Edward Argar
MP for Melton and Syston · Conservative · United Kingdom
“I will not keep the Committee long. I am very pleased to see the hon. and gallant Gentleman, the Minister, still in post, as this is a policy area that he has cared deeply about throughout his life. I share the broad support for the instrument expressed by the shadow Minister, my hon.”
“I appreciate it may be set out in the 2006 or 2025 primary parent legislation to these draft regulations, but if he can, I would be grateful for a little clarification. Finally, paragraph 10.1 of the explanatory memorandum refers to the legislation being continuously monitored.”
“I live in my patch and I know that there will be genuine local fury at the contempt this Government have shown for my constituents in approving a Leicester city land grab, which has cross-party opposition locally.”
“Lady was right to highlight in her remarks the importance of timely discharge from hospital as a key element of whether we can achieve that flow into hospital beds and have hospital bed capacity to allow an A&E department or emergency department to function.”
“That should not be a challenge; I suspect that that data is already extant in some part of the system. She is proposing a very moderate measure, which would pull all that together in one place, and allow it to be focused on and looked at in the round, rather than in disparate little penny packets of data.”
“Gentleman’s point, however, that with many of these things—both clinicians and coroners grapple with this—it is often complex to determine the actual most significant contributory factor. My hon.”
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“That is necessary to ensure that the information system is able to capture a comprehensive picture of a patient’s treatment to generate robust evidence, and that if a patient moves from one area of the UK to another, they are not lost from the registry. Robust decision making on patient safety must be made using accurate data, which can only be achieved by processing identifiable data from the four nations to create the UK-wide information system. That necessitates precise data linkage due to the nature and potential rarity of harmful events based on multiple identifiable data points. It is proportionate to use identifiable data to understand potentially adverse patterns early.”
“The medicine information systems clauses give us an important opportunity to ensure we have the highest quality evidence on which to base critical regulatory decisions. If we get this right, there is real potential, which has been alluded to by all Members, to take a step forward in the way medicines are monitored, risks are identified and action is taken to protect patients. We need to provide for the most effective operation of this system to realise the full benefits for patients across the UK. The detailed operation of the system will need to be carefully considered further as we develop the regulations under the clause. It will probably be important that the systems are able to receive information that is fully identifiable to ensure accurate linkage and deduplication of data.”
“I spoke to him a week or two ago, and with tragic timing, in that conversation he asked me to pass on his best wishes to James Brokenshire for his recovery. I know that they got on well, and I hope that I have a similar relationship with Humza, who is pragmatic, and I appreciate the work that he is doing on this. We continue to talk, because I am keen that we have that healthy relationship and it is my intention that we respect the Sewel convention and work together to come to an agreed position. It is challenging because there are genuine differences of principle on how things should be interpreted, but I am committed to working with him, as he is with me, to find a way to reach a common position that respects everyone’s principles and approach.”
“To the point made by the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire about the relationship with Edinburgh, while it is correct that a number of these clauses, and a large part of the Bill, were not finalised in their drafting until a day or two before publication, it is important to say that since the beginning of this year Scottish Government officials have had sight of the intentions and have been discussing with UK Government officials the wording and content of these clauses. I appreciate that this is not necessarily the same as a Minister seeing the exact wording, but that relationship and transparency has been there at that level. I also put on record my gratitude to Humza Yousaf, the Cabinet Secretary for Health and Social Care.”
“It will ensure that we have robust and comprehensive evidence to address public health concerns, and enable mechanisms to track the use and effects of medicines, based on public health needs. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.”
“Given the overarching aims of the clause, it makes sense that the provisions will ultimately sit within the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021, which has a similar power for establishing information systems for medical devices in section 19. To ensure the effective operation of both the medicines information systems and the medical devices information systems, the clause also introduces necessary technical amendments to the MMD Act. The clause drives forward improvements to the safety measures that protect patients in the UK against avoidable harm from medicines, and supports the need for the establishment of registries as recommended in the independent medicines and medical devices safety review, published last year. The clause directly supports putting patient safety at the heart of regulatory decision making.”
“For example, where safety concerns have led to the introduction of measures to minimise risk to patients, comprehensive medicines registries will enable early identification and investigation of cases where those measures are not being followed, so that additional action can be taken to improve safety at national, local or individual patient level. The clause also ensures that we have the right powers to promptly modify what data is collected by NHS Digital as the need for new or different information about a medicine emerges in the light of changing or developing public health needs. That will provide the ability to rapidly respond to emerging risks to patient safety if and when they develop.”
“Medicines information systems will enhance the capture and collation of information on the uses and effects of specific medicines across all four nations, including medicines prescribed to patients by the NHS and private healthcare providers. That information will be used by the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency to enhance post-market surveillance of medicines by enabling the development of comprehensive UK-wide medicines registries, which will be used to drive improvements to patient safety. The evidence generated through medicines registries can be used to inform regulatory decision making, support local clinical practice and provide prescribers with the evidence needed to make better-informed decisions.”
“As we have discussed in the context of the various amendments, clause 85 inserts a new chapter, 1A, into the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021. It introduces a new power to make regulations that would provide for one or more medicines information systems to be established and operated by NHS Digital. The power may be exercised only for the specified purposes set out in the provision: namely, purposes relating to the safety, quality and efficacy of human medicines and the improvement of clinical decision making in relation to human medicines. The clause sets out the types of provisions that could be made by the regulations and, to ensure full engagement, includes a mandatory public consultation requirement that must be fulfilled before any regulations are made.”
“I have nothing further to add to what we have said, save that I am always in listening mode when the shadow Minister is making his points. Question put and agreed to . Clause 85 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. — (Steve Double .)”
“We have now received applications from trusts to be one of the next eight hospitals in our new hospital programme, which will be the biggest hospital building programme in a generation. I understand that an expression of interest has been submitted, proposing developments at the Doncaster Royal Infirmary site. Although I cannot comment on this particular application at this stage, I can tell my hon. Friend that we aim to make our final decision in spring next year.”
“The last time I saw David was a few weeks ago, when he posed for a photo that he wanted with me and then tried to impress on me the question of whether I would come to the wonderful town of Southend.”
“I cannot comment on the selection process while it is under way, but my hon. Friend is a strong and powerful advocate for his constituents and for a new hospital in Doncaster. He has met me a number of times and continues to raise this matter in the House. I should perhaps have taken him up on his offer of a visit in the summer, when it was sunny, but I am still certainly happy to take him up on that offer. If I may briefly be indulged, Mr Speaker—we do not often have the opportunity to do this from the Front Bench—let me say that I am grateful to the hon. Member for Tooting (Dr Allin-Khan) for her kind words about our late colleagues, James Brokenshire and Sir David Amess.”
“Hang on, sir! I was about to say that I would be delighted to visit what is now the city of Southend. My only deep sadness is that our friend will not be there to meet me when I do so. He and his family are very much in our thoughts.”
“That ensures that Parliament can scrutinise the use of the power, including any necessary amendments made to primary legislation, following consultation with the relevant parties, as set out in clause 92. It is an important provision that will allow transfers and delegations of functions to be made effectively.”
“As the functions of the relevant bodies are set out in primary legislation, it will be necessary to amend, repeal or revoke such primary legislation when providing for a transfer of functions. The power to do this is provided at subsection (5). Future legislation that relates or refers to the relevant bodies in question may also need to be amended. It is also necessary for there to be powers to amend devolved legislation—I suspect this is where the hon. Lady and I may have a slight divergence of interpretation or of view, but we will see. There are references to the relevant bodies in devolved legislation, which may need to be amended in order to refer to a new body to which a function is transferred to ensure the effective operation in law of that transfer. Regulations made under these powers will be subject to the affirmative procedure.”
“Clause 89 details the scope of those powers referenced in clauses 87 and 88, namely the powers for the Secretary of State to transfer functions to and from relevant bodies and to delegate the Secretary of State’s functions to them. Clause 89 sets out the detail of what may be done when using these powers, which gives useful clarity as to the powers’ scope. Subsections (1) to (3) set out what may be included in regulations when modifying the functions of a body, the constitutional arrangements or the funding arrangements. The clause also sets out certain types of powers that may be repealed and re-enacted, but not created, at subsection (4). For example, the power cannot be used to create a new criminal offence, but can be used to repeal or re-enact an existing one so that it moves with a relevant function if appropriate.”
“There are precedents for this type of power to make consequential amendments to devolved legislation in many other Acts, and indeed reciprocal powers for devolved Administrations to make consequential amendments to UK Acts of Parliament. It is worth noting, in the context of the ALBs that we are concerned with in these clauses, that Welsh legislation in 2013 made consequential amendments to the Human Tissue Act 2004 of this place. We fear that seeking to introduce new consent requirements on consequential amendments to devolved legislation would be unnecessary and could risk unbalancing current delicate constitutional relationships.”
“I hope I have been able to provide some reassurance to this Committee; it is my intention to provide further reassurances on this matter throughout the Bill’s passage, and I continue to talk to the relevant Ministers in the devolved Administrations. The power to make consequential amendments to devolved legislation provided for by clause 89(6) is entirely limited to matters that are genuinely consequential upon regulations and will be largely technical in nature, such as name changes post transfer. The substantive power is to make the transfer of functions, and the consequential amendments flow directly from that. For the statute to work, those consequential changes should not be subject to consent requirements in their own right.”
“This clause, together with clause 87, provides vitally needed flexibility for the health system. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire for tabling amendments 71 and 72 and thereby bringing these issues before the Committee for debate. These amendments seek to ensure that devolved Administrations have the power of veto over any consequential changes that may be needed to devolved legislation. I note that in her evidence to the Committee Baroness Morgan, the Welsh Minister for Health and Social Services, also expressed concern about this power, as well as the general power to make consequential amendments in clause 130, which she linked it to. During my discussions with Lady Morgan about the Bill, I have set out why I believe these powers are necessary and appropriate.”
“The special health authorities that currently exercise functions on behalf of the Secretary of State are the NHS Business Services Authority, NHS Blood and Transplant, the NHS Litigation Authority, now known as NHS Resolution, the NHS Counter Fraud Authority and the NHS Trust Development Authority, which is merging with NHS England as part of this Bill. As outlined in clause 87, this clause sets out that, by virtue of clause 131, the Secretary of State can use that power to make consequential, transitional or saving provision to modify the functions, constitution or funding of either affected body. The Secretary of State must also make provision for maintaining representation of the interests of the devolved Administrations where there is the pre-existing requirement in the constitution of the body from which the function is transferred.”
“Clause 88 merely extends that provision, so that the Secretary of State may delegate their functions to one of the NDPBs. For that reason, I encourage the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire not to press her amendments, but I will wait to hear what she says when she speaks to them shortly. As we have already discussed, clause 88 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations providing for a relevant body to exercise some of their functions. As with clause 87, that would be done by way of a statutory instrument laid under the affirmative procedure. Since special health authorities exercise functions of, and are subject to, direction by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State already has the power to provide for a function currently exercised by one special health authority to be exercised instead by another.”
“As with clause 87, clause 88 makes explicit provision for the continuation of any existing board representation for DAs on the body to which its functions are transferred. I set out in our debate on amendment 68 the Government’s reasons for opposing the imposition of a consent requirement on the use of the power in clause 87. We oppose a consent requirement in clause 88 for the same reasons. A further reason for opposing a requirement for the consent of the devolved Administrations to the power in clause 88 is that the clause simply allows the delegation of functions of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State already has the power, in effect, to move any of his or her functions between different special health authorities. That does not require the consent of the DAs.”
“Amendment 70 would introduce a requirement for devolved Administration ministerial consent if a proposal to transfer a function involves the transfer of a function exercisable in a devolved Administration and a transferring body with devolved representation on its board. Clause 88 confers a power on the Secretary of State, through secondary legislation, to delegate functions that may be delegated to special health authorities to any of the relevant non-departmental public bodies listed in clause 86 instead. The clause gives the Secretary of State the power only to delegate the Secretary of State’s functions. It does not create any power for him or her to do anything in respect of the functions that devolved Administration Ministers direct those special health authorities to perform in the devolved nations.”
“The Secretary of State must also make provision for maintaining representation of the interests of the devolved nations where there is the pre-existing requirement in the constitution of the body from which the function is transferred. That provision, together with clause 88, ensures a more agile and flexible framework for key health bodies that can adapt over time. Our arm’s length bodies want to work together more closely, and the covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated the value of working flexibly. Building on that recent energy and innovation, the clause provides a mechanism to support a more responsive and adaptive system than the current structure allows.”
“Clause 87 sets out the conditions that would need to be met for the Secretary of State to use that power—namely, to improve the exercise of those functions with regard to efficiency, effectiveness, economy and securing appropriate accountability to Ministers, with the aim of improving patient outcomes. The Secretary of State can, through regulations, modify the functions and constitutional or funding arrangements of the affected bodies, and, with the exception of NHS England, abolish a body if it has become redundant as a consequence of the transfer of functions. That will be done by way of a statutory instrument laid before the House under the affirmative procedure.”
“We believe that that provision, alongside the current commitment to consult that is set out in the Bill, and underpinned by a detailed memorandum of understanding between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations, provides the opportunity to engage in a thorough and meaningful way throughout the entire process. However, as I alluded in my response to the hon. Lady’s previous amendments, I will continue to engage with Ministers in each of the devolved Administrations to further explore whether—to build on what I have already said—there is anything more we can do to provide reassurance ahead of Report. Clause 87 confers on the Secretary of State the power to transfer functions between the relevant bodies listed in clause 86 using secondary legislation.”
“If it is used, it will be to make necessary and helpful changes to the ALB landscape, such as enabling professionals with complementary expertise to work more closely together, as they have in many areas in response to the ongoing pandemic. Many functions relate to England only, and when bodies do operate in devolved areas it is often through mutual agreement. We fear that it would be disproportionate to require consent each time the power is used. We consider this to be primarily about improving administrative effectiveness. We recognise that there are arrangements to ensure that devolved Administrations’ interests are recognised and represented at board level. Clause 87 makes explicit provision for the continuation of any existing board representation for devolved Administrations on the body to which relevant functions are transferred.”
“Amendment 68 seeks to introduce a requirement for devolved Administration ministerial consent if a proposed transfer of a function includes a function exercisable in relation to a devolved Administration and involves a body with a requirement for representation of Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland on its board. Clause 87 confers a power on the Secretary of State, through secondary legislation, to transfer functions between the relevant bodies listed in clause 86. That is not a power to take away services that are currently provided by the relevant arm’s length bodies that are in scope; the power allows only for moving the existing functions around within the current landscape in order to provide greater flexibility.”
“Clause 92 sets out the Secretary of State’s duty to consult any body to which the proposed change relates, as well as the devolved Administrations if the draft regulations apply in their jurisdictions and relate to matters that are within the legislative competence of their legislatures, or in respect of which their Ministers exercise functions. If functions exercisable by Scottish Ministers are impacted, Scottish Ministers would, in our view, already be consulted under the current wording. We do not consider it appropriate, therefore, to consult a devolved Administration on reserved issues where it can be shown that they do not impact on it in any way. We have committed to setting out further detail in the memorandum of understanding, both in terms of early engagement and the formal consultation process, when it is appropriate.”
“This definition does not include a number of health and care-related bodies, including the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence and the Care Quality Commission, which we have determined should not be covered by the powers in part 3 of the Bill due to the nature of their advisory, regulatory and/or public health functions. The clause therefore establishes the non-departmental public bodies in scope of the power to transfer functions set out in clauses 87 to 92. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire for tabling amendment 69, which seeks to ensure that Scottish Ministers are consulted before a transfer of functions in reserved areas is carried out.”
“Clause 86 sets out the definition of “relevant bodies” that is used in part 3 of the Bill. This definition is relevant to clause 87, which provides the Secretary of State with a power to transfer functions between relevant bodies, and to clause 88, which provides a power to delegate functions of the Secretary of State to relevant bodies. The bodies covered by this definition are all public, sponsored by the Department and operating in the health sector. In many instances they have complementary functions where there could be material benefit to elements of joint delivery.”
“It is a pleasure, as ever, to see you in the Chair, Ms Elliott. The existing arm’s length body landscape has remained largely unchanged since the Health and Social Care Act 2012 reforms. As the health service has evolved, this structure has led to a fragmentation of roles between different organisations, and sometimes competing priorities being disseminated to providers. We have seen ALBs, with all their differing functions and operations, responding as rapidly as possible during the pandemic. Building on this recent energy and innovation, and the value of working flexibly, this power provides a mechanism to support a more responsive and adaptive system than the current structure allows. Using these powers—to transfer functions to and from ALBs—the system will be able to respond to differing challenges more swiftly.”
“Gentleman some explanation of the difference in approach.”
“I am grateful to colleagues for their comments and contributions. The short answer to the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North, is that comparing the UK Health Security Agency, for example, to what we are discussing here is in a sense comparing apples with pears. This is about non-departmental public bodies. UKHSA is an Executive agency, so it is already directly under the power of the Secretary of State, hence why the Secretary of State was able to make those changes. This is about the different categorisation of two subordinate bodies of the Department—NDPB versus Executive agency—which is why this section of the Bill deals with NDPBs, for which that power is currently not the same as it is for an Executive agency such as UKHSA. It is a technical point, but hopefully that gives the hon.”
“Therefore, in spaces such as this, we come across complex challenges where there is no clear delineation for how to respect the devolution settlement and not intervene in aspects that are clearly devolved, while also striking a balance such that the devolved Administrations do not have a power of veto over a reserved matter. Those are the complexities we are wrestling with in a number of areas here, and I think that goes to the heart of the issues that the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire has been raising.”
“Member for Central Ayrshire, is that where a policy area is devolved, it should be that devolution settlement that takes primacy. The challenge is that, in a number of areas here, we see almost a hybrid of reserve powers and devolved powers. We will come on to this after we have debated the Health Service Safety Investigations Body part, but it is a good illustration, so I will use it as an example here: if we look at reciprocal healthcare arrangements, which we will come to, the implementation or impact on the ground is to a degree devolved; it is about the organisation of health services in a particular area. However, the power to make international agreements is reserved.”
“I will turn to that issue, but before I do I will address the question of why I think this is a proportionate and necessary change in the powers. As we have seen during the pandemic, there can be rapid changes and moves in the functions of those NDPBs, and we therefore cannot have a process that preserves in aspic a particular set of functions in primary legislation. I believe this is a proportionate measure that allows for flexibility around those functions around NDPBs, although in my view it does not encroach on the way they operate, hence the non-departmental public body point that the hon. Lady made. It strikes an appropriate balance. The other point the hon. Member for Nottingham North made, which shades into the points from the hon.”
“I am trying to reassure the hon. Lady that there is no intention to undo what works, but there is a recognition of the need for us to continue to work as four nations together on this. I hope she will be reassured that that helps to respect the devolution settlement; I suspect she may wish to probe me further in future debates, but that, of course, is what we are here for. I encourage hon. Members not to press their amendments to a Division. Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Lady’s specific point about the public health arrangements that work in Scotland and that are a matter for the Scottish Government is that those relationships and that way of working will be able to continue. However, we saw in the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 and the withdrawal agreement a way of working regarding the health security provisions that has a UK approach to working but fully involves each of the devolved Administrations, because we recognise that the threats are national—as in four nations—and we have seen that diseases and public health threats do not stop just before they get to Berwick, and vice versa. Therefore, we are keen to look at this in a four-nations way, and we have just been looking with the Scottish Government at the public health framework and how we work with it.”
“The hon. Lady makes a couple of points there. First, on the transition with Public Health England, to avoid a cliff edge—in the context of some of my conversations with the hon. Member for Nottingham North about different aspects of policy, that is perhaps not the best word—in the transition between two organisations, we have had for some months parallel running of the two. I believe, relying on my memory, that Public Health England finally transfers all its functions and ceases at the end of this month, and then we will see that transition. We have both in being for the time being, to ensure smooth operation of the actual functions they perform. My understanding of the hon.”
“That would risk reducing public trust in HSSIB, which I think we all agree will be paramount in gaining public support for the work it does, and it could undermine the acceptance of its recommendations.”
“HSSIB will be a non-departmental public body and will therefore meet the criteria to be added to the Public Appointments Order in Council, which lists those bodies whereby the non-executive member appointments are bound by the Cabinet Office’s governance code on public appointments, which are regulated by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. It is standard practice to have the Secretary of State appoint non-executive board members to a public body. Making that the responsibility of the chief executive of NHS England could bring into question HSSIB’s independence, especially when it is investigating issues that might involve or lead to recommendations for NHS England.”
“The intention is that following the NHS England and NHS Improvement merger, which we have discussed earlier, the functions of the current Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch will sit with NHS England until such time as HSSIB is established as a separate statutory body, so the transfer scheme provisions in the schedule provide for a transition from NHS England to HSSIB. The amendments that have been tabled focus largely on the membership and responsibilities of, and the appointments process relating to, HSSIB’s board. Amendment 127 would remove the responsibility of the Secretary of State to appoint the chair and non-executive members to the board, and would instead give that responsibility to the chief executive of NHS England.”
“It also gives effect to schedule 13, which sets out arrangements for HSSIB’s constitution and governance, and provides details of its membership and its financial and reporting obligations. I am proud that this will be one of the first independent healthcare bodies of its kind in the world carrying out systemic investigations. The independence of the new body’s investigations will give the public full confidence in its investigation processes and its ability to deliver impartial conclusions and recommendations. The aim will be to learn and not to blame. On the practical side, schedule 13 also allows the making of transfer schemes to ensure a smooth transition when HSSIB is set up.”
“Unfortunately, that Bill did not progress past Second Reading because Parliament was dissolved for the general election. However, the Government are committed to reducing patient harm by improving the quality of health investigations and developing a culture of real learning. We are using this Bill to deliver that world-leading innovation in patient safety. I will take this opportunity to pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire (Ms Dorries) for all the work she did on this when she was Minister of State for patient safety. Clause 93 specifically establishes HSSIB as the body to take forward systemic patient safety investigations.”
“We want to ensure that we learn from what has gone wrong before, which ultimately will ensure that patients get the best care, which they rightly deserve. HSSIB’s investigations will not assess or determine blame, civil or criminal liability, or whether action needs to be taken in respect of an individual by a regulatory body. Instead, its investigations will identify risks to the safety of patients and address these by facilitating the improvement of systems and practices in the provision of healthcare services in England. There have been calls for some time to put the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch on an independent statutory footing. We previously introduced proposals to do that in the Health Service Safety Investigations Bill, which was introduced in the other place in October 2019.”
“I will endeavour to make progress before the Division in the House. Clause 93 is the first clause in part 4, which establishes the health services safety investigations body. This new body will build on the work of the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch, which became operational in 2017 as part of NHS Improvement. Part 4 makes provision to establish an independent statutory body to investigate qualifying incidents that occur in England during the provision of healthcare services that have or may have patient safety implications. Crucially, HSSIB’s investigations and reports are about learning from incidents across the healthcare landscape and will help to foster a strong learning culture.”
“Giving a chief finance officer control over the remuneration of non-executive members means that the Secretary of State and, via the Secretary of State, Parliament would not have full oversight of how public money is spent. Although I am sure that the non-executive board members would act with the utmost integrity, we must ensure that the legislation supports them to do so as far as possible, and that we do not deviate from standard practice in public appointments. For those reasons, I ask hon. Members not to press their amendments, and I commend this clause and schedule to the Committee.”
“In respect of public appointments, the governance code for public appointments states that “Ministers must be consulted before a competition opens to agree the job description for the role, the length of tenure and remuneration.” A number of non-departmental public bodies follow this code, such as the Care Quality Commission, the Human Tissue Authority and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, to name a few. There is no reason why the arrangements for HSSIB should differ from those of other non-departmental public bodies. We wish to ensure the independence of HSSIB’s board, and I know that hon. Members feel strongly about that, too.”