Tommy Tuberville
Senator for Alabama · Republican · United States
“(e) Report on Certain Drivers of Deforestation and Environmental Degradation in the Brazilian Amazon.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to Congress regarding certain drivers of deforestation and environmental d…”
“(e) Report on Certain Drivers of Deforestation and Environmental Degradation in the Brazilian Amazon.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to Congress regarding certain drivers of deforestation and environmental d…”
“(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive strategy, with a classif…”
“(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive strategy, with a classif…”
“``(ii) In a civil action brought under section 2255 or 2255A, for purposes of paragraph (1), the court may-- ``(I) order the plaintiff or defendant to provide to the court or the Government, as applicable, any equipment necessary to maintain care, custody, and control of such property or material; and ``(II) take reasonable measures, and…”
“``(ii) In a civil action brought under section 2255 or 2255A, for purposes of paragraph (1), the court may-- ``(I) order the plaintiff or defendant to provide to the court or the Government, as applicable, any equipment necessary to maintain care, custody, and control of such property or material; and ``(II) take reasonable measures, and…”
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“(b) Elements.--The research campaign required by subsection (a) shall-- (1) pursue sandbox demonstrations with frontier artificial intelligence models or leverage other tactics necessary to uncover vulnerabilities to intelligence community systems, infrastructure, or personnel that may result from-- (A) the accelerated development of artificial intelligence capabilities by foreign nations; (B) the increasing access that non-state and criminal actors have to commercial artificial intelligence tools that can identify vulnerabilities and propose or orchestrate attacks; and (C) the potential for artificial intelligence systems to interact directly with each other during an attack; and (2) pursue findings, including-- (A) an identification of potential mitigations for unique vulnerabilities discovered; or (B) if no mitigation could be identified, an identification of vulnerabilities that require follow-up action by the intelligence community.”
“(a) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall commence a research campaign to deepen the understanding of the intelligence community with respect to novel dynamics and vulnerabilities that may arise when an adversarial artificial intelligence system interacts directly with systems of, or contracted by, the intelligence community that include artificial intelligence components.”
“(2) Intelligence community.--The Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall brief the heads and Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the intelligence community on the findings and recommendations of the research campaign required by subsection (a), as appropriate. SEC. 708. RESEARCH ON INTERACTION OF ADVERSARIAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS WITH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SYSTEMS.”
“(c) Briefings.-- (1) Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, or 30 days after the date of completion of the research campaign required by subsection (a), whichever occurs first, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall brief the congressional intelligence committees on the findings and recommendations of the research campaign.”
“(b) Elements.--The research campaign required by subsection (a) shall include-- (1) the identification of scenarios in which artificial intelligence capabilities could contribute to inadvertent escalation with foreign nations or actors, including-- (A) analytic judgments that fail to properly consider or weigh alternative explanations; (B) automation of imagery classification or signals intelligence; (C) distinguishing between civilians and authorized targets; (D) operational uses of artificial intelligence, such as time-constrained uses that do not allow for independent verification; and (E) such other scenarios as identified by the Director or participating subject matter experts; (2) a simulation of select scenarios to discern where miscommunication or miscalculations have a higher likelihood of occurrence; and (3)(A) an identification of potential mitigations for vulnerabilities discovered; or (B) if no mitigation could be identified, an identification of vulnerabilities that require follow-up action by the intelligence community.”
“(a) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall commence a research campaign to deepen the understanding of the intelligence community with respect to specific ways in which the use of artificial intelligence systems by the intelligence community could contribute to inadvertent escalation with foreign nations or actors.”
“(b) Reports on Risk Mitigation Measures.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the head of each element of the intelligence community to which the policy described in subsection (a) applies shall submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees describing risk mitigation measures undertaken by the given element regarding artificial intelligence systems that generate intelligence that could reasonably be judged useful to develop or inform targeting with lethal effects. SEC. 707. RESEARCH ON USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO INADVERTENT ESCALATION.”
“(a) Labeling Policy.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the intelligence community, establish a policy that applies to elements of the intelligence community, which generate intelligence that could reasonably be judged useful to develop or inform targeting with lethal effects, and that requires-- (1) labeling of outputs from any artificial intelligence system used in the development of such intelligence are clearly marked to indicate-- (A) that artificial intelligence was used; (B) the artificial intelligence system or model used; [[Page S4041]] (C) the manner in which, or task for which, the artificial intelligence was used; and (D) a point of contact such as the relevant Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer, who can address questions about data inputs, system access, or artificial intelligence system performance; and (2) the label or indicator that is used pursuant to paragraph (1) is attached to the resulting data or work product in a manner that remains prominent and visible to any person who subsequently interacts with that data on a system of the intelligence community, regardless of organizational affiliation of the person or the role of the person in developing the data.”
“(d) Form.--Each report submitted pursuant to subsection (b) shall be submitted in classified form. (e) Sunset.--This section shall expire on October 1, 2032. SEC. 706. CLEAR LABELING OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OUTPUTS FOR TARGETING WORKFLOWS.”
“(c) Contents.--Each report submitted pursuant to subsection (b) shall describe the proposed novel use of artificial intelligence technology, including-- (1) hardware and software requirements; (2) the proposed application of the technology; (3) the risks and advantages assessed with respect to the proposed novel use; (4) any specific risk mitigation measures contemplated, including measures specific to the proposed novel use; (5) any test and evaluation activities conducted in conjunction with the proposed novel use; (6) any additional test and evaluation activity that is still needed, and whether the intelligence community has resources to conduct and fund such activity; and (7) any estimated cost increases anticipated in connection with the proposed novel use.”
“(b) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the other elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a consolidated report detailing any novel use of artificial intelligence technology that any element of the intelligence community is considering employing within the one-year period following submission of such report.”
“(a) Definition.--In this section, the term ``novel use of artificial intelligence technology'' means-- (1) an artificial intelligence capability or series of capabilities combined that has not previously been included in an intelligence community element's inventory of artificial intelligence use cases consistent with guidance issued pursuant to section 6702(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m(b)); (2) a use of an artificial intelligence capability that contravenes a restriction on the use of artificial intelligence contained in such an inventory; or (3) a use of an artificial intelligence capability that constitutes a high-impact artificial intelligence use as that term is defined under policies of the executive branch.”
“``(e) Reports on Test-bed Access.--Not less than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027 and annually thereafter, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the test-bed established under subsection (c)(3) that includes -- ``(1) a list of persons that requested access to the test- bed during the period covered by the report; ``(2) a list of the persons that were granted access to the test-bed during such period; ``(3) a list of the persons that were denied access to the test-bed during such period, and a justification for each such denial; and ``(4) a full copy of the terms of usage established under subsection (d)(1).''. SEC. 705. REPORTS ON NOVEL USES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY.”
“75191; relating to safe, secure, and trustworthy development and use of artificial intelligence). ``(3) Voluntary security guidance.--In order to incentivize participation by vendors of leading commercial models and to promote the national security of the United States, the Director shall share relevant guidance, informed by pre- deployment testing in the secure test-bed environment identified in subsection (c), to inform voluntary vendor actions to mitigate against potential security threats to such models, or the ability of foreign actors to utilize such models for computer network exploitation campaigns, the design or development of weapons systems, or to further foreign surveillance capabilities.”
“``(iv) Preservation of authority.--Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed as limiting the authority of the Director to condition participation on a researcher's ability to protect classified or sensitive intelligence information, a researcher's agreement to comply with intelligence handling, use, and nondisclosure requirements, or other valid counter-intelligence concerns. ``(B) Availability to federal agencies.--The Director shall ensure that the test-bed made available under subsection (c)(3) is also made available to other Federal agencies on a cost-recovery basis. ``(2) Use of certain infrastructure and other resources.-- In carrying out subsection (c)(3), the Director shall leverage, to the greatest extent practicable, infrastructure and other resources provided under section 5.2 of Executive Order 14110 (88 Fed. Reg.”
“``(ii) Equitable access.--In establishing terms of usage under clause (i), the Director shall ensure that access to the test-bed is made available to academic and private sector researchers in an equitable, impartial, and nondiscriminatory way. ``(iii) Ideological and political viewpoints.--Terms and conditions under clause (i) may not deny or condition access on the basis of the ideological or political viewpoints of the given researcher or the institution with which a given researcher is affiliated.”
“SEC. 704. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY CENTER. Section 6504 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (division F of Public Law 118-159) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c)-- (A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and (B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph (3): ``(3) Making available a research test-bed to private sector and academic researchers, on a subsidized basis, to engage in artificial intelligence security research, including through the secure provision of access in a secure environment for pre-deployment testing of to proprietary third-party models with the consent of the vendors of the models.''; (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (f); and (3) by inserting after subsection (c) the following: ``(d) Test-bed Requirements.-- ``(1) Access and terms of usage.-- ``(A) Researcher access.-- ``(i) In general.--The Director shall establish terms of usage governing researcher access to the test-bed made available under subsection (c)(3), with limitations on researcher publication only to the extent necessary to protect classified information or proprietary information concerning third-party models provided through the consent of model vendors.”
“``(4) Specific issues relating to agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes.--In carrying out paragraph (3), the Director of National Intelligence, at a minimum and to the extent such requirements are not already replicated in existing processes or policies, consider-- ``(A) establishing a taxonomy of autonomy and security risks associated with agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes that operate on, or have the possibility of accessing, information within the intelligence community; and ``(B) establishing technical controls, processes, and other mitigation measures to address the risks identified under subparagraph (A), including, at a minimum-- [[Page S4040]] ``(i) requirements that any element of the intelligence community or external department or agency incorporating information from an intelligence community element as part of an agentic artificial intelligence system or process provide the relevant element of the intelligence community controlling such information with documentation of-- ``(I) the properties of the agentic artificial intelligence system or process, including the range of additional systems or data sources it may access (whether as a system or process input or as an agent action), the permissions and classification entitlements associated with such access, as well as any relevant model or system documentation, such as model and system cards; ``(II) anticipated mission use cases for any access to information within the intelligence community in the context of an agentic artificial intelligence system or process, including whether any use case constitutes a high-impact artificial intelligence use as those terms are defined under existing Federal policies; ``(III) procedures to notify relevant intelligence community elements controlling such information of any changes to the properties of the agentic artificial intelligence system or process, to permissions and classification entitlements, or to anticipated use cases of such system or process, that might significantly limit the utility, confidentiality, integrity, or availability of such information; and ``(IV) procedures for intelligence community elements to promptly notify external intelligence community elements or departments or agencies of any material changes to upstream classified data or systems that might significantly limit or impair the utility, confidentiality, integrity, or availability of any downstream agentic artificial intelligence system or process maintained by that external intelligence community element or department or agency; ``(ii) policies and procedures to log any actions, as well as associated inputs, taken by an agentic artificial intelligence system or process to information within the intelligence community, including mechanisms to reverse or negate unauthorized actions or actions that pose a risk to the user intent or confidentiality, integrity, or availability of such information; ``(iii) policies and procedures for safeguards, continuous monitoring, and the detection of security incidents or other unexpected behavior of an agentic artificial intelligence system or process, or failures of associated safeguards, that may pose a threat to the confidentiality, availability, or integrity of information within the intelligence community; ``(iv) policies and procedures for system-level controls of agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes, tailored to address each system or process component; and ``(v) criteria for the selection of interoperability standards for agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes, with preference, to the extent practicable, for standards that are openly specified, governed in a vendor- neutral manner, supported by multiple model providers, extensible to future requirements, and subject to ongoing independent security review.''.”
“``(3) Policy guidance.--Upon completion of the review required by paragraph (2), the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, shall issue appropriate policy guidance on-- ``(A) the use of agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes within the intelligence community; and ``(B) the access of agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes to information within the intelligence community.”
“``(B) Evaluation of effectiveness of mechanisms for agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes to authenticate as non-human actors.--The review required by subparagraph (A)(i) shall include an evaluation of the effectiveness of mechanisms for agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes to authenticate as non-human actors, including the appropriate delegation of clearance entitlements and the traceability of any action taken by an agentic artificial intelligence system or process to a cleared individual on whose behalf the agentic artificial intelligence system or process is acting.”
“3024(g)), the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the National Manager for National Security Systems, shall-- ``(i) not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this paragraph, complete a review of the adequacy of existing identity, credential, and access management systems for information within the intelligence community used by agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes; and ``(ii) not permit access to any information within the intelligence community by an external department or agency for use in an agentic artificial intelligence system or process until the review required by clause (i) is completed.”
“``(2) Review of the adequacy of existing identity, credential, and access management systems for information within the intelligence community.-- ``(A) In general.--Consistent with authority under section 102A(g) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.”
“``(g) Policies for Agentic Artificial Intelligence Systems and Processes.-- ``(1) Definition of agentic artificial intelligence system or process.--In this subsection, the term `agentic artificial intelligence system or process'-- ``(A) means an artificial intelligence system or process that, given an objective or instruction-- ``(i) determines the action or sequence of actions to be taken to accomplish that objective; and ``(ii) is capable of executing such actions directly on information systems, data, or external services; and ``(B) does not include a system or process that solely generates informational or advisory output for a human operator to act upon.”
“3334m) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)-- (A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and (B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following: ``(3) Study for tracking data generated or modified by an artificial intelligence system.--The Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of each element of the intelligence community, shall examine whether the intelligence community should identify intelligence information generated or materially modified by an artificial intelligence system, including determining what methods are necessary to preserve such information throughout the intelligence lifecycle.''; (2) in subsection (d), by adding at the end the following: ``(3) Process for review of artificial intelligence testing methodologies and benchmarks.--Consistent with applicable classification and access policies, the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of each element of the intelligence community, shall-- ``(A) establish a process to review artificial intelligence testing methodologies and benchmarks employed within each element; and ``(B) ensure such methodologies and benchmarks remain commensurate with the capabilities and impacts of systems being evaluated.''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(f) Process to Systematically Track and Evaluate Incidents.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in coordination with the National Manager for National Security Systems, shall establish a process to systematically track and evaluate incidents associated with compromises to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of artificial intelligence systems within each element of the intelligence community.”
“(3) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. SEC. 703. IMPROVEMENTS FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE POLICIES, STANDARDS, AND GUIDANCE FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) In General.--Section 6702 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C.”
“(B) Identification of any artificial intelligence tools utilized and for what tasks or purposes they are used. (C) The level of autonomy afforded to the tools, and whether human review of artificial intelligence system outputs is required to be conducted prior to dissemination of materials. (D) The scope of individuals expected to have access to the materials described in subparagraph (C). (E) An explanation of whether and how the capability limitations of artificial intelligence tools available to personnel of the intelligence community are communicated to users, including the cutoff date for the tool's training data, databases to which it does or does not have access rights, and the tasks the model has been trained for or approved for use.”
“(f) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the reviews and assessments carried out under subsection (b) as well as a summary of any new policies and directives issued pursuant to subsection (e). (2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A) A description of contributions of the intelligence community to targeting workflows, such as identification of points of interest, pattern of life analysis, review of proposed targets, target selection, and civilian impact reviews, as well as the understanding of the intelligence community of the delineation of roles and responsibilities with the Armed Forces where applicable.”
“(d) Consultation.--In carrying out the review and assessments required by subsection (b), the Director shall consult with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community whose intelligence is commonly consulted to inform targeting decisions with lethal effects, such as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency, to solicit input on potential negative consequences resulting from artificial intelligence supported analysis, and possible ways to mitigate such consequences. (e) Policies and Directives.--The Director shall issue or adjust such policies and directives to the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate to improve risk mitigation in light of the review carried out under subsection (b).”
“(c) Artificial Intelligence Errors Exploratory Analysis.-- In carrying out the reviews required by subsection (b), the Director shall direct the National Intelligence Council to conduct a structured, exploratory analysis that-- (1) assess ways in which frontier artificial intelligence models could exhibit bias or cause errors that undermine intelligence or other information provided by the intelligence community that informs targeting accuracy; (2) identify the specific point and cause of error; and (3) provide proposed process mitigations to catch and correct such mistakes.”
“(2) Workflow reviews.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall review and assess all workflows of the intelligence community that incorporate artificial intelligence used by the United States to inform targeting decisions with lethal effects.”
“(B) Elements.--In carrying out the review and assessment required by subparagraph (A), the Director shall-- (i) assess whether policies and procedures of the intelligence community that were in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act adequately address risks posed by the use of artificial intelligence technologies in the targeting analysis and development and civilian harm mitigation processes; and (ii) ensure the review covers all policies of the intelligence community that regard the production or review of intelligence, regardless of which element first produced the intelligence.”
“(a) Definitions.--In this subsection: (1) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of National Intelligence. [[Page S4039]] (2) Intelligence.--The term ``Intelligence'' has the meaning given the term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). (b) Reviews Related to Intelligence Community Use of Artificial Intelligence to Support Targeting.-- (1) Policy and procedure reviews.-- (A) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall review and assess the policies and procedures that govern the use by the intelligence community of artificial intelligence technologies in the production, or review, of intelligence used by the United States to inform targeting decisions with lethal effects.”
“(j) Exemption From Disclosure; Protection.--Any information shared by a covered person or other entity or individual with the United States Government pursuant to this section-- (1) shall be exempt from disclosure and withheld, without discretion, from the public, pursuant to section 552(b)(3)(B) of title 5, United States Code, and any other provision of United States law or law of any State, political subdivision or agency thereof, or Tribe requiring disclosure of information or records; and (2) shall not be deemed a waiver of any applicable privilege or protection, including trade secret protection. SEC. 702. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT TARGETING.”
“(B) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (i) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be construed-- (1) to authorize the collection of intelligence on United States persons not authorized by another provision of law; (2) to authorize the sharing of personally identifiable information about an individual in a manner that violates another provision of law; (3) to require the disclosure of classified information to unauthorized persons; (4) to establish commercial, competition, or technology policy outside the purview of the intelligence community; (5) to require a non-Federal entity to provide information to a Federal entity or another non-Federal entity; (6) to condition the sharing of threat information with a non-Federal entity on such entity's provision of threat information to another entity; or (7) to condition the award of any Federal grant, contract, or purchase on the provision of threat information to a Federal or non-Federal entity.”
“(h) Evaluation and Reporting.-- (1) Evaluation.--The Director shall, acting through the Center, continuously evaluate the effectiveness and risks of the pilot program established under subsection (b). (2) Report.-- (A) In general.--Not later than 90 days before the date on which the pilot program required by paragraph (1) of subsection (b) terminates pursuant to paragraph (2) of such subsection, the Director shall, acting through the Center, submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report covering-- (i) the effectiveness of intelligence sharing under the pilot program; (ii) the adequacy of safeguards for sources, methods, privacy, and civil liberties and any recommendations to mitigate harms; (iii) the scope of participation; (iv) a list of covered persons granted access to the pilot program; (v) a list of each covered person that requested access and was denied, including a justification for each such denial; and (vi) whether the pilot program should be modified, extended, or terminated.”
“(2) Nondisclosure.--A covered person may not disclose to any person who is not a covered person or an element of the intelligence community any intelligence shared with the covered person under the pilot program required by subsection (b), except as expressly authorized by the Director acting through the Center. (g) Privacy and Civil Liberties.--In planning and coordinating the pilot program required by subsection (b), the Director shall, acting through the Center, coordinate with the Civil Liberties Protection Officer of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to produce guidance relating to privacy and civil liberties which shall govern the receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of threat information containing personal information of United States persons.”
“(3) Handling requirements.--The Director shall, acting through the Center, codify policies governing the handling, storage, and dissemination of intelligence shared under the pilot program required by subsection (b), including audit and compliance mechanisms. (f) Permissible Use and Nondisclosure.-- (1) Permissible use.--Intelligence shared under the pilot program required by subsection (b) may be used solely for detecting, preventing, or mitigating malicious foreign activity exploiting access to United States artificial intelligence systems and enabling infrastructure to engage in intelligence collection, intellectual property theft, and other malicious activities.”
“(e) Tailoring, Handling, and Protection of Intelligence.-- (1) Procedures required.--The Director shall, acting through the Center, codify procedures to tailor, sanitize, or downgrade the classification level of intelligence shared under the pilot program required by subsection (b) to ensure usability while protecting intelligence sources and methods. (2) Examples of procedures.--The procedures developed under paragraph (1) may include the following: (A) The use of tear lines and segregable summaries. (B) The preparation of classified annexes where necessary. (C) Criteria governing the classification level of shared intelligence. (D) The appropriate use of cleared industry personnel.”
“(d) Intelligence Sharing Structure.-- (1) Authorized modes.--Under the pilot program required by subsection (b), the Director may, acting through the Center, authorize the sharing of intelligence and threat information as described in paragraph (1) of such subsection through-- (A) bilateral exchanges between elements of the intelligence community and a covered person; (B) multilateral exchanges among covered persons, as determined appropriate by the Director; or (C) another designated intelligence-sharing mechanism operated or overseen by the Director. (2) Limitation.--Any mechanism established under this section shall be limited to the dissemination of intelligence and threat information and shall not establish standards, requirements, or best practices governing artificial intelligence development or deployment.”
“(3) Process for requesting participation.--The Director shall, acting through the Center, establish and make available to covered persons a process by which such covered person may request access to participate in the pilot program required by subsection (b). Such process shall include -- (A) submission by a covered person of a formal request to participate in the pilot program; (B) evaluation of each such request against, at minimum, the criteria established under paragraph (1); and (C) timely notification to the covered person who requested access of the status of their request and, in the case of denial, an explanation of the reason for denial.”
“(D) Agreement to comply with intelligence handling, use, and nondisclosure requirements. (E) The availability of cleared personnel of covered persons or willingness of covered persons to increase the number of cleared personnel. (2) Nature of participation.--Participation in the pilot program shall not be construed as a certification, endorsement, or regulatory approval by the United States Government of any artificial intelligence system or commercial activity and the Director may not exclude a covered person from participating on the basis of political or ideological viewpoints of the covered person or its employees.”
“(2) Participation.--The Director may not select covered persons to participate in the pilot in a manner that provides a competitive advantage or procurement preference to any covered person, to the detriment of another covered person. (3) Duration.--The Director shall carry out the pilot program established pursuant to paragraph (1) during the 3- year period beginning on the date of the establishment of the pilot program. (c) Participation Requirements.-- (1) Criteria.--The Director shall establish criteria governing engagement with covered persons under the pilot program required by subsection (b), which may include criteria relating to the following: (A) Relevance to national security. (B) The ability to protect classified or sensitive intelligence information. (C) Cybersecurity and information security maturity.”
“(12) United states person.--The term ``United States person'' has the meaning given that term in section 105A(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3039(c)). (b) Establishment of Pilot Program on Sharing of Intelligence and Threat Information With Covered Persons.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall, acting through the Center, establish a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of facilitating the secure sharing with covered persons of intelligence and threat information germane to the exploitation of access to United States artificial intelligence systems and enabling infrastructure to engage in intelligence collection, intellectual property theft, and other malicious activities.”
“(11) Threat information.--The term ``threat information'' means information on-- (A) efforts by foreign adversary countries to use products or research of covered persons or other entities or individuals to generate synthetic media for foreign-directed influence campaigns, develop and manage computer network exploitation campaigns, design or develop weapons systems, or enhance surveillance capabilities in ways that undermine the privacy or threaten the security of citizens of the United States; (B) threats posed by foreign adversary countries, including indications of compromise to networks associated with covered persons and other entities and individuals, or other technical indicators, indicating a compromise to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an artificial intelligence system, or to the supply chain of an artificial intelligence system, including training or [[Page S4038]] test data, frameworks or software libraries, training or inference computing environments, or other components necessary for the training, management, or maintenance of an artificial intelligence system; (C) activity of foreign entities of concern to clandestinely, fraudulently, or otherwise maliciously access the systems of covered persons for purposes of illicit technology transfer or otherwise gaining unfair economic advantage, including through techniques to extract a model's technical capabilities to replicate, develop, or improve a foreign artificial intelligence model without authorization by the covered person; (D) activity of foreign entities of concern to sabotage or otherwise clandestinely degrade artificial intelligence systems or the supply chain of an artificial intelligence system, including training or test data, frameworks or software libraries, training or inference computing environments, or other components necessary for the training, management, or maintenance of an artificial intelligence system; and (E) observations, emerging concerns, or other inputs from vendors or researchers regarding relevant malicious or clandestine activity of foreign entities of concern toward an artificial intelligence system, its supply chain, or other necessary components.”
“(8) Intelligence.--The term ``intelligence'' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003). (9) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003). (10) Security clearance.--The term ``security clearance'' means an authorization to access classified information.”
“(4) Cleared industry personnel.--The term ``cleared industry personnel'' means employees or representatives of a covered person who hold an appropriate security clearance and have a demonstrated need to know. (5) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003). (6) Covered person.--The term ``covered person'' means a non-Federal person who-- (A) is a United States citizen; (B) develops, deploys, or operates artificial intelligence models or critical enabling infrastructure; and (C) provides the services described in subparagraph (B) to an element of the intelligence community or Department of Defense. (7) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of the National Security Agency.”
“TITLE VII--ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SEC. 701. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION GUARD AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Artificial intelligence model.--The term ``artificial intelligence model'' means a capability or series of capabilities combined that can, for a given set of objectives, generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or decisions without human intervention or input. (2) Center.--The term ``Center'' means the Artificial Intelligence Security Center of the National Security Agency. (3) Classified information.--The term ``classified information'' has the meaning given such term in section 805 of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3164).”
“``(G) A summary of any significant increases or reductions in intelligence sharing during the reporting period and the national security rationale for such changes. ``(3) Form.--Each report required by paragraph (1) report shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex. ``(4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this subsection, the term `appropriate congressional committees' means-- ``(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and ``(B) to the extent Department of Defense information is implicated, the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code).''. (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such Act is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Sec. 1115. Requirements relating to intelligence sharing.''.”
“``(C) A description of how such intelligence sharing has contributed, if at all, to-- ``(i) improved detection, tracking, warning, interception, or deterrence of aerial threats, including missiles and unmanned systems, for Israel, United States forces, or regional partners; and ``(ii) the overall stability and coordination of security in the region. ``(D) An assessment of progress in improving interoperability among technology networks of the United States, Israel, and partner countries. ``(E) A description of efforts to secure technology networks and data from cyber threats and unauthorized access. ``(F) An identification of any legal, policy, technical, counterintelligence, or security barriers limiting deeper intelligence integration, including risks to intelligence sources and methods.”
“``(2) Matters to be included.--Each report required by paragraph (1) shall include, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the following: ``(A) A description of the categories of intelligence and security information shared by the United States Government with the Government of Israel. ``(B) An assessment of progress toward seamlessly integrating Israel into regional air and missile defense and early warning architectures with partner countries, including those that have normalized relations with Israel pursuant to the Abraham Accords.”