YouSaid · the spoken record

Vassily Nebenzia

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656
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2020-04-16
most recent
2021-05-26
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80
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un-security-council

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  1. It means that progress on all tracks is insufficient. That conclusion is confirmed by the public discontent in Colombia that swept through the streets in recent months. Thousands of people from the indigenous population and participants of the peace process went on march, seeking governmental protection because it is the Government that bears the main responsibility for the security of the population. According to the data provided by reputable non-governmental organization Indepaz, a systemic intimidation and extermination campaign was launched against the participants of the peace process. The position of civic activists and public leaders is no less gruesome. As a result, part of the population has to take up arms again.

    2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/77 (2021) · source

  2. We thank the Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, Carlos Ruiz Massieu, for presenting the report on the situation in the country. We are also glad to welcome Ms. Claudia Blum de Barberi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia, to this meeting. The Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2020/1301) adequately reflects the developments in Colombia. It raises great concern, as we clearly see gaps in the Government’s implementation of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace. This historic document, supported by the General Assembly and the Security Council, is, in itself, a road map for settlement, which means that it must be strictly upheld. However, the five recommendations that are presented in the report address almost every aspect of the peace process.

    2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/77 (2021) · source

  3. Although Syria was not put on the list by the State Department, the sanctions applied against Syria are no less harmful than the consequences, for Yemen, of the State Department’s decision.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  4. When we have humanitarian Syria on the agenda, we speak about humanitarian Syria. We do not mix the two, as was often the case in our previous meetings, when political and humanitarian files on Syria became practically indistinguishable, according to the statements of some of our colleagues. Now, on what Mr. Lowcock commented, I would not call it an answer to a question that I graciously asked him yesterday. If he is unable to comment more in depth on the strategic framework for Syria, then I suggest that we invite another briefer who is closer to that issue to our next meeting on Syria. On the comparison between Yemen and Syria, I do not agree that the two situations differ.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  5. However, I would like to remind him that he speaks English and does not need interpretation. If I had spoken in English, I could have condensed my statement to perhaps three minutes. But I have respect for the interpreters, who have to cope with the speed of my statement and interpret it. Still, I would like to apologize to him for stealing his precious time. Judging by the fact that he left, he was indeed in a hurry. However, it seems to us that it was not the only reason. It looks like certain parts of our statement were not particularly pleasing to the representative of the United Kingdom. On the idea of separating political and humanitarian meetings on Syria, as far as we know, it is already in the February programme. Let us strike an understanding, then. When we have political Syria on the agenda, we speak about political Syria.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  6. We recall the internal document “Parameters and Principles of United Nations Assistance to Syria,” which contained an unacceptable thesis about the conditions of assistance, and proceed from the assumption that, in reality, the United Nations remains impartial and independent. This document also mentions the work of the Inter-Agency Task Force. We would like to ask Mr. Lowcock about its parameters and progress, as we understand that OCHA is a member of it. Second statement by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Vassily Nebenzia First of all, I would like to start by saying that I presumably should appreciate the lesson on manners that the representative of the United Kingdom gave me. I also checked the timing of his intervention; it was five minutes and 57 seconds.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  7. Furthermore, in the context of coordinating humanitarian efforts and promoting development — what some call nexus, although that term is not entirely clear to us — and given the growing trend for Syrian refugees to return to their homes, the issue of rebuilding the social infrastructure in Syria — hospitals, schools and housing — is becoming increasingly urgent. In that regard, we once again wish to underscore that imposing political conditions for the United Nations work in the interest of Syria’s development is unacceptable. We should be guided by the real needs of the Syrians and the priorities of the Government, as set out in the agreed parameters for United Nations assistance.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  8. Should we only talk about this in the context of Syria if people start starving on the same scale as in Yemen? This is a selective approach to country-specific files. We are counting on Mr. Lowcock to be as principled on Syria as he was on Yemen. Finally, I would like to ask another question, once again to Mr. Lowcock. The humanitarian plan for Syria and the country-specific United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework expired in December 2020. It would be interesting to learn about the progress in preparing new versions of those documents.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  9. During the 14 January Council meeting on Yemen (see S/2021/56), he emotionally stated that having humanitarian exemptions would not solve the problem of supplies to that country and that, even if they did allow goods to be delivered, the prices would be severely inflated. He said it raised serious concerns in the context of Yemen because it severely limits the ability of humanitarian workers on the ground. We appreciate his frankness and courage in that regard. But what is the difference between the situation in Yemen and the situation in Syria? The same dysfunctional humanitarian exemptions, the same blocking of bank accounts, the same fear of suppliers falling under secondary sanctions and the same rising fuel prices amid increasing shortages.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  10. In this situation, is it right to blame Damascus, which is experiencing problems in feeding its citizens because it lacks access to its national resources? As much as some colleagues might like to see Russian or Syrian propaganda in sanctions-related topics, this issue is increasingly raised at the United Nations. In addition to the Special Rapporteur’s materials and the Secretary-General’s calls in December, the WHO Regional Director for the Eastern Mediterranean, Ahmed Al-Mandari, openly admitted during a briefing that sanctions are negatively affecting all aspects of life in Syria, including health care. We cannot help but ask Mr. Lowcock a question in that regard.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  11. Colleagues will be reminded that the occupied north-east of Syria is rich not only in hydrocarbons, but revenues from their sale go not into Syrian treasury but elsewhere. In the meantime, Syria is suffering environmental damage for which no one wants to be held accountable, and the United Nations simply keeps silent. The occupying Power is responsible. The north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic, which used to be the breadbasket not only of the country but also of the region, now is also cut off from the national economy. While the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations reports a significant increase in crop production in 2020— an average of 77 per cent as compared to the previous five years — the rate of starvation in the country is increasing.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  12. The sanctions pressure that is exerted on Syria significantly limits the ability of the inhabitants of Government-controlled territories to protect themselves from the pandemic. The reasons are the same: blacklists of sanctions violators discourage potential contractors. This vicious circle that ordinary Syrians have been trapped in needs to be broken as soon as possible. It is unacceptable to label the Government and accuse it of inaction while completely cutting the country off from the outside world, business contacts and financial transactions. Syria has a legitimate right to self-sufficient sustainable development, and Damascus is doing all it can in the current complicated circumstances to keep its economy afloat.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  13. The Syrian Central Bank’s exclusion from international payment systems and the potential "dual use" of humanitarian goods prevent the Government of Syria from purchasing not only polymerase chain reaction tests, personal protective equipment and syringes but — absurd as it may sound — even toothpaste. Restrictions on the use of online platforms that cannot be accessed from Syrian territory also contribute to Syria’s difficulties. For example, in the absence of sufficient medical staff, remote medical consultations for patients, telemedicine, which the modern world prides itself on, are hampered. Schoolchildren are deprived of the opportunity to study online from home. In the same context, it is worth highlighting the right of Syrians to access the coronavirus vaccine.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  14. During the Security Council meeting in December (see S/2020/1257), we drew attention to the anti-sanctions guidelines for the period of the coronavirus disease pandemic, which were issued on 10 December by Alena Douhan, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights. This is essentially a summary of all the problems faced by humanitarian workers in Syria. It was dialogue with them that provided the basis for the preparation of this document. I will cite only the following as one of the most vivid examples of the difficulties faced by ordinary Syrians.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  15. Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity must be restored. We call on our Irish and Norwegian colleagues, as well as on all other members of the Council, to show their impartiality and look at the situation from that perspective. Criticism of our position on the cross-border mechanism sounds blasphemous in a situation where supplies to Idlib from Damascus are being delayed due to far-fetched and inexplicable pretexts. I cannot fail to mention the topic of unlawful unilateral restrictive measures — simply put, sanctions.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  16. The flywheel of passion and emotion will spin exponentially faster, but predictably in a one-sided manner. Once again, the majority will keep silent about the lack of progress in aid deliveries from Damascus to Idlib. Our position is very clear: the cross-border mechanism, created as a provisional tool in 2014, is becoming outdated and continues to undermine Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Syrian Arab Republic is no longer the terrorism-torn country it was when the mechanism was first launched. It is being rebuilt, and the Government has facilitated the delivery of aid from inside the country in every way possible. Suffice it to mention the World Health Organization’s (WHO) humanitarian aid to the north-east alone — more than 90 per cent is distributed to territories not controlled by Damascus.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  17. We ask this question over and over again because we do not understand the meaning of the declaration of commitment on compliance with international humanitarian law and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance signed by armed groups — terrorists, in fact, who have been classified as such by the Security Council — under the auspices of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). We have not heard anything from OCHA on that document. We would like to finally hear from them. We would like to address the new co-penholder on the Syrian humanitarian dossier — the delegations of Ireland and Norway. They should not take the example of their predecessors and focus only on the cross-border mechanism. It will not be long before we are once again faced with the question of whether it needs to be extended.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  18. We have repeatedly said that the work of the mechanism raises many questions because of its lack of transparency and accountability — all the more so because the share of United Nations humanitarian shipments through it within the total volume of humanitarian aid from Turkey is extremely small. Against that background, of course, it is discouraging that, for almost a year now, there has not been any movement in the humanitarian convoy to Idlib across the contact lines. Mr. Lowcock has said that the parties cannot agree on this convoy. I want to correct him. Damascus has fulfilled its obligation to approve the mission, having issued an authorization back in April. The way to the enclave is open. What is stopping the so-called “other parties” from cooperating?

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  19. There has been an increase in Islamic State in Iraq and the Shams cells in the Euphrates region as well as in clashes between Kurdish units and tribes and among various Kurdish forces. We also condemn Israeli air strikes on territory, which threaten the stability of the entire region. It is disappointing that Western countries have imposed sanctions against Syrian Foreign Minister Fayssal Mekdad. That action demonstrates the West’s unwillingness to seek a diplomatic solution to the Syrian crisis, which it instigated, to a large extent. With regard to the humanitarian component of the Syrian file in the Security Council, let us focus on the key aspects that require an urgent solution. The countdown in the operation of the cross-border mechanism for the provision of humanitarian assistance to Syria is accelerating.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  20. We have consistently advocated non-interference in the political process led and conducted by the Syrians themselves, as explicitly set out in resolution 2254 (2015). It is all the more inadmissible to prejudge the outcome or to impose artificial deadlines. Incidentally, resolution 2254 (2015) is silent on and has no bearing on the upcoming elections. Despite the stabilization of the situation in Syria, risks of escalation remain. We note the high degree of tension, in particular in areas not controlled by the Government — Idlib, the Euphrates region and Al-Tanf. The terrorists of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham continue to shell population centres and Syrian army positions and continue the practice of harassing civilians, carrying out executions and illegally enriching themselves.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  21. We are grateful to Geir Pedersen and Mark Lowcock for their information on the situation in Syria. We welcome the fact that, despite the coronavirus factor and the known restrictions in that regard, the fifth session of the drafting committee of the Constitutional Committee has already been scheduled for 25 January in Geneva. That confirms the resolve of the Government delegation to stabilize and resolve the situation in the country, despite the accusations against it and economic, political and military pressure from Western States. We intend to support Mr. Pedersen’s mediation efforts and, together with our colleagues in the Astana format, to encourage the delegations from Damascus and the opposition to work constructively.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  22. Before turning to the topic of our meeting, I would like to pay tribute to United States Permanent Representative Kelly Craft, who today is attending her last Security Council meeting in that capacity. I would like to thank her for her cooperation and for the friendly spirit she has shown despite our disagreements in the Council, including on today’s topic. I am sure Mrs. Craft has left her mark on the history of the Security Council and has contributed to its work. I ask her to please accept our sincere wishes for all the best and every success in all her future endeavours. We hope that she will not forget her Security Council friends. I will now turn to what Permanent Representative Craft referred to in her statement as the Russian version of the Syrian story.

    2021-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/75 (2021) · source

  23. To that end, we will make use of the mechanism of the Russian-Arab Cooperation Forum, the fifth ministerial session of which was held in Moscow in 2019. The action plan adopted at its conclusion and the joint communiqué confirm the proximity and convergence of positions on a wide range of issues. We look forward to continuing dialogue in that format as the epidemiological situation improves. In that context, we confirm our readiness to discuss common efforts to combat the coronavirus. We underscore the spirit of strengthening Russian-Arab friendship and cooperation. We will also promote coordination between the United Nations and the League of Arab States.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  24. Russia’s concept of collective security in the Persian Gulf is an invitation to dialogue, in which the League can play an important role. It is an invitation to peace, not war. On Martin Luther King Jr. Day, I would like to follow the example of our American colleagues by citing a different quote from Mr. King, which they seem to avoid: “A nation that continues year after year to spend more money on military defence than on programmes of social uplift is approaching spiritual death.” There is a need to stop the rattling of arms and provoking an arms race in the region. Russia will continue to strengthen its partnership with the League of Arab States on topical international and regional issues.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  25. We echo the call to de-escalate the situation, as confirmed by the October Council video- teleconference meeting on this topic (see S/2020/1037), presided over by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. We appreciate Mr. Aboul Gheit’s statement at that event, unequivocally confirming the League’s desire to seek a diplomatic solution to the existing contradictions. We confirm our readiness — in our national capacity and collectively — to assist in any way in the process of normalizing the situation, including through cooperation between the League of Arab States and the United Nations. We have put forward an initiative to ensure regional security by renouncing confrontational approaches and promoting a constructive, unifying agenda.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  26. Given the potential of the League of Arab States in spreading an interfaith and inter-ethnic culture of peace and combating radical and extremist ideologies, it is important to hold a dialogue between the United Nations and the League on the situation of Christians and other religious and ethnic minorities affected by conflict. It is in the interests of all States in the Arab region and beyond to abandon mutual recriminations and suspicions, much less the use of unilateral sanctions, pressure and provocations. Unfortunately, tensions in the Persian Gulf region, which have a destabilizing effect on international relations as a whole, have not abated and are largely being artificially exacerbated by the United States Administration.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  27. We are interested in a strong, united and effective League of Arab States that will enhance the profile of Arab countries in preventing and unblocking conflicts. We believe that attempts to prevent rapprochement among Arab States by external players pursuing geopolitical interests are immoral and unacceptable. We believe that cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations should be based on the recognition of the leading role of regional actors in determining ways of settling conflicts in that part of the globe.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  28. This situation calls for enhanced cooperation between the United Nations and the League in countering new challenges, peacekeeping and jointly preventing the escalation of conflicts in the region. That would contribute to resolving existing problems and disputes peacefully, without external interference, while respecting the interests of all parties involved and on the basis of international law. To that end, the League of Arab States is increasingly needed as a mechanism for multilateral dialogue among regional players. We consider it important to activate coordination between the League of Arab States and United Nations Special Envoys in dealing with crises in the Arab region in order to better understand the nature of the problems encountered and to find possible joint measures to address them.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  29. We hope that the recent normalization of relations between a number of Arab countries and Israel will not lead to further violations of the rights of the Palestinian people and will, instead, promote a just settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of internationally agreed parameters. All these pain points provoke a strengthening of radical sentiments and an increase in manifestations of extremism. The task of developing collective measures to combat the terrorist threat is becoming increasingly urgent. The coronavirus pandemic has compounded the already difficult socioeconomic and humanitarian situation in a number of Arab countries.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  30. In order to enhance their interaction, the United Nations Liaison Office to the League of Arab States was opened at the League’s headquarters in Cairo, in 2019. We advocate the effective use of that channel. Unfortunately, the situation in the Middle East and North Africa remains difficult, owing, in part, to unresolved acute crises often triggered by external interference. The conflicts in Syria, Libya and Yemen remain volatile, there is escalation in Western Sahara and efforts are needed to strengthen stability in Iraq. Urgent steps are needed to break the deadlock on the central issue for the region — the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  31. We welcome your participation in today’s debate in your capacity as President of the Security Council. We also note the participation via video-teleconference of Mr. Aboul Gheit, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States. We thank him and Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for their information and assessments. We also welcome the participation of Mr. Anwar bin Mohammed Gargash, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates. Russia has consistently advocated stepping up cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States. The two organizations are of the same age and were both established to ensure peace and security on a global and regional scale.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  32. We would like to stress that a political settlement in Yemen would make a big contribution to de-escalation in the entire subregion. We again invite our colleagues to pay attention to the need for comprehensive stabilization in the Persian Gulf area, in particular on the basis of resolution 598 (1987) and national initiatives, including the Russian collective security concept.

    2021-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/56 (2021) · source

  33. Yemen is generally recognized to be home to the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. Therefore, humanitarian assistance to the country must be a priority of our joint work. In that context, we call on donors, including those from the region to enhance the required financial support for United Nations programmes providing basic assistance, including those ensuring food security for the population, access to clean water and medical services, which are so needed amid the coronavirus disease pandemic. We recall that humanitarian assistance to Yemen from abroad must be distributed on a non-discriminatory basis among the entire population of the country. We once again call for rejecting unilateral steps that hinder the work of humanitarians and negatively impact the international efforts to settle the Yemeni conflict.

    2021-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/56 (2021) · source

  34. As for the remaining issues, Yemenis will be able to solve them in the course of negotiations. In that regard, we welcome the formation of a new coalition Government of the Republic of Yemen, the first one to include representatives from Yemen’s southern regions. This important step towards the practical implementation of the Riyadh agreement was negotiated at the talks involving official Yemeni authorities and the leadership of Southern Transitional Council that took place in Riyadh. In that regard, we commend the role of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which greatly contributed to elaborating those agreements. We count on the continued implementation of the Riyadh agreement, as that document is aimed at stabilizing and normalizing the situation in the south of the country.

    2021-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/56 (2021) · source

  35. We again reiterate our full support for Special Representative Griffiths as he works to establish a country-wide ceasefire, develop confidence-building measures for the prompt launching of the negotiations of the consolidated delegation of official Yemeni authorities and the Southern Transition Council, with the leadership of Ansar Allah, to address issues concerning Yemen’s future political structure. On our part, during our contacts with interested stakeholders, we will continue supporting United Nations mediation in Yemen. We are convinced that the Security Council should not take sides, but rather give a hand to the Special Envoy and help the sides terminate the armed conflict — for instance, by creating a constructive environment for inter-State relations in the region.

    2021-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/56 (2021) · source

  36. Current developments serve to underscore the need for a prompt and comprehensive political settlement, inter alia in the interest of countering the terrorist threat. Once again, we reiterate our standing and unchanging position in favour of putting an end to armed action in Yemen and starting inclusive negotiations. We believe that numerous contradictions that exist in Yemen, including the issue of its political and territorial structure, can be resolved only through inclusive dialogue, which should take into account the legitimate interests of all leading political forces in the country.

    2021-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/56 (2021) · source

  37. We believe that making such allegations without having conclusive evidence to support them can only complicate the search for a peaceful settlement and put the sides on a confrontational track. The decision by the United States to designate Ansar Allah as a terrorist organization may also have negative consequences for the peace process in Yemen. It may both exacerbate the humanitarian situation in the country and undermine United Nations efforts to launch negotiations between the opposing sides. Since the decision has not yet come into force, we call on the United States to reconsider it. We stand at a crucial juncture. If we make irreparable mistakes now, it will jeopardize an eventual settlement and reverse many years of efforts on this track.

    2021-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/56 (2021) · source

  38. This Security Council meeting is taking place against the backdrop of a dangerous escalation in Yemen. We strongly condemn the attack on the international airport in Aden. That criminal act, for which no one has yet claimed responsibility, resulted in a large number of deaths. We convey our heartfelt condolences to the families and friends of the victims, and we support conducting an objective investigation into the attack. To date, the perpetrators have not been identified and experts, including in Yemen, have put forward various versions. At the same time, we hear accusations against one side that sound like a final verdict. Theories such as “highly likely” are no longer acceptable to us and are unconvincing.

    2021-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/56 (2021) · source

  39. We welcome the participation of the Foreign Minister of Yemen in this video- teleconference. We thank Special Envoy Martin Griffiths for his update on the efforts being made to bring the positions of the parties to the Yemeni conflict closer together and plans to resume the negotiation process. We understand that there is little reason for optimism at this time. However, we call on the Special Envoy not to lose hope and to continue his efforts, and we will support and assist him. We also thank Under-Secretary-General Mark Lowcock and the Executive Director of the World Food Programme, David Beasley, for their clear-sighted, impassioned, but, unfortunately, disheartening briefings on the humanitarian situation in Yemen. I believe the reason for that is clear.

    2021-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/56 (2021) · source

  40. We hope that these efforts will result in a further improvement in the effectiveness of United Nations counter-terrorism efforts, including through good-faith cooperation among States, as enshrined in resolution 1373 (2001).

    2021-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/48 (2021) · source

  41. The use of this pretext in such an unscrupulous way is unacceptable. The effectiveness of the work of the United Nations largely depends on whether its organs adhere to their mandates. At the moment, the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies sometimes pay too much attention to the human rights aspects of counter-terrorism, which is the focus of other parts of the Organization, and this to the detriment of their primary mission to ensure security. We are pleased to note Tunisia’s contribution to the work of the CTC as its Chair. The year 2021 promises to be a busy one in terms of activities that are directly related to resolution 1373 (2001). We will have to update the tools for evaluating States, launch the new format of hybrid monitoring visits and, at the end of the year, renew the CTC’s mandate.

    2021-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/48 (2021) · source

  42. The risk also remains that new hotbeds of instability could be created, chiefly owing to the actions of foreign terrorist fighters who are returning to their countries of origin from combat zones. The implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) today is just as relevant as it was 20 years ago. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Al-Qaida and related structures are inspiring attacks in countries that were until recently considered islands of security. The situation is compounded by the fact that those who commission or S/2021/48 carry out terrorist attacks can be physically located on a different continent. And even given this level of uncertainty, some States continue to neglect their obligations to prosecute terrorists and refuse to cooperate with foreign partners. Sometimes this is done with reference to human rights.

    2021-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/48 (2021) · source

  43. At present, projects that are aimed at fostering border security to combat foreign terrorist fighters, countering the use of the Internet by terrorists and shutting down the illicit supply of arms are particularly important. Our country supports those efforts, including in financial terms. Unfortunately, the threat of terrorism is not abating but remains one of the major challenges of the modern age. The global community must pool its efforts to respond to that challenge, deploying much greater efforts than those that are used to establish the relations among countries. Even during the global pandemic, terrorists are continuing to take advantage of the situation, accusing States of failing to deal successfully with the crisis.

    2021-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/48 (2021) · source

  44. The monitoring and impartial evaluation of States remain the primary tasks of CTED experts; no other body of the United Nations system has, or could have, the same mandate. The United Nations has established a contemporary counter-terrorism architecture, which is coordinated by UNOCT. Russia is in favour of the steady strengthening of cooperation between UNOCT and CTED, with a focus on supporting the implementation of the Security Council’s counter-terrorism decisions, including resolution 1373 (2001). It is also important that technical assistance for interested States be provided on the basis of Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) recommendations and, it goes without saying, with the consent of the host country.

    2021-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/48 (2021) · source

  45. The counter-terrorism priorities set out in resolution 1373 (2001) were built upon independently in subsequent Council decisions. As the terrorist threat evolved, we steadily strengthened the mechanisms for the criminal prosecution of terrorists and for combating the financing of terrorism and the spread of violent propaganda. To that end, bilateral and multilateral channels of cooperation have been established, and the exchange of information has been streamlined. Without a doubt, the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate (CTED) was a turning point. It was given responsibility for oversight of the implementation of the relevant Council decisions.

    2021-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/48 (2021) · source

  46. At the outset, let me thank you, Mr. President, for the initiative of convening this high-level meeting on issues related to the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001), on countering terrorism, which turns 20 this year. We are grateful to Tunisia for having prepared a balanced presidential statement (S/PRST/2021/1) that once again confirms the relevance of the resolution and the Council’s counter-terrorist measures, which were based on it. We welcome the Head of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), Vladimir Voronkov, and the Head of the Executive Directorate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, Michèle Coninsx. Russia deeply appreciates their contributions to the practical implementation of Security Council decisions and to today’s discussion. We also welcome Ms. Fatima Akilu.

    2021-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/48 (2021) · source

  47. We consider it important to more actively use the potential of regional organizations to resolve conflicts on the continent, given their better understanding of the situation in their area of responsibility.

    2021-01-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/24 (2021) · source

  48. Some of our partners, however, choose to either ignore or downplay the obvious harm of those illegal measures. We absolutely agree with the Secretary- General, who calls for the lifting of unilateral sanctions, as prescribed by the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. States bear the primary responsibility for responding to security challenges within their territories. The role of the United Nations and the international community should be to provide them with targeted support in accordance with their national priorities. We wholeheartedly echo the Secretary-General’s call to strengthen cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union. The challenges facing the African continent dictate the need to combine efforts and leverage the comparative advantages of both organizations.

    2021-01-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/24 (2021) · source

  49. However, we are against automatically linking them and positioning them as universal factors causing conflict. We are convinced that the efforts of the international community in that area should not be based on arbitrary interpretations of so-called indicators of potential crises. That would lead to potential abuse. Crisis prevention and settlement, as well as peacebuilding, should not be used as pretexts for external interference, including the overthrowing of a legitimate Government and exerting pressure on it. But what is undoubtedly a factor that is aggravating those already fragile situations is the imposition of unilateral coercive measures and illegal sanctions that bypass the Security Council. We talk about that constantly, and we are not alone in doing so.

    2021-01-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/24 (2021) · source

  50. Environmental issues, however, should be considered on a case-by-case basis, with due account taken of the specifics of each situation. There should be no illegal exploitation of Africa’s natural resources, inter alia by external players that exploit difficult social and economic situations to exert pressure on Governments in order to achieve their own aims and goals. The sustainable management of natural resources, including forests, water and the soil, and the provision of the relevant assistance to vulnerable States can help to ensure that environmental factors do not lead to social instability. We do not deny that there are certain links between development, climate and human rights and threats to peace and security in some countries.

    2021-01-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/24 (2021) · source