YouSaid · the spoken record

Vassily Nebenzia

lines on the record: 656
first: 2020-04-16
most recent: 2021-05-26
sittings or episodes: 80
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“We welcome the appointment of Mr. Ján Kubiš as the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Libya and the Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. We thank Mr. Kubiš for briefing us on the situation in Libya. This March not only marks the tenth anniversary of the Syrian crisis, as our Western colleagues were so emphatically recalling just some days ago (see S/2021/265). There is another sad and no less important date to be marked this month that they would rather not remember.”
2021-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/292 (2021) · source
“It is only they who can guide the peace process in Afghanistan. No scenarios must be imposed from the outside. As for the regional and international partners, they should be creating the environment necessary for negotiations and providing lasting political and economic support.”
2021-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/291 (2021) · source
“Afghanistan cannot counter these challenges without the support and assistance of the regional States, above all its neighbours, and the global community. Therefore, it is fundamentally important to engage the full potential of the relevant mechanisms, first and foremost the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the renewed SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group, as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization. We will continue to provide help and assistance to our Afghan friends, including in the framework of the Paris Pact Initiative. Let me conclude by saying that Russia has been Afghanistan’s friend and partner for many years, and we stand for establishing the long-awaited sustainable peace in that long-suffering land. To that end, the Afghans will need to work on a unifying platform.”
2021-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/291 (2021) · source
“The situation with the drug threat is also far from optimistic. Despite certain counter-measures taken by Kabul, the drug industry is flourishing and re-energizing terrorism. It remains a serious challenge for Afghanistan, the region and the entire world. Against this backdrop, we are disappointed by the delay by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in the publication of its regular report. This topic is insufficiently covered in the Secretary-General’s report as well. Attempts to silence or underestimate the presence and scale of terrorist and drug threats in Afghanistan are unacceptable. We appreciate the fact that Special Representative Lyons highlighted the topic of drug threat in her briefing today.”
2021-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/291 (2021) · source
“New initiatives should be thoroughly considered and issues relating to their added value, agenda and modalities clarified. We have closely studied the recent report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations activities and efforts in Afghanistan (S/2021/252). First and foremost, we share its assessments about the unprecedented level of violence and its toll on civilians, women and children. Unfortunately, throughout the years of war deadly terrorist attacks have become a sad routine for the Afghan people. Many of the large-scale attacks are the responsibility of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). We note that, despite numerous losses, the Afghan wing of ISIL has not abandoned its regional plans and seeks to enhance capacity and spread its terrorist activity to neighbouring Central Asia.”
2021-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/291 (2021) · source
“We expect these results to be taken on board by the Afghans as they discuss substantive issues on their agenda in order to achieve the long-awaited progress in the intra-Afghan talks. Preserving regional consensus on peaceful settlement in Afghanistan remains a priority task. We are in favour of combining the efforts of the extended troika and the Moscow format, which includes Afghanistan, all its neighbours and the United States. It was the Moscow format that in November 2018 first brought together the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban at one negotiating table. It is now vital to seize every opportunity to achieve political solutions and compromises in the interests of national reconciliation. We proceed from the need to consolidate all international and regional efforts.”
2021-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/291 (2021) · source
“On 18 March, Moscow hosted a regular meeting of the extended troika, comprising representatives of Russia, China, the United States and Pakistan. The event was attended by representatives of the Afghan sides: the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan’s High Council for National Reconciliation, prominent Afghan political figures and leaders of the Taliban movement, as well as of Qatar and Turkey as guests of honour. Since the troika was established in 2019, that mechanism has played a meaningful, positive role. Last week, it once again proved relevant and highly in demand, as well as capable of promoting peaceful settlement. The negotiations resulted in the extended troika’s adopting a statement that put matters into perspective and called on the sides to act flexibly.”
2021-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/291 (2021) · source
“We thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Ms. Deborah Lyons, for her thoughts and assessments of the situation in Afghanistan. We are firmly convinced that UNAMA plays an important role in coordinating international assistance to that country. We also thank the Chairperson of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Ms. Shaharzad Akbar, for her briefing. We welcome the participation in this meeting of the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations, Ambassador Adela Raz. Russia has consistently supported the Afghan-led peace process. We have done much to promote national reconciliation and direct intra-Afghan dialogue.”
2021-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/291 (2021) · source
“We believe that the non-discriminatory distribution of humanitarian assistance among the entire population of the country is the key factor that can ease the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen. We also believe that mutually acceptable and non-politicized solutions can be found to solve the problem of the FSO SAFER tanker. In conclusion, we recall that the launch of a confidence- and security- building process in the Persian Gulf, and eventually in the entire Middle East, would contribute to resolving crises, including the Yemeni conflict. In this regard, we once again call on our colleagues to pay attention to the fact that the entire subregion needs comprehensive stabilization, based, among other things, on resolution 598 (1987) and the Russian collective security concept.”
2021-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/266 (2021) · source
“Humanitarian assistance to Yemen should be a priority track of our joint work. To counter the hunger that is spreading throughout the country, and diseases, including the coronavirus disease, Yemen needs the broad support of the international community. We take note of the international pledging event on Yemen held on 1 March, which resulted in donors assuming an obligation to cover about 50 per cent of the budget of Yemen’s humanitarian response plan. The United Nations leadership believes this result to be insufficient to reverse the negative humanitarian trend in Yemen. We call on donors, including those from the region, to enhance their financial support for United Nations programmes providing basic assistance, including those ensuring the population’s food security and access to clean water and medical services.”
2021-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/266 (2021) · source
“We also advocate for practical implementation of the Riyadh provisions addressing the launch of negotiations of a consolidated delegation of official Yemeni authorities and the Southern Transitional Council with the leadership of the Houthi Ansar Allah movement on issues of the future political structure of Yemen. Some encouraging signals have recently arrived from Washington. I am referring to the United States decision to reconsider having the Ansar Allah Houthi movement on the list of foreign terrorist organizations, and the proclaimed commitment of the new United States Administration to join efforts aimed at bringing the conflict to an end promptly. Should this constructive approach be backed up by corresponding practical steps, the prospects for restoring long-awaited peace and stability to Yemen will increase significantly.”
2021-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/266 (2021) · source
“We intend to further support relevant efforts taken by the Special Envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths. We emphasize that all sides to the conflict must uphold international humanitarian law. Any combat operations that can damage civilian infrastructure or claim lives of civilians are unacceptable. A new coalition Government was formed on 18 December 2020 — wherein representatives of the southern regions for the first time received a considerable share of ministerial posts — to support the implementation of the Riyadh agreement of 5 November 2019, which was designed to normalize the situation in the south of Yemen. We hope that the implementation of the aforementioned agreements will enhance public security and allow efforts to focus on urgent socioeconomic and humanitarian problems in this part of Yemen.”
2021-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/266 (2021) · source
“We thank Special Envoy Martin Griffiths and Under-Secretary-General Mark Lowcock for the briefings on the political and humanitarian situations in Yemen. We also closely followed the briefing by Ms. Shawky. This video-teleconference convenes against the backdrop of a dangerous escalation in Yemen, where an almost-six-year long deadly conflict has put two thirds of the population into dire need of urgent humanitarian assistance. We have to state with regret that the logic of armed confrontation still prevails. We are particularly concerned over the situation around Ma’rib, where deadly clashes resumed in early February. Fighting is also reported in other Yemeni governorates. We call on the sides to stop fighting and solve the problem by political and diplomatic means.”
2021-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/266 (2021) · source
“By the way, United Nations humanitarians on the ground in Syria are also rather critical about that situation. Syria’s return to the Arab family, in particular to the League of Arab States, would greatly contribute to the country’s normalization. We welcome the readiness of Damascus and the Arab States to move in that direction, and we call on others to not impede this emerging normalization between Damascus and the Arab world. We believe that the main prerequisite for a peaceful settlement is putting an end to the foreign occupation and armed action that is not coordinated with the legitimate Government, in addition to respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Syria, as envisaged by resolution 2254 (2015).”
2021-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/265 (2021) · source
“We are convinced that such an approach would facilitate the return of Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes. Today, surveys show that most of them still harbour hope of returning to their homeland. Despite all the hardships that Syrians are living through, the political opponents of Damascus decided to take the country through the means of starvation. Once their forceful attempts failed to overthrow the unwanted Government, they switched to financial and economic pressure. Syria has faced sanctions that put immense constraints on the country’s normal life. In fact, ordinary Syrians are suffering a collective punishment. At the same time, West-proclaimed humanitarian exemptions from sanctions regimes simply do not work — a fact that has led to further deterioration of the socioeconomic situation in Syria.”
2021-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/265 (2021) · source
“At the same time, we proceed from the understanding that intra-Syrian negotiations constitute an internal affair of the Syrian people, and that such negotiations do not allow for any artificial deadlines or external pressure. We stand ready to further support Special Envoy Pedersen in establishing constructive contacts among the parties to the Syrian conflict. The Syrian authorities need the support of the international community today as never before. In his recent statement, the Secretary-General said that 60 per cent of Syria’s population is at risk of hunger. The people are in need of collective international assistance, and this problem cannot be solved by merely distributing food. We must help ordinary Syrians restore peaceful life by carrying out early recovery infrastructure projects.”
2021-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/265 (2021) · source
“Had it not been for the ongoing resupply of militants and separatists and attempts to conceal them, the entire territory of Syria would have been liberated from extremists. There can be no military solution to the Syrian conflict. It can be resolved only by promoting the political process on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015), with the assistance of the United Nations. Following the decisions of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, in Sochi, Syria established the Constitutional Committee, which remains active today. In that context, progress has not been easy, but it is vital that we support and encourage it in every possible way.”
2021-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/265 (2021) · source
“However, the Syrian State was able to withstand this unprecedented terrorist pressure. Thanks to Russia’s decisive support, the Syrian authorities were able to break the backbone of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and put down other hotbeds of terrorism on its land. Now they are restoring the devastated socioeconomic infrastructure in the liberated areas. In the framework of the effective and thoughtful action of the Astana format, Russia, Turkey and Iran jointly achieved a sustainable ceasefire throughout most of Syria’s territory. Hotspots of tension still remain in the Idlib de-escalation zone, where Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, listed by Security Council as a terrorist organization, maintains its position. As of today, the ceasefire in Syria is generally holding.”
2021-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/265 (2021) · source
“We thank Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria Pedersen for his briefing and listened attentively to Mr. Bernard Duhaime. In this anniversary of the Syrian crisis, we are faced with two questions: What allowed this conflict to last this long? And what can we do to put an end to it as soon as possible? External forces used the unrest that flared up in March 2011 to stir up the situation in Syria. They sought to overthrow the legitimate authorities and reform the country as they saw fit. Syria was rapidly delving into chaos and illegal armed groups gained a foothold in vast swathes of its territory. Among them were terrorist groups who terrorized the local population, instilled extremism and intolerance and, generally, committed unspeakable crimes against civilians.”
2021-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/265 (2021) · source
“Moreover, one of the most important, and obvious, ways of eliminating the root causes of conflict is to lift sanctions and unilateral coercive measures. As such, we can only welcome the recent decision of the new United States Administration to reconsider sanctions against Ansar Allah. But for that, the hunger situation in Yemen would have reached a point of no return. Russia agrees that we should promptly respond to the problem of hunger. However, we should do so with the mechanisms specifically mandated to address those issues, taking into account the complex nature of sustainable development challenges facing affected States.”
2021-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/250 (2021) · source
“As for ensuring the resilience of food systems in the face of climate change, that issue falls under sustainable development and is not directly related to the activities of the Security Council. We therefore do not deem it necessary to task the Secretary-General with making mandatory biannual reports to the Security Council about emerging crisis situations with regard to conflict-induced hunger. The Secretary-General has had a mandate to act since resolution 2417 (2018) was adopted. Nothing prevents him from reporting to the Council on specific countries engulfed in hunger. Coming back to the issue at hand, let me stress that new opportunities and local production capabilities, as well as stable global commodity markets, more liberal trade and mitigating the effects of natural disasters, would reanimate economies devastated by conflicts.”
2021-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/250 (2021) · source
“We are greatly concerned about attempts to anchor the issue of conflict- induced hunger on the Security Council’s agenda, as they seek to promote ideas and ungrounded links between the topics. We cannot agree that there is a nexus between food security and protection, which was proposed as a central track of humanitarian worker activity. We believe that to condemn States for refusal or late submission of data is to interfere in internal affairs. Cooperation should be voluntary and unconditional. The problem of ensuring food security amid an armed conflict is directly related to compliance with international humanitarian law and improving the efficiency of the humanitarian response.”
2021-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/250 (2021) · source
“Similarly, we do not agree that we should focus on conflict rather than other causes of hunger, such as the actions of some countries that escalate internal political crises. By a strange coincidence, the tragedy of hunger afflicts areas with broken State institutions. That is what exacerbates conflict and heightens the risk of national food insecurity. Some vivid examples are the daily situations in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Somalia — especially Yemen, where it was not hunger that provoked an S/2021/250 armed conflict, but the other way around. We must learn from those situations if we hope to reduce the number of tragic humanitarian catastrophes on this planet.”
2021-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/250 (2021) · source
“We therefore stand against the idea of appointing a focal point to monitor the implementation of resolution 2417 (2018), as such activity would only add turmoil to the work of the Rome agencies. Our position does not mean that we consider these topics and hunger unimportant. We do not deny that, for some regions and countries, issues like climate change, hunger and migration can exacerbate conflict, but such phenomena should be analysed on a case-by-case basis. It would be unjustified to speak of it in globally and in generic terms, and it may even be harmful to assert their interconnectedness. Besides, not every conflict poses a threat to international peace and security — the area under the Council’s purview — and not every hunger-engulfed country is afflicted by conflict.”
2021-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/250 (2021) · source
“We regret that today’s list of briefers did not include a representative from FAO, since it is a leading United Nations agency operating in the area of food and agriculture and an knowledgeable organization with a unique methodological capacity that enables it to provide a comprehensive assessment of food security. The WFP and FAO work on risk assessment and stand at the helm of the United Nations humanitarian cluster in the area of food security. As I mentioned, real, thorough and productive work to improve international coordination in this arena is under way through the specialized platforms of the WFP and FAO in Rome, and in other bodies of the economic cluster. We are not entirely sure that the Security Council’s involvement in this discussion would have any added value.”
2021-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/250 (2021) · source
“At the same time, we believe that, to achieve tangible results, the Security Council must not start interfering in the fine-tuned and effective work of the General Assembly on this issue, or in efforts to address food security and combat hunger undertaken by specialized United Nations agencies mandated to do so — notably the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). The WFP’s contribution to resolving the acute problem of food shortages in countries with a complicated military and political situation can hardly be overstated.”
2021-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/250 (2021) · source
“We thank our briefers — the Secretary-General, Mr. David Beasley and Ms. Gabriela Bucher — for sharing an analysis of the food security situation. We believe that the choice of such a pressing issue as this topic for the flagship event of her first Security Council presidency highlights the President’s support for more robust joint action to address food insecurity. Strengthening cooperation among the States Members of the United Nations on this issue is a priority for us. The international community needs to make coordinated efforts to respond to the growing socioeconomic challenges related to poverty, famine, climate change and migration. Without collective efforts and mutual confidence, we cannot ensure the effective implementation of the ambitious Sustainable Development Goals.”
2021-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/250 (2021) · source
“I strongly recommend that those who have an interest in this episode, which looks like a mysterious case but is in fact a provocation, to pay attention to that list. As for us, within corresponding chemical weapon-related discussions, we will find a way to make those questions public again. And we will do our best to have those questions answered.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“Second statement by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Vassily Nebenzia In response to the Permanent Representative of Great Britain, I would like to comment on some statements that were made during this meeting. We thank our British colleagues for a reminder of the third anniversary of the notorious Skripals case. It is indeed 4 March today. I have to say that this is a strange case, which our Western colleagues believe to have been closed based on the infamous “highly likely” notion that has taken hold in their active vocabulary. But closed it is not. We still have received no answers to the dozens, if not hundreds, of questions that we posed to our British colleagues. The official website of the Russian Embassy in the United Kingdom has posted a full list of those questions.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“Now that a new Permanent Representative of Syria to the United Nations, Ambassador Bassam Sabbagh, has arrived in New York, the Security Council has a good opportunity to receive first-hand information about the situation around Syria’s chemical file. I say so because, in one of his previous posts, Ambassador Sabbagh for many years served as Syria’s representative to the OPCW, which gave him vast expertise on all nuances of Syria’s interaction with this mechanism, including the progress on chemical weapons issues reached at The Hague platform. There is no one who could give a better account of that than he could. That is why I call on you to give all your attention to his statement when he speaks at the end of this meeting.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“I will not dwell further on this topic, although there are more and more examples proving that the Technical Secretariat is being used for the purposes of the “political commissioning” I mentioned earlier. They have already damaged the reputation of the OPCW as an international organization. I anticipate our colleagues addressing to us further accusations of shattering and undermining the authority of the OPCW. The fact is that such accusations are completely baseless. On the contrary, Russia aspires to restore the good name of the organization and seeks to receive from Director-General Arias answers to the questions that everyone is concerned about. I will stop here and, as my final point, I would like to draw your attention to the following.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“Hopefully the majority of delegations at the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in April will refuse to participate in that provocation and the West-initiated punitive decision will not be taken. It is painfully obvious that there is nothing that would require such steps — nothing extraordinary about Syria’s chemical file in general or its initial declaration in particular. At the previous Security Council meeting on that agenda item (S/2021/109), we mentioned that the dialogue between the OPCW and Damascus on those issues was of a normal, routine character. Many states, including Western ones, had to deal with the same issues in the context of their initial declarations.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“Therefore, attempts to establish a connection between the file and the actual use or non-use of chemical weapons are absolutely senseless. That is most clearly illustrated by the episode involving an accusatory anti-Syrian decision by the OPCW Executive Council. That decision was taken in July 2020 by the minimum required number of votes and prescribed that Syria must meet knowingly unrealistic conditions: declare the allegedly remaining chemical weapons and related facilities that Syria simply did not have. Of course, Damascus was not able to meet that ultimatum. Now our Western colleagues are seeking to incapacitate Syria in the OPCW by initiating a corresponding process.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“No wonder its final products can withstand no criticism owing to political bias, factual falsity and technical illiteracy. We have already shared our detailed position on this and circulated our arguments regarding the IIT report on the Al-Lataminah incident of 2017 as an official Council document as early as in June 2020. We will not be surprised if IIT steps forward soon with more commissioned pseudo-revelations, as unconvincing as those regarding Al-Lataminah. It is like releasing a new sequel in a series of books that readers were already bored with. Everyone realizes that it will hardly make the headlines. However, IIT’s efforts are just the tip of the iceberg. The root cause of the problem is that our Western colleagues have long turned Syria’s chemical file into a means of punishing the unwanted authorities in Damascus.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“Maté at the Arria Formula meeting held on 28 September 2020 that we circulated as official documents of the Security Council and the General Assembly. I also recommend that you pay attention to the testimony of a former OPCW expert who had taken part in the Douma investigation, I. Henderson. He claimed that the Technical Secretariat leadership had falsified conclusions regarding the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic under direct pressure from Western states. I will not go into detail on the activities of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), which is illegitimate per se because the Team was established once a corresponding decision had been pushed through the OPCW Executive Council, thus contravening the principle of consensus and violating the CWC.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“When some freethinkers among the Technical Secretariat employees raised the alarm and refused to take part in a blatant forgery, the Technical Secretariat leadership started to oppress, intimidate and suppress the dissidents and to distort facts. As a result, the bulk of the proof of the direct forgeries, manipulations and internal violations in the OPCW Technical Secretariat reached a critical level. The most vivid examples are the blatant violations that occurred during investigations of incidents in Khan Shaykhun, in April 2017, and Douma, in April 2018. I call on those who would like to form an objective idea of this to study the materials provided by independent experts T. Postol and A.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“Unfortunately, the Technical Secretariat assumed the role of transmitter of the anti-Syrian claims of the Western countries and from the very beginning started to churn out reports that would fit into that paradigm. All evidence traditionally was rather “lame”, rich in technical discrepancies that would often run counter to all laws of physics and rules of logic. Either projectiles would land in vent shafts tailored precisely to accommodate their diameter, or unguided air bombs would fly a 5-kilometre distance to hit their target instead of falling to the ground, or the White Helmets would collect samples of sarin with nearly bare hands. The Technical Secretariat stopped even pretending to observe the normal practices and procedures of collecting evidence, inter alia the principle of the secure preservation of physical evidence.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“Unfortunately, hopes that it would help leave behind the allegations that Syria’s leadership had used chemical weapons against its own people were not realized. During all these years, some States have continued to play that chemical-weapons card as a tool to exert pressure on the Syrian Government. Again and again they have brought up grave accusations against Damascus backed up by unconvincing evidence such as video footage on social media or the testimony of knowingly biased witnesses, or falsified facts. At the same time, they reject the counter-arguments provided not only by Russia and Syria but also by independent experts and organizations, and do not give any coherent explanation as to why they do so.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“With Russia’s support, Syria voluntarily joined the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), submitted its initial declaration under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and got rid of all its chemical-weapon stockpiles. In 2014, Syria’s chemical-weapons programme was fully shut down, all chemical-weapons stockpiles were eliminated and production capacities were destroyed. The OPCW has proved that on many occasions. Since then, Syria has engaged in comprehensive cooperation with the OPCW and its Technical Secretariat, including the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), and all investigative missions on the ground. By the way, as concerns the fact-finding mission, it was the Syrian authorities that first invited it to visit the country.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“Madam President, I should like to indicate at the outset that we noted your reference to the note by the President of the Security Council contained in document S/2017/507. However, that note is not a Council resolution. Its provisions are guidelines rather than binding rules. Of course, we should be concise, because brevity is known to be the “sister of talent”, but there are situations when it does not seem possible. Madam President, since today is the first opportunity for you to delve into the Council’s discussions of the Syrian chemical file, I will give a brief — yet I believe useful to everyone here — retrospective account of this topic and related Council discussions.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“Such a Quartet-plus meeting could provide a review of the current state of affairs and outline key tracks for joint work aimed at overcoming the impasse in the settlement process. We hope that this idea will enjoy broad support and encourage all interested sides to share their comments and proposals in order to ensure that comprehensive preparatory work for the meeting is carried out.”
2021-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/218 (2021) · source
“The Quartet met via video-teleconference on 15 February, and we can say that our partners in this inclusive and Security Council-endorsed mechanism demonstrated their readiness to cooperate constructively. We deem it reasonable to engage regional stakeholders in promoting a Middle East settlement. It would therefore be useful to hold a ministerial meeting in the spring or summer of 2021 in 4+4+2 format — the Quartet plus Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, plus the Palestinian and Israeli sides — with the possible inclusion of Saudi Arabia. Such a meeting would be in line with the initiative of the President of the State of Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas, to convene an international conference on a Middle East settlement.”
2021-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/218 (2021) · source
“We intend, together with our Egyptian friends, to continue to help the Palestinians achieve national unity on the Palestine Liberation Organization platform. The pending elections in Palestine also provide an opportunity to overcome existing controversies and strengthen institutional power. For our part, we are taking steps to support the collective efforts aimed at achieving equitable peace in the region. We believe that one of the necessary tasks is to give impetus to the activities of the Quartet of international mediators and ensure that its meetings are convened on a regular basis. That would allow for the Quartet — Russia, the United States, the United Nations and the European Union — to keep an ear to the ground and coordinate their actions at all times.”
2021-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/218 (2021) · source
“Russia unswervingly supports the two-State solution, which provides for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, based on the universally recognized international legal framework, including the relevant decisions of the United Nations and the Arab Peace Initiative. There is no alternative to Palestinians and Israelis engaging in direct negotiations to determine parameters of the final settlement, including the problem of refugees, borders, water resources and the status of Jerusalem. We also expect that the upcoming elections in both Palestine and Israel will contribute to domestic consolidation and to the strengthening of the State institutions of both sides. Israel’s security concerns also need to be taken into account.”
2021-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/218 (2021) · source
“We believe that it is very important that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continue its effective work in lending support to the Palestinian people, both in the occupied territories and in neighbouring Arab States. The mobilization of comprehensive humanitarian assistance is especially needed amid the pandemic in order to overcome the socioeconomic challenges and contain the virus, including in the context of vaccination. We believe that the process of Arab-Israeli normalization, which gained momentum in 2020, will contribute to pan-regional stabilization, promote a Middle East settlement and ensure that the Palestinian problem is not forgotten.”
2021-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/218 (2021) · source
“The Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, which coordinates the delivery of international aid to the Palestinians, held a video-teleconference meeting on 23 February at which we informed our colleagues about the efforts we are making jointly with the Palestinians to counter the spread of the coronavirus disease. At the same time, the unilateral steps that Israel is taking in order to create irreversible trends on the ground raise serious concerns. Those include illegal construction activities, the demolition of houses and plans to annex the occupied territories, all of which undermine the prospects for a lasting settlement. The international community should play a constructive role in both the Palestinian-Israeli settlement and in alleviating the acute humanitarian and socioeconomic problems in the occupied territories, most of all in Gaza.”
2021-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/218 (2021) · source
“We thank Special Coordinator Tor Wennesland for the briefing. We also listened with great interest to the representatives of the Palestinian and Israeli student communities. The task of ensuring lasting peace and security in the Middle East and North Africa ranks among the priorities on the international agenda. One of the basic components of sustainable stability in the region is clearly the promotion of a Middle East settlement with a focus on finding a just solution to the Palestinian problem. We note that Palestine and Israel have resumed contacts to address issues of security and tax payments. At the current stage, fighting the common enemy — the coronavirus disease pandemic — has become an important track for interaction.”
2021-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/218 (2021) · source
“We have nothing against the briefer in question; we simply thought that it would be enough to have just one civil society representative. The briefer we proposed for this meeting would have been much more relevant. I also note that, not long ago, several of our colleagues — including from the United States — prevented our proposed briefers from appearing before the Council. Mr. Lowcock only partially answered the questions we had submitted in advance. Here are the ones he left unanswered. Are there any obstacles to carrying out the work in Syria that would fall under the development-humanitarian action nexus? If so, then what are they and what needs to be done to overcome them? What is the difference between the Inter-Agency Task Force and the United Nations country team?”
2021-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/206 (2021) · source
“In conclusion, we must say in all seriousness that if we were to decide tomorrow on renewing the cross-border mechanism, we are afraid that we would have no compelling reasons to preserve it. Those interested in extending the mechanism should understand that there is little time left and a lot to do by July. Half-measures will not work; it is vital to begin domestic Syrian deliveries of humanitarian assistance to Idlib and to ensure that they are carried out on a regular basis. I would now like to return to Mr. Lowcock’s answers to our questions. But before I do that, I must say that we were surprised to hear our colleague from the United States assert that we prevented a briefer from participating in this video- teleconference.”
2021-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/206 (2021) · source
“How is the Government supposed to restore uninterrupted electric power supply to ensure, among other things, that cooling equipment for vaccine storage works 24/7 if the required equipment and spare parts cannot be purchased abroad? We still have reservations about the United States occupying Syria’s north- east and appropriating its oil resources. Deliberate general neglect of this toxic episode casts a shadow on the authority of our Security Council partners and calls into question Syria’s territorial integrity, which is affirmed in resolution 2254 (2015). It was the Russian military that cleared a corridor for humanitarian deliveries to Al-Hasakah. What have the United States occupying forces, the champions of humanism, done?”
2021-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/206 (2021) · source