← LEADERSHIP TERMINAL

UK PARLIAMENT · FORMER

Arlene Foster

Fermanagh and South Tyrone · Ulster Unionist Party · Northern Ireland

IN THEIR OWN WORDS

Yet, like too many projects, it has been tied up in legal wrangles. Too many infrastructure projects are being swallowed up in the courts. We need to improve the expertise in infrastructure delivery. We need better infrastructure for the next generation, but key projects being delayed by 10-plus years is unsustainable.

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Any agreement involves compromises but NDNA had two central pillars that, I believe, remain important: ambition for devolution and a new cultural deal. The breadth and depth of issues that NDNA set us all to deliver on would have been enough to fill an entire term or perhaps more, let alone two years of government.

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That confidence-and-supply agreement will leave a legacy but also highlights our challenges. Some £150 million has been rolled out via Project Stratum to bring broadband to rural areas and leave Northern Ireland as the best-connected region in Europe. When it is completed, the project will be transformational to our economy.

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However, such short-term advantage comes at the cost of long-term harm to relationships. It is not a real partnership. Imbalance and instability are built in that will fester and deteriorate. If Brussels continues to think that the protocol is enough, it is in denial.

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Colleagues inside and outside the House know very well that all periods of leadership must come to an end. That is why, when we are privileged and, indeed, honoured to hold such a position, we must not waste a moment in frivolous brinkmanship but forge ahead on behalf of those whom we represent.

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The recommendations of the Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture and Tradition (FICT) are to be taken forward as well. I encourage all of you to do all of it, to take it forward in its totality and to speak of and implement it as one complete, independent package: a new cultural deal for Northern Ireland's new century.

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The complete record

Every one of 3,345 lines we hold for Arlene Foster, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 24 of 67.

  1. The record shows that I have worked hard, throughout my political and ministerial career, to bring more investment and more jobs to Northern Ireland. The record shows that I have worked hard to keep Northern Ireland moving forward, and I will continue to do so as First Minister. That is why, rather than whipping up a media storm, I have actually been dealing with the problem along with my ministerial colleague Simon Hamilton and the Finance Minister, working on a practical solution, because that is what responsible politicians do. That is what government is about. <BR /> <BR />On a personal note, I want very much to thank each and every member of the public who has called my office at Stormont and, indeed, DUP offices across the length and breadth of Northern Ireland to offer words of support and encouragement. It really is appreciated.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  2. My priority, just as it was when I pressed for the earlier closure of the scheme rather than let it run to March, is to ensure that lessons are learned and to reduce the projected cost. <BR /> <BR />When I became First Minister, I said that I could think of no greater honour than to serve my country and the people of Northern Ireland. It is not a responsibility that I take lightly. I am not immune to the considerable anger and frustration that this issue has caused; not only do I understand it, I feel it too. I share those emotions because I am proud of this place and I want the best for it, and that is why I entered politics. I did not enter politics to shirk or shy away from difficult decisions. <BR /> <BR />The record shows that I have always put Northern Ireland first.

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  3. <BR /> <BR />While there will be significant interest in how we came to the present position, the most important issue for us now is to mitigate the costs of the scheme. Minister Hamilton plans to make a statement to the Assembly as soon as possible in the new year. The hope and intent is to reduce significantly the cost of the scheme to the Executive's Budget, but the details are still subject to considerable further work. This matters as we want to be fair to all those who responded to the incentive as it was intended to operate and to ensure that our process completely resolves the widespread abuse of the scheme. <BR /> <BR />In conclusion, unlike others, my priority in this is not headline grabbing or grandstanding.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  4. This is not an exhaustive rebuttal of the allegations made by Mr Bell, but I hope it will convey, with documentary evidence, what actually happened. <BR /> <BR />I also want to make it clear that I support the need for an independent investigation, free from partisan political interference, to establish the facts around the renewable heat incentive scheme. I believe that the conclusions of any investigation must be made public and that any investigation must be conducted speedily to assist in the process of building public confidence. I have been working to reach an agreement with officials and others on the precise details of such an investigation over the last number of days, and I hope that it can be resolved in the next few days.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  5. Members across this House voiced concerns that businesses that had just bought boilers would be left in the lurch. The two-week extension that Mr Bell then agreed to as Minister was supported by me and the deputy First Minister. Other parties in this House, of course, wanted it to be longer. Cost controls were in place for the RHI at that stage, and civil servants were content with the two-week period.

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  6. In it, officials recommended a longer process to close the scheme over a longer period of time, but it was agreed that it should be closed as quickly as possible. So even taking into account the issue of the two-week delay that was agreed after the announcement, after all the complex processes the simple truth is that the scheme closed earlier than had initially been proposed by the Enterprise, Trade and Investment Minister. The reality is that it was the intervention of OFMDFM that ensured an earlier closure of the scheme than would otherwise have been the case. <BR /> <BR />To deal briefly with that subsequent two-week delay in the RHI closure, let us remember that it was decided, after cross-party concerns, that the scheme should not close within a fortnight of the announcement.

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  7. That was released to the media last evening, and the Minister has also placed in the Assembly Library copies of the draft submission with the tracked changes marked. The final version was then approved by the then Minister. <BR /> <BR />In relation to the closure of the scheme in 2016, Mr Bell has alleged that he wanted to close the scheme immediately. Once again, let us return to the documentary evidence. First, let me refer to a submission dated 19 January 2016. That proposed a closure date of early to mid-March 2016 and was signed off by the then Minister, Mr Bell. The deputy First Minister and I believed that we should act more quickly, and a further submission was prepared by DETI officials which provided three options. Minister Hamilton has also left a copy of that submission in the Assembly Library.

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  8. The removal of that reference had the effect of avoiding any impression that the Enterprise, Trade and Investment Minister had been told that he had agreed to a process of closing the scheme that was too slow. <BR /> <BR />Sixthly, this was a submission for the Enterprise, Trade and Investment Minister only and did not impact on the document that was being forwarded to the First Minister and deputy First Minister. Seventhly, and most importantly, the change to the submission had absolutely no effect on anything in the real world; the timing and process for the suspension of the scheme had already been agreed. <BR /> <BR />Minister Hamilton asked for urgent clarification on that issue from officials, who provided a note setting out the factual position.

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  9. I can set out the simple facts, based on the official records of the Department for the Economy. First, the only conversation approximating to this version of events took place in February 2016, not in 2015. Secondly, it relates to paperwork concerning the closure of the scheme in 2016, not the introduction of cost controls in 2015. Thirdly, the DETI adviser accepts that any changes he made were made of his volition and not at the request of others. <BR /> <BR />Fourthly, the amendment that was made relates to one draft submission before it was finalised for the Minister to consider, not to any attempt to delete emails or Government records. Fifthly, the reference that was removed was one that highlighted the role of OFMDFM in wishing to see the scheme close more quickly and without consultation.

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  10. Indeed, it is clear from Mr Bell's statement on the two-week delay in February that he could robustly defend his role as Minister and would not change his course on the basis of SpAds acting without any ministerial authority or cover. <BR /> <BR />In discussing the decisions around the autumn of 2015, Mr Bell also claimed that he has a fact that reveals the role of special advisers in the scheme staying open. He then referred to a conversation he had with the deputy secretary of the Department, claiming his own special adviser had been asked by other special advisers to remove references to "Arlene Foster" and "the Department of Finance and Personnel". This is the key allegation — that documents were amended — and it is a crucial point. <BR /> <BR />The truth is very different from that suggested by Mr Bell.

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  11. Mr Bell also claimed that he acted in the way that he did because of what he referred to as "collective responsibility". This demonstrates a total and fundamental misunderstanding of the convention of collective responsibility. The doctrine of collective responsibility refers to a convention whereby, once Cabinet takes a decision, all Ministers are expecting to abide by it or resign. In this case, there was no decision of the Northern Ireland Executive, nor had there ever been any conversation between DUP Ministers, much less a decision, on the matter. There has been no allegation from Mr Bell that the First Minister Peter Robinson sought to delay the change to the scheme. Collective responsibility has no bearing whatsoever on this issue.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  12. The DUP party officers took no interest in this issue and gave no instructions. It is, therefore, clear that, whatever the belief, the DUP did not ask the Minister of Enterprise, Trade and Investment to extend the scheme. I also understand that, when the suggestion of a four-week extension was mentioned in the DETI issues meeting on 24 August, the Minister did not voice any objections. In fact, he endorsed the decision. <BR /> <BR />The bottom line is that this decision was taken by the Minister of Enterprise, Trade and Investment. No attempt was made to overrule him and no such allegation was made at the time. In fairness to the Minister, I should say that I understand from Minister Hamilton that departmental officials did not object to a four-week extension.

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  13. The Minister was not subsequently overruled by special advisers, and I am clear that whatever representations may have been made by anyone on this issue, it was not being done with the authority of the party. <BR /> <BR />I understand from Minister Hamilton that the permanent secretary recalls being told at the time that some in the party wanted the scheme to be kept open. He was unaware of the source of this suggestion, but believes it may have been based on the erroneous but widespread view at the time that because the scheme was funded through annually managed expenditure (AME), it was possible to maximise take-up without creating a problem. <BR /> <BR />I have checked and confirmed that no Minister made any such request or took any interest in the decision taken in September 2015.

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  14. The fact remains that the Minister signed off a proposal that was to take effect from 4 November 2015. The only further delay in the introduction of cost control measures was as a result of legal and financial issues being resolved by departmental officials. This was unconnected to any ministerial decision. The decision was solely for the Minister of Enterprise, Trade and Investment to take. <BR /> <BR />The former Enterprise Minister claims that he made a decision to amend the RHI scheme but was overruled by special advisers. Since last week, I have specifically investigated this claim. The evidence is clear. The only decision taken by the Minister was in early September to amend the scheme in November.

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  15. <BR /> <BR />Today my colleague the Minister for the Economy is placing in the Assembly Library a copy of the submission that was agreed by the former Minister. It will show that the Minister received a submission on 8 July 2015 recommending the introduction of cost control measures. It will also indicate that the original proposal from officials was to introduce cost controls from October 1 2015 but was amended to 4 November 2015 and signed off by the Minister on 3 September 2015. It is apparent from this document that action was not taken immediately but after considerable delay. <BR /> <BR />Mr Bell further claims that other SPADs became involved in the process who were, and I quote:

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  16. Once again, for the record, the scheme was closed earlier than initially approved by the Minister of Enterprise, Trade and Investment. <BR /> <BR />Since the announcement of my decision to make this statement, the former Minister of Enterprise, Trade and Investment has given an interview to the BBC. In that, he makes a number of allegations about the decision to amend and then subsequently to close the scheme. I think it is important that I also take this opportunity to put on record the factual position about a number of those allegations. <BR /> <BR />Mr Bell alleged on several occasions that he took action immediately to introduce cost control measures into the scheme and signed off the submission at the most immediate point he could. This is untrue.

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  17. Immediately after the announcement of the early closure of the scheme, concerns were raised about those who had already installed boilers but had not yet applied and would be disadvantaged. <BR /> <BR />On the basis that cost control measures were now in place, there was a danger of legal challenges to those who had installed boilers but had not yet received authorisation and, with the agreement of senior civil servants, it was decided that the scheme should remain open for a further two weeks. <BR /> <BR />As the Enterprise Minister at the time highlighted in the Assembly, he took the decision with the agreement of the First Minister and the deputy First Minister. The extension of the amended scheme was an entirely proper and proportionate step to take in all the circumstances.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  18. These submissions were based on the assumption that conventional processes of consultation and Committee clearance were required. The Minister signed off on this submission on Friday 22 January, agreeing to the early to mid-March closure. However, as a result of concerns, a hold was put on this decision within half an hour. <BR /> <BR />In late January 2016, complaints about the operation of the RHI scheme were made to me. I informed the deputy First Minister and I passed them on to the head of the Civil Service. I was deeply concerned about the proposed mid-March closure date in light of the growing financial pressures, and the Executive agreed on 5 February to a closure around 15 February.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  19. <BR /> <BR />By way of a submission from John Mills, the then director of DETI's energy division, on 31 December 2015, a recommendation was made to the then Minister to close the RHI scheme because of concerns about an overspend, and the Minister agreed to that proposal. A subsequent submission from John Mills on 19 January 2016 recommended steps to close the scheme by early to mid-March 2016.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  20. <BR /> <BR />No other Minister took any role in this matter, nor did they make any representations in relation to it. I can confirm that the DUP party officers took no interest or role in the question of the RHI. Therefore, regardless of what, if anything, was said in relation to the party's role, no one had any authority to instruct the ETI Minister to do anything. There is no evidence whatsoever of Mr Bell raising any concerns with the First Minister if he felt that he was being pressurised. Let me make it absolutely clear: any suggestion that the Enterprise Minister was instructed to delay the changes to the RHI scheme is totally without foundation.

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  21. <BR /> <BR />Let there be no doubt that the decision to amend the RHI scheme was a matter for the ETI Minister. The timing of the introduction of cost controls was entirely a matter for him. It has been suggested that my party sought to influence the decision on the timing of the introduction of cost controls. It has been only in recent days that I have been aware of this allegation, and I have now taken the opportunity to investigate it. The only person who would have been in a position to instruct the ETI Minister would have been the First Minister at the time. This has been checked with the then First Minister, who has made it clear that the problems surrounding RHI were never brought to him either as First Minister or as party leader. He made it clear, therefore, that he could not and did not intervene in any way.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  22. <BR /> <BR />To sum up, at no time during my period as Minister were any recommendations made to me to introduce cost controls, nor were there any warning signs that spending on the scheme was spiralling out of control. In fact, during my time in the Department, there was an underspend of the money available to us. <BR /> <BR />I will now turn to the period after I left the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment. In May 2015, I became Finance Minister and had no role whatsoever in the ETI Minister's decision to amend the RHI scheme. The then First Minister, Peter Robinson, has also made it clear that he was unaware of the issues around RHI as they had not been brought to him as party leader or as First Minister. Therefore, at no time did he seek to intervene either.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  23. <BR /> <BR />It has also been alleged that I contributed to the problem by putting the introduction of the domestic RHI ahead of cost controls on the non-domestic scheme. It is quite wrong of anyone to describe this as a smoking gun. I make no apology at all for having pushed to see the domestic scheme introduced, as it was a totally legitimate and rational decision based on the information available to me at that time. I did not receive any indication that cost control of the non-domestic scheme was an urgent priority at that time. The Department for the Economy is seeking to establish the facts as to why the warning signals that had been given, not least those from the concerned citizen, were not escalated in the Department. It is important that this work progresses to a conclusion as soon as possible.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  24. I made that statement from memory and on advice that appeared to indicate that she had raised her concerns directly with me. It is my normal practice — indeed, it is the appropriate practice — to pass any concerns received from members of the public to the relevant departmental officials. However, my response was made without the benefit of having reviewed the concerned citizen's original letter. It is now clear that the initial communication to me did not raise concerns about the RHI scheme. I understood from the Department for the Economy officials who have spoken to the person in question that this was the only correspondence sent directly to me. However, a subsequent email to my private account the following week has now come to light in which there is a reference to concerns about the scheme.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  25. She deserves our highest respect and a sincere apology on behalf of my former Department, which should not have dismissed her claims with disbelief but examined them with diligence. It is no exaggeration to say that, had she been listened to on any of the three occasions on which she approached DETI, the crisis would have been avoided. <BR /> <BR />Unfortunately, it has been difficult to establish the exact facts around contact between the concerned citizen and me and the Department. When asked by 'Spotlight' about correspondence from the concerned citizen, I replied:

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  26. <BR /> <BR />The BBC 'Spotlight' programme and subsequent comment has made significant play of a concerned citizen. I would ask the entire Assembly, if it were here, to join me in thanking that person for all that she did to try to prevent the calamity that we have fallen into.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  27. The unfortunate reality is that no one in government or in the Assembly in their work in creating and passing the legislation picked up on that crucial failing. Contrary to some accounts, in the early years of the scheme, that was not widely picked up by the industry either. In fact, as has been stated, when I was the Minister responsible, Northern Ireland was underperforming in that area. In my years as Minister, there was an underspend on the RHI up to and including my final year at DETI, which was 2014-15. That is detailed in the Northern Ireland Audit Office report. Take-up in the scheme's early years was low. Indeed, as hard as it is to believe now, there was even a publicity campaign in 2014 to encourage more applicants.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  28. The tariff was set out in schedule 3 to the legislation, which was scrutinised by the Enterprise, Trade and Investment Committee and passed after debate by the Northern Ireland Assembly. Indeed, the Chair of the Committee at the time, Mr Patsy McGlone MLA, said:

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  29. However, as the PAC has exposed, a further major failing of the scheme here has been that the necessary aspects of the regulations have not been rigorously enforced. There clearly should have been more and better inspections of businesses long before the summer of 2016. <BR /> <BR />At the heart of the RHI story is that the tariff subsidy was higher than the cost of the wood pellets, yet DETI's 2012 business case on the RHI wrongly stated that the tariff was lower. That crucial misunderstanding informed DETI's attitude to the RHI in subsequent years. It helps explain why concerns were not taken seriously enough and why action was not taken quickly enough when problems emerged. With the greatest of respect to those who criticise me for that, I remind them that I did not simply impose the scheme on the people of Northern Ireland.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  30. <BR /> <BR />While this statement is not the place to rehearse every failing or flaw in the process, there is one matter that I believe it is important for me to address. It is the error that goes to the very heart of why the costs of the scheme ran out of control. The crucial mistake in the scheme was that the tariff for the most commonly used boilers — small to medium biomass — was set at a level higher than the market price of the relevant fuel, which is mainly wood pellets. In essence, that created an incentive to continue to burn fuel over and above the levels required for the relevant function, whether a commercial business operation or a community facility such as a nursing home or a church. Of course, the regulations do not provide for payment for wasted heat or heat that has no functional benefit.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  31. That investment brings benefits: job retention and creation in the energy services sector. I make those points simply to underline the point that, however bad the execution has turned out to be, the aims of the scheme were good and necessary. <BR /> <BR />One question that has been asked by many people is this: why did we not simply replicate the Great Britain arrangements in Northern Ireland? The answer is quite simple: in Great Britain, the main obstacle to the growth of renewable heat was and is the wide availability of affordable natural gas. Here, the main heating fuel is oil, and the gas market is relatively immature. It was even more so in 2012, hence it is clear that simply to import the GB arrangement to the Northern Ireland market at that time would not have been appropriate.

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  32. Just under £38 million of funding was provided by the Treasury for the Northern Ireland RHI schemes during the five-year period from 2011 to 2016. However, scheme uptake was initially low in the first few years, with only 409 applications received by the end of 2014, leading to an underspend of around £15 million during the first four years. The total number of renewable heating installations under the non-domestic scheme had increased to over 2,000 by the time that the scheme was suspended in February 2016. Current estimates suggest that around 6% of our total heating needs in Northern Ireland are now met through renewable heating technologies. In addition to the resultant reduction in CO2 emissions, the local Northern Ireland economy is benefiting from the ongoing investment through the RHI schemes.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  33. The non-domestic scheme incentivises the uptake of renewable heat technologies such as biomass, heat pumps and solar thermal installations. It provides payments for 20 years based on the heat energy generated. The level of tariff is dependent on the size and type of technology, and the calculation of the tariff was intended to cover capital costs, operating costs and non-financial hassle costs over the lifetime of the technology. <BR /> <BR />A domestic RHI scheme was introduced in December 2014. There was an increase in application numbers during 2015 that escalated quite rapidly to produce the crisis we now face. Focusing on the incentive for small to medium-sized biomass boilers, the scheme provided a tariff of just over 6p a unit.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  34. Once again, for the avoidance of doubt, I believe that it is right and proper that I answer to the Assembly for my role in the RHI scheme, and not for one moment do I seek to shirk or avoid that responsibility. But, if we are to learn lessons from the entire experience, it is essential that we know exactly where things went wrong. <BR /> <BR />The non-domestic RHI scheme was introduced in November 2012. It supports the UK objective of contributing to the EU-wide target that, by 2020, 20% of energy consumption should be from renewable sources. The UK's share of the target is 15%, and the plan is to achieve that through a combination of 12% renewable heat and 30% renewable electricity by 2020. In Northern Ireland, the renewable heat target is 10% by 2020.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  35. It is the departmental accounting officer — normally the permanent secretary — who is responsible for the stewardship of resources within the Department's control. <BR /> <BR />While it may have been lost amidst the media hype, I am on record as saying that I entirely accept that I am accountable to the Assembly for the actions of the Department during my tenure as Minister. I am sorry that the initial scheme did not contain cost control measures and that there were fundamental flaws in its design. This is the deepest political regret of my time in the House. As Minister, I accept responsibility for the work of the Department during my time at the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment (DETI).

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  36. However, I want to make it clear that the statement will not set out every failing and flaw in the scheme and process, every missed opportunity and every mistaken assumption. That work has been and will continue to be carried out by the Public Accounts Committee. <BR /> <BR />Before I move to the chronology of what occurred, I want to say a few words about ministerial accountability. By convention, Ministers are answerable to the Assembly not only for their actions and decisions but for those of civil servants in their Department, regardless of any personal responsibility for actions or omissions by officials. In practice, Ministers determine departmental policies and delegate their implementation to officials.

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  37. <BR /> <BR />The one issue on which we can all agree is that there were shocking errors and failures in the RHI scheme and a catalogue of mistakes, all of which coincided to create the perfect storm, resulting in the position in which we now find ourselves. In all of this, it is critical that lessons are learned and that the costs of the scheme are brought under control. As First Minister, I am determined that that will be done. <BR /> <BR />Today, I want to cover in some detail the establishment, operation and eventual closure of the scheme. I want to set out the policy objectives behind the scheme and the flaws in its operation. I also want to address some of the more common questions that have arisen over the past two weeks and, most importantly, to put to rest some of the myths that have grown up around the scheme.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  38. Unlike normal practice on these occasions, which, by the way, you endorsed, I want to make it clear that the statement has not been cleared or approved by the deputy First Minister. I felt that it was important that I come before the House at the earliest opportunity. For almost two weeks there has been a barrage of media coverage on this matter, including wild claims and allegations, many of which have been based on spin rather than reality. This morning, I want to set out the actual facts to the Assembly. To repeat what I said in media interviews, I want to make it clear that, in order to get to the bottom of the entire issue, I am prepared to waive the normal convention and give evidence to the Public Accounts Committee.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  39. — a statement about my role in the renewable heat incentive (RHI) scheme.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-12-19 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  40. Mr Speaker, I am grateful to you for agreeing to recall the Assembly today and permitting me to make —

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  41. I am very pleased that you have mentioned that because Rory is, of course, one of our greatest sporting ambassadors. We are incredibly proud of what he achieved on Saturday evening, not just because he got a win but because it was his 100th cap. He can take from this place, I hope, the support of the whole House for what he has achieved wearing the green shirt.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-11-29 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  42. Two weeks ago, the Rugby World Cup bid was officially launched between us and the Irish Government. Our main competitors appear to be France and the Republic of South Africa. We are quietly hopeful, if not confident, that we can attain the Rugby World Cup for 2023. We say that not only because we have been doing some lobbying and some very hard work behind the scenes, but because we have not had the Rugby World Cup and the other two jurisdictions have already hosted it in their own countries.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-11-29 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  43. We have been taking a ministerial lead on these matters through our junior Ministers and, indeed, through ourselves as well. This time last year — I think it was probably later in December — the deputy First Minister and I, as Finance Minister, visited our very first group of refugees that had come to Northern Ireland. We can do that, therefore, by very positive leadership. We set up our racial equality subgroup, and the refugee integration strategy is being drafted at the moment. We hope it will be out for preconsultation very soon with a number of very important stakeholders. So, that is going on as well.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-11-29 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  44. We have had a very successful integration of the refugees who have come to Northern Ireland. The junior Minister will keep me right, but I think I am right in saying we have had five groups of families, mostly, coming to reside here in Northern Ireland. They have been spread out across Northern Ireland. I have to say that a great deal of praise and commendation should go to the officials right across the piece who have worked very hard to make sure that those who come to Northern Ireland for a new life are given all the support they require.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-11-29 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  45. We will look for opportunities not least for our agri-sector and, in particular, our pork sector out in China. We will no doubt eat some of the fare from China — the things we do for Ulster — and we will bring them the message that Northern Ireland is very much open for business and wants to do business with China. The agri-food sector will be very much a strong part of what we will talk about when we go to China.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-11-29 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  46. That will be a very important staging post for us out in the Far East. We are hoping to meet Madam Liu Yandong, who was here in Northern Ireland some years ago when she met the then First Minister and deputy First Minister and, indeed, all the Executive and took in some of our tourism opportunities. <BR /> <BR />We are going to meet Bombardier, which has a facility out in China — in Shenyang — and we will meet other very important dignitaries in Shenyang and look at various investment opportunities for here in Northern Ireland. We will return to Northern Ireland on Friday of next week.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-11-29 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  47. The deputy First Minister and I will leave for China very early on Sunday. We have a full programme from Monday morning, when we will meet the Northern Ireland Bureau in China; indeed, we will open our bureau there.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-11-29 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  48. Two great giants — Seamus Heaney and C S Lewis — and it is about time that we started to recognise what they have done for this place.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-11-29 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  49. Yes, it is Tourism Northern Ireland, which does tremendous work in marketing those initiatives, as does Tourism Ireland. The wonderful thing about tourism is that it can be a job creation initiative and an economic driver for the whole of Northern Ireland. When you get a local story or hook, you are able to tell the world about your local environment, and I have seen some marvellous examples of that. <BR /> <BR />The deputy First Minister and I were at Seamus Heaney's HomePlace recently, which is another tremendous example of how you can use culture and someone's birthplace as a way to bring tourists and those who are looking to expand their minds to Bellaghy. A tremendous initiative has gone on there as well.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-11-29 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD

  50. I congratulate east Belfast on a wonderful open space to commemorate one of its most famous sons. It is a tremendous example of partnership working between the community, the Connswater greenway, Belfast City Council, the Big Lottery Fund and, of course, the Department for Communities in the Executive. It is a tremendous way in which we can regenerate urban spaces in a very meaningful way. I have to say to the Member that I was really taken by the number of children who were there and who looked on with great awe and admiration at the huge statues that have been put in place at C S Lewis Square. I hope that they all get as much enjoyment from the works of C S Lewis as my generation did.

    OFFICIAL REPORT, 2016-11-29 · READ THE OFFICIAL RECORD