Tommy Tuberville
Senator for Alabama · Republican · United States
“(e) Report on Certain Drivers of Deforestation and Environmental Degradation in the Brazilian Amazon.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to Congress regarding certain drivers of deforestation and environmental d…”
“(e) Report on Certain Drivers of Deforestation and Environmental Degradation in the Brazilian Amazon.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to Congress regarding certain drivers of deforestation and environmental d…”
“(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive strategy, with a classif…”
“(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive strategy, with a classif…”
“``(ii) In a civil action brought under section 2255 or 2255A, for purposes of paragraph (1), the court may-- ``(I) order the plaintiff or defendant to provide to the court or the Government, as applicable, any equipment necessary to maintain care, custody, and control of such property or material; and ``(II) take reasonable measures, and…”
“``(ii) In a civil action brought under section 2255 or 2255A, for purposes of paragraph (1), the court may-- ``(I) order the plaintiff or defendant to provide to the court or the Government, as applicable, any equipment necessary to maintain care, custody, and control of such property or material; and ``(II) take reasonable measures, and…”
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“``(g) Policies for Agentic Artificial Intelligence Systems and Processes.-- ``(1) Definition of agentic artificial intelligence system or process.--In this subsection, the term `agentic artificial intelligence system or process'-- ``(A) means an artificial intelligence system or process that, given an objective or instruction-- ``(i) determines the action or sequence of actions to be taken to accomplish that objective; and ``(ii) is capable of executing such actions directly on information systems, data, or external services; and ``(B) does not include a system or process that solely generates informational or advisory output for a human operator to act upon.”
“3334m) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)-- (A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and (B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following: ``(3) Study for tracking data generated or modified by an artificial intelligence system.--The Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of each element of the intelligence community, shall examine whether the intelligence community should identify intelligence information generated or materially modified by an artificial intelligence system, including determining what methods are necessary to preserve such information throughout the intelligence lifecycle.''; (2) in subsection (d), by adding at the end the following: ``(3) Process for review of artificial intelligence testing methodologies and benchmarks.--Consistent with applicable classification and access policies, the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of each element of the intelligence community, shall-- ``(A) establish a process to review artificial intelligence testing methodologies and benchmarks employed within each element; and ``(B) ensure such methodologies and benchmarks remain commensurate with the capabilities and impacts of systems being evaluated.''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(f) Process to Systematically Track and Evaluate Incidents.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in coordination with the National Manager for National Security Systems, shall establish a process to systematically track and evaluate incidents associated with compromises to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of artificial intelligence systems within each element of the intelligence community.”
“(3) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. SEC. 703. IMPROVEMENTS FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE POLICIES, STANDARDS, AND GUIDANCE FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) In General.--Section 6702 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C.”
“(B) Identification of any artificial intelligence tools utilized and for what tasks or purposes they are used. (C) The level of autonomy afforded to the tools, and whether human review of artificial intelligence system outputs is required to be conducted prior to dissemination of materials. (D) The scope of individuals expected to have access to the materials described in subparagraph (C). (E) An explanation of whether and how the capability limitations of artificial intelligence tools available to personnel of the intelligence community are communicated to users, including the cutoff date for the tool's training data, databases to which it does or does not have access rights, and the tasks the model has been trained for or approved for use.”
“(f) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the reviews and assessments carried out under subsection (b) as well as a summary of any new policies and directives issued pursuant to subsection (e). (2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A) A description of contributions of the intelligence community to targeting workflows, such as identification of points of interest, pattern of life analysis, review of proposed targets, target selection, and civilian impact reviews, as well as the understanding of the intelligence community of the delineation of roles and responsibilities with the Armed Forces where applicable.”
“(d) Consultation.--In carrying out the review and assessments required by subsection (b), the Director shall consult with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community whose intelligence is commonly consulted to inform targeting decisions with lethal effects, such as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency, to solicit input on potential negative consequences resulting from artificial intelligence supported analysis, and possible ways to mitigate such consequences. (e) Policies and Directives.--The Director shall issue or adjust such policies and directives to the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate to improve risk mitigation in light of the review carried out under subsection (b).”
“(c) Artificial Intelligence Errors Exploratory Analysis.-- In carrying out the reviews required by subsection (b), the Director shall direct the National Intelligence Council to conduct a structured, exploratory analysis that-- (1) assess ways in which frontier artificial intelligence models could exhibit bias or cause errors that undermine intelligence or other information provided by the intelligence community that informs targeting accuracy; (2) identify the specific point and cause of error; and (3) provide proposed process mitigations to catch and correct such mistakes.”
“(2) Workflow reviews.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall review and assess all workflows of the intelligence community that incorporate artificial intelligence used by the United States to inform targeting decisions with lethal effects.”
“(B) Elements.--In carrying out the review and assessment required by subparagraph (A), the Director shall-- (i) assess whether policies and procedures of the intelligence community that were in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act adequately address risks posed by the use of artificial intelligence technologies in the targeting analysis and development and civilian harm mitigation processes; and (ii) ensure the review covers all policies of the intelligence community that regard the production or review of intelligence, regardless of which element first produced the intelligence.”
“(a) Definitions.--In this subsection: (1) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of National Intelligence. [[Page S4039]] (2) Intelligence.--The term ``Intelligence'' has the meaning given the term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). (b) Reviews Related to Intelligence Community Use of Artificial Intelligence to Support Targeting.-- (1) Policy and procedure reviews.-- (A) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall review and assess the policies and procedures that govern the use by the intelligence community of artificial intelligence technologies in the production, or review, of intelligence used by the United States to inform targeting decisions with lethal effects.”
“(j) Exemption From Disclosure; Protection.--Any information shared by a covered person or other entity or individual with the United States Government pursuant to this section-- (1) shall be exempt from disclosure and withheld, without discretion, from the public, pursuant to section 552(b)(3)(B) of title 5, United States Code, and any other provision of United States law or law of any State, political subdivision or agency thereof, or Tribe requiring disclosure of information or records; and (2) shall not be deemed a waiver of any applicable privilege or protection, including trade secret protection. SEC. 702. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT TARGETING.”
“(B) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (i) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be construed-- (1) to authorize the collection of intelligence on United States persons not authorized by another provision of law; (2) to authorize the sharing of personally identifiable information about an individual in a manner that violates another provision of law; (3) to require the disclosure of classified information to unauthorized persons; (4) to establish commercial, competition, or technology policy outside the purview of the intelligence community; (5) to require a non-Federal entity to provide information to a Federal entity or another non-Federal entity; (6) to condition the sharing of threat information with a non-Federal entity on such entity's provision of threat information to another entity; or (7) to condition the award of any Federal grant, contract, or purchase on the provision of threat information to a Federal or non-Federal entity.”
“(h) Evaluation and Reporting.-- (1) Evaluation.--The Director shall, acting through the Center, continuously evaluate the effectiveness and risks of the pilot program established under subsection (b). (2) Report.-- (A) In general.--Not later than 90 days before the date on which the pilot program required by paragraph (1) of subsection (b) terminates pursuant to paragraph (2) of such subsection, the Director shall, acting through the Center, submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report covering-- (i) the effectiveness of intelligence sharing under the pilot program; (ii) the adequacy of safeguards for sources, methods, privacy, and civil liberties and any recommendations to mitigate harms; (iii) the scope of participation; (iv) a list of covered persons granted access to the pilot program; (v) a list of each covered person that requested access and was denied, including a justification for each such denial; and (vi) whether the pilot program should be modified, extended, or terminated.”
“(2) Nondisclosure.--A covered person may not disclose to any person who is not a covered person or an element of the intelligence community any intelligence shared with the covered person under the pilot program required by subsection (b), except as expressly authorized by the Director acting through the Center. (g) Privacy and Civil Liberties.--In planning and coordinating the pilot program required by subsection (b), the Director shall, acting through the Center, coordinate with the Civil Liberties Protection Officer of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to produce guidance relating to privacy and civil liberties which shall govern the receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of threat information containing personal information of United States persons.”
“(3) Handling requirements.--The Director shall, acting through the Center, codify policies governing the handling, storage, and dissemination of intelligence shared under the pilot program required by subsection (b), including audit and compliance mechanisms. (f) Permissible Use and Nondisclosure.-- (1) Permissible use.--Intelligence shared under the pilot program required by subsection (b) may be used solely for detecting, preventing, or mitigating malicious foreign activity exploiting access to United States artificial intelligence systems and enabling infrastructure to engage in intelligence collection, intellectual property theft, and other malicious activities.”
“(e) Tailoring, Handling, and Protection of Intelligence.-- (1) Procedures required.--The Director shall, acting through the Center, codify procedures to tailor, sanitize, or downgrade the classification level of intelligence shared under the pilot program required by subsection (b) to ensure usability while protecting intelligence sources and methods. (2) Examples of procedures.--The procedures developed under paragraph (1) may include the following: (A) The use of tear lines and segregable summaries. (B) The preparation of classified annexes where necessary. (C) Criteria governing the classification level of shared intelligence. (D) The appropriate use of cleared industry personnel.”
“(d) Intelligence Sharing Structure.-- (1) Authorized modes.--Under the pilot program required by subsection (b), the Director may, acting through the Center, authorize the sharing of intelligence and threat information as described in paragraph (1) of such subsection through-- (A) bilateral exchanges between elements of the intelligence community and a covered person; (B) multilateral exchanges among covered persons, as determined appropriate by the Director; or (C) another designated intelligence-sharing mechanism operated or overseen by the Director. (2) Limitation.--Any mechanism established under this section shall be limited to the dissemination of intelligence and threat information and shall not establish standards, requirements, or best practices governing artificial intelligence development or deployment.”
“(3) Process for requesting participation.--The Director shall, acting through the Center, establish and make available to covered persons a process by which such covered person may request access to participate in the pilot program required by subsection (b). Such process shall include -- (A) submission by a covered person of a formal request to participate in the pilot program; (B) evaluation of each such request against, at minimum, the criteria established under paragraph (1); and (C) timely notification to the covered person who requested access of the status of their request and, in the case of denial, an explanation of the reason for denial.”
“(D) Agreement to comply with intelligence handling, use, and nondisclosure requirements. (E) The availability of cleared personnel of covered persons or willingness of covered persons to increase the number of cleared personnel. (2) Nature of participation.--Participation in the pilot program shall not be construed as a certification, endorsement, or regulatory approval by the United States Government of any artificial intelligence system or commercial activity and the Director may not exclude a covered person from participating on the basis of political or ideological viewpoints of the covered person or its employees.”
“(2) Participation.--The Director may not select covered persons to participate in the pilot in a manner that provides a competitive advantage or procurement preference to any covered person, to the detriment of another covered person. (3) Duration.--The Director shall carry out the pilot program established pursuant to paragraph (1) during the 3- year period beginning on the date of the establishment of the pilot program. (c) Participation Requirements.-- (1) Criteria.--The Director shall establish criteria governing engagement with covered persons under the pilot program required by subsection (b), which may include criteria relating to the following: (A) Relevance to national security. (B) The ability to protect classified or sensitive intelligence information. (C) Cybersecurity and information security maturity.”
“(12) United states person.--The term ``United States person'' has the meaning given that term in section 105A(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3039(c)). (b) Establishment of Pilot Program on Sharing of Intelligence and Threat Information With Covered Persons.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall, acting through the Center, establish a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of facilitating the secure sharing with covered persons of intelligence and threat information germane to the exploitation of access to United States artificial intelligence systems and enabling infrastructure to engage in intelligence collection, intellectual property theft, and other malicious activities.”
“(11) Threat information.--The term ``threat information'' means information on-- (A) efforts by foreign adversary countries to use products or research of covered persons or other entities or individuals to generate synthetic media for foreign-directed influence campaigns, develop and manage computer network exploitation campaigns, design or develop weapons systems, or enhance surveillance capabilities in ways that undermine the privacy or threaten the security of citizens of the United States; (B) threats posed by foreign adversary countries, including indications of compromise to networks associated with covered persons and other entities and individuals, or other technical indicators, indicating a compromise to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an artificial intelligence system, or to the supply chain of an artificial intelligence system, including training or [[Page S4038]] test data, frameworks or software libraries, training or inference computing environments, or other components necessary for the training, management, or maintenance of an artificial intelligence system; (C) activity of foreign entities of concern to clandestinely, fraudulently, or otherwise maliciously access the systems of covered persons for purposes of illicit technology transfer or otherwise gaining unfair economic advantage, including through techniques to extract a model's technical capabilities to replicate, develop, or improve a foreign artificial intelligence model without authorization by the covered person; (D) activity of foreign entities of concern to sabotage or otherwise clandestinely degrade artificial intelligence systems or the supply chain of an artificial intelligence system, including training or test data, frameworks or software libraries, training or inference computing environments, or other components necessary for the training, management, or maintenance of an artificial intelligence system; and (E) observations, emerging concerns, or other inputs from vendors or researchers regarding relevant malicious or clandestine activity of foreign entities of concern toward an artificial intelligence system, its supply chain, or other necessary components.”
“(8) Intelligence.--The term ``intelligence'' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003). (9) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003). (10) Security clearance.--The term ``security clearance'' means an authorization to access classified information.”
“(4) Cleared industry personnel.--The term ``cleared industry personnel'' means employees or representatives of a covered person who hold an appropriate security clearance and have a demonstrated need to know. (5) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003). (6) Covered person.--The term ``covered person'' means a non-Federal person who-- (A) is a United States citizen; (B) develops, deploys, or operates artificial intelligence models or critical enabling infrastructure; and (C) provides the services described in subparagraph (B) to an element of the intelligence community or Department of Defense. (7) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of the National Security Agency.”
“TITLE VII--ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SEC. 701. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION GUARD AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Artificial intelligence model.--The term ``artificial intelligence model'' means a capability or series of capabilities combined that can, for a given set of objectives, generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or decisions without human intervention or input. (2) Center.--The term ``Center'' means the Artificial Intelligence Security Center of the National Security Agency. (3) Classified information.--The term ``classified information'' has the meaning given such term in section 805 of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3164).”
“``(G) A summary of any significant increases or reductions in intelligence sharing during the reporting period and the national security rationale for such changes. ``(3) Form.--Each report required by paragraph (1) report shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex. ``(4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this subsection, the term `appropriate congressional committees' means-- ``(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and ``(B) to the extent Department of Defense information is implicated, the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code).''. (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such Act is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Sec. 1115. Requirements relating to intelligence sharing.''.”
“``(C) A description of how such intelligence sharing has contributed, if at all, to-- ``(i) improved detection, tracking, warning, interception, or deterrence of aerial threats, including missiles and unmanned systems, for Israel, United States forces, or regional partners; and ``(ii) the overall stability and coordination of security in the region. ``(D) An assessment of progress in improving interoperability among technology networks of the United States, Israel, and partner countries. ``(E) A description of efforts to secure technology networks and data from cyber threats and unauthorized access. ``(F) An identification of any legal, policy, technical, counterintelligence, or security barriers limiting deeper intelligence integration, including risks to intelligence sources and methods.”
“``(2) Matters to be included.--Each report required by paragraph (1) shall include, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the following: ``(A) A description of the categories of intelligence and security information shared by the United States Government with the Government of Israel. ``(B) An assessment of progress toward seamlessly integrating Israel into regional air and missile defense and early warning architectures with partner countries, including those that have normalized relations with Israel pursuant to the Abraham Accords.”
“``(B) Restrictions on access.--If the Director of National Intelligence determines that a recipient of intelligence sharing or analytic cooperation carried out under this subsection has any intelligence, defense, or technological information sharing relationship with an adversarial nation, the Director shall restrict all access of such recipient to such intelligence sharing and analytic cooperation. ``(c) Report Required.-- ``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the status of United States intelligence sharing with the Government Israel and, as appropriate, regional partners.”
“``(3) Safeguards.-- ``(A) Adoption of guidelines.--The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall adopt guidelines for intelligence sharing and analytic cooperation carried out under this subsection that ensure appropriate safeguards-- ``(i) to protect intelligence sources and methods; and ``(ii) to ensure that recipients maintain adequate security protections consistent with United States requirements.”
“``(2) Priority areas.--In carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall prioritize the sharing of appropriate intelligence and information relating to-- ``(A) counterterrorism threats and networks, including state and nonstate aggressors, and terror financing; ``(B) cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities, and defensive best practices; ``(C) air and missile defense early warning and threat tracking; ``(D) geospatial, overhead, and other imaging intelligence relevant to shared security concerns; and ``(E) maritime security threats, including threats to freedom of navigation, commercial shipping, sanctions evasion, and regional maritime stability.”
“``(v) An assessment of the anticipated impact on regional security, United States forces, and integrated air and missile defense cooperation. ``(b) Intelligence Sharing and Analytic Cooperation With Abraham Accords Countries.-- ``(1) In general.--The President, acting through the Director of National Intelligence and, as necessary, the Secretary of Defense, shall, consistent with applicable law and security agreements, expand and enhance intelligence sharing and analytic cooperation with countries that have normalized relations with Israel pursuant to the Abraham Accords (as defined in section 64(k) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2735a(k)) in order to strengthen regional security integration.”
“``(4) Congressional notification.-- ``(A) In general.--Not later than 15 days after the date of any decision to materially increase, suspend, reduce, or otherwise alter intelligence sharing or related security information exchanges with the Government of Israel, the President shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of such decision. ``(B) Elements.--Each notification required by subparagraph (A) shall include the following: ``(i) A description of the change in intelligence sharing or security information exchange. ``(ii) The categories of information affected. ``(iii) The national security objectives served by the change. ``(iv) In the case of a suspension or reduction, the specific national security concern supporting the change.”
“``(3) Limitations on reduction of intelligence sharing.-- ``(A) In general.--Intelligence sharing and related security information exchanges with the Government of Israel shall not be suspended, reduced, or otherwise materially limited except on the basis of a specific and identifiable national security concern determined by the President, such as the protection of intelligence sources and methods, counterintelligence risk, or another significant security consideration. ``(B) Documentation requirement.--The President shall document any determination to suspend, reduce, or otherwise materially limit intelligence sharing or related security information exchanges with the Government of Israel, including a description of the national security rationale supporting the change.”
“``(2) Scope of intelligence sharing.--Intelligence sharing carried out under this subsection shall include the sharing of information relating to cybersecurity threats, terrorism, sanctions evasion, plans and intentions of state and nonstate actors, adversarial technology proliferation, missile threats, unmanned aerial systems, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, air and space domain awareness, and other aerial threats relevant to the defense of Israel, United States forces and interests in the region, and regional security partners.”
“(c) Requirements Relating to Intelligence Sharing.-- (1) In general.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 1115. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE SHARING. ``(a) Intelligence Sharing With Israel.-- ``(1) In general.--The President, acting through the Director of National Intelligence and, as necessary, the Secretary of Defense, shall, subject to applicable law and [[Page S4037]] the protection of intelligence sources and methods, expand and enhance intelligence sharing with the Government of Israel.”
“(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) Israel remains a critical United States security partner whose defense and intelligence capabilities provide a strategic advantage that contributes to enhanced operational effectiveness and technological superiority; (2) timely and actionable intelligence sharing between the United States and Israel has saved United States personnel and property in the region and should remain a central pillar of the bilateral security relationship; (3) the evolving threat environment in the Middle East-- including missile proliferation, unmanned systems, cyber operations, terror financing, and proxy warfare--requires sustained and adaptive cooperation between the United States and Israel; (4) the United States-Israel security partnership has historically benefitted from bipartisan support, which strengthens the partnership's credibility, durability, and deterrent value; and (5) expanding normalization and practical security cooperation between Israel and regional states can serve as a force multiplier for collective deterrence and integrated defense.”
“(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States-- (1) to maintain and strengthen the strategic security partnership with Israel as a means of advancing the national defense of the United States, regional stability, and the protection of United States personnel and interests in the Middle East; (2) to enhance intelligence collaboration through robust intelligence sharing and analytic partnership with Israel to counter terrorism, proliferation networks, cyber threats, state and nonstate aggressors, terror financing, sanctions evasion, and other transnational security challenges that threaten both Israel and the United States; (3) to deter and counter destabilizing activities by the Government of Iran and Iran-aligned state and nonstate actors that threaten Israel, United States forces, and regional partners; (4) to ensure that security assistance and defense cooperation are structured to help Israel maintain its qualitative military edge, consistent with United States law and broader regional security considerations; (5) to encourage and support the expansion of regional security architectures that include Israel and willing regional partners, with a focus on integrated air and missile defense, maritime security, early warning systems, and intelligence-sharing frameworks; and (6) to leverage security coordination with Israel to enhance force protection, early warning, and crisis response capabilities for United States military and diplomatic personnel in the region.”
“``(B) Elements.--The notification required in subsection (a) shall include-- ``(i) a detailed description of the reason for the pause, termination, restriction, or material downgrade of intelligence support; ``(ii) a description of the change in intelligence sharing; ``(iii) the categories of information affected; ``(iv) the expected duration of the pause, termination, restriction, or material downgrade; and ``(v) the anticipated impact of such decision on regional security and the national security objectives of the United States.''. SEC. 618. UNITED STATES-ISRAEL INTELLIGENCE SHARING ENHANCEMENT.”
“3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities), to Israel, Ukraine, Taiwan, or any other country or partner determined by the President to be of significant importance to the United States, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a notification of such decision.”
“3024(j)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Under the direction'' and inserting the following: ``(1) In general.--Under the direction''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(2) Notification required.-- ``(A) In general.--Not later than 48 hours after a decision to pause, terminate, or otherwise restrict or materially downgrade intelligence support or intelligence activities (as defined in section 501(f)), including information, intelligence, and imagery collection authorized under Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C.”
“(D) Credible intelligence that an element of the Government of Ukraine receiving United States intelligence support engaged in a pattern of human rights violations, atrocities, or violations of the law of armed conflict. (4) Territory of ukraine.--The term ``territory of Ukraine'' means all territory internationally recognized to be the sovereign territory of Ukraine on February 19, 2014, including Crimea and the territory that the Russian Federation claims to have annexed in Kherson and Zaporizhzia. SEC. 617. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH COUNTRIES AND PARTNERS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES. Section 102A(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.”
“(2) Intelligence support.--The term ``intelligence support'' means activities authorized under the provisions of law governing the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, including the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of information, intelligence, and imagery. (3) Specific and identifiable national security concern.-- The term ``specific and identifiable national security concern'' includes the following: (A) Credible intelligence that an element of the Government of Ukraine has been compromised by the Russian Federation or another foreign adversary. (B) Protection of sources and methods. (C) A voluntary request from the Government of Ukraine to pause intelligence support.”
“(B) Recommencement.--Upon the cessation of the provision of intelligence support under subparagraph (A), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the heads of any other relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall resume the provision of intelligence support to Ukraine pursuant to subsection (d). (f) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Armistice; comprehensive political settlement.--The terms ``armistice'' and ``comprehensive political settlement'' mean a formal written agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation that has the effect of permanently ending the armed conflict between both nations.”
“(C) Form.--A notification submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (3) Sunset.-- (A) In general.--The provision of intelligence support for Ukraine under this subsection shall cease on the date that is 120 days after the date on which the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation agree to reinstate the armistice or comprehensive political settlement that was violated or a new armistice or comprehensive political settlement is entered into force.”
“(2) Notification.-- (A) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly notify the congressional intelligence committees not later than 5 days after resuming intelligence support pursuant to paragraph (1). (B) Contents.--A notification submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall include-- (i) a description of the specific attack or act of aggression against Ukraine; (ii) a description of any intelligence support that Ukraine requested from the United States; (iii) an assessment of the support that Ukraine might require in order to deter or repel the attack or act of aggression; (iv) a description of any intelligence support that the Director has authorized to be provided to Ukraine; and (v) a description of the response of the Government of Ukraine upon receiving the intelligence support.”
“(C) Form.--A notification submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (e) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support in the Event of an Armed Attack on Ukraine in Violation of an Armistice or Comprehensive Political Settlement.-- (1) In general.--In the event of an armed attack by the Russian Federation on Ukraine that violates an armistice or a comprehensive political settlement, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the heads of other relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall immediately resume the provision of intelligence support to the Government of Ukraine at a level the Directors deem necessary to support military operations of the Government of Ukraine that are intended, or reasonably expected, to help the Armed Forces of Ukraine defend or liberate the territory of Ukraine and prevent such territory of Ukraine from being occupied or attacked by the Russian Federation.”
“(B) Contents.--A notification submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall include-- (i) a description of the specific threatened attack or act of aggression shared with Ukraine; [[Page S4036]] (ii) the date on which the intelligence was provided to Ukraine; (iii) details of the channel through which the intelligence was shared, including the names and titles of the relevant intelligence community officers and Ukrainian government officials; (iv) the response of the Government of Ukraine upon receiving the intelligence; (v) an assessment produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency, in coordination with other relevant elements of intelligence community, as to what support Ukraine might require in order to deter or repel the threatened attack or act of aggression; and (vi) a summary of subsequent actions that the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and other heads of relevant elements of the intelligence community, directed be taken to support Ukraine in defending against or otherwise responding to the threatened attack or act of aggression.”
“(3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (4) Early warning.--The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of any other relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall provide to Ukraine and member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization intelligence and early warning to allow for an appropriate and timely response with respect to any potential attack or act of aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation. (5) Notification.-- (A) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly notify each Member of the congressional intelligence committees not later than 5 days after any intelligence element provides Ukraine any intelligence pursuant to paragraph (4).”
“(2) Report on modifications to united states intelligence support.--Not later than 30 days after an armistice or a comprehensive political settlement is entered into force, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the heads of the other relevant elements of the intelligence community, including the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Director of the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that includes-- (A) a description of the details of the armistice or the comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in Ukraine, including a description of the role of the intelligence community in monitoring the adherence by the parties to specific elements of the agreement; (B) an assessment of the vulnerabilities that Ukraine will face under the terms of the agreement and potential measures that the intelligence community or other parties could take to help mitigate such vulnerabilities; (C) a description of the modifications to ongoing intelligence support the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency has authorized in light of the changed situation on the ground in Ukraine in order to help build and sustain the capacity of Ukraine to detect, deter, and repel any future Russian attack against the territory of Ukraine; (D) an assessment of the implications of the armistice or comprehensive political settlement for the national security interests of the United States in Europe, including the capacity of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to deter future aggression by the Russian Federation; and (E) a description and assessment of any cooperative arrangements that Ukraine has with other countries, including member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, that the intelligence community assesses would contribute to deterring a future attack or act of aggression by the Russian Federation aimed at occupying or seizing the territory of Ukraine.”