YouSaid · the spoken record

Vassily Nebenzia

lines on the record: 656
first: 2020-04-16
most recent: 2021-05-26
sittings or episodes: 80
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“We thank the delegations that did not shy away from participating in our Arria Formula event. To those who did, I must say that the actors who side with only one party to the internal Ukrainian conflict and, contrary to the established facts, indulge their sickly fantasies about the “Russian aggression” cannot be called mediators. Rather, you are accomplices in Kyiv’s crimes against the Donbas population. In conclusion, if Ukraine wants to normalize the situation in Donbas, Kyiv needs to make every effort to ensure that the people living in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk are not afraid of returning but, on the contrary, are eager to do so.”
2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source
“It would be good if today we could also listen to the representatives of Donbas, since they are parties to the settlement process. Interestingly, the members of the Normandy format, namely, France, Germany and others, do not reject direct dialogue with Ansar Allah— affiliated with the Houthis in Yemen — the Syrian opposition and the Venezuelan opposition, or unrecognized State entities in the eastern Mediterranean for that matter. However, they get nervous when it comes to initiatives aimed at direct communication between Kyiv and the real inhabitants of Donbas, as envisaged by the Minsk agreements. Is it not you who keep stressing the importance of finding political and diplomatic solutions through an inclusive dialogue? Where are your principles in this case?”
2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source
“Nevertheless, no one has cared to provide a shred of proof of this so-called aggression, which is actually not a surprise. Furthermore, Mr. Apakan, Ms. Grau’s predecessor, unambiguously stated at a similar meeting two years ago that the Special Monitoring Mission had not and did not establish the presence of any Russian military units in Donbas. I expect to hear Ms. Grau confirm this fact again today. We know too well that Kyiv only pretends to be implementing the Minsk agreements. Donbas representatives shared that information with the Council at an informal Arria Formula meeting that we organized on 2 December 2020. Incidentally, the Ukrainian delegation and its Western sponsors, including Normandy format members France and Germany, avoided the event.”
2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source
“He seems to forget that Russia is not the only one to support the Minsk agreements as the only basis for an internal Ukrainian settlement, the Security Council, in the presidential statement S/PRST/2018/12, dated 6 June 2018, reiterated the need for resolution 2202 (2015) and the Minsk package of measures to be strictly observed. At the same time, without batting an eye, Mr. Reznikov claims that “Ukraine has implemented almost all the agreements made at the summit held in Paris under the Normandy format”. The fact that Kyiv has thoroughly implemented not a single one of its Minsk obligations does not seem to faze him. Instead of implementing the Minsk agreements, Kyiv keeps spinning tales of ongoing Russian aggression; Ukraine blames everything on that.”
2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source
“For example, in May and December 2020, President Zelenskyy claimed that “the Minsk agreements are needed not to settle the conflict, but to preserve sanctions against Russia”. In a January 2020 article, First Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine and Head of the Ukrainian delegation to the Trilateral Contact Group, Oleksii Reznikov, said that Kyiv was willing work to reform the Minsk agreements. He believes that the agreements are “more a political and diplomatic arrangement than an international treaty”. Furthermore, Mr. Reznikov is convinced that the term of the agreements expired on 31 December 2015. At the same time, Mr. Reznikov wonders whether “Russia can be persuaded to accept amending the Minsk agreements or completely changing the settlement format”.”
2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source
“The drafters of this legislation thought in strategic terms. They have figured out ways to be able to keep violating the Minsk agreements for the next 25 years. The legislation is silent as to both direct dialogue between Kyiv and Donetsk and Luhansk and about negotiating special status for Donbas with them. Instead, it contains fantasies about creating some kind of “international administration” and holding elections only two years thereafter. Does anyone think the people of Donbas will agree to this form of international occupation of their homeland? Most important, how does such a plan comport with provisions of resolution 2202 (2015)? In parallel to that, we have to state that Kyiv’s desperate unwillingness to observe its obligations under the Minsk package of measures is not a secret even by Ukraine’s leadership.”
2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source
“Has permanent legislation been adopted with regard to the special status of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in line with measures as set out in the footnote to paragraph 11? I would remind Council members that these two steps must precede the reinstatement of full control of the State border by Ukraine. Furthermore, I would ask Ms. Grau to tell us if the so-called Steinmeier formula, which was articulated in the Normandy format as early as October 2015 in order to help Ukraine implement paragraph 11 of the Minsk package of measures, has been incorporated in Ukrainian legislation? We would also be interested in hearing comments by the briefers on draft legislation dedicated to Kyiv reinstating control over this region, which was recently published by the Ukrainian Ministry for the Reintegration of Donbas.”
2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source
“In this regard, what can one say about the fact that Kyiv has not closed criminal files even against those subject to detainee exchange and that there have been instances of second detentions? Has Ukraine reinstated control of the local sector of its banking system in the conflict-affected area, in accordance with paragraph 8 of the Minsk package? Has there been dialogue on modalities for local elections and the future regime in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as stipulated in paragraph 4 of the Minsk package? And finally, has Ukraine carried out any constitutional reform? Has a new constitution been enacted that includes decentralization as a key element? According to paragraph 11 of the package, that should have happened by the end of 2015.”
2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source
“It would be good for the new members of the Council who have not yet had the opportunity to dig into the Ukraine case to hear her answer. I would also like to take this opportunity to ask the briefers to give direct, non-evasive answers to our questions regarding Ukraine’s alleged implementation of the Minsk package, which our Western and Ukrainian colleagues will be telling us about. Has Ukraine ensured pardon and amnesty by enacting the law prohibiting the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Minsk package of measures?”
2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source
“At the same time, Kyiv and our Western partners are presenting our legitimate and understandable wish to draw attention to the need for Ukraine to implement the Minsk package of measures as “Russian propaganda” and “spreading fake information”. I am unfortunately certain that we will hear similar accusations today, as well as mantras that it is Russia that has allegedly failed to implement the Minsk agreements. I would like to take advantage of Ms. Grau’s presence at today’s meeting to kindly ask her to give a direct answer to the following questions. Is there any mention of Russia in the text of the Minsk package of measures apart from the signature of our representative on the document alongside that of the OSCE representative? Could Ms. Grau tell us what obligations are laid upon Russia by the agreements?”
2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source
“We regularly draw attention to this situation because, in 2015, the Security Council efficiently endorsed the hard-won Minsk compromise by adopting resolution 2202 (2015), thereby incorporating the package of measures into international law. The Trilateral Contact Group was supposed to become a unique platform for direct dialogue among the three Ukrainian sides in the presence of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Russia. As Ms. DiCarlo rightly mentioned today, there is no other internationally recognized format of settlement for the Maidan-provoked internal conflict in Ukraine.”
2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source
“It is well known that this document was signed not on the first day of the internal conflict that flared up after the notorious Maidan events, but after nine months of tense work and uneasy concessions that Kyiv, Donetsk and Luhansk had to make. Those six years have given no answer to the following two important questions. How exactly is Ukraine going to resolve the conflict peacefully? What is Kyiv’s vision for the future special status of Donbas within Ukraine? Indeed, all prospects for a settlement depend directly on answers to these two questions, because once Kyiv started to use force, in 2014, and the Ukrainian military began to fire on residential areas, the people of Donbas ceased to feel any connection to Ukraine.”
2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source
“We thank Ms. DiCarlo, Ms. Grau and Mr. Çevik for their briefings. We welcome the participation of Mr. Leonid Kravchuk, the first President of independent Ukraine and the representative of his country at the Trilateral Contact Group, in today’s video-teleconference. We also welcome the participation of Germany, a member of the Normandy quartet. I cannot see German representative Christoph Heusgen on the screen, but I am sure he is here with us. I welcome him back. Tomorrow will mark six years since the adoption of the package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk agreements on a settlement in Ukraine.”
2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source
“While these aspects are indeed important, the balanced approaches set forth in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy needs to be preserved.”
2021-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/140 (2021) · source
“We should not forget that ISIL evolved from the illegitimate use of force on a territory of a foreign State and illegal cross-border arms deliveries. States must stay united, cooperate under the coordination of the United Nations and cast aside their disagreements if they are to counter ISIL in accordance with their obligations set forth in resolutions of the Security Council and international conventions. Furthermore, United Nations mechanisms and related technical assistance programmes must share tasks to consolidate progress in countering ISIL. Accordingly, the report of the Secretary-General highlights the importance of human rights and gender aspects in United Nations programmes and initiatives.”
2021-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/140 (2021) · source
“Despite the efforts of national enforcement authorities, which have been taken with the help and direct participation of a foreign military contingent, there are no signs of stabilization of the situation at this time. Speaking of countering terrorism in Afghanistan, we should recall the crimes committed there by foreign military contingents and the personnel of private military entities. Those crimes must be investigated and the guilty held accountable. In conclusion, we would like to say that the fight against ISIL is yielding results. While today we cannot honestly speak of ISIL creating a terrorist caliphate, the group is still striving to adapt to the changing environment and poses a real threat. Terrorists benefit from a lack of unity among States, and from those States’ contradictions.”
2021-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/140 (2021) · source
“Instead of pursuing their proclaimed noble goals, they are used for provocation and the incitement of conflicts. The White Helmets, who are closely linked to terrorists, mainly those from Jabhat Al-Nusra, are a sad example of this phenomenon. The financing of that organization has not stopped. Remarkably, after the defeat of ISIL in Syria, members of the White Helmets were transferred to neighbouring countries, with Western sponsors promising to transport them. But apparently things got bogged down. Now there is some concern that these so-called humanitarians are inspiring terrorist activity in their new locations. ISIL positions in Afghanistan are still strong, which is why the terrorist and drug threats are spreading from Afghanistan to other countries in the region and beyond.”
2021-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/140 (2021) · source
“At present, documents have been prepared for another 96 children now living in refugee camps in Syria. We call on States to make every effort to save the children from involvement in the cycle of violence perpetrated by terrorists. It is no less important for there to be full-fledged cooperation in holding foreign terrorist fighters accountable. In the first instance, there must be cooperation with the States on whose territory terrorist crimes have been committed. Instead, we are witnessing attempts by some States to create quasi-legal mechanisms to cooperate with individuals and entities that are not authorized to administer justice. We cannot fail to mention the problem of pseudo-humanitarian organizations created by Western special services.”
2021-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/140 (2021) · source
“Unfortunately, a number of these fighters’ countries of origin prefer to turn a blind eye to the issue. A vivid example of this is the problem of Al-Hol camp, which for several years now has been mentioned in one report of the Secretary-General after another. In order to solve the problem of Al-Hol camp, States whose nationals are in the camp must establish stable interaction with Syria’s legitimate authorities. Russia is closely cooperating with the authorities of Syria and Iraq to establish the whereabouts of Russian minors there and ensure that they get back home. At the end of December 2020, a humanitarian operation repatriated 19 children, whose ages ranged from 3 to 15. Since December 2018, 274 children have returned to Russia from conflict zones: 122 from Iraq and 152 from Syria.”
2021-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/140 (2021) · source
“A rather complicated situation is unfolding in Mozambique, where militia leaders seek to seize gas fields to ensure a source of sustainable financing. ISIL suffered a considerable defeat in Syria. However, the terrorist threat remains in the country, owing, first of all, to the presence of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, a group that counts among its members approximately 15,000 militants, and its main forces are concentrated in Idlib, western Aleppo and north-east Latakia. Hurras Al- Din, a group that counts among its adherents about 9,000 militants, at least half of whom are foreign terrorist fighters from the Middle East and North Africa, also poses a serious threat to Syria. Speaking of Syria, the problem of repatriating foreign terrorist fighters and their family members, especially minor children, has grown to its fullest expression.”
2021-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/140 (2021) · source
“The leaders of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) are using web resources to manage ISIL cells and combat units and promote their narrative. We agree with Secretary-General’s assessments of the threat posed by ISIL. The report before us (S/2021/98) clearly demonstrates that this terrorist organization is retaining its positions in several of the world’s regions. The ISIL threat is gaining momentum in the Sahelo-Saharan-Saharan zone: in the south-east of Mali, the northern areas of Burkina Faso and the western regions of the Niger. The so-called Islamic State in the Greater Sahara proceeds with the goal of creating an Islamic “caliphate”. With militants gaining strongholds in Central Africa, there remains a threat that they might penetrate countries of the Southern African region.”
2021-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/140 (2021) · source
“Today, on 10 February, Russia marks Diplomats’ Day — our professional holiday. This is not an invitation to congratulate ourselves, however. On the contrary, I would like to congratulate Under-Secretary-General Voronkov. Before assuming his office, he was a prominent Russian diplomat, and I would extend my warmest wishes to him. We thank Under-Secretary-General Voronkov and Assistant Secretary- General Coninsx for their effective leadership of their respective entities in monitoring terrorists and providing counter-terrorism assistance to States in the complicated context of today’s world. Terrorists make use of the global pandemic and its related socioeconomic perturbations to win new adherents. They actively use the Internet for these purposes.”
2021-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/140 (2021) · source
“We hope Member States will approach current developments in a critical manner and will not take part in a performance with the anti-Syrian draft decision at the April session of the Conference of the State Parties, because such a performance threatens to undermine the authority of the OPCW and, for that matter, of the Security Council, which is responsible for implementing resolution 2118 (2013).”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“However, our conversation on this matter must not turn into a means to “punish the unwanted”. We will robustly oppose such attempts. In conclusion, here is what I urge you to think about. If Syria is deprived of any right to partake in the OPCW decision-making process, what will be the point for Damascus to continue cooperating with the organization? After all, what is your goal — to “crush” Syria as you did with Iraq, on far-fetched pretexts, or to ensure that Syrian soil is free of chemical weapons?”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“Both the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the United Nations Secretariat neglect vast evidence proving that non-State entities — that is, terrorist groups — used chemical weapons on Syrian territory. Since 2013, Syria has sent over 200 letters to the Secretariat informing about terrorist activities to prepare and carry out acts of chemical terrorism. Almost every month the Syrian side provides information about chemical-weapon provocations planned by terrorists. We do not see that reflected in OPCW documentation. Let me stress that Russia, as any other responsible OPCW member State, in the strongest terms condemns the use of chemical weapons by whomever and for whatever purposes. We are fully committed to strengthening the non-proliferation regime on weapons of mass destruction.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“Facts indicate that the Syrian initial declaration was not an extraordinary case and that the Technical Secretariat and Western delegations prefer to inflate agitation around it artificially. We repeatedly called on the OPCW leadership to explain why the Technical Secretariat openly uses double standards and “forgives” minor drawbacks in the initial declarations of some countries while “inflating” accusations against others. We received no answer to that. Instead, we see further groundless accusations that the Syrian authorities allegedly “do not cooperate actively enough” with the OPCW in resolving this issue. At the same time, the opposition seems to be enjoying the “presumption of innocence”.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“As per established OPCW practice, initial declaration is a dynamic instrument. States add to their declarations all the time, which is not perceived as something extraordinary. Western States, including the United States, Canada, Belgium, France and Germany, update their declarations on a regular basis; therefore, their declared stockpiles are growing — moderately, yet constantly. Let me also remind you of Libya’s case. In 2012 around 500 undeclared projectiles were discovered there. Or we can also mention Iraq’s initial declaration — no one confirmed it and it was based solely on United Nations documents at hand. But in those cases, for some reason, the Technical Secretariat was easy on the drawbacks with initial declarations.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“Therefore, all questions pertaining to that issue lie in a historical dimension and clearly cannot be considered evidence proving that Syrians are hiding something. Besides, as we learned from former OPCW inspector Ian Henderson during our Arria Formula video-teleconference held on 28 September 2020, the guidance of the Technical Secretariat gives direct instructions to the Declaration Assessment Team to keep outstanding issues open. Given such an approach, no matter how hard Syrians justify themselves, they will not be able to close this part of the file. According to the same expert, at the initial stage of joining the CWC, many States that filed their declarations at that time encountered similar problems. But those were interpreted as “minor drawbacks” that did not undermine the integrity of the declaration.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“But the case of Iraq and its chemical file clearly shows that so long as certain countries need to maintain political pressure on it, there will always be unresolved issues. New York is not a specialized platform for discussing issues relating to the initial declaration as such. That is the prerogative of The Hague, which has all the relevant technical expertise, unlike the United Nations Secretariat, so it remains unclear to us why the Secretariat would afford such freedom of comments and conclusions on that topic. But since colleagues address it so widely, I would like to point out that the initial declaration touches only on the military-chemical activities that Syria had carried out before it joined the CWC.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“Why do our Western colleagues never speak of those positive developments but deliberately shift their emphasis to the issues that remain pending? No matter how biased the behaviour of the Technical Secretariat and regardless of how many facts about anti-Syrian manipulation and falsifications on the part of its leadership emerge, Syria still keeps the door open. Would Damascus be doing this had it anything to hide? We often hear urgent calls on Syria for more cooperation. In response to that, may we ask: what is meant by “more”? It seems that the only thing that would meet those requirements would be Syria’s acknowledging its guilt and publicly confessing to all deadly sins. Damascus is doing everything possible to confirm its commitment to the CWC.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“On the initial declaration, the Director General confirms that the twenty-third round of consultations between the Declaration Assessment Team and the Syrian side took place in autumn 2020. As a result, three outstanding issues were resolved. Is that not objective progress on this track? Why is it addressed only in a negative way? In addition, in December last year Syria submitted to the OPCW Director General its regular report on steps to implement resolution 2118 (2013), in which the Syrian national authority responsible for OPCW-related issues reiterated that they were ready to continue consultations and technical meetings with the OPCW Technical Secretariat in order to resolve all remaining outstanding issues.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“The facts show that even amid the current complicated internal military-political and epidemiological context, Syria is not evading cooperation with the OPCW. It faithfully accommodates all inspections, provides materials and demonstrates readiness for dialogue in every possible way. Even the current report of the Director General proves this, even though it could hardly be called pro-Syrian. From 8 to 13 November 2020, the Technical Secretariat carried out a seventh round of inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities, as the report mentions. What it does not mention is that the Syrian side once again demonstrated maximum openness and readiness to cooperate.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“Today our Western colleagues will again predictably refer to the monthly report of the OPCW Director General (S/2021/84), especially to the parts that address the initial declaration, to prove their allegations that Syria has been deliberately violating its obligations under the CWC almost since the day of its accession. Again, they will attempt to frighten us with a difficult to believe figure of 19 outstanding issues with regard to the initial declaration and present it as if it were Damascus’s fault, among other things. But that is manifest slyness and a shift in emphasis. I call on the Council, primarily its newly arrived members, which can develop their own independent vision of current developments, to look at this situation through the lens of objectivity.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“He evaded this for quite some time on various pretexts but finally came to brief the Council in December 2020 (S/2020/1202). But he failed to answer any of the questions regarding the numerous shortcomings and irregularities in the work of the OPCW Technical Secretariat on Syria’s chemical file that we had raised. But the problem will not vanish if you just close your eyes and pretend it is no longer there. We hope that Director General Arias will find an opportunity to answer our questions publicly. Council members have a list of those questions.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“Had that inspection taken place at Shayrat airbase at the time, before the trail got cold, it could have provided an exhaustive answer to all questions. However, the IIT failed not only to study those circumstances but even to mention them in the report. Instead, it readily accepted all evidence from biased, so-called open sources, false witnesses and non-governmental organizations with rather dubious reputations. Unlike our Western colleagues, we do not impose our conclusions on anyone but only call for an objective and truly professional investigation and frank dialogue between the Security Council and the OPCW. That is why for several months on end we struggled to have incumbent Director General Arias invited to a Security Council discussion on the Syrian chemical issue.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“The OPCW confirmed that the facility had been destroyed as per CWC provisions long before the events of 2017. Secondly, right after Western air forces bombed the base, claiming that it remained a chemical-weapons production facility, on 11 April 2017 Damascus requested the OPCW to dispatch experts to carry out an on-the-ground inspection without any time limits and with full access, inter alia to collect samples. The previous leadership of the OPCW Technical Secretariat had declined that request. Finally, Western delegations blocked our proposal in the OPCW Executive Council to formally authorize the Director General to inspect Shayrat. We see why that was done: to hinder any serious investigation into the context of the allegations they had made against the Syrian leadership.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“Those who criticize Damascus base their position on a knowingly issued impossible ultimatum that was enshrined in a July 2020 decision of the OPCW Executive Council. It demanded that Syria declare the chemical weapons that it does not have that were allegedly used in Al-Lataminah in March 2017. We have repeatedly expressed our criticism of the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) regarding that incident, to say nothing of the illegitimate nature of the IIT itself, which was established once a corresponding decision had been pushed through the Executive Council. But now I would like to highlight other facts that our Western colleagues prefer to keep silent about. First of all, Shayrat airbase was first declared as one of Syria’s chemical- weapons production facilities, and OPCW inspectors visited it several times.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“Basic common sense tells us that Damascus must be most interested in resolving issues with regard to its chemical file. However, in reality, the more concessions it makes, the more accusations it encounters. Members of the Council should clearly understand that this stance aimed at “squeezing Syria” can take away all its motivation to cooperate with the OPCW. The country is living under a sword of Damocles as represented by accusations of non-compliance with the CWC — this time in the form of outstanding issues with the initial declaration. Our Western colleagues are trying to enact this through a punitive decision of the Conference of the OPCW States parties that would incapacitate Syria at the organization.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“We thank Izumi Nakamitsu for her briefing. We have quite a few things to say regarding today’s topic, so I would kindly ask you to be patient and listen carefully. I think that you will find it interesting. Soon enough we may encounter a serious problem that risks imperilling the interaction between Damascus and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and inflicting greater damage on the reputation of the OPCW Technical Secretariat. I refer here to the situation concerning Syria’s so-called initial declaration. Let us turn to the facts. Syria is a responsible partner in the dialogue with the OPCW and the United Nations. It is a partner that despite unprecedented pressure seeks to do its best to reiterate its commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“An important element in stabilizing the situation is dialogue on ensuring the stable functioning of the oil sector, with the understanding that the country’s natural resources belong to all its citizens. It is necessary to put things in order in the financial and economic area, again guided by the principle of Libyan ownership of financial resources, including those in “frozen” accounts. In this regard, we express our concern at reports of Western, in particular European, companies enriching themselves at the expense of Libya’s assets they are responsible for safeguarding.”
2021-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/97 (2021) · source
“Taking into account the leading role of the United Nations in international efforts to promote a Libyan settlement, we sincerely wish success to the new Special Envoy, Ján Kubiš, who will need all of his rich diplomatic experience. We believe that his main task will not be to achieve formal planning or benchmarks, but to create an atmosphere of trust among the broadest range of Libyan political forces, especially since some of them, including LPDF participants, are critical of the current state of affairs. We believe there is a need to grant the Special Envoy a certain “free hand”, especially since the post of the Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya has been empty for almost a year.”
2021-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/97 (2021) · source
“We are following the progress in the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) closely. We would like to reiterate that any steps in various areas of settlement should not only be formally agreed upon, supported and approved by the Libyan parties, but should incorporate the implementation of the principle of inclusiveness. Only this principle can ensure the stability and effectiveness of the peace process. It is from this point of view that we will evaluate the results of the work of the LPDF and the 5+5 Joint Military Commission. Achievements on paper may look impressive, but the most important thing is to organically integrate the plans that have been developed into the highly complex reality on the ground in Libya.”
2021-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/97 (2021) · source
“This applies to the political, military, economic and other tracks. We welcome the fact that the period of armed confrontation gave way to negotiations. At the same time, the situation remains fragile. The process of implementing the terms of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, signed in Geneva on 23 October 2020, in the framework of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, is faltering. We call on all Libyan parties to show restraint and to uphold their obligations. In the interests of strengthening the dialogue, the military is pursuing discussions of mutual confidence-building measures, including the civilian matters. We welcome the steps taken to unblock air and road traffic between different regions of the country. These decisions will help to normalize the lives of ordinary citizens and provide humanitarian assistance.”
2021-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/97 (2021) · source
“We thank Stephanie Williams for the information on the situation in Libya. We consistently advocate a peaceful settlement of the Libyan crisis by political and diplomatic means. We are convinced that all international players who have influence on the various Libyan forces should urge them towards constructive interaction seeking compromise solutions to the compound problems. This is the approach we were guided by when visited in Moscow in November 2020 by the President of the House of Representatives of Libya, Aguila Saleh Issa, and in December 2020 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of National Accord, Mohamed Siala. We reaffirmed our position that the settlement process should be Libyan-owned and Libyan-led, and our high-ranking guests fully supported this.”
2021-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/97 (2021) · source
“That is one of many examples of destructive impact of illegal restrictive measures on humanitarian cooperation. I am pointing this out for our colleagues who justify their malevolent policies with the claim that their targeted sanctions have no impact on humanitarian issues. Pandemics and natural disasters put matters in perspective and prove that restrictive measures have become a major challenge to the sustainable recovery of States. This issue deserves the closest attention of, and a response by, the international community.”
2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/77 (2021) · source
“A short time ago Russia was intending to provide humanitarian financial assistance to the countries affected by tropical storms Eta and Iota. The money was intended to be spent on water filters to curb the spread of disease. However, the United States-based Citibank, which acted as mediator in the transaction, refused to transfer funds to the Central American Parliament. After two weeks of inquiries into the source of the funds, which was the Russian Foreign Ministry, Citibank returned the money. To date, we have received no explanation either from the bank or from the United States Department of State as to the reasons for the return of those funds. This refusal of our contribution inflicted harm on ordinary people who were merely waiting for urgent humanitarian aid.”
2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/77 (2021) · source
“What the report really lacks is information on the social safety net and the security of families with children where the breadwinner has fallen victim to conflict or attack. In post-conflict situations, single-parent families constitute a vulnerable group. Thirdly, we believe the report gives insufficient information on the resolution of disputes between the Government and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional. Lasting peace in Colombia is impossible without the participation of all key stakeholders. Russia is ready to offer its support for the Colombian peace process in order to ensure that peace is sustainable and irreversible. In conclusion, let me touch upon an important regional issue, or, rather, a problem of global proportions.”
2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/77 (2021) · source
“We expect that Bogotá will take the criticism contained in the Secretary-General’s report in a constructive manner and forcefully start to fulfil peacebuilding tasks. I would now like to make a couple more points on the report. First, we would very much like to see in future reports a dynamic headcount of illegal armed formations such as dissidents from the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and members of the Ejército de Liberación Nacional. Those figures could be indicative of the level of public trust in the Government’s efforts. Secondly, we are surprised that the report contains separate statistics on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex representatives. This group is not considered vulnerable, so the inclusion of this kind of specifics in the report provides no added value.”
2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/77 (2021) · source
“It is not seldom that the Government ignores Commission meetings, whereas that body is crucial, as it provides a platform for direct dialogue between the Colombian sides. Security Council members know from the cases of Syria, Ukraine and Venezuela that direct dialogue between sides is an indispensable part of any lasting settlement. The final peace agreement is losing momentum. Against this backdrop, we are concerned at attempts to interpret and substitute provisions of the document with the “peace with legality” programme. Programme implementation at the local level sometimes looks like an attempt to revise the final agreement. All of the foregoing takes Colombia further from its strategic goal of lasting national reconciliation.”
2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/77 (2021) · source
“It is no coincidence that the report becomes more alarming when it touches upon those returning to the ranks of illegal armed formations. Other priority tracks, such as comprehensive land reform, electoral changes, political and social reintegration of peace process participants, and drugs also require urgent progress. Statistical data indicates that in 2020 drug production volume remains unchanged, implying that in fact there has been zero progress. State agencies that are responsible for the peace process, including the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, still lack financing. Assessments indicating low efficiency of the Commission for the Follow- up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement raise particular concern.”
2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/77 (2021) · source