Edward Argar
MP for Melton and Syston · Conservative · United Kingdom
“I will not keep the Committee long. I am very pleased to see the hon. and gallant Gentleman, the Minister, still in post, as this is a policy area that he has cared deeply about throughout his life. I share the broad support for the instrument expressed by the shadow Minister, my hon.”
“I appreciate it may be set out in the 2006 or 2025 primary parent legislation to these draft regulations, but if he can, I would be grateful for a little clarification. Finally, paragraph 10.1 of the explanatory memorandum refers to the legislation being continuously monitored.”
“I live in my patch and I know that there will be genuine local fury at the contempt this Government have shown for my constituents in approving a Leicester city land grab, which has cross-party opposition locally.”
“Lady was right to highlight in her remarks the importance of timely discharge from hospital as a key element of whether we can achieve that flow into hospital beds and have hospital bed capacity to allow an A&E department or emergency department to function.”
“That should not be a challenge; I suspect that that data is already extant in some part of the system. She is proposing a very moderate measure, which would pull all that together in one place, and allow it to be focused on and looked at in the round, rather than in disparate little penny packets of data.”
“Gentleman’s point, however, that with many of these things—both clinicians and coroners grapple with this—it is often complex to determine the actual most significant contributory factor. My hon.”
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“I see these clauses as permitting a further evolution of the system and a recognition of the need, ideally, where we can, to further delegate powers from the Secretary of State to lower down within the system. On that basis, I hope the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues will feel able to support the clauses. Question put and agreed to. Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill . Clause 36 Power of direction: investigation functions”
“The past 18 months have shone a light on public health; under Governments of all political complexions, public health has not always enjoyed that prominence in public debate, external media and other commentary. One thing that I hope will follow on from the terrible events we have endured over the past 18 months is a greater understanding and appreciation of public health and its measures, and for public health to enjoy the support it needs to do its job. I think all Members would agree that one of the few positives has been the recognition of the value of public health and prevention. I think that those were the main points that the hon. Gentleman raised.”
“My reading of that is that, as I mentioned in my opening remarks on these clauses, there are some public health functions that are NHS and delegated through CCGs, such as GPs participating in child immunisation programmes—hence the reference to ICBs, because they will be replacing CCGs in the new world. Understandably, the hon. Gentleman talked about funding for public health. On his comments about the bigger picture on funding and spending levels more broadly, I simply remind him of the note left by a previous Chief Secretary to the Treasury: “I’m afraid there is no money.” We cannot get away from that context in this space, but more broadly he is right to highlight the importance of public health.”
“My recollection—I may be wrong—is that they date to about 2016, rather than 2012, and my understanding of the power is that it does not go against what he was saying, but provides for the continued evolution of the system and enables that delegation to take place. In practical terms, I would envisage that, where local authorities combine and work together, they would have their own arrangements, and we are not seeking to cut across those local working arrangements. The hon. Gentleman also talked about the ICBs, saying that they are NHS bodies and asking whether this is a threat to local authority delegation of public health functions.”
“He and I share a common view on that, and he is right: one of the few things in the 2012 Act that I suspect he would have agreed with was the recognition of the public health function of local authorities. We are not seeking to do anything in the Bill to undermine that function in any way. It will not surprise the hon. Gentleman to know that I believe that the Bill provides for multiple layers of integration. Within a local NHS system, at an ICB level and then at an integrated care partnership level, there will be increased integration with local authorities and others, laying the foundations for the ambitious programme that the Prime Minister set out when he spoke earlier in this Session about the health and care levy. The hon. Gentleman spoke about combined authorities.”
“The shadow Minister has made a number of serious points—I am not sure how one spins the wheels when the car is stalled, but none the less I took his point. First, at the heart of this Bill is the fact that we seek to strike the appropriate balance between what is clearly a national health service, accountable to the Secretary of State and Parliament, and local flexibilities and local integration. The debate we will have for the next two hours or so will probably be about whether we have struck that balance appropriately, but that is the core of what we are seeking to do here. The hon. Gentleman rightly talked about the importance of local authorities in this space.”
“Members that the HSSIB will be independent. Clause 36 is not designed to infringe upon its independence and cannot be used to direct the new HSSIB in how it exercises its functions; it is there simply to ensure the continuity of current investigations until the 2023 start date. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston to consider not pressing the amendment to a vote.”
“Members that clause 36 is a temporary measure to ensure that the current Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch can continue to exist in the interim phase before the new body is established. As I am sure hon. Members are aware, the merger of NHS England and NHS Improvement means that the NHS Trust Development Authority, of which the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch is a part, will be abolished. We need the important investigation function that the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch provides to continue until HSSIB is fully operational which, subject to parliamentary approval, is planned for spring 2023. The power set out in clause 36 is designed to enable the Secretary of State to direct NHS England, or another public body, to carry out the investigation function in the interim period. I reassure hon.”
“I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman; I made it in rather slower time down to the Chamber to listen to the statement. After one of our sittings last week, I think the hon. Member for Nottingham North was on his feet asking a question in the Chamber before I had even made it out of this room, which shows a certain speed that I can only seek to emulate. I appreciate that the amendment is linked to the independence of the Health Services Safety Investigation Body. The Government are clear that HSSIB will be independent, which is why it is being set up as a non-departmental public body, with a chief executive—to be known as the chief investigator—and executive and non-executive members. I hope I can reassure hon.”
“I will be brief, because I believe that in responding to the shadow Minister’s amendment I set out the intentions behind the clause and the reasons why it is drafted as it is. Notwithstanding his desire to push his amendment to vote, all I can say is that I will continue to reflect on the points he has made. I cannot promise the outcome, but I will reflect on what he said. Having made the case when I addressed the amendment, I commend the clause to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 36 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 37 General power to direct NHS England Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“We believe that both clauses not only support that intention, but strengthen it, and I commend them to the Committee.”
“Neither the provisions in clause 37 nor those in clause 62, or indeed anywhere else in the Bill, do anything to change the nature of NHS England as an arm’s length body. I hope that I can reassure the hon. Member—I fear that I may not—that the removal of these duties does not mean that Ministers are about to start interfering in the NHS or in any other body exercising functions relating to the health service. Integration is at the heart of the Bill. By creating integrated care boards and removing unnecessary bureaucracy that can get in the way of local organisations wanting to work together, we are putting more power and autonomy in the hands of local systems, and that is our intention here. We are seeking to strengthen local leadership and empower local organisations to make decisions about their populations.”
“The second reason for repealing that duty is to ensure compatibility with the duties elsewhere in the Bill on NHS organisations, including NHS England, to consider the effects of their decisions on the better health and wellbeing of everyone, equality of care for patients and the sustainable use of NHS resources. To avoid any conflict in duties, it is important to remove NHS England’s duty of autonomy, as these new duties require NHS England to co-operate and work closely with other partners, rather than autonomously. Repealing the duty of autonomy will also make it easier for NHS England to facilitate co-operation within the system—when commissioning services or issuing guidance, for example.”
“They reflect the evolution of NHS England in recent years, changes to the wider system and the appropriate expectations on Government to support, challenge and steer the system, while also leaving it free to determine operational matters. Clause 62 amends the National Health Service Act 2006 by repealing the duty on the Secretary of State and NHS England to promote autonomy. The rationale for doing so comes is two parts. First, the response to the pandemic has further highlighted the importance of different parts of the health and care system working together in the best interests of public and patients. By repealing the duty to promote autonomy, the clause further enshrines integration and collaboration at the heart of the legislative framework underpinning the system.”
“The clause ensures, in proposed new section 13ZE, that appropriate levers are in place—as there are for other arm’s length bodies—for Ministers to respond and take swift action if NHS England fails to carry out any of its functions. It also ensures, in proposed new section 13ZF, that Ministers have the levers they need to direct NHS England to provide information. Without it, we would be expanding the functions, responsibilities and powers of NHS England without ensuring that there are appropriate accountability arrangements in place for this large integrated body. The changes that clause 37 introduced are proportionate, in our view.”
“To ensure the NHS’s continued clinical and day-to-day operational independence, proposed new section 13ZD also sets out specific areas where the power of direction in section 13ZC cannot be used. The Secretary of State is unable to use this power to intervene in the appointment of individuals by NHS England, in individual clinical decisions or in relation to drugs or treatments that the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence has not recommended or issued guidance on. We believe that clause 37 is crucial for ensuring that we have the right framework for national oversight and accountability of our health system, and of one of the largest arm’s length bodies, responsible for over £130 billion of public money.”
“Of course, the Department’s title is “Health and Social Care”, and while NHS England will rightly continue to be focused on the NHS, the Government must take a wider view—and this wider view may lead us, on occasion, to a different conclusion about the appropriate course of action from that held by NHS England colleagues. There is already a strong and close working relationship between Ministers and NHS England. The clause helps to formalise that in a way that is more transparent for everyone to see, building in the normal expectations of ministerial decision making and accountability by requiring Ministers to issue directions in writing, and to ensure they are published and made in the public interest. Any decision to exercise this power will be premised and guided by general public law principles and broader statutory duties.”
“The Government’s primary means of shaping the NHS agenda continues to be the mandate to NHS England, which has been an established means of providing direction to NHS England since 2013. As we have learned in recent times, events can move fast, and the mandate may not be adaptable to all circumstances—and nor was it designed to be when it was conceived. The powers in the clause are designed to supplement the existing mechanisms, such as the mandate, to give the Secretary of State the ability, where he or she deems it appropriate and in the public interest, to provide direction and to intervene in relation to NHS England’s functions.”
“It does not give the Secretary of State any new powers over other NHS bodies. It gives the Secretary of State precisely no new powers over clinical decisions. The clause is about ensuring appropriate accountability mechanisms between the democratically elected Government and one of the biggest arm’s length bodies, if not the biggest. That is a principle of democratic accountability in a publicly funded national healthcare service, and I am sure it is accepted not just by the leadership of NHS England, but by Opposition Members, even if they may not feel that the clause reflects their interpretation of it. In practice, NHS England will continue, as now, to make the vast majority of its decisions without direction, consulting the Government and others as it needs to.”
“I suspect that, with this, we get to the main event of this afternoon’s proceedings. I begin with clause 37, which introduces powers for the Secretary of State to give directions to the newly merged NHS England. This merger, which is widely welcomed, of three different bodies with different accountability arrangements into one has inevitably required us to look at the appropriate accountability arrangements for the future, and the extent to which the accountability arrangements have evolved and kept up with the evolution of the organisation. The powers in the clause will ensure the appropriate balance between democratic accountability to the Secretary of State and the NHS’s clinical and day-to-day operational independence. Clause 37 will give the Secretary of State new powers over a newly merged and larger NHS England.”
“Clause 37 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 38 Reconfiguration of services: intervention powers Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“I remember those days. If I remember correctly, not only did she sit on a board; she also has extensive experience in running healthcare services as a senior leadership figure within the local NHS, so she knows of what she speaks. I do not think that what we are seeing here is quite as the hon. Lady characterises—a huge change in the direction of our party’s policy or the direction of travel. We are putting in place a pragmatic and sensible measure, to reflect the focus now on a duty to co-operate, which a duty of autonomy sits slightly ill with, as I say, and to make sure that we have clear accountabilities. We recognise in theory and in legislation what is already deemed by the public to be there in reality, which is the accountability of the Secretary of State and the Government. Question put and agreed to.”
“Were something to be done that he thought inappropriate, I can bet my bottom dollar that I would be standing at the Dispatch Box answering an urgent question from him 24 or 48 hours later. There are mechanisms in this House by which Ministers can be held to account for decisions they make. That is why I believe that this move aids transparency. Rather than informal conversations and discussions, as happen in any organisation, the clause will require that, where a disagreement occurs, there is a clear direction for it to be published transparently, for shadow Ministers and others in this House to question and challenge it, or to raise, within or outwith the House, their concerns in front of the public. The hon. Member for Bristol South quite rightly alluded to how PCTs operated. Like her, I sat as a non-executive member of a PCT board.”
“I think that is right, and that is why we must ensure that the accountability is reflected in the responsibility and the ability to exercise that responsibility and accountability over how the NHS operates. On the promotion of autonomy, as the hon. Member for Nottingham North alluded to and as I set out, if we are seeking to promote integration and co-operation, as the Bill does, that therefore sits slightly ill with a duty to promote autonomy, and this is about how we reconcile those two matters in legislative language. He talked about a parliamentary mechanism in this context. I emphasise the need for the directions to be published in writing and to be in the public interest. As we know, such documents are always able to be debated in the House.”
“There are a few points that I will seek to address. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Nottingham North for highlighting the accountability of the Secretary of State—he also highlighted me. I remind colleagues that in my ministerial capacity, as a junior Minister, I am in legal terms but an extension of my Secretary of State; all the powers are vested in him and I am but a legal extension of him. Colleagues may dwell on that as they wish, but possibly not too much. The hon. Member for Nottingham North set it out well. If we went out into Parliament Square and asked three dozen people who they believe is accountable for the NHS and the delivery of health services in this country, they would say it was the Government, or possibly the Secretary of State or the Prime Minister.”
“Without it, the Secretary of State’s ability to intervene and take decisions will remain limited, often coming at the end of a long local process. As now, he would not be alerted to a potential change in services until the change became an issue and he would remain powerless to intervene without a formal referral by a local authority. I am conscious that that existing arrangement satisfies few in Parliament, including Opposition Members, on the occasions when they make representations about the process. However, it will be for this debate to see whether Members feel that the proposed new arrangement satisfies them—I will not prejudge that for a minute, looking at the faces of the Opposition Members. I therefore commend clause 38 and schedule 6 to the Committee.”
“The Secretary of State will be able to take any decision that could have been taken by the NHS commissioning body. That includes the ability for the Secretary of State to decide whether a proposal should proceed, the results the NHS commissioning body should achieve, and the procedural steps that should be taken. As I set out earlier, decision making will continue to be guided by the four reconfigurations tests. The new power will not replace the important role that local scrutiny and engagement play in service change decisions. As the shadow Minister set out, the public expect Ministers to be accountable for the health service, which includes reconfigurations of it. The clause ensures that decisions made in the NHS that affect all our constituents are subject to democratic oversight.”
“The new intervention power will enable the Secretary of State to act as a scrutineer and decision maker for reconfigurations, to intervene where, for example, they can see a critical benefit or cost to taking one or other course of action, or to take action where there is significant cause for public concern. We do not expect or intend to use the power with any regularity, and where it is used, it will be done so transparently. As I have emphasised, the Secretary of State must publish any decisions made about reconfigurations. Schedule 6 sets out the scope of the reconfiguration powers as they pertain to NHS commissioning bodies, NHS services, NHS trusts and foundation trusts. It introduces a new duty for the relevant NHS bodies to notify the Secretary of State of any proposed or likely reconfiguration.”
“The clause inserts proposed new section 68A and proposed new schedule 10A into the National Health Service Act 2006. It also introduces schedule 6, which includes a new intervention power to allow the Secretary of State to call in a reconfiguration of NHS services at any stage of the process, without the need for a referral from a local authority. A reconfiguration of NHS services is a change in service provision that has an impact on the manner in which a service is delivered at the point at which the service is received by the user, or the range of health services available to individuals. That could be, for example, a change in where a mental health in-patient unit is based, building a new stroke unit, or restructuring a whole hospital trust.”
“The Secretary of State is also under a number of duties set out in the National Health Service Act 2006, including a duty to promote a comprehensive health service, to secure continuous improvement in quality of services, and to have regard to the NHS constitution. As I have already set out, the Secretary of State will continue to be advised by the IRP, and will seek appropriate advice from clinicians, local leaders or other experts. As for paragraph 4 of schedule 6, the Secretary of State already has a duty to publish any decision they make on a reconfiguration and to notify the NHS commissioning body of the decision. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Nottingham North to withdraw his amendment—I suspect that I will be unsuccessful in that plea, but I make it none the less. I will now address clause 38 and schedule 6.”
“Amendment 104 would require the Secretary of State to publish, alongside any decision they have made under this provision, a statement demonstrating that the decision is in the public interest. The Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament for all his or her decisions. Ministers are expected, as a core principle of the constitution, to act in the public interest, and this is reflected in the ministerial code. In addition, the Secretary of State’s scrutiny and direction-making process on this and any other matter must already take into account the public law decision-making principles, all relevant information and their legal duties, including the public sector equality duty, that adhere to such decisions.”
“All decision making on reconfigurations, at both local and ministerial level, will continue to be guided by the four tests laid out in existing guidance that reconfiguration should be assured against: strong public and patient engagement; consistency with current and prospective need for patient choice; a clear clinical evidence base; and support for proposals from clinical commissioners. As such, we believe that clause 38 and the guidance that the Secretary of State is required to produce under the powers in schedule 6 will provide sufficient safeguards to ensure that the Secretary of State receives appropriate advice before using the powers in this clause. As a result of not accepting amendment 103, we will also resist amendment 102, which is consequential on amendment 103.”
“Schedule 6 also includes the requirement for NHS commissioning bodies, including integrated care boards, to give the Secretary of State any information or other assistance required to carry out any functions under the schedule. It is envisioned that the Secretary of State will obtain information from NHS commissioning bodies when making reconfiguration decisions. This will include any representations that an HOSC, stakeholder, patient group or any other interested party have made, if applicable.”
“Certainly during my tenure in this post, I have consulted it and seen its advice on a number of occasions, and I am grateful for the work its staff do, the speed with which they do it and the benefit I have gained from that advice in making decisions or advising the Secretary of State on particular decisions. In practice, the Secretary of State will always need to seek appropriate advice from clinicians, local leaders or other experts before making any decision, and all decisions made using the powers inserted by clause 38 and schedule 6 must be published. This will ensure transparency and allow for proper scrutiny of the way the power is being used.”
“The new power will not replace the important role that local scrutiny and engagement plays in service change decisions; we expect the vast majority of reconfiguration decisions to continue to be managed by the local system, and system players will be encouraged to resolve matters locally where possible. The Secretary of State will continue to be advised by the Independent Reconfiguration Panel, which is being retained. The focus of the IRP is and will continue to be the patient and quality of care in the context of safe, sustainable and accessible services for local people. It has also provided the system with advice based on its experience to date around critical success factors. If I may go down a slight rabbit hole here, I would like to put on the record my appreciation for the work of the IRP.”
“If I may, I will turn to the amendments first and then the substantive clause. I am grateful to hon. Members for tabling the amendments. I said that the previous clause was coming to the main business of the afternoon, but I now suspect that was but an hors d’oeuvre to the discussion we may have on this clause and this set of amendments. Amendments 102 and 103 would require the Secretary of State to consult all relevant health overview and scrutiny committees before making a decision on a reconfiguration. Amendment 103 would also require the Secretary of State to have regard to, and publish, clinical advice from the ICB’s medical director. It is of course vital that local views are represented in any reconfiguration. However, although I understand the rationale behind these amendments, I do not think they are strictly necessary.”
“I intend to continue with an open and transparent approach, discussing with colleagues and engaging with them and others, because we know that we can always learn by listening.”
“Friend the Whip, the Member for St Austell and Newquay, I will pass over the invitation that the shadow Minister and others have extended to my colleagues on the Government Benches to break the Whip. I saw the expression on my hon. Friend’s face when that was suggested, so I strongly discourage any of my right hon. or hon. Friends from contemplating that course of action. Even though a reshuffle has only just happened, there is always another one at some point. The shadow Minister mentioned the Health Service Journal, which I enjoy reading. All I would say is that we continue to engage with a wide range of stakeholders, as we have done throughout the process. Indeed, I think that in her evidence, Dame Gill Morgan highlighted the collaborative nature of the genesis of this Bill.”
“I do not believe that the notification requirements will prove unduly onerous: a notification can be a very simple process. To the shadow Minister’s point about timeliness, process and definitions, we are working very closely with the NHS and other partners to produce guidance that will set out clear expectations about how and when the powers will be used, and how they will be exercised. In his remarks, he touched on a concern that Ministers might be beset by lobbying from the public and others. I would argue that such lobbying would clearly point to greater public engagement with such matters and increased transparency, which are things that we might welcome. For fear of upsetting my hon.”
“and hon. Members, including my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingswood, have raised a number of important points that bear further reflection. As we have said throughout this process, the challenge with this Bill is striking the right balance between being permissive and ensuring accountability at a national level, and we believe this clause plays a key part in doing so. I disagree with the shadow Minister’s view—although I respect it—that the clause does not strike the right balance, and I do not believe that the powers set out in it are disproportionate, as he has suggested. He has highlighted the role of the IRP. I mentioned my gratitude for its work in my opening remarks, and I was very clear that that work will continue. The IRP will continue to give the valuable advice it has given thus far.”
“I fear we may not have consensus in Committee at this point, but none the less I will endeavour to answer some of the points raised. I am always grateful to the shadow Minister for his kind offers of help and assistance, and he will know that I always reflect carefully on the evidence we have heard and on the opinions of hon. Members on both sides of the House. I welcome his welcoming of the publication of the impact assessment in time for him to be able to quote it back at me. Finally, I thank him for his heartfelt and kindly offer of alternative approaches, given his concern for my workload were these proposals to be approved. I am touched on a number of levels by that, and equally by his suggestion that I and others have been engaged in the dark arts of spin—heaven forbid. In the context of clause 38 and these amendments, right hon.”
“He touched on local authority engagement, who can refer, whether there is a diminution in power—I think the hon. Member for Bristol South might have mentioned that—and what qualifies the Secretary of State to make those decisions. He also referred to local knowledge.”
“We believe that the Secretary of State should be able to intervene in reconfigurations for which they are ultimately accountable, and that this proposal will increase accountability to Parliament and the community by enabling intervention at an earlier stage. Too often, controversial proposals are referred at the very end of the process after a huge amount of work, effort and expenditure, rather than at an earlier stage when there is already a divergence of opinion in the local community. The Bill gives the Secretary of State an opportunity to take a view—based on advice and on the IRP’s four tests, which will continue to be the basis of that—and to get earlier intervention, where appropriate. That is one of the key reasons. I will carry on, and the shadow Minister will nod if I am missing anything.”
“I will come to the shadow Minister’s point, but I just want to get through the points he made earlier in his preamble. He mentioned the quote in the Health Service Journal article from a spokesperson for the Department of Health and Social Care, and I think that quote accurately reflects the nature of this Bill. I am grateful to those officials from the Department who ensured that the Health Service Journal got its quote. I now turn to the substance of the shadow Minister’s argument and some of the gritter points that he, the hon. Member for Bristol South and others have alluded to. Fundamentally, he asked what challenge this Bill seeks to resolve. He asked a few other questions as well, which I will try to answer.”
“His scrutiny and direction-making process must take into account the public law decision-making principles, all relevant information and all legal duties, including the public sector equality duty. In that context, the Secretary of State will also continue to be bound by his duty on quality of service. That includes promoting the comprehensive health service and securing continuous improvement in the quality of services provided. The new call-in power for reconfiguration will allow the Secretary of State to support effective change and to be more responsive to the concerns of the public—and of Members of Parliament as their representatives—at an earlier stage.”
“Member for Bristol South has highlighted the importance of local authorities and local accountability in a number of previous speeches and interventions. The new call-in power will not replace the important role that local scrutiny and engagement play in service change decisions. Decision making on all reconfigurations, as I said, will continue to be bound by the four tests against which reconfiguration should be assured: strong public and patient engagement; consistency with current and prospective need for patient choice; a clear clinical evidence base; and support for proposals from clinical commissioners. The IRP will continue to provide the independent clinical advice to inform the Secretary of State’s decision making.”
“We anticipate the guidance setting out what is proportionate, the criteria and the appropriate point at which an intervention can be considered. I come back to the point that too often, under the current arrangement, proposals come forward right at the end of the process, after huge amounts of expenditure, effort and time, only to be overturned—potentially at the very last moment—on the basis of the referral. Having a measured and proportionate intervention power at an earlier stage is the right approach to save a lot of angst and possibly money, although we do not anticipate that the power will need to be used on many occasions, because the vast majority of reconfigurations are broadly consensual, or reach a local consensus. The shadow Minister alluded to local authority referrals, and the hon.”
“Member for Bristol South, perhaps in vain, not to press her amendment to a Division, and colleagues on the Committee to support the clause. Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Where cases are highly contentious and require ministerial input, our proposals will allow the Secretary of State to intervene. He is accountable in Parliament for reconfigurations. The shadow Minister made the broader point that if we ask who is responsible for the NHS, people will say the Secretary of State, or potentially the Prime Minister. That is already there in people’s minds. It is right that we have commensurate powers in the Bill to enable the Secretary of State to properly discharge that function and accountability. I remain touched by the hon. Gentleman’s kind concern about the volume of work I may end up having to do as a result of the measure. I do not quite share his concerns, but I am none the less touched by the thought. I urge the hon.”
“One particular example comes to mind, but given that it is a live one, I will not use it. However, if I semi-anonymise it, there are decisions that are made locally and followed through, and only at that last moment is the process challenged—for example, whether a consultation was done properly—so it triggers a potential referral to the IRP, which could see that process overturned. An earlier power to intervene and an earlier opportunity to engage could in many cases avoid that problem and lead to a smoother process. Let me make a final point. I would expect most reconfiguration decisions to be managed by the local system, and system players will be encouraged to resolve matters locally where possible and not to require any referral to the Secretary of State.”