in ensuring the conditions necessary for the full return of UNDOF to the Bravo side. In conclusion, let me once again express our appreciation to the Force Commanders for their leadership, which is in special demand in this time of pandemic, and for their continued efforts aimed at delivering on the tasks before them with dedication.

    2020-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/514 (2020) · source

  6. Increasing numbers of refugees and internally displaced S/2020/514 persons returning to their places of permanent residence are also being reported. However, the security situation is still fragile. The efforts by UNMISS peacekeepers are therefore indispensable. We would like to highlight the role MINUSMA has played in addressing the security situation and facilitating the progress in the political settlement in Mali. We are convinced that the Mission needs comprehensive support, as outlined in the recent report of the Secretary-General (S/2020/476) and in his letter on MINUSMA’s performance (S/2020/481). Certain steps carried out in accordance with the Mission’s mandate are already bringing about some positive results in the most affected areas, such as the country’s central regions.

    2020-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/514 (2020) · source

  7. It is therefore vital not to lose the gains made in the implementation of peace agreements and to continue to encourage parties to reach political solutions and move forward towards national reconciliation despite temporary pandemic difficulties. The call by the Secretary-General for a ceasefire provides a very good basis for such efforts. In that regard, we note the signs of normalization of the situation in South Sudan, primarily owing to the accords reached by the parties on the implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement of 2018. The formation of transitional Government bodies, including the Government of National Unity, has begun. Significant decreases in the level of violence and cases of human rights violations in the country are already being reported.

    2020-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/514 (2020) · source

  8. The necessity for confidence-building measures and information exchange is especially important nowadays, when measures implemented by national authorities to combat the spread of the pandemic could lead to limitations on the movement of United Nations personnel. Such situations must be solved through dialogue. Supporting host countries in their response to COVID-19 can be provided, where possible, within the respective mandates and upon the request of national Governments. The primacy of diplomacy and dialogue stands at the core of peacekeeping mandates and remains an imperative in the resolution of any crisis where peacekeeping missions are deployed.

    2020-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/514 (2020) · source

  9. We appreciate the efforts of the Secretariat in that connection and wish to emphasize the importance of close collaboration with troop- and police-contributing countries on any steps in that regard, particularly on the issue of temporary restrictions for the rotation of contingents. Peacekeeping operations, as we all know, are not meant to be a substitute for the authority of the host State, but rather a supplement to help them enhance their own national capacities. The vital precondition for the success of any peacekeeping operation is constructive and effective cooperation with the host State.

    2020-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/514 (2020) · source

  10. United Nations peacekeeping operations are usually deployed in complex and dangerous environments, complicated by difficult humanitarian and socioeconomic situations and sometimes by asymmetrical threats. Needless to say, the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak became an additional factor, adversely affecting the performance of peacekeeping operations and the ability of the Blue Helmets to effectively fulfil their tasks. Under such unprecedented circumstances, it is of the utmost importance to ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers and to take appropriate measures to continue the effective implementation of the mandates, while reducing the risk of virus outbreaks within missions and through contact with civilian population.

    2020-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/514 (2020) · source

  11. We would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Lacroix, Lieutenant General Gyllensporre and Lieutenant General Tinaikar, the Force Commanders of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), as well as Brigadier General O’Brien, Acting Force Commander of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), for their briefings and the information they provided on the current situation in the respective peacekeeping missions under their command. It is always useful to learn first-hand how the mandates authorized by the Security Council are implemented on the ground and what specific challenges arise in that regard. We join our colleagues in expressing our condolences with regard to the recent death of two peacekeepers in the line of duty.

    2020-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/514 (2020) · source

  12. I am referring to the situation with the Iranian nuclear programme, the Middle East settlement, the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia and the training of national security forces in the Central African Republic, to name a few. I would specifically highlight the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which is currently facing tremendous challenges as a result of the totally irresponsible behaviour of certain actors. We need to be firm in defending what we have achieved. I want to stress once again that the Russian Federation stands ready for and would prefer to see full-fledged cooperation with the European Union. But that is possible only on an equitable basis, when all interests and concerns are mutually taken into account. We are ready for it and believe that the whole world would benefit from such cooperation.

    2020-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/489 (2020) · source

  13. We expect the Operation to fully comply with international law, resolution 2292 (2016) and its operational zone covering the length of the Libyan coast. Any imbalance on such a delicate issue could undermine international efforts to establish dialogue between the opposing Libyan parties. Brussels should not be avoiding contact with any of the parties to the conflict either. We will have to take all those factors into account when the time comes in June to take a decision on extending the inspection regime on the high seas off Libya. In conclusion, I want to reiterate that we value positive examples of cooperation between Russia and the European Union at the United Nations.

    2020-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/489 (2020) · source

  14. We expect Brussels not to cheapen European values and principles when dealing with flagrant violations of the rights of the Russian- speaking population in Ukraine and some Member States, namely the Baltic States, who continue to face discrimination and abuses. We also urge the EU not to turn a blind eye to the rise of nationalism, far right and neo-Nazi movements in Ukraine, xenophobia and anti-Semitism. Today we heard appeals for dialogue from some EU members. But when it comes to frank dialogue and to taking our concerns on board, somehow that does not materialize. We took note of the EU decision to launch the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation IRINI with the declared aim of supporting the United Nations arms embargo on Libya.

    2020-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/489 (2020) · source

  15. We call on the EU to reverse its policies on sanctions, reach out to the population of the countries in question and refrain from punitive and coercive measures adopted beyond and outside the scope of the Security Council. The EU is expected to play a stabilizing role in the wider Europe, from the Balkans and the Mediterranean to its eastern periphery. To live up to those expectations, the EU should adhere to the principles of international law and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbours. We regret to recall that it was the EU’s Eastern Partnership programme that led to widened divides in Europe, triggered and detonated the so-called Maidan Revolution in Kyiv and led to ongoing civil conflict in Ukraine.

    2020-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/489 (2020) · source

  16. I would stress specifically the global fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, which we are waging together, individually and in coordination with United Nations partners and structures, first and foremost the World Health Organization. That being said, we regret to see that the EU still applies multiple restrictive and coercive mechanisms. We repeatedly heard assurances from Brussels and other European capitals that those mechanisms were targeted and carefully calibrated. However, practice has proved the opposite: in reality, the application of such measures considerably undermines the socioeconomic situation in the affected developing countries, thus seriously reducing the living standards of innocent people. The relevant appeal of the Secretary-General, issued at the beginning of the pandemic, is a good signal to that end.

    2020-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/489 (2020) · source

  17. During our presidency of the Security Council in September 2019, we initiated a discussion on cooperation between the United Nations, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (see S/PV.8626). Cooperation with them, as well as with the European Union and other regional organizations, should be balanced and based upon the United Nations Charter. One of the main priorities for such cooperation is collective response to transborder crimes, first and foremost in the sphere of counter-terrorism. Russia is ready to promote such cooperation.

    2020-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/489 (2020) · source

  18. We continue to count on our European colleagues to address together the challenges of our times, from the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic to the peaceful resolution of various conflict situations in the world. We all expect the EU to be an unbiased player, ready to help and facilitate, and not to impose its agenda or conditions on those countries and regions that need its help. We hope that our European partners will adhere to such an approach, permitting us to work together in different country situations. The Russian Federation has always advocated for developing and improving cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in line with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

    2020-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/489 (2020) · source

  19. We believe that there should be no ambiguity about that, and therefore make a clear distinction between international law and the so-called rules- based order promoted by many EU countries, which can be easily tweaked or even hijacked by a closed circle of like-minded States to serve their collective interests and not those of the international community as a whole. We hope that we are on the same page with our EU partners when we discuss multilateralism. The EU continues to be an important international actor that is very visible from political and economic perspectives alike. That implies huge responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Even after Brexit, the EU is well represented in the Security Council and has all the necessary tools and means to influence the international agenda.

    2020-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/489 (2020) · source

  20. We welcome the participation in the discussion with the Security Council of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Mr. Josep Borrell, and took note of his remarks. We completely concur with the task of strengthening multilateralism in international affairs promoted by our European Union (EU) partners. We are convinced that true multilateralism can succeed only with a central role for the United Nations and through clear support for the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

    2020-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/489 (2020) · source

  21. We note that medical equipment has been delivered by the World Health Organization and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). However, given the humanitarian situation in Gaza, these efforts should be enhanced. The work of UNRWA, and support for it from the international community, become more important than ever. We see no alternative to the Agency as an important element for maintaining stability and providing assistance to Palestinian refugees in the region.

    2020-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/430 (2020) · source

  22. We are ready to support and facilitate them as a member of the Quartet. We are also ready to engage with key countries of the region to consolidate collective efforts and to hold Quartet meetings with their participation. We will continue dialogue with countries in the Middle East and with the League of Arab States. Palestinian unity is more necessary than ever. We will continue our efforts in this regard, and greatly appreciate the role of our Egyptian friends. We urge Palestinians and Israelis to continue coordination on fighting the coronavirus disease pandemic. We share concerns about possible consequences of the spread of the disease in the Gaza Strip. But even without the pandemic, the humanitarian situation in Gaza is dire.

    2020-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/430 (2020) · source

  23. Russia, as a member of the Middle East Quartet of international mediators, is ready to fully engage in efforts to safeguard the principles of the settlement, which are enshrined in the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, the Madrid principles and the Arab Peace Initiative. They provide a basis for the creation of an independent, sovereign, territorially contiguous Palestinian State within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital. We say no to violence. At the same time, we say no to the annexation of Palestinian territories, but also to that of the Syrian Golan Heights and of Lebanese territories. We say no to continuation of settlement activities, the demolition and confiscation of Palestinian property, and violent clashes. Events show the urgent need to engage in efforts to salvage the peace process.

    2020-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/430 (2020) · source

  24. We thank Special Coordinator Nickolay Mladenov for his briefing. We are grateful to Nickolay for all his efforts and support him and his initiatives and ideas. As never before, international cooperation and action are needed to advance the Middle East peace process. Plans for the annexation of Palestinian territories threaten to undermine this process. President Mahmoud Abbas announced yesterday that the Palestinian Authority is free from its commitments under the Oslo Accords. As a result, the door to any prospects for the two-State solution may be closed. It proves that no time should be wasted. We see no alternative to two States, Israel and Palestine, living peacefully, side by side. In this regard, we reiterate our call to refrain from any unilateral action that may undermine prospects for such a solution.

    2020-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/430 (2020) · source

  25. To sum up, I would say to colleagues, having negotiated resolutions on the cross-border mechanism each time we agreed on its urgent but temporary status, that they should not pretend they do not know about it, or probably they want to forget. They should stop cherry-picking their individual political dividends that have nothing to do with humanitarian principles. Today I would like to reiterate what I said last time. No time should be wasted on efforts to reopen the closed cross-border points. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs should be encouraged to work with Damascus to find routes and cross-border points as well as on cross-line deliveries to the north-east and throughout Syria. And, of course, we want to hear answers to our new set of questions.

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/427 (2020) · source

  26. In addition, those targeted by restrictive measures may pass on to the civilian population the economic consequences of international sanctions imposed on them, thus increasing hardship for the non-targeted civilian population”. This relates to the claims aimed at whitewashing illegitimate sanctions regimes. As a recent example, I would cite the negative experience of the Norwegian Refugee Council when, owing to these restrictive measures, it refused to buy interactive educational programmes for children in Syria. I want to draw the attention of our Belgian colleagues, since they are responsible in the Council for the dossier on children.

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/427 (2020) · source

  27. Let me quote just one excerpt: “Sanctions may alter countries’ ability to fight COVID-19 by affecting the procurement of certain goods and technologies, either because such goods are subject to restrictions (for instance, dual-use goods which can also be used for military purposes), or because the persons involved in their procurement are sanctioned. In addition, there may be an indirect, but significant effect caused by certain operators’ unwillingness to engage in transactions related to a sanctioned country or individual, even if those are legitimate (over- compliance), for fear of accidentally violating the sanctions, or a lack of economic incentives to engage in comparison to the risks stemming from those transactions.

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/427 (2020) · source

  28. Concerning sanctions, repetitive slogans on humanitarian exemptions are — and I am sorry to say so — not worth a penny. I highly recommend that those colleagues — in particular Christoph, who addressed me yesterday — who keep insisting that unilateral restrictive measures are harmless to ordinary citizens should Google a recent European Union (EU) Commission guidance note on the provision of humanitarian aid to fight the COVID-19 pandemic in certain environments subject to EU restrictive measures, dated 11 May, which is specifically and in a timely manner focused on Syria. That document fully proves quite the opposite.

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/427 (2020) · source

  29. The International Committee of the Red Cross and the non-governmental organization Médecins sans frontières continue working to the east of the Euphrates as well. That means that, no matter how complicated conditions are, it is possible to deliver humanitarian aid to the north-east of Syria. What is needed is the will to do so. We would also like to welcome the intention of the United Nations to establish a laboratory in Qamishli based at the city’s national hospital. We heard this good news that in Geneva from the Resident Coordinator in Damascus, Mr. Imran Riza. We would like to receive more information on United Nations plans in this regard: among other things, how it will be equipped and how will test samples be collected, especially in the hard-to-reach areas not under the control of Damascus?

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/427 (2020) · source

  30. Does the United Nations have a plan on how to do it and how to guarantee, for its part, that the assistance will reach the most vulnerable? That applies to wherever the assistance comes from. Let us turn to another recommendation, that in para 47 (d), addressing the “facilitation of deliveries by local authorities in the north-east to all locations without delay”. Whose prerogative is it to negotiate with local authorities? Who should be responsible for it? Who is the United Nations addressing this question to? Maybe our American colleagues can help with it? I wish to welcome the first road convoy of the World Health Organization to the north-east. We definitely need to study this example carefully.

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/427 (2020) · source

  31. As for recommendations in the report on the improvement of cross-line deliveries — which allegedly do not function properly but are in fact the source of the bulk of humanitarian assistance in Syria — the solution depends on one thing only: whether there is strong interest on the part of humanitarians in delivering aid to those most in need rather than in inventing artificial obstacles and blaming Damascus. When the Government of Syria is required, in paragraph 47 (c), to “approve access to all areas and facilities within north-east to ensure that assistance reaches all people in need, impartially and without discrimination”, OCHA forgets that some of those areas are not under the control of Damascus and, as such, Damascus simply cannot guarantee the demanded provisions. Such issues must be negotiated with local authorities.

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/427 (2020) · source

  32. We would like to get back to the Secretary-General’s February report on the review of alternative modalities for the border crossing of Al-Yarubiyah (S/2020/139), since it contains much more food for thought, especially now that the ongoing campaign to reopen Al-Yarubiyah heats up and new arguments are taken out of an old box. No clear explanation is provided for why five other crossing points to the east of the Euphrates controlled by Damascus cannot be used. In the Secretary-General’s report, it is clearly stated that using those five would not require Security Council authorization. Our understanding of the problem with using those crossing points is that it would entail a request for the consent of Damascus.

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/427 (2020) · source

  33. We all know that Idlib is controlled by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, but the cross- border operations have always been regular. The resonating story with arbitrary levies by terrorists at Bab Al-Hawa border crossing in Idlib in late 2018 did not prevent the continuation of United Nations cross-border operations there. Even the Board of Inquiry, in its report of 6 April, admitted the financial accountability problems of humanitarian operations in Idlib — the United Nations does not know to whom it pays and cannot track the final distribution of aid. Over the past five years, we have continuously underlined the need to make a list of implementing partners and detailed nomenclature of supplies, to perform systematic and preliminary notification of Syrian authorities and to mark convoys. But none of that has been taken on board.

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/427 (2020) · source

  34. On humanitarian access to the north-west, according to reports of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), no COVID-19 cases have yet been confirmed in that region. Why, then, does it say in paragraph 14 of the report that the joint mission by the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent to Idlib approved by the Government of Syria was temporarily put on hold due to “concerns related to COVID-19”? What were those concerns? We have different information, which says that it was Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham that blocked that mission. To us, the reason is obvious: Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham does not want it — it would undermine their monopoly control over cross- border assistance.

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/427 (2020) · source

  35. Let me, first of all, thank Under-Secretary-General Mark Lowcock for his briefing. We have heard a lot today with regard to the deteriorating humanitarian situation. We were not able to receive answers to our questions at the last meeting. We hope it will be different this time. We studied carefully the Secretary-General’s report (S/2020/401) on the review of the United Nations humanitarian cross-line and cross-border operations, and would like to flag the following points. The report cites economic problems inside Syria, such as price increases and shortages in some basic goods, but it ignores unilateral sanctions. We need the Secretary-General’s assessments of how unilateral economic measures worsen the economic situation and hinder the fight against the coronavirus disease (COVID-19).

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/427 (2020) · source

  36. In particular, it is not clear why the drone is attributed to Russia, since its manufacturing characteristics point to one of Russia’s neighbours. In the same vein, equipment that has long been in Libya is misidentified as newly exported from Russia. Another fabrication in the report is photos from Syria passed off as Libyan landscapes. Another story tells of Syrian militants transported to the west of Libya to support the Government of National Accord. Deliberately or not, the facts are turned inside out, as the report turns mercenaries associated with terrorist organizations into fighters in the Libyan National Army. These are only the most apparent mistakes in the report. To us it is clear that the report is intended to mislead the international community about Russia’s policy in Libya.

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/421 (2020) · source

  37. Much of the data, especially regarding the Russian citizens mentioned in the report, is simply unfounded. The Russian people allegedly fighting in Libya have not left our country. The so-called wounded are quite healthy. This information is all publicly available and verifiable. It is worth noting that the lists selected by the experts were copied from the notorious Ukrainian database Myrotvorets, or “Peacemaker”. I reiterate that there are no Russian servicemen in Libya. We are aware, however, that there is a host of foreign military personnel in the country, and not just foreign terrorist fighters. If there is great interest, we are willing to disclose the names of the countries involved. Council members would be surprised to hear them. A lot of mistakes or deliberate falsifications have been made regarding weapons.

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/421 (2020) · source

  38. We are still studying the report. However, our first reading of the text allows us to draw certain conclusions. To begin with, there is no concept of a private military company in Russian legislation. The report incorrectly interprets and arbitrarily uses excerpts from Russian law. For the most part, the report is based on unverified or clearly fabricated data and is aimed at discrediting Russia’s policy in Libya. Experts use sources of dubious quality that have a direct interest in the Libyan conflict. In the report a significant number — not just one or two — of Internet links are not working. That can be verified by anyone who ventures to do so. That is not accidental. The reliability of the information, particularly the portion based on so- called confidential discussions, is impossible to prove.

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/421 (2020) · source

  39. We hear a lot of speculation about so-called Russian mercenaries. The United Kingdom representative went as far as to say that they are responsible for all the troubles and mishaps in Libya. That is an interesting way to shift responsibility. I remind the Council that the primary reason for all of Libya’s troubles today is NATO’s aggression, which destroyed Libyan statehood. Instead, today some prefer to miss the point and pretend to not hear. I now move on to the report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011). First of all, we are dismayed that the confidential report of the Panel of Experts was leaked to the press. This is not the first time that a report of a sanctions committee Panel of Experts has been leaked. We demand an investigation of the incident by the Secretariat.

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/421 (2020) · source

  40. We are concerned about reports of ongoing violations of the arms embargo in Libya. We believe that the supply of arms and mercenaries should be stopped. That practice has continued in Libya from the very start of the conflict in 2011, when Libyan statehood was destroyed as a result of NATO’s illegal aggression. We are pushing Libyan parties to pursue dialogue and search for compromises.S/2020/421 We are closely following preparations for the launch of a European Union military operation off the Libyan coast. We once again emphasize that this operation must be in accordance with the mandate of resolution 2292 (2016). Any modification must be subject to Council review. I have listened to some allegations of Russian participation in the Libyan conflict. I will reserve my right to say a few words about it today after all speakers have spoken.

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/421 (2020) · source

  41. We continue efforts in that regard, including through participation in follow-up meetings of the Berlin Conference and communication with the parties concerned. At the same time, we proceed from the principle that we have repeatedly voiced — that any decision and recommendation must be agreed in advance by the Libyans. Otherwise, we will never succeed. We would like to remind the Council of its adoption of resolution 2510 (2020). I note that Russia abstained in the voting, not because we were whimsical or capricious, but rather — as we said — because without involving the protagonists, the resolution would fail. In my explanation of vote on that resolution (see S/PV.8719), I said publicly that if I was wrong and the resolution worked, I would be the first to acknowledge it. I regret to say that I was, unfortunately, right.

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/421 (2020) · source

  42. We believe that these ideas could form a basis for political discussions in the framework of the comprehensive Libyan settlement process. However, so far there has been no progress in military consultations in the 5+5 format or on the political track. We believe that the early appointment of a new Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya can help break the deadlock in the political process. This issue is long overdue. We are convinced that further armed conflict will bring more disastrous consequences for Libya and its people. We urge all parties to immediately cease hostilities and resume dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations on all three tracks of the settlement: military, political and economic.

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/421 (2020) · source

  43. The threat of coronavirus has become another challenging issue in Libya, especially given the grave humanitarian situation on the ground and basically destroyed health-care system. The parties continue to exchange aggressive rhetoric. At the same time, Mr. Agila Saleh, Speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives, called for a cessation of hostilities in connection with the holy month of Ramadan. We note that this statement contains a number of constructive proposals on how to pull Libya out of the crisis. Among them are the creation of unified bodies of power on the basis of proportional geographical representation, the development of a new constitution and the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections.

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/421 (2020) · source

  44. We thank the Acting Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Stephanie Williams, for her briefing on the situation in Libya and the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya, Juergen Schulz, for his report on the work of that subsidiary body. To our regret, we see how the trend of a protracted armed conflict is being consolidated in Libya. Clashes continue in various parts of the country. Unfortunately, the level of distrust between Libyan parties is so high that it is virtually impossible to enforce a ceasefire despite the calls made by many, including the Secretary-General. Humanitarian pauses introduced separately by the Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army were not respected.

    2020-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/421 (2020) · source

  45. The joint efforts of Syrians in the Constitutional Committee and the effectiveness of responses to the threats facing the Syrian nation — coronavirus, terrorism and foreign occupation — call for concrete steps to be taken to restore the unity and territorial integrity of Syria. That applies to the inside. The external perimeter should come together to provide humanitarian assistance and enable the post-conflict reconstruction of Syria so as to facilitate the political process without interfering in it.

    2020-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/420 (2020) · source

  46. Terrorist attacks are also carried out in other areas, most notably along the east coast of the Euphrates river. The problem of foreign terrorist fighters and other prisoners in the north-east has not gone away. Militants riot in prisons, escape to other countries and beyond the region. We would like to hear what is being done in that regard. We also have not gotten responses to our queries on what is happening in the north-east of the country, where United States forces are present illegally in the Al-Hol camp, as well as in the Al-Tanf area, in the Rukban camp. Stability and security in those areas can be ensured only if they return under the control of the legitimate Government. Attempts to freeze the dividing lines that, unfortunately, have been drawn in today’s Syria are unacceptable. Those line should be erased.

    2020-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/420 (2020) · source

  47. Sanctions impact ordinary Syrians. Our colleagues will not convince us that exemptions remove all problems. That is not true. It is impossible to conduct banking transactions from Syria, including for the purchase of medical equipment. In addition, international humanitarian non-governmental organizations cannot take effective action for fear of being sanctioned. There is ample evidence of that. We therefore again call for the lifting of unilateral sanctions. In Idlib, the ceasefire is generally being maintained, although terrorists frequently attack Syrian army positions. The Russian military, together with its Turkish colleagues, continues to patrol designated areas even as radical groups impede their work, incite provocations and create blockades, thereby confirming the need to separate the moderate opposition from the terrorists.

    2020-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/420 (2020) · source

  48. We will continue to make efforts through contact with the parties concerned, both in our national capacity and together with Turkey and Iran, within the framework of the Astana format. There are significant differences between the situation on the ground in Government territories and in areas outside of Damascus control, especially in the terrorist-held Idlib and the occupied Syrian territories. In most of Syria, the people and Government are working to restore a normal life. The coronavirus pandemic is an additional challenge. The authorities are taking the necessary measures by testing for the disease, equipping isolation rooms for patients with coronavirus and opening laboratories in Aleppo, Latakia and, eventually, Homs. But suffocating sanctions have led to a deterioration in the socioeconomic situation in Syria.

    2020-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/420 (2020) · source

  49. We thank Special Envoy Geir Pedersen for his briefing. The pandemic has affected the political settlement in Syria, just as it has affected many other processes around the world. But the Special Envoy is determined, and we support him. The Special Envoy is in constant contact with the Syrians on the issue of the next round of Constitutional Committee talks. Some accuse Syrians of avoiding dialogue under the pretext of not being able to meet in person, but these meetings are critical for discussing sensitive details about the future of their country. Leaks or provocations that could emerge from the use of video-teleconference platforms might undermine those efforts. It would be unacceptable if the settlement process were to break down for a lack of confidentiality.

    2020-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/420 (2020) · source

  50. With regard to the subject of today’s discussion, we would like to highlight the issue of the submission of the report of the Council to the General Assembly. As we all understand, that document remains a sort of outreach to the broader United Nations membership in the General Assembly. We are satisfied with the progress in the preparation of the report for the year 2019. It proves the ability of the Council to operate in a constructive manner with the aim of reaching consensus. It is our hope that this time the Council will be able to respect the deadline it set itself for adopting the report no later than 30 May, even though we all agreed such a deadline would take effect starting from the seventy-fifth session of the General Assembly.

    2020-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/418 (2020) · source