← LEADERSHIP TERMINAL

US CONGRESS · SITTING

Tommy Tuberville

Senator for Alabama · Republican · United States

IN THEIR OWN WORDS

(e) Report on Certain Drivers of Deforestation and Environmental Degradation in the Brazilian Amazon.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to Congress regarding certain drivers of deforestation and environmental d…

TEXT OF AMENDMENTS · 2026-07-14 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

(e) Report on Certain Drivers of Deforestation and Environmental Degradation in the Brazilian Amazon.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to Congress regarding certain drivers of deforestation and environmental d…

CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive strategy, with a classif…

TEXT OF AMENDMENTS · 2026-07-14 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive strategy, with a classif…

CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

``(ii) In a civil action brought under section 2255 or 2255A, for purposes of paragraph (1), the court may-- ``(I) order the plaintiff or defendant to provide to the court or the Government, as applicable, any equipment necessary to maintain care, custody, and control of such property or material; and ``(II) take reasonable measures, and…

TEXT OF AMENDMENTS · 2026-07-14 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

``(ii) In a civil action brought under section 2255 or 2255A, for purposes of paragraph (1), the court may-- ``(I) order the plaintiff or defendant to provide to the court or the Government, as applicable, any equipment necessary to maintain care, custody, and control of such property or material; and ``(II) take reasonable measures, and…

CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

The complete record

Every one of 3,267 lines we hold for Tommy Tuberville, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 15 of 66.

  1. ``(b) Authorization of Grants.--The Attorney General may award a competitive grant to an eligible entity for the purpose of using any technology used in a forensic laboratory-- ``(1) to conduct whole genome sequencing technology to assess not less than 100,000 genetic markers; and ``(2) that is compatible with genealogical databases. ``(c) Applications.--An eligible entity seeking a grant under this section shall submit to the Attorney General an application at such time and in such form as the Attorney General may require.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  2. ``(8) Law enforcement agency.--The term `law enforcement agency' means an agency of the United States, a State, a political subdivision of a State, or an Indian Tribe authorized by law or by a government agency to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of any violation of criminal law. ``SEC. 3062. DNA ANALYSIS GRANTS. ``(a) Eligible Entity Defined.--In this section, the term `eligible entity' means-- ``(1) a State; ``(2) a Tribal, county, or local law enforcement agency; ``(3) a publicly funded accredited forensic laboratory; ``(4) a State, Tribal, county, or local prosecutor's office with a forensic laboratory capability; ``(5) a medical examiner's office; and ``(6) a coroner's office.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  3. ``(5) Forensic laboratory.--The term `forensic laboratory' means a facility, entity, or site that-- ``(A) offers or performs forensic analysis; and ``(B) follows appropriate evidentiary, documentation, and quality assurance requirements for use in judicial proceedings. ``(6) Genetic genealogy service.--The term `genetic genealogy service' means a repository of genetic data containing genetic profiles submitted by individuals that permits search by a law enforcement agency for forensic genetic genealogy purposes. ``(7) Interim policy.--The term `Interim Policy' means the `Interim Policy on Forensic Genetic Genealogical DNA Analysis and Searching' of the Department of Justice dated November 1, 2019, or any successor policy.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  4. ``(3) Forensic analysis.--The term `forensic analysis' means an expert examination, interpretation, or test-- ``(A) requested by a law enforcement agency, a coroner or medical examiner's office, a prosecutor, a criminal suspect or defendant, or a court; and ``(B) performed on physical or biological evidence for-- ``(i) investigative purposes, including to determine the identity of unidentified human remains; or ``(ii) prosecutorial, defense, or court-ordered judicial purposes. ``(4) Forensic genetic genealogy profile.--The term `forensic genetic genealogy profile' means a single nucleotide polymorphisms-based genetic profile generated from a forensic or reference sample by an accredited forensic laboratory for the purpose of conducting FGG DNA analysis and searching.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  5. ``(2) FGG dna analysis and searching.--The term `FGG DNA analysis and searching' means-- ``(A) forensic genetic genealogical DNA analysis of a forensic or reference sample of biological material by an accredited forensic laboratory to develop a forensic genetic genealogy profile; and ``(B) the subsequent search of that genetic genealogy profile in a genetic genealogy service.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  6. 10101 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``PART PP--GRANTS TO IMPROVE FORENSIC ACTIVITIES ``SEC. 3061. DEFINITIONS. ``In this part: ``(1) Accredited forensic laboratory.--The term `accredited forensic laboratory' means a forensic laboratory that-- ``(A) is accredited by an accrediting body that is a signatory to an internationally recognized arrangement and that offers accreditation to forensic science conformity assessment bodies using an accreditation standard that is recognized by that internationally recognized arrangement; or ``(B) attests, in a legally binding and enforceable manner, to prepare and apply for an accreditation described in subparagraph (A) not later than 2 years after date on which the forensic laboratory-- ``(i) first receives a grant under this part; or ``(ii) first receives a request for analysis from an eligible entity receiving a grant under this part.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  7. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section. (d) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section. [[Page S4020]] TITLE LXVIII--JUDICIARY MATTERS SEC. 6801. CARLA WALKER ACT. (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Carla Walker Act''. (b) Grants to Improve Forensic Activities.--Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (34 U.S.C.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  8. (b) Exceptions.-- (1) Exception relating to the provision of humanitarian assistance.--Sanctions under this section may not be imposed with respect to transactions or the facilitation of transactions for-- (A) the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices; (B) the provision of humanitarian assistance; or (C) transporting goods or services that are necessary to carry out operations relating to humanitarian assistance. (2) Exception for intelligence, law enforcement, and national security activities.--Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any authorized intelligence, law enforcement, or national security activities of the United States. (c) Implementation.--The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  9. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of each person identified under subsection (a) or (e) of section 6704 as having conducted model extraction attacks or having facilitated such attacks via fraudulent account networks if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  10. (b) Entities Described.--An entity described in this subsection is-- (1) an entity that is a person of concern identified, under subsection (a) or (e) of section 6704, as having conducted model extraction attacks or having facilitated such attacks via fraudulent account networks; or (2) a subsidiary of such an entity (to be determined by ownership of 50 percent or more in the aggregate, directly or indirectly). SEC. 6706. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO MODEL EXTRACTION ATTACKS AND FRAUDULENT ACCOUNT NETWORK PROVIDERS. (a) In General.--The President, may, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  11. (a) In General.--Not later than 210 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, in coordination with the head of each agency that is a member of the End-User Review Committee, shall make a determination, by majority vote of the Committee, with respect to whether each entity described in subsection (b) should be added to the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security and set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor regulations.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  12. (3) Protection of confidential information.--Any confidential information provided to the Secretary by the owner of a closed-source artificial intelligence model shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the ``Freedom of Information Act''), unless the owner expressly consents to the disclosure. SEC. 6705. DETERRING MODEL EXTRACTION ATTACKS AND FRAUDULENT ACCOUNT NETWORK PROVIDERS.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  13. (2) Protection of confidential information.--The Secretary of Commerce may not, in publishing the list required by paragraph (1) on a publicly available website of the Department of Commerce, disclose confidential information provided by the owner of a closed-source artificial intelligence model without the express permission of the owner. (h) Public Guidance.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 210 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the head of each agency that is a member of the Operating Committee for Export Policy, shall publish a report comprising of best practices to detect, prevent, and respond to model extraction attacks. (2) Public access.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be publicly available.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  14. (g) AI Model Extraction Attackers List.-- (1) In general.--The Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the head of each agency that is a member of the Operating Committee for Export Policy, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of such other departments or agencies of the Federal Government as the President determines appropriate, shall-- (A) maintain a list, to be known as the ``AI Model Extraction Attackers List'', that displays information about-- (i) specific persons of concern identified pursuant to an assessment required by subsection (a) or (e) as having conducted or directed model extraction attacks in the past year; and (ii) artificial intelligence models that have been derived from model extraction attacks by persons of concern against closed-source artificial intelligence models owned by United States persons or have benefitted from activities of persons of concern acting as fraudulent account network providers; and (B) publish the list on a publicly available website of the Department of Commerce.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  15. (f) Industry Coordination.--The Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of such other departments or agencies of the Federal Government as the President determines appropriate, shall establish an information-sharing mechanism that allows owners of closed-source artificial intelligence models to voluntarily, quickly, and confidentially share information about model extraction attacks and fraudulent account network providers with the Department of Commerce.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  16. (e) Routine Assessment.--The Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the head of each agency that is a member of the Operating Committee for Export Policy, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of such other departments or agencies of the Federal Government as the President determines appropriate, shall routinely assess for-- (1) model extraction attacks directed against owners of closed-source artificial intelligence models that occur after the date of completion of the assessment required by subsection (a); (2) fraudulent account network providers that facilitate model extraction attacks after that date; (3) artificial intelligence models that have been derived from model extraction attacks by persons of concern against closed-source artificial intelligence models owned by United States persons or have benefitted from activities of persons of concern acting as fraudulent account network providers; and (4) any material changes related to other matters specified in subsection (b).

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  17. (2) Updates.--Not later than one year after submitting the report required by paragraph (1), and annually thereafter for 3 years, the Secretary of Commerce shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an update to the report listing any additional persons of concern identified pursuant to subsection (a). (3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1), and each update required by paragraph (2), shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  18. (2) Voluntary participation.--The participation of owners of closed-source artificial intelligence models described in paragraph (1) in consultations under that paragraph shall be voluntary. (d) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 210 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the heads of such other departments or agencies of the Federal Government as the President determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that, as appropriate, contains the findings of the assessment required by subsection (a).

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  19. (c) Public Consultation.-- (1) In general.--In conducting the assessment required by subsection (a), the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the head of each agency that is a member of the Operating Committee for Export Policy, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of such other departments or agencies of the Federal Government as the President determines appropriate, shall consult with owners of closed-source artificial intelligence models that have been the targets or victims of model extraction attacks, academic experts, industry fora, and other appropriate entities-- (A) to identify patterns of behavior and methods of attackers to better inform efforts of the United States Government and the private sector to detect model extraction attacks; (B) to develop best practices for defending against model extraction attacks; and (C) to develop best practices for identifying activities of fraudulent account network providers that facilitate model extraction attacks.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  20. (6) An assessment of the economic and national security consequences of successful model extraction attacks by persons of concern that occurred during the 2 calendar years preceding the date on which the Secretary of Commerce begins the assessment required by subsection (a). (7) Steps detailing how the United States Government is assisting owners of closed-source artificial intelligence models that have been the target or victim of model extraction attacks in detecting model extraction attacks, deterring future model extraction attacks, and punishing persons of concern that engage in model extraction attacks or are fraudulent account network providers. (8) A diplomatic strategy to leverage allies and partners of the United States in detecting and preventing model extraction attacks by persons of concern.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  21. (4) An analysis of the methods employed by persons of concern identified pursuant to paragraph (1), including-- (A) the role of fraudulent account network providers in model extraction attacks, including, to the extent possible, the physical [[Page S4019]] location of offices and data centers of such providers; and (B) a determination, to the extent possible, of the number of attempted model extraction attacks that occurred during the 2 calendar years preceding the date on which the Secretary of Commerce begins the assessment required by subsection (a). (5) An examination of the strengths and weaknesses of various detection approaches that can be used to determine whether a model extraction attack has occurred or is occurring.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  22. (b) Matters To Be Included.--The assessment required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) A determination of which persons of concern-- (A) have either previously or are currently engaging in model extraction attacks; or (B) are fraudulent account network providers. (2) A determination of the countries, if any-- (A) from which model extraction attacks have originated; and (B) in which fraudulent account network providers exist. (3) An identification of which, if any, agencies or instrumentalities of governments of countries of concern have provided or are providing material assistance to entities identified pursuant to paragraph (1).

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  23. (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the head of each agency that is a member of the Operating Committee for Export Policy, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of such other departments or agencies of the Federal Government as the President determines appropriate, shall complete an assessment to determine-- (1) which, if any, persons of concern have conducted or are currently conducting model extraction attacks against closed- source artificial intelligence models owned by United States persons; (2) which, if any, persons of concern are fraudulent account network providers; and (3) which, if any, artificial intelligence models have been derived from model extraction attacks by persons of concern against closed-source artificial intelligence models owned by United States persons or have benefitted from activities of persons of concern acting as fraudulent account network providers.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  24. (11) United states person.--The term ``United States person'' means-- (A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity; or (C) any person located in the United States. SEC. 6704. ASSESSMENT OF MODEL EXTRACTION ATTACKS AND FRAUDULENT ACCOUNT NETWORK PROVIDERS.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  25. (9) Owner.--The term ``owner'' means, with respect to a closed-source artificial intelligence model, the person that-- (A) holds intellectual property rights (including trade secret, copyright, patent, or other proprietary rights), contractual rights, or a combination thereof, sufficient to authorize or restrict third-party access to, use of, extraction from, or reproduction of the model, or any version, instance, or deployment the model, whether such rights were obtained through development, acquisition, assignment, license, or otherwise; and (B) is a United States person. (10) Person.--The term ``person'' means individual or entity.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  26. (C) Exclusion.--For purposes of subparagraph (A), model training activities conducted in compliance with the terms, conditions, and restrictions governing access to and use of a closed-source artificial intelligence model, or otherwise conducted within a permitted exception or the express authorization of the owner of the model, are not model extraction attacks. (8) Operating committee for export policy.--The term ``Operating Committee for Export Policy'' means the Operating Committee for Export Policy referred to in section 1763(c) of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4822(c)).

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  27. (B) Inference of purpose.--For purposes of subparagraph (A), the purpose of extraction may be inferred from the totality of circumstances, including-- (i) the volume, structure, pattern, coordination, or timing of the extraction activity; (ii) the concentration of extractions on specific model capabilities; (iii) the use of multiple accounts in a coordinated manner; or (iv) the correlation of extraction activity within the development timeline of another artificial intelligence model.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  28. (7) Model extraction attack.-- (A) In general.--The term ``model extraction attack'' means the unauthorized extracting of the capabilities of a closed- source artificial intelligence model to replicate, develop, train, or improve another artificial intelligence model, if such extraction-- (i) circumvents technical, contractual, or other access controls, identity verification requirements, or geographic access restrictions implemented by the owner of the model; (ii) is conducted through fraudulent, misrepresented, or unauthorized credentials; or (iii) violates the terms, conditions, or restrictions governing access to or use of the model, as established by the owner, that specifically prohibit the use of model outputs or interactions to replicate, develop, train, or improve another artificial intelligence model.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  29. (6) Fraudulent account network provider.-- (A) In general.--The term ``fraudulent account network provider'' means any foreign person that knowingly and intentionally creates, obtains, maintains, sells, brokers, or otherwise provides access to an account that allows a person of concern to access a closed-source artificial intelligence model that the entity would otherwise be prohibited from accessing as a result of location restrictions in the terms of service or a contractual agreement created by the owner of the model. (B) Exception.--For purposes of subparagraph (A), an entity that creates or transmits location information to enable persons within countries of concern to access the internet for purposes of freedom of expression is not, on the basis of that activity alone, a fraudulent account network provider.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  30. (4) Person of concern.--The term ``person of concern'' means any foreign person that-- (A) is located or headquartered in, or the ultimate parent company of which is headquartered in, a country of concern; (B) is operating under the direction or control of any entity located or headquartered in, or the ultimate parent company of which is headquartered in, a country of concern; or (C) is conducting or attempting to conduct a model extraction attack against closed-source artificial intelligence models owned by United States persons and outside of authorized model training practices. (5) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means a person that is not a United States person.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  31. 1 to part 740 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, as published on January 1, 2026, that is designated by the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State, as a country of concern for purposes of this section and for which notice of such designation has been published in the Federal Register; and (ii) identified by the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the head of each agency that is a member of the Operating Committee for Export Policy, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of such other departments or agencies of the Federal Government as the President determines appropriate, pursuant to an assessment required by subsection (a) or (e) of section 1704.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  32. (B) Access and use governed by terms of service or contractual agreements that are established by the owner of the model. (C) Access that is provided via an application program interface or another consumer-facing, owner-controlled interface without enabling third parties to obtain, modify, or host the closed-source artificial intelligence model on their own data servers or other technology unless specifically authorized by the owner of the model. (3) Country of concern.--The term ``country of concern'' means-- (A) the People's Republic of China, including the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions; (B) the Russian Federation; and (C) any other foreign country-- (i) listed in Country Group D:5 in Supplement No.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  33. SEC. 6703. DEFINITIONS. In this title: (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. (2) Closed-source artificial intelligence model.--The term ``closed-source artificial intelligence model'' means any artificial intelligence model with the following characteristics: (A) Proprietary key technical information, such as underlying model weights, that are necessary to reproduce and independently recreate the model and that are not willingly shared with third parties or otherwise made publicly available by the owner of the model.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  34. 6701. SHORT TITLE. This title may be cited as ``Blocking Large-scale Adversarial Distillation Efforts Act of 2026'' or ``BLADE Act''. SEC. 6702. SENSE OF CONGRESS. It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) artificial intelligence models owned by United States private sector entities are essential for advancing economic and national security interests of the United States; [[Page S4018]] (2) many of the most advanced artificial intelligence models owned by United States entities are ``closed-source models'' whose unique technical characteristics are not openly shared or published; (3) the unauthorized acquisition of model capabilities, such as model weights, model architectures, and other technical characteristics of closed-source artificial intelligence models, by persons of concern through model extraction attacks represents a threat to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, as well as the intellectual property rights and economic competitiveness of United States entities; (4) the United States Government, in cooperation with private owners of closed-source artificial intelligence models, should take steps to identify, punish, and deter model extraction attacks on the protected capabilities of closed-source artificial intelligence models by persons of concern; (5) model extraction attacks against United States closed- source artificial intelligence models allow foreign adversaries a short cut to acquiring advanced artificial intelligence capabilities; and (6) authorized model training practices that adhere to the terms of service or are otherwise consistent with contractual terms set by the owners of closed-source artificial intelligence models are a legitimate research method that play an important role in artificial intelligence research and are fundamentally distinct from model extraction attacks addressed by this title.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  35. (3) By striking the item relating to section 301 and inserting the following new item: ``Sec. 301. Quantum information science, engineering, and technology research and education program.''. (4) By inserting after the item relating to section 302 the following new items: ``Sec. 303. Quantum testbeds. ``Sec. 304. Research security.''. (5) By adding at the end the following new items: ``TITLE V--NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION QUANTUM ACTIVITIES ``Sec. 501. Definition of Administrator. ``Sec. 502. Quantum information science, engineering, and technology research for space and aeronautics. ``Sec. 503. National Aeronautics and Space Administration quantum initiatives. ``Sec. 504. Research security. ``Sec. 505. Authorization of appropriations.''. TITLE LXVII--BLOCKING LARGE-SCALE ADVERSARIAL DISTILLATION EFFORTS ACT OF 2026 SEC.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  36. 7502(a)); (D) identify any relevant responsibilities that should be reassigned to existing programs at the Office of Science and Technology Policy; and (E) minimize duplication and ensure fiscal efficiency in the conclusion of the Program. SEC. 6533. CLERICAL AMENDMENTS. The table of contents in section 1(b) of the National Quantum Initiative Act is amended as follows: (1) By inserting after the item relating to section 105 the following new items: ``Sec. 105A. International Quantum Cooperation Strategy. ``Sec. 106. National quantum prize challenges.''. (2) By inserting after the item relating to section 201 the following new items: ``Sec. 202. National Institute of Standards and Technology Quantum Centers. ``Sec. 203. Research security. ``Sec. 204. Collaboration For Quantum Application Development Acceleration.''.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  37. (2) Elements.--The plan presented under paragraph (1) shall-- (A) ensure minimal disruption to ongoing federally funded research and development activities; (B) ensure transfer or reassignment of nanotechnology research infrastructure programs and facilities to minimize disruption of researcher access to critical tools that support other national priorities; (C) provide for the orderly disposition or transfer of active grants, contracts, and personnel associated with the National Nanotechnology Coordination Office established under section 3(a) of the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act (15 U.S.C.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  38. (b) Wind-down.--The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall take such actions as may be necessary to terminate and wind down the Program before the date specified in subsection (a). (c) Plan and Briefing.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall provide to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives a briefing in which the Director shall present a plan on how the Director will carry out subsection (b).

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  39. (e) Quinquennial Updates.--Not later than 5 years after the date on which the Director completes the review and assessment required by subsection (b), and every 5 years thereafter, the Director shall update the review and assessment required by subsection (b) and submit to the appropriate congressional committees an updated report detailing the findings and recommendations of the Director. SEC. 6532. SUNSET OF NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY PROGRAM. (a) Sunset of National Nanotechnology Program.--The National Nanotechnology Program (in this section referred to as the ``Program'') and the authorities and requirements of the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act (15 U.S.C. 7501 et seq.) are terminated on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  40. (5) Recommended actions to harmonize regulatory requirements relating to quantum information science, engineering, and technology across Federal agencies where inconsistencies exist. (d) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date on which the Director completes the review and assessment required by subsection (b), the Director shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the findings and recommendations described in subsection (c).

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  41. (c) Elements.--The review and assessment conducted pursuant to subsection (b) shall include the following: (1) An inventory of existing Federal regulations, policies, and guidance documents that are applicable to quantum information science, engineering, and technology. (2) An analysis of whether regulations, policies, and guidance inventoried pursuant to paragraph (1) impose undue burdens on academic, private sector, or government-led quantum information science, engineering, and technology research or development. (3) Recommendations to modernize, streamline, or eliminate duplicative or outdated regulatory barriers identified pursuant to subsection (b). (4) Input from stakeholders across industry, academia, and the National Laboratories with respect to such regulatory barriers.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  42. (2) Quantum information science, engineering, and technology.--The term ``quantum information science, engineering, and technology'' has the meaning given such term in section 2 of the National Quantum Initiative Act (15 U.S.C. 8801), as amended by section 6512 of this Act. (b) Review and Assessment Required.--Not later than 540 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall, in coordination with the National Quantum Coordination Office, conduct a review to identify and assess any existing or potential regulatory barriers that inhibit research, development, deployment, or scaling of quantum information science, engineering, and technology.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  43. (c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after completing the review under subsection (a), the Comptroller General shall submit to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate and the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives a report on the findings of the review, which shall include recommendations relating to paragraphs (1) and (2) of such subsection. SEC. 6531. REVIEW OF REGULATORY BARRIERS TO QUANTUM INFORMATION SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' has the meaning given such term in section 2 of the National Quantum Initiative Act (15 U.S.C. 8801).

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  44. 8801 et seq.) to identify potential opportunities-- (1) to reduce duplicative and unnecessary paperwork and reporting requirements without compromising security, transparency, and accountability; and (2) to expedite access to facilities and equipment of the Federal Government for researchers affiliated with such programs. (b) Research and Development Programs Covered.--The review required under subsection (a) shall cover all research and development programs established pursuant to sections 201, 302, 402, 403, and 404 of the National Quantum Initiative Act (15 U.S.C. 8831, 8842, 8852, 8853, and 8854).

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  45. ``The Administrator shall allocate up to $25,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2026 through 2030 to carry out this title, subject to the availability of appropriations. Amounts made available to carry out this title shall be derived from amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.''. SEC. 6530. COMPTROLLER GENERAL REVIEW AND REPORT. (a) Review.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a review of existing processes and reporting requirements associated with research and development programs established within the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Energy pursuant to the National Quantum Initiative Act (15 U.S.C.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  46. ``(2) Reapplication.--Subject to the availability of appropriations, an awardee may reapply for an additional subsequent period of 5 years following a successful merit- based review. ``(3) Termination.--Consistent with the authorities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Administrator may terminate the initiative for cause during the performance period. ``SEC. 504. RESEARCH SECURITY. ``The activities authorized under this title shall be carried out in a manner consistent with-- ``(1) subtitle D of title VI of the Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act (42 U.S.C. 19231 et seq.); and ``(2) section 6432 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (42 U.S.C. 7144b note; Public Law 118-159). ``SEC. 505. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  47. ``(d) Initiative Requirements.--To the maximum extent practicable, an initiative established under this section shall serve the needs of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for the benefit of the broader [[Page S4017]] United States quantum information science community, for the purpose of advancing space and aeronautics applications in quantum information science, engineering, and technology, and improving the competitiveness of the United States. ``(e) Initiative Selection and Duration.-- ``(1) In general.--Subject to the availability of appropriations, an initiative established under this section may carry out activities for a period of 5 years.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  48. ``(6) Commercial technology.--An initiative established under this section may leverage commercially available hardware and software to carry out the activities described in subsection (c). ``(c) Initiative Activities.--An initiative established under this section may carry out activities that-- ``(1) support research focused on developing and demonstrating space, aeronautics, and exploration applications for quantum information science, engineering, and technology, including research relating to the strategy developed under section 502(c); and ``(2) support quantum information science, engineering, and technology education and public outreach.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  49. ``(4) Collaborations.--A collaboration that receives an award under this section may include multiple types of research institutions, including institutions of higher education, private sector entities, and nonprofit organizations. ``(5) Coordination and accountability.--The Administrator shall ensure that an awardee under this section-- ``(A) coordinates with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, including by identifying personnel designated to serve as program liaisons for technical and programmatic oversight; and ``(B) avoids unnecessary duplication of existing activities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, other activities carried out under the National Quantum Initiative Reauthorization Act of 2026 or the amendments made by that Act, and other related programs.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

  50. ``(2) Application requirements.--An applicant under this section shall submit to the Administrator an application at such time, in such manner, and containing such technical, programmatic, and budgetary information as the Administrator determines necessary to evaluate the application through the review process developed under paragraph (1). ``(3) Eligible applicants.--In carrying out the process under paragraph (1), the Administrator shall consider applications from institutions of higher education, research centers, multi-institutional collaborations, and any other entity the Administrator considers appropriate.

    CREC-2026-07-14-PT1-PGS3947 · READ IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD