Edward Argar
MP for Melton and Syston · Conservative · United Kingdom
“I will not keep the Committee long. I am very pleased to see the hon. and gallant Gentleman, the Minister, still in post, as this is a policy area that he has cared deeply about throughout his life. I share the broad support for the instrument expressed by the shadow Minister, my hon.”
“I appreciate it may be set out in the 2006 or 2025 primary parent legislation to these draft regulations, but if he can, I would be grateful for a little clarification. Finally, paragraph 10.1 of the explanatory memorandum refers to the legislation being continuously monitored.”
“I live in my patch and I know that there will be genuine local fury at the contempt this Government have shown for my constituents in approving a Leicester city land grab, which has cross-party opposition locally.”
“Lady was right to highlight in her remarks the importance of timely discharge from hospital as a key element of whether we can achieve that flow into hospital beds and have hospital bed capacity to allow an A&E department or emergency department to function.”
“That should not be a challenge; I suspect that that data is already extant in some part of the system. She is proposing a very moderate measure, which would pull all that together in one place, and allow it to be focused on and looked at in the round, rather than in disparate little penny packets of data.”
“Gentleman’s point, however, that with many of these things—both clinicians and coroners grapple with this—it is often complex to determine the actual most significant contributory factor. My hon.”
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“I crave your indulgence, Mr Speaker. May I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the hon. Member for Cardiff North (Anna McMorrin), who shadowed me for some time, and to the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge (Ellie Reeves), who also did so? I wish them both well, although given the latter’s election co-ordination role, hopefully not too well. It remains our priority to deliver swifter access to justice for victims of rape. As the hon. Gentleman says, the experience of attending court is incredibly difficult for them. That is why we have committed to increasing the number of independent sexual violence advisers and independent domestic violence advisers to more than 1,000 over the next three years.”
“She touched on a specific case and I am happy to engage with her outwith the Chamber if that would be helpful.”
“It is nice to see the hon. Lady in her place and it is always a pleasure to answer questions from her. She highlights an important issue raised by IICSA and historic and current child sexual abuse. It is worth remembering that the investigation of such crimes can be lengthy because of the complexities of the crimes and of obtaining evidence. While training for the judiciary and courts is a matter for the judiciary and the Judicial College rather than for the Government, we have been investing in training, as have police forces, across a range of specialisms, including handling child sexual abuse cases. It is important that they are handled with sensitivity and with an understanding of the impact that the trauma has had on those who are victims, and indeed also those who are witnesses.”
“The hon. Lady is right to highlight the importance of timeliness. One of the key aims of Operation Soteria—the new model for investigating rape and serious sexual offences that is being rolled out to all police forces in the coming months—is to improve timeliness. Investigations in this space are, of necessity, often complex and can take a long time. The number of rape convictions is at or around the level it was in 2010. Now, the number of cases passed by the police to the Crown Prosecution Service for charge is up 130%. The number of cases charged is up more than 90%, and the number of cases received in the Crown court is up by more than 120%. Much has been achieved, but she is right to highlight that there is always more that we can and should do in this important space.”
“It has been a pleasure to work with my right hon. Friend on those amendments to the Online Safety Bill, which returns to the Commons today. She is right to highlight the rapidly changing environment that we are legislating for and the need therefore to keep things under constant review. Although she tempts me, I shall resist the temptation to speculate on a forthcoming King’s Speech or any future legislative announcements. What I will say, which I hope will give her some reassurance, is that we have been clear that, as soon as legislative time can be found, the Government are committed to implementing the full package of measures in the Law Commission report.”
“It is right that those convicted of a crime face up to its consequences by being in court when they are sentenced. On 30 August, the Lord Chancellor announced his intention to legislate as soon as parliamentary time allows to enable judges to order an offender to attend court for sentencing, making it clear in legislation that reasonable force can be used to compel attendance and that refusal to comply with a judge’s order will cause the offender to face up to two years in custody.”
“I am grateful to my hon. Friend, and I hope he will allow me this opportunity to express my sympathy to the friends and family of Claire Tiltman, who lived in his constituency and, in 1993, was tragically murdered. I was glad to see her murderer brought to justice after so many years. Colin Ash-Smith, like Lucy Letby, was cowardly for not attending the sentencing hearing to face up to his appalling crime. Each case is different, so it is important that the court and the judge have discretion in how to make an attendance order, and in reaching that decision—although we are working through the details—we would expect the courts to consider the full circumstances of each individual case, including any representations made by the prosecution or the defence in that context.”
“I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, particularly for the dexterity with which he got Harrow Crown court in. He is right to highlight that case. I understand that remedial work is under way and that cases listed there have been transferred to other London courts to ensure they still continue to be heard. I understand from the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green (Mike Freer), that the indicative timescale to complete the works is six to nine months.”
“I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman and may I take the opportunity to welcome him to his place? I suspect there will occasionally be to-and-fros across this Chamber, but I hope there will also be opportunities, where we are in agreement, to work constructively together. We have been clear on our intention to bring forward appropriate legislation to reinforce the existing powers the judiciary has in this respect, but it is important that we get this right and that it builds in that degree of judicial discretion, because there may be some circumstances where victims would not wish to see the offender in court for sentencing because it would be deeply distressing or deeply disruptive. So it is important that we get this right. We are determined to do that, but we will work through the detail to make sure it is robust and effective.”
“I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who I know takes a keen interest in this issue. The safety of our roads is a key objective for the Government, and protecting all road users is a priority. Like all road users, cyclists have a duty to behave in a safe and responsible manner. While laws are in place for cyclists, they are old and it can be difficult to successfully prosecute offences. That is why Department for Transport colleagues are considering bringing forward legislation to introduce new offences concerning dangerous cycling to tackle those rare instances where victims have been killed or seriously injured by irresponsible cycling behaviour.”
“My hon. Friend is right to highlight the issue of traffic offences. As part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, there was an increase in the minimum disqualification periods for the serious offence of causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs from two years to five years, and an increase from three to six years if there is a repeat offence within three years. The Department for Transport is also currently considering a broader call for evidence on motoring offences. I hope that the very recent report from the all-party parliamentary group for cycling and walking will be useful to it in that respect. I will ensure that colleagues at the DFT are aware of her interest in this issue.”
“I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who throughout her time in the House, and particularly while Home Secretary, has always taken a keen interest in supporting victims of crime. It is vital that victims get the compensation they are entitled to, be that from the offender or the criminal injuries compensation scheme, which paid out more than £173 million in 2022-23. The making of a compensation order is a matter for the court, and there is no limit on the amount that a court can order an offender to pay. In respect of the criminal injuries compensation scheme, His Majesty’s Government are consulting on changes following the report of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse alongside previous consultations. It is important that that can be considered fully, but that will be post-passage of the Victims and Prisoners Bill.”
“My hon. Friend is right to highlight the scourge of knife crime and the need for tough sentences. Although sentencing in an individual case is a matter for our independent judiciary, which is able to consider the specific circumstances of individual cases, in legislating on this issue Parliament was clear about its seriousness. That is reflected in average sentences for all types of knife crime, which are up from 6.5 months in 2010 to 8.1 months in 2020. In addition, 87% of those committing repeat offences were given a custodial sentence, including suspended sentences, which are a custodial sentence.”
“I am grateful to the hon. Lady. I know she is meeting the Secretary of State to discuss this matter and I do not want to pre-empt that meeting. If she wishes, I am very happy to join that meeting with her, or even to meet her separately to talk about this issue if she feels that would be helpful.”
“I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I know the Lord Chief Justice and I am very happy, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government and all those on the Government Front Bench, to do exactly as my hon. Friend says: to pay tribute to Lord Burnett’s exemplary period as Lord Chief Justice.”
“HM Prison and Probation Service will respond on behalf of the Secretary of State to each victim to confirm whether an application for reconsideration has or has not been made, with an explanation of why. This is an operational process, rather than one set out in primary legislation. I am grateful to the shadow Minister for highlighting the need to ensure that we build the right processes and support for victims into whatever new ministerial or other decision-making model is in place, but I do not consider it necessary to set that out in primary legislation.”
“Within 30 days, the Secretary of State would be required to either refer the case to the Court of Appeal or provide a written statement explaining to the victim why they have decided not to exercise that power. I understand the concern that victims often feel about the potential release of an offender, and as we implement the reforms in the Bill we will ensure that they are able to make their voices heard as part of the process. Let me give an example of how we already do this in our existing processes. Under the pre-existing reconsideration mechanism, victims are able to submit a request to the Secretary of State asking them to apply to the Parole Board for a decision to be reconsidered.”
“On the principle of whether it is right that Ministers themselves should directly take decisions, I believe that the public rightly expect a role for Ministers when it comes to the release of the most serious offenders. Keeping the public safe is the Government’s first duty, and it is not unreasonable for Ministers to act as an additional safeguard—as a check and balance in the system. That is why the approach in the Bill is for Ministers to apply the additional safeguard themselves, with an onward route of appeal. The new clause would introduce a new statutory role for victims in the referral process, by creating a power for them to apply to the Secretary of State to request that the prisoner’s case is referred to the Court of Appeal.”
“While I recognise our differences in approach, I believe there is a degree of agreement across both sides on that underlying principle. I turn to the principal difference in the new clause. Let me begin by explaining the different approaches. Clauses 35 and 36 would allow the Secretary of State to call in a top tier case to retake a release decision, with an onward route of appeal to the upper tribunal. We will come on to this route of appeal and its destination in later clauses. The new clause would instead provide a new power for the Secretary of State to refer a top tier case directly to the Court of Appeal, instead of making a decision themselves.”
“New clauses 22 and 23 would seek to replace the ministerial decision-making power with a new power to allow the Secretary of State to instead refer a case directly to the Court of Appeal for review, which would determine whether the prisoner was safe to release. The new clause introduces a statutory right for victims in the referral process, expands the offences included in the top tier, and removes the power for the Parole Board to be able to refer cases directly without making a decision. I will come on to these changes in turn, but let me first say that the principle behind the new powers in the Bill is that the most serious offenders should be subject to additional scrutiny before they are released, in order to reinforce our focus on public protection and bolster public confidence.”
“Some offenders present a heightened risk to the public due to the nature of their crimes, and their release should be approached with even greater caution. They are murderers, rapists, the most serious terrorists and those who have caused or allowed the death of a child. The top tier cohort has been carefully chosen to capture these offences, and we do not think it is proportionate to widen the cohort of offenders to which the power applies beyond these four offence types. These are the cases that the root and branch review deemed to carry the greatest risk to the public, and they are the cases that most greatly affect public confidence in the justice system.”
“Sexual offences committed against children and those with mental disorders cause long-lasting harm to their victims. Those who commit manslaughter have caused immeasurable grief to their victims’ families. The impact of these offences cannot be understated, and the entire parole system needs to be robust in protecting the public from those who commit such grave offences. The Parole Board does its difficult job well and has a very good track record of assessing risk. Over 99% of offenders directed for release do not go on to commit a serious further offence. It is clear that in the overwhelming majority of cases the Parole Board gets it right. However, the root and branch review of the parole system, published in March 2022, found that a small number of cases have demonstrated the need for an additional safeguard.”
“It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship on a Bill Committee once again, Mrs Murray. I am grateful to the shadow Minister for her amendments, which would add sexual offences against a child, sexual offences against those with mental disorders and manslaughter to the list of offences to which the ministerial decision-making power would apply. To remind the Committee, the ministerial decision power in clauses 35 and 36 imposes a new safeguard—a check and balance—on the release of the most serious offenders in the top tier. It will allow the Secretary of State to intervene on behalf of the public and take a second look at the release decision. I recognise, as I am sure Members on both sides do, that all crimes are serious, especially to their victims, and the top tier in the Bill is not an exhaustive list of serious crimes.”
“Member for Lewisham West and Penge, has also raised concerns about this route of referral, and we are carefully considering the issues raised and the broader point of the Justice Committee in its very swift—for which we are grateful, and I know the Lord Chancellor is grateful—one-off inquiry into part 3 of the Bill. In subsequent debates, I will outline what we believe is the most appropriate route of referral and why we do not believe that the Court of Appeal is the right route. We believe that that remains the upper tribunal, but that is addressed specifically in subsequent amendments and clauses. I am grateful to the shadow Minister for her amendments and new clauses, but I am afraid that at this stage we must resist them.”
“I will be cautious on the hon. Lady’s specific question about the statistics, because I do not know whether that level of granularity is available, but I will take that away and look. If the data is recorded in a way that answers her question and is publicly available, I will be happy to share it with her. Finally, the new clause would remove the discretionary referral power, which would allow the Parole Board to send a case directly to the Secretary of State without taking a first-instance decision or, in this instance, directly to the Court of Appeal. The intention behind this route of referral is to allow the Parole Board to refer a case where, for whatever reason, it is unable adequately to make an assessment of risk and so cannot make a robust decision. I recognise that the Justice Committee, as referred to by the hon.”
“I am grateful to the hon. Lady, but I do not think anyone is suggesting what she suggested in her final sentence. She is right to highlight the tariff difference, which is reflective of something that Parliament decided it wished to do, recognising that it would create a disparity in the tariffs, in the light of the Kinsella murder. Parliament was cognisant of that. Whether that should be looked at is a perfectly reasonable point. In that context, I pay tribute—as I know the hon. Lady would—to the Goulds and Deveys for the campaign they are undertaking on the issue, and to the Killed Women campaign more broadly. Wherever this lands, they are provoking an important public debate on this very important issue and the disparity between whether a knife is taken to the scene of a crime in a public place or is already there.”
“We expect that this power will be used in very rare cases only.”
“The clauses contain a new power for the Secretary of State for Justice to intervene in the release of the most serious offenders, providing for a second check by taking or retaking release decisions. Once a prisoner has been referred to the Parole Board to decide whether they are safe to be released, there are two routes by which such decisions may come before the Secretary of State. First, the clauses contain a provision that will allow the members of the Parole Board to refer a top tier release decision to the Secretary of State, instead of making a decision themselves. They can do so for any reason that they consider appropriate, including if, for whatever reason, they are unable to adequately assess risk in a particular case. The Secretary of State would then make a decision about release for that offender.”
“Clause 35 reflects the views of the root-and-branch review by amending the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 to create a top tier cohort of indeterminate-sentenced offenders who have committed some of the most serious crimes and whose release from prison will be subject to additional safeguards. In the same way, clause 36 amends the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to create a top tier cohort of fixed-term offenders. As the clause applies to offenders serving determinate sentences, murder is not included in the list of offences for referral, as life sentences are mandatory in all murder cases in any event. The top tier therefore consists of offenders serving sentences for murder, rape, certain terrorism offences, or causing or allowing the death of a child—again, as I have alluded to, this reflects the root-and-branch review’s approach.”
“The Secretary of State will have information from the Parole Board and the Parole Board’s view but, ultimately, we believe it is right that the Secretary of State is accountable to the public in such cases. We therefore believe that that is the appropriate route by which someone who is accountable, and to whom I suspect the public would look in the most serious cases, can ensure public protection where the Parole Board feels that it is unable to do so.”
“Allowing the Secretary of State to apply an additional check and balance to such decisions will help to ensure that those who present the highest risk to the public remain in prison. The board will continue to risk assess offenders in the same way that it does now, independently of the Government, and will continue to make the final decision about release for most parole-eligible offenders. The board does that difficult job well in the vast majority of cases. However, in the few cases where it is necessary, clauses 35 and 36 will allow the Secretary of State to intervene to provide additional scrutiny to release decisions and to further bolster public confidence in the system.”
“For either of the two routes, the Secretary of State will make a decision about whether the offender is safe to be released by applying the full release test, as set out in clauses 32 and 33, based on all the evidence and advice before them. If the Secretary of State decides that the offender should remain in prison, they must notify the prisoner of the reasoning behind their decision and of the prisoner’s right to appeal. We will turn to that right of appeal in the debates on later clauses. The new power provides an additional safeguard to the release of the most serious offenders, an issue that particularly affects public confidence in the parole process. Victims are often anxious about whether a prisoner who caused them harm is released, out of concern not only for themselves and their families but for the wider public.”
“Clauses 35 and 36 also allow the Secretary of State to call in a top tier case if the Parole Board has directed release. Around 1,900 top tier cases come before the Parole Board each year and, on average, the board directs release for about 650 of those offenders. In any top tier cases in which release has been directed, the Secretary of State may decide to call in the case and, by doing so, quash the decision of the Parole Board. The Secretary of State will then retake the decision as to whether that offender should be released. If a case is not called in, the decision of the Parole Board stands and the Secretary of State is required to give effect to that release decision as soon as reasonably practicable in the circumstances.”
“The shadow Minister says “what we have always done before”, but the powers and the approach—the so-called separation of powers—are relatively new, and I believe came in under the last Labour Government. If I recall correctly, the Home Secretary under previous Conservative Governments in the ’80s and ’90s had a number of the relevant powers. I take her point, but it is not how this has always been done; it is a relatively new innovation—that is not to say it is a bad one, but I would exercise a degree of caution about whether it is from time immemorial. We have the principle of a separation of powers, of course, but in this space, historically, there has always been a lack of clear delineation—for want of a better expression—in such matters.”
“I am grateful, as ever, to the shadow Minister for her tone and approach. I do not want her to feel left out as we have already debated parts 1 and 2—I am always happy to work with her, too, over the course of the summer. She is very welcome, along with the hon. Member for Rotherham, the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood and other shadow Ministers, to meet me over the summer, along with the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my right hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds), who is the policy Minister for this part of the Bill. I commend clauses 35 and 36 to the Committee. Question put and agreed to . Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Clause 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill . Clause 37 Procedure on referral of release decisions Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Clause 37 would ensure that the same procedural requirements are replicated for the Secretary of State, including that he or she must consider all the evidence that was before the Parole Board in reaching a decision. The Secretary of State may also make their own findings of fact as appropriate. The clause also provides for the Secretary of State to make rules on the procedure to be followed by the Secretary of State when making release decisions, akin to the Parole Board rules, which are made in secondary legislation and govern the proceedings of the Parole Board. That means that, post the commencement of the legislation, there will be a robust and clear legislative procedure in place for the exercise of the Secretary of State’s power to provide an additional check on the release decisions of the most serious offenders.”
“Before I start, I should make a correction: I think I just inadvertently took away membership of the Privy Council from the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood. I restore it swiftly, with an apology. Clause 37 will insert a new section into the Criminal Justice Act 2003, setting out what the Secretary of State must consider as part of their decision making on referral of a case from the Parole Board to them, and allowing the Secretary of State to take any evidence necessary for decision making. Section 239 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 sets out the requirements of the board in considering an offender’s case, including that it must consider all documents put before it by the Secretary of State, as well as any other evidence obtained, and that, if it deems it necessary to make the decision, it can interview the prisoner.”
“I always reflect very carefully on all points made to me by the shadow Minister. Question put and agreed to. Clause 37 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 38 Appeal to Upper Tribunal of decisions on referral: life prisoners”
“We therefore conclude that, on balance, the upper tribunal is best placed, in terms of the existing legislative powers, to hear appeals against the new ministerial decision-making power, and the Court of Appeal does not appear to be as suitable a venue in this context. I appreciate that the shadow Minister may form a different view, but I think this is a balanced judgment and I would urge her not to press her amendments.”
“On the other hand, the upper tribunal has wide-ranging powers already extant under section 25 of the Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, facilitated by the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, which gives it the same powers as the High Court in terms of attendance, examination of witnesses, production and inspection of documents, and broad scope to conduct and administer hearings. The tribunal has experience in hearing oral evidence and in making decisions in the light of such evidence. For example, it takes oral evidence in appeals against decisions of the Disclosure and Barring Service, and occasionally may also do so to remake a decision after setting aside a decision of the first tier tribunal.”
“If the Court of Appeal were to be the venue to hear appeals from a decision of the Secretary of State not to release, substantive amendments would have to be made to the 1968 Act and training would have to be given to the Lords Justices of Appeal. Taking on this additional work could have a detrimental effect on the timescale in which the court can hear appeals from those who consider that they have been wrongly convicted and who are serving prison sentences as a result.”
“The Court of Appeal is a statutory body that has its powers set out in the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. It primarily considers appeals from the Crown court against conviction or sentence. Section 2 of the 1968 Act explains that the court may allow an appeal against conviction if it thinks the conviction is unsafe; otherwise it has to dismiss the appeal. It also has powers under section 3 of the 1968 Act to substitute a conviction for another offence. In determining these issues, and other matters under the 1968 Act, the Court of Appeal does not need to give any consideration to whether a prisoner is safe to release, nor does it conduct re-hearings on the facts.”
“An appeal may be made either on the grounds that the Secretary of State’s decision is flawed in some way—for example, it is irrational or there has been an error of fact—or it may be made on a merits ground, that is, on the grounds that the prisoner believes they meet the minimal risk threshold for release. The “no more than a minimal risk” ground will require the appellate court, whether that be the upper tribunal or the Court of Appeal, to apply the public protection test to determine whether the prisoner is safe to release. That may involve a fresh hearing of the case, if the upper tribunal considers it necessary, and may require the taking of oral evidence. The amendments require us to consider which appellate court is best placed to fulfil these functions and hear appeals.”
“Even though the Secretary of State and the Parole Board will have applied the same test, there may be occasions when the Secretary of State reaches a different conclusion from the Parole Board and judges, such that a top tier offender has not satisfied the threshold for release and should therefore remain in prison. In such cases, part 3 enables the offender to appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision not to release them. It is right that an appeal should be possible. The ability to challenge a decision is a crucial mechanism and safeguard in our justice system, and it provides a route for ensuring that decisions have been taken correctly and fairly. The grounds on which an appeal may be brought forward are laid out in clauses 38 and 39. They are straightforward and comprehensive.”
“The Government’s view is that the public will be further reassured if that check is made by the Secretary of State or another Minister acting on their behalf. Although I say “check”, it will, of course, be much a more thorough review than that term might imply. The procedure set out in part 3 for verifying whether an offender is suitable for release will require the Secretary of State to apply the public protection test in full and to reach a decision as to whether the offender, if released, would pose “no more than a minimal risk” of committing an offence that would cause “serious harm.” That test is the very same release test that will be applied by the Parole Board, which is set out in clauses 32 and 33, which we considered on Thursday.”
“The appeals in question will be where the Secretary of State has called in a Parole Board decision to release a top tier offender, or the board has referred a case to the Secretary of State for an initial release decision. I appreciate that other amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge propose the direct referral of a decision by the Parole Board, but the principle is the same in either case: a judicial body with the correct powers and expertise, whether that is the upper tribunal or the Court of Appeal, would ultimately be required to assess the decision. Top tier offenders, as we have already debated, are those who have committed the most serious crimes, such as murder and rape, so it is only right that there is a second check on any decision to release them.”
“I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her amendment, which would change the appellate chamber for appeals of any Secretary of State decision to refuse release to the Court of Appeal, rather than the upper tribunal. I know that the Justice Committee has also heard evidence that suggests that the Court of Appeal might be the appropriate venue for referral appeals. The hon. Lady and I may disagree on the underlying point about the role of the Secretary of State, but in looking specifically at which is the most appropriate appellate route, the Government feel, for specific procedural and legal reasons, that the Court of Appeal is the wrong route. It may help the Committee if I set out the Government’s position on that point.”
“That would allow the tribunal to examine the evidence and re-take the release decision from first principles by applying the same release test, without referring the case back to the Secretary of State. There is no permission stage for this route of appeal. Ongoing post-tariff detention requires determination of lawfulness by a court, in accordance with article 5(4) of the European convention on human rights. The appeal process will ensure that the referral process is robust and there is a proper check and balance on the use of the Secretary of State’s power. I urge that clauses 38 and 39 stand part of the Bill.”
“Subsection (4) clarifies that a decision should not be found to be irrational by the upper tribunal unless it deems that no reasonable Secretary of State could have made that decision. In such cases, permission must be sought from the upper tribunal for the appeal to proceed. If the appeal is upheld, the matter is referred back to the Secretary of State for another decision, in line with other public law decision-making processes; otherwise, the Secretary of State’s decision is upheld and the prisoner remains confined. Secondly, an appeal is also available on full-merits grounds—that is, whether it is necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner remain confined.”
“We have already discussed clauses 35 and 36, which create a new power for the Secretary of State to intervene in release decisions for the most serious offenders. It is only right that if the Secretary of State refuses release, there is recourse to an independent review. Clauses 38 and 39 therefore set out that a prisoner whose release is refused by the Secretary of State under the new provisions can appeal the decision to the upper tribunal. Clause 38 covers life prisoners and clause 39 is for fixed-term prisoners. There are two routes of appeal available. First, appeals can be made on the grounds that the decision was flawed because it was illegal, irrational, procedurally improper or the Secretary of State made an error of fact that was fundamental to the decision they reached.”