YouSaid · the spoken record

Vassily Nebenzia

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656
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2020-04-16
most recent
2021-05-26
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80
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un-security-council

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  1. A statement was also delivered by Ms. Claudia Blum de Barberi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia. In accordance with the procedure set out in the letter dated 7 May 2020 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council (S/2020/372), which was agreed in light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the coronavirus disease pandemic, that briefing and those statements will be issued as a document of the Security Council.

    2020-10-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1023 (2020) · source

  2. I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a briefing provided by Mr. Carlos Ruiz Massieu, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, as well as the statements delivered by the representatives of Belgium, China, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (on behalf of the Niger, South Africa, Tunisia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Viet Nam (on behalf of Indonesia and Viet Nam) in connection with the video-teleconference on “Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)”, convened on Wednesday, 14 October 2020.

    2020-10-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1023 (2020) · source

  3. A statement was also delivered by the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In accordance with the procedure set out in the letter dated 7 May 2020 from the President of the Security Council addressed to Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council (S/2020/372), which was agreed in the light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the coronavirus disease pandemic, these briefing and statements will be issued as a document of the Security Council.

    2020-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/987 (2020) · source

  4. I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a briefing provided by Ms. Leila Zerrougui, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and Ambassador Abdou Abarry, Permanent Representative of the Niger, in his capacity as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as the statements delivered by the representatives of Estonia, France, Germany, Indonesia, the Russian Federation, South Africa (on behalf of the Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, South Africa and Tunisia), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Viet Nam in connection with the video teleconference on “The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo” convened on Tuesday, 6 October 2020.

    2020-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/987 (2020) · source

  5. In accordance with the procedure set out in the letter dated 7 May 2020 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council (S/2020/372), which was agreed in the light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the coronavirus disease pandemic, the enclosed briefings and statements will be issued as an official document of the Security Council.

    2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/979 (2020) · source

  6. I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a briefing provided by Ms. Helen Meagher La Lime, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, as well as the statements delivered by His Excellency Mr. Roberto Álvarez Gil, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic, and by the representatives of Belgium, China, Estonia, France, Germany, Indonesia, the Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (on behalf of the African members of the Security Council plus one — the Niger, South Africa, Tunisia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Viet Nam, in connection with the video-teleconference on “The question concerning Haiti” convened on Monday, 5 October 2020.

    2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/979 (2020) · source

  7. In this regard, we are disappointed that during the Security Council’s meetings on Syria, primarily on the humanitarian situation, we have heard no United Nations assessment of the negative impact of sanctions, including on the Syrian Government’s fight against the pandemic; nor we hear any analysis of the environmental threat to Syria and Iraq in light of the barbaric oil extraction methods in the north-east.

    2020-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/936 (2020) · source

  8. The Secretary-General has called for the lifting of sanctions, specialized United Nations structures talk about the negative impact of sanctions, humanitarian NGOs and Western journalists write about this. Unilateral coercive measures also impede the return of refugees, as they block the efforts of the Syrian Government to rebuild homes and infrastructure for the benefit of the people. The Syrian Government is ready for the return of citizens who fled the war; neighbouring countries are also interested in this. Resolution 2254 (2015), by the way, provides for the return of refugees and the rehabilitation of the affected areas for this purpose.

    2020-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/936 (2020) · source

  9. We would like them to clarify what exactly they mean. First, the ceasefire in Syria holds. Secondly, who should sign such an agreement? The information coming from Syria, including through the United Nations, proves that only terrorists provoke violence in the country. Do we have to sign an agreement with them? Must we legalize them? We also see Israeli strikes at Syria. In this regard, we call on our Western colleagues to stop exploiting these calls but rather exert their influence on those who really continue to wage war in Syria. Unilateral coercive measures negatively affect the stabilization of the situation, suffocate the economy and cause suffering for ordinary Syrians. Humanitarian exemptions do not work, according to humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) themselves.

    2020-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/936 (2020) · source

  10. The plundering of oil resources, secured by exemption from United States sanctions, as well as the illegal unilateral sanctions themselves, which are used as an instrument of collective punishment and aimed at inciting social discontent, also hamper the efforts of those who want peace in Syria. We heard recently about plans to assassinate a head of a sovereign State, President Al-Assad. What is this if not a policy of regime change? We call on all who preach respect for international law to abandon these practices and even their designs for political assassination and interference by military or economic means in the internal affairs of sovereign countries — even those that they do not like. We have long heard calls from our Western colleagues for the establishment of a nationwide ceasefire in Syria.

    2020-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/936 (2020) · source

  11. It is obvious that the achievement of lasting calm in Idlib and other Syrian areas is possible only if the terrorists of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham, Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham and their affiliates are neutralized and their support from abroad is stopped. The implementation of resolution 2254 (2015), adherence to which is asserted by all members of the Council, provides for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. We urge our colleagues not to be selective in this regard. The illegal occupation of a part of the Syrian territory by the United States and the policy S/2020/936 to isolate the Kurdish regions from the rest of Syria lead to ethnic and sectarian hatred, and this is a factor in the delay in the political settlement in Syria.

    2020-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/936 (2020) · source

  12. Russia will continue to provide the Special Envoy and the Syrians with all necessary support, including within the framework of the Astana format. As for the situation on the ground, it can be described as generally calm. Instability has been registered in Idlib, controlled by terrorists from Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, and territories in the north-east. In the Idlib de-escalation zone, militants sabotage Russian-Turkish patrols. The shelling of positions of Government troops and nearby settlements continues, causing civilian casualties and deaths. Terrorists are also active in other parts of Syria. All attacks by militants will be resolutely suppressed.

    2020-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/936 (2020) · source

  13. This is symbolic; the Constitutional Committee itself was formed thanks to our effective trilateral cooperation, as well as the decision of the Congress of the Syrian National Dialogue, held in Sochi in 2018. The Astana participants also met with Syrian representatives and the Special Envoy. We circulated the joint trilateral statement that was adopted in Geneva as an official document of the Security Council. Its key elements are reaffirmation of commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, determination to confront the terrorist threat, rejection of the illegal seizure of oil fields, condemnation of unilateral sanctions that undermine the socioeconomic situation in the country, and the need to increase humanitarian aid to all Syrians without politicization or discrimination.

    2020-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/936 (2020) · source

  14. At the same time, it is important to ensure safety and health of the Syrian delegates, as well as Mr. Pedersen’s team and the host country officials when planning next rounds. The Syrians, with the help of the Special Envoy, should agree on the agenda and dates for the next meetings. It is important to help them lead this political process on their own without external interference. The work of the Constitutional Committee does not and should not have artificial time restrictions or be synchronized with any events, including electoral process within Syria. The latter is an internal matter of the country. The guarantors of the Astana format — Russia, Turkey and Iran — held a meeting on the sidelines of the Syrian dialogue in Geneva.

    2020-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/936 (2020) · source

  15. We thank Special Envoy of the Secretary-General Mr. Geir Pedersen for his briefing. We welcome the third round of the small body of the Syrian Constitutional Committee held in Geneva last month. The most important achievement of that meeting was the constructive approach of the Syrian delegations. The credit for this belongs to the United Nations team working on Syrian settlement, led by the Special Envoy, as well as to all international players who are interested in stabilizing the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. Syrians showed their readiness to continue working together to find common denominators and establish principles for discussing the future of their country. We highly appreciate the level of preparation of the event against the backdrop of the coronavirus restrictions.

    2020-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/936 (2020) · source

  16. At the end of the statement, in relation to Russian-German bilateral relations, it says — in Russian, so I will have to translate it: “If these materials are not provided by the German side, this will be regarded by the Russian side as a refusal by the Federal Government of Germany to establish the truth in the context of an objective investigation, and all its former and current actions in relation to Alexei Navalny will be seen as a blatant hostile provocation against Russia, which would definitely undermine Russian-German relations and international relations as a whole.”

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  17. Indeed, the Russian Ambassador was at the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He was subject to an oral démarche. He received none of the materials, data or evidence that we had requested. I would therefore like to cite the statement issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry yesterday, 9 September. This statement specifies that the German Ambassador in Moscow was called to the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, where he was reminded that the Russian Federation asked for data from Germany on 27 August, including Mr. Navalny’s biodata and the results of the expert analysis — none of which it had received — so that it could study them in a comprehensive manner and verify the German laboratory’s findings.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  18. This whole incident cannot but raise questions about whether some foul play is being staged. We will listen carefully to the statements that follow to see what measures are being proposed, discussed or implemented. This leads to an unavoidable rhetorical question the ancient Romans posed in such situations: Cui bono? For whose benefit was the thing done? Here is the answer: Cui prodest scelus is fecit. The one who benefits is the one who did it. Third statement by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Vassily Nebenzia I listened to my German colleague carefully. He was trying to frame the situation as a matter of international significance. He is trying to portray it as having nothing to do with bilateral relations between Germany and Russia. However, I do not think this is the case.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  19. I would also like to recall that according to article VII, paragraph 2 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), “[e]ach State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and afford the appropriate form of legal assistance”. If our partners are so committed to the CWC, why do they fail to comply with that provision? A group of prominent Russian doctors proposed to their German colleagues to jointly discuss the available data on Alexei Navalny’s health. But, yet again, this was rejected. We are seeing a paradoxical situation. We ask our German partners to cooperate, but how can we proceed if the German side refuses to cooperate, which prevents the Russian law enforcement agencies from engaging the necessary procedural mechanisms for starting an investigation?

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  20. At the same time, the German side shared its findings with its allies, and now we hear not only appeals for explanations and to conduct an investigation, but also demands that we confess and plead guilty. The allegation is not just simply immoral and implausible, but it also goes against the rule of law that the German’s claim to champion. If they demand explanations, then let us put the facts on the table and compare notes. Why should we trust allegations that are not corroborated by evidence, even if they are, as the German Ambassador says, beyond a reasonable doubt? As of yet, we have received nothing that would allow our relevant authorities to conduct their own de jure investigation, although they did start a de facto investigation, what we call “pre-investigation procedures”.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  21. I will not speak of the tone in which this lack of clarity was expressed or of the accusations that followed. I would like to stress that our request is fully legitimate and natural under the circumstances and that it should be honoured in accordance with the agreement between our countries. Moreover, the request serves the exact purpose our German colleagues — and now many others — are invoking, namely, to establish the truth by investigating an alleged crime. A few days ago, we were told that the samples had been analysed in a Bundeswehr institute. However, the Germans would not share any of their information with us, since that could enable Russia to learn how much the Bundeswehr knows about chemical substances. We then heard that the results were classified. How should we interpret this? What do you think, Mr. President?

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  22. Our law enforcement authorities do not have grounds to open an investigation. Our doctors — who, by the way, saved Alexei Navalny — found no chemical-weapon substances in their analyses. While the German laboratory claims it did find chemical substances, Germany has provided us with no evidence that would allow us to conclude that the crime of attempted poisoning was committed, thereby justifying the start of an investigation. On 27 August, in accordance with the legal assistance agreement between Russia and Germany, we officially submitted a request for such assistance through the Russian Prosecutor-General’s Office. For more than a week, our German partners did not respond. We then heard conflicting information about whether the request was being considered; what decision will be taken and when it will be taken remains unclear.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  23. We had few illusions that certain countries would raise the situation with Alexei Navalny today, despite the fact that it is completely irrelevant to the topic of discussion at hand. Today, we are witnessing in person another attempt at imposing a narrative. This is nothing new; we have seen it before, when it was tested on the case of Sergei Skripal. Incidentally, we are still awaiting answers to pending questions in that case. With regard to the Alexei Navalny case, everything we have said has been crystal clear. We are the party most interested in knowing what happened, but even a first-year law student understands that any investigation should be preceded by the gathering of evidence and by the development of facts based on the available evidence. In this case, there is a remarkable lack of evidence.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  24. In his statement today, I think he mentioned Russia 10 times more than he mentioned Syria. He bombards me with rhetorical questions that he believes make me petrified and speechless. I am supposed to answer all of them in a row, but I will try to answer at least one that he posed. I believe that when meeting with President Al-Assad in Damascus, Foreign Minister Lavrov discussed a few things with the Syrian leader, in particular the constricting sanctions that Germany and its allies have imposed on Syria. I do not exclude the possibility that he raised the issue of the Syrian chemical dossier or that he cited the cheating, manipulation and insinuation that Germany and other Western countries have foisted upon the country in this matter. I myself have a few questions, if not a declarative statement, for the German Ambassador.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  25. With this statement, we are beginning to roll out a series of instructive lessons on the Syrian chemical dossier. More are to follow. We already know perfectly well the narrative that our Western colleagues will use today — that the conclusions of the IIT, the FFM and the JIM are unquestionable and that the OPCW Technical Secretariat is beyond reproach. We regret to state that this narrative can no longer be used and that it is our Western colleagues alone who have drawn this conclusion. Second statement by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Vassily Nebenzia I am already long accustomed to the fact that my friend, the German Ambassador, uses the Security Council platform to engage in a bilateral dialogue with me personally.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  26. We also insist on the prompt and proper investigation of the recently reported mysterious evaporation of samples containing phosphorus trichloride collected by the Declaration Assessment Team at its twenty-second round of consultations in Damascus in October 2019. It is appalling that this could happen in a certified OPCW laboratory, and it raises a lot of questions. The Technical Secretariat noticed the evaporation problem as early as February 2020; however, it decided to keep the problem secret until the samples had become irreversibly damaged. We continue to expect a substantive clarification by the Technical Secretariat on the issue surrounding the Douma report and, more crucially, on the steps the Director-General intends to take to address the acts of malpractice that were revealed in this context.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  27. As a founding member of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, we are deeply concerned to see that OPCW — a once respectable organization — has become a tool in a geopolitical game. We call on the Technical Secretariat to adjust its working methods and ethics, abandon malpractice and double standards, and duly fulfil its mandate. In this regard, we insist, at the request of Damascus, that the Technical Secretariat stop delaying the investigations of the incidents, and in particular those that took place in Aleppo on 24 November 2018. It is surprising and unfortunate that the current report does not have a single reference to this issue.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  28. That document, which was adopted by the narrow margin of one vote, clearly showed how divided the international community is on this subject and how unwilling many countries are to further assist in the crusade against Syria. The decision demands that Syria do what in theory is impossible — that it declare, within 90 days, additional chemical weapons and alleged facilities related to them, meaning those that were destroyed or confirmed to never have existed. We are not so naïve as to fail to see that this is a trap with no backdoor. These demands cannot be met either in theory or in practice, which is why they were put to us. They set a precondition for further steps that the masterminds planned to take after the expiration of these 90 days.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  29. The IIT’s gaps, inconsistencies, discrepancies and inherent bias logically follow on the illegitimacy of the IIT itself, coupled with the Technical Secretariat’s managerial, infrastructural and policy flaws. As expected, instead of conducting serious investigative work, the team of so-called experts merely reduced itself to retranslating baseless accusations that are unsupported by material evidence or are outright contradictory. This seven-year-old strategy of fake evidence and manipulations culminated in July 2020, when the OPCW Executive Council adopted an anti-Syrian decision based on the unsubstantiated assumptions of IIT, which in its methodology carries the same original sin as the FFM and the JIM.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  30. Then, in violation of the CWC, our Western colleagues illegally created the so-called OPCW IIT, which was devised to be a useful tool for implicating the Syrian Government and serves no other purpose than to whitewash the true misdeeds, justify the aggression against Syria by three members of the Security Council in April 2017 and April 2018, and continue a maximum-pressure policy against Syria. The chemical dossier is used as one of many levers to delegitimize the Syrian Government and justify meddling and military intervention. The recent report of the IIT clearly testifies to this. The Russian position on it is explicit in the document we circulated in the Security Council and General Assembly in June.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  31. No follow-up measures have been taken with regard to this information. Russia has repeatedly called on the OPCW Technical Secretariat to adjust its flawed working methodology. We were interested in having an unbiased and fully accountable investigative body at our disposal, not a political tool to back somebody’s geopolitical adventures. However, these calls have been met with no response, so there was no other way out for us but to withhold support for the extension of the JIM mandate.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  32. We have called for a professional dialogue on the IIT’s findings, including on the aforementioned episodes — a dialogue among experts who would be able to understand the validity of conclusions made. But we have been regularly denied such a dialogue. Our Western partners are not interested in one because it will reveal the false nature of the FFM, JIM and IIT conclusions. All they needed was sanctioned proof of the Syrian Government’s guilt, and they got one. At the same time, the evidence of the use of chemical weapons on Syrian territory by non-State actors, including terrorist groups, has been deliberately neglected. Since 2013, the Syrian Arab Republic has sent more than 200 letters to the United Nations Secretariat about terrorist activities undertaken to prepare and carry out acts of chemical terrorism.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  33. By disregarding the so-called chain of custody, which requires that evidence be collected on site and exclusively by the OPCW specialists, the investigative mechanisms have conducted their investigations in clear violation of the CWC. Instead, they have used information provided by dubious sources, including the notorious White Helmets. The gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies in their reports, as well as their bias, have been widely criticized not only by Member States, but also by independent and reputable experts and scientists. Our experts have produced national reports on all of the foregoing episodes, including the recent report of the so-called Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) on chemical episodes in Latamneh.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  34. The original investigation was marked by deliberate flaws of ballistic, toxicology and chemical analysis, manipulation of the alleged victims, distortion of the conclusions of the FFM team and harassment of experts who had come to alternative conclusions. We have still not received any response from the OPCW Technical Secretariat on these multiple examples of malpractice. Initially, Russia, just like other responsible States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), was hopeful that the investigation of all these incidents would be unbiased. However, it became obvious to us very soon that the investigative mechanisms, namely, the FFM and the JIM, had failed to duly fulfil their mandates.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  35. Subsequently, the White Helmets’ ill-fated video footage suddenly disappeared, just the way the memorable photos of allegedly poisoned children from Khan Shaykhun had done a year before. The Western narrative on the Douma incident was that the attack was carried out by air-dropped cylinders containing chlorine, which penetrated the roof and entered apartments where people were living. However, further expert investigation of traces found on the cylinders and the scale of the damage showed that they were manually placed at targeted locations rather than dropped by helicopter. In January 2020, we dedicated a special Arria Formula meeting to elucidating the incident and presenting extensive evidence of the staged nature of the episode.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  36. Another bone-chilling story about the crimes of the Syrian “regime” — to use the preferred Western terminology — comes from an incident in Douma on 7 April 2018, when a video of the White Helmets providing first aid to victims of exposure to toxic substances was released. Our military experts, together with Syrian colleagues, managed to find the Syrians captured on that notorious footage. It turned out that these Syrians were not poisoned; rather, they had involuntarily become involved in a staged provocation set up by the White Helmets. The 13 people in question, including a boy named Hassan Diab, confessed as much during a special briefing at OPCW headquarters on 26 April 2018.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  37. However, ballistic analysis, including by independent experts, showed that this is not only technically impossible, but also runs counter to the basic laws of physics. In order to reach the target, the plane would have had to get much closer, which would have rendered it visible for external observation. Besides, the crater left after the alleged bombing resembled a static explosion on the ground rather than an aerial bomb. The alleged use of sarin in that case was highly questionable, as video footage by the White Helmets, widely circulated by the Western media, featured a so-called rescue team without the necessary protective equipment to handle a sarin attack. There were other numerous inconsistencies, which were fully ignored by the then Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM).

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  38. It suggested that a barrel bomb with chlorine, allegedly dropped from a military helicopter, fell through a ventilation shaft into a residential building. It was presumed that the diameter of the barrel fully matched the diameter of the shaft. That contradicts the laws of physics, ballistics and common sense. Even the authors of the report admitted that it was improbable. However, the blame was placed on Damascus. I turn now to the 7 April 2017 incident in Khan Shaykhun, in which it is alleged that the Syrian Government used sarin. Accusations were made that an uncontrolled aerial bomb was dropped by a Syrian military plane on the target at no less than 5 kilometres distance.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  39. No undeclared chemical weapons stockpiles have been uncovered by the OPCW in the course of numerous intrusive inspections since October 2013. So far, no one has been able to prove the opposite. Nevertheless, throughout the years, Western countries have continued to accuse the Syrian Government of using chemical weapons, basing their allegations on a number of doubtful, handpicked incidents, with a total disregard for evidence of fact manipulation and of the staging of those incidents. Let me cite some of those here. One of the early reports of the OPCW fact- finding mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (FFM), which accused the Syrian Government of the use of chemical weapons in Sarmin on 16 March 2015, reflected an absolutely unrealistic scenario.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  40. Suffice it to say that this is one of the most politicized items the Security Council is currently dealing with. However, let me recall some basic facts. In 2014, Syria’s chemical weapons programme was shut down, all its chemical weapons stockpiles eliminated and its production facilities destroyed. Damascus has no capacity, intent or, most importantly, clear or explicable reason to use chemical weapons. Their use would provide no benefits on the battlefield, but would instead put Syria in a vulnerable position, as can be seen in the retaliation and the accusations levelled at it every time allegations of their use have been made. The Syrian Arab Republic is fully cooperating with the OPCW and its Technical Secretariat and Declaration Assessment Team, as well as with all investigative missions on the ground.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  41. We would like to thank Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu for presenting the eighty-third monthly report (S/2020/871, annex) of the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). The Syrian chemical dossier has been on the agenda of the Security Council for seven years. We have discussed it mostly in closed format. But upon our request, the Security Council meeting on this topic today is open to the general audience. We did this because we believe that the Council has nothing to hide from the world, and nor has Syria. Everyone who is interested deserves an opportunity to form a judgment on how this issue is discussed in the Security Council. It is difficult to address every aspect of the Syrian chemical dossier in one statement.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  42. There are no reports of them participating in armed clashes or dying there. Behind all this there is a clear desire to divert attention from the destructive role played in Libya by those who are the loudest today in paying lip service to the fate of ordinary Libyans. Such behaviour will not mislead the Libyans or their neighbours, who are well aware of who has in fact pushed the region into chaos. We are very surprised that those who spread accusations about so-called Russian involvement in Libya are turning a blind eye to their own military presence, in both the capacity of national armed forces and through private military companies, in both the west and east of Libya. They send weapons and ammunition to different armed groups, train them and recruit mercenaries. We call on those delegations to stop these hypocritical accusations.

    2020-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/879 (2020) · source

  43. At the same time, we stress that the central and leading role in the Libyan settlement belongs to the United Nations. We believe that a new Special Representative can help move forward the political process and coordinate all existing initiatives and ideas. We call on the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative as soon as possible and on Security Council members to contribute to this process, which has dragged on unjustifiably and is clearly impeding international efforts. We have already heard accusations of Russian interference in Libya. I am sure that there will be a follow-up to the ones that we originally heard. In this regard, I would like to reiterate what I said in our previous statements. We have repeatedly reiterated that not a single Russian serviceman is currently in the combat zone in Libya.

    2020-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/879 (2020) · source

  44. We believe that in the current critical situation all States that have leverage over the warring Libyan parties must do their best to help launch the negotiation process. In addition to statements on the ceasefire, a number of peace initiatives have recently been voiced, including by the head of the Libyan Parliament. Mr. Aguila Saleh, and the President of Egypt, Mr. Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, supported by many influential States. We believe that the aforementioned ideas could form the basis for political discussions within the framework of the process of a comprehensive Libyan settlement. On our part, we will continue contacts with countries interested in stabilizing Libya, including Turkey, on the basis of the statement adopted by our two countries on 22 July. The most recent round of such contacts was held on 31 August.

    2020-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/879 (2020) · source

  45. We are convinced that the supply of weapons and foreign terrorist fighters to this country must be stopped. “Pumping” Libya with weapons, which started back in 2011, as well as the presence of Western military specialists with unknown missions, further fuels the crisis and, accordingly, increases radical sentiments and the spread of the terrorist threat throughout the African continent. We reiterate our approach to peaceful settlement in Libya. This process should be Libyan-owned and Libyan-led. All issues, including those related to the situation around Sirte and Al-Jufra, should be discussed within established mechanisms. Progress on military and economic tracks could become a door opener for inclusive dialogue on the political modalities of the comprehensive settlement.

    2020-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/879 (2020) · source

  46. At the same time, we proceed from the principle that we have repeatedly voiced that any decisions and recommendations must be coordinated and approved by the Libyans themselves. Without this, no success can be achieved. Although the military situation has stabilized, we cannot exclude a fresh escalation at any moment. The ongoing armed conflict has a negative impact on the socioeconomic and humanitarian situation of the population. Mass protests were held in Tripoli demanding urgent measures to remedy the situation. We are also very concerned at the rapid increase in cases of the coronavirus disease. We call on the Libyan authorities to respond promptly to these challenges and on the international community to continue humanitarian assistance. We are worried about reports of ongoing violations of the arms embargo in Libya.

    2020-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/879 (2020) · source

  47. We have consistently advocated the establishment of a sustainable cessation of hostilities in Libya and an end to the bloodshed that has been tearing the country apart since NATO’s intervention in 2011. In that regard, the recent statements by the Head of the Government of National Accord, Mr. F. Serraj, and the head of the Libyan Parliament, Mr. A. Saleh, give cause for cautious optimism. We call on the parties to launch the Libyan national dialogue as soon as possible within the mechanisms created by the Berlin Conference and approved by resolution 2510 (2020). We confirmed this position during the most recent teleconference of the Berlin Conference follow-up committee, as well as in contacts with interested parties.

    2020-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/879 (2020) · source

  48. We welcome the delegation of the Niger as President of the Security Council for the month of September and wish you, Ambassador Abarry, every success. We also thank the Indonesian delegation and Permanent Representative Djani for the efforts and leadership of the Council during the challenging month of August. We thank Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General Williams for her report on the situation in Libya. We also thank Guenter Sautter, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011), for his report on the work of that body. Russia remains convinced that the Libyan crisis can be resolved only by political and diplomatic means. There is no alternative to a peaceful solution.

    2020-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/879 (2020) · source

  49. The competitive advantages and required professional skills to implement mandated tasks also needs to be assessed. We also underline the importance of ensuring wide geographical representation when appointing women to leadership positions in peacekeeping operations. The primary responsibility for increasing the number of women in uniformed peacekeeping contingents lies with States. As such, we must consider the opinions and views of troop- and police-contributing countries in that regard, as well as each country’s approach to staffing.

    2020-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/856 (2020) · source

  50. The Russian Federation voted in favour of resolution 2538 (2020), on women in United Nations peacekeeping operations. We would like to express our appreciation to Indonesia, as the coordinator of the negotiations. Its efforts to strike a balance among the wide range of views of Council members made it possible to adopt the final document unanimously. We stress the importance of ensuring women’s meaningful participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations, as well as equal opportunities and conditions for their involvement in peacekeeping activities. At the same time, we are convinced that this process requires a thoughtful approach, which makes it necessary to take into account the needs and security situation of each mission.

    2020-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/856 (2020) · source