Tommy Tuberville
Senator for Alabama · Republican · United States
“(e) Report on Certain Drivers of Deforestation and Environmental Degradation in the Brazilian Amazon.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to Congress regarding certain drivers of deforestation and environmental d…”
“(e) Report on Certain Drivers of Deforestation and Environmental Degradation in the Brazilian Amazon.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to Congress regarding certain drivers of deforestation and environmental d…”
“(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive strategy, with a classif…”
“(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive strategy, with a classif…”
“``(ii) In a civil action brought under section 2255 or 2255A, for purposes of paragraph (1), the court may-- ``(I) order the plaintiff or defendant to provide to the court or the Government, as applicable, any equipment necessary to maintain care, custody, and control of such property or material; and ``(II) take reasonable measures, and…”
“``(ii) In a civil action brought under section 2255 or 2255A, for purposes of paragraph (1), the court may-- ``(I) order the plaintiff or defendant to provide to the court or the Government, as applicable, any equipment necessary to maintain care, custody, and control of such property or material; and ``(II) take reasonable measures, and…”
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“Short titles. Sec. 8722. Statement of policy. Sec. 8723. Definitions. Sec. 8724. Report on activities of certain foreign governments and groups in Sudan. Sec. 8725. Report on atrocities and gross violations of internationally-recognized human rights in Sudan. Sec. 8726. Strategy. Sec. 8727. Assessment of eligibility of armed actors in Sudan for designation as specially designated global terrorists. Sec. 8728. Sanctions. Sec. 8729. Special Envoy for Sudan. Sec. 8730. Assistance to the Government of Sudan by international financial institutions. Sec. 8731. Sudan Business Risk Advisory. Sec. 8732. United States engagement at the United Nations with respect to Sudan. Sec. 8733. Foreign assistance to Sudan. Sec. 8734. Annual report on financial assets held by armed actors in Sudan. Sec. 8735. Termination. Sec. 8736. Rule of construction. Sec.”
“Implementation. Sec. 8709C. Termination of sanctions authorities. Chapter 2--Other Matters Sec. 8710. Determination with respect to Russian military actions in support of Russian shadow fleet. Sec. 8710A. Resources for sanctions implementation at the Department of State. Sec. 8710B. Modification of limitation on military cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation. Sec. 8710C. Emergency appropriations for the Countering Russian Influence Fund. Sec. 8710D. Report on presidential drawdown authority and Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. Sec. 8710E. Support for Ukraine arms sales. Subtitle B--Deterring Aggression Against Taiwan Sec. 8711. Short title. Sec. 8712. Sense of Congress. Sec. 8713. Definitions. Sec. 8714. Task force. Sec. 8715. Report. Sec. 8716. Rule of construction. Subtitle C--PEACE in Sudan Sec. 8721.”
“subchapter b--sanctions with respect to russian-origin energy products Sec. 8706. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons with certain interests in Russian energy projects. Sec. 8706A. Strategy to counter role of the People's Republic of China in evasion of sanctions with respect to Russian-origin petroleum products. subchapter c--sanctions with respect to russian defense industrial base Sec. 8707. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons that sell, lease, or provide goods or services relating to the defense industrial base of the Russian Federation. subchapter d--modifications of protecting europe's energy security act of 2019 Sec. 8708. Modifications of Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019. subchapter e--general provisions Sec. 8709. Sanctions described. Sec. 8709A. Exceptions; waivers. Sec. 8709B.”
“Imposition of sanctions with respect to port terminals accepting oil from Russian shadow fleet vessels. PART II--Disclosures, Publications, and Reports Sec. 8703. Alignment of designation authorities with European Union and United Kingdom regarding Russian shadow fleet. Sec. 8703A. Support of efforts of the Joint Expeditionary Force. PART III--Flag State Requirements and Strategy Sec. 8704. Minimum standards for operating as a flag state registry and assessment of efforts to prevent the circumvention of sanctions and other crimes. Sec. 8704A. Strategy for countries that do not make sufficient efforts to comply with minimum standards for operating as a flag state. PART IV--Other Matters Sec. 8705. International efforts to identify vessels transporting Russian-origin oil.”
“Strategy on maritime economic resilience. Sec. 8618. Modernization of international agreements related to critical undersea infrastructure. Sec. 8619. Embassy evacuation and notification planning. Sec. 8620. Young African Leaders Initiative. TITLE VII--OTHER MATTERS Subtitle A--SHADOW Fleet Sanctions Act of 2026 Sec. 8700. Short titles. Chapter 1--Sanctions With Respect to the Russian Federation Sec. 8701. Definitions. subchapter a--sanctions with respect to russian shadow fleet PART I--Imposition of Sanctions Sec. 8702. Imposition of sanctions with respect to vessels suspected of participation in or support of the Russian shadow fleet. Sec. 8702A. Imposition of sanctions with respect to foreign persons that support Russian illicit shipping with vessels subject to United States sanctions. Sec. 8702B.”
“Sunsetting the 180-day COVID obligation and expenditure reports. Sec. 8607. Congressional delegations. Sec. 8608. Modification of the special rule for countries downgraded from and reinstated to the tier 2 watch list in the Trafficking in Persons report. Sec. 8609. United States support to United Nations peacekeeping duplicative reporting. Sec. 8610. Restrictions on stinger missile transfers to Bahrain. Sec. 8611. Change to the missile sanctions laws statutory references. Sec. 8612. Congressional notifications under the Arms Export Control Act. Sec. 8613. Report on critical language expertise. Sec. 8614. Use of artificial intelligence to meet congressional reporting requirements. Sec. 8615. Millennium Challenge Corporation compacts. Sec. 8616. Office of the Inspector General for Foreign Assistance. Sec. 8617.”
“Authorization of certain public libraries to collect and retain fees for the acceptance and execution of passport applications. Sec. 8505. Review of tour lengths for Foreign Service officers at critical Human Intelligence threat posts. Sec. 8506. Modernization of consular forms. Sec. 8507. Expansion of limited consular appointment authority. Sec. 8508. Report on indefinite suspensions for members of the Civil Service. Sec. 8509. Artificial intelligence use for online presence review. TITLE VI--MISCELLANEOUS Sec. 8601. Au pair regulation. Sec. 8602. Requirement for think tanks to disclose foreign funding. Sec. 8603. Marking and branding. Sec. 8604. Permitting for international bridges and land ports of entry. Sec. 8605. Arms Export Control Act increase for direct commercial contracts authority. Sec. 8606.”
“Strategy on Department plan to reopen diplomatic facilities in Syria. Sec. 8205. Amendment to reflect the Bureau of Medical Services. TITLE III--INFORMATION SECURITY AND CYBER DIPLOMACY Sec. 8301. Internal report on smart cable analytics. Sec. 8302. Generative artificial intelligence enabled language translation. TITLE IV--PUBLIC DIPLOMACY Sec. 8401. Mega-decade sports diplomacy. [[Page S4043]] Sec. 8402. Strengthening United States response to adversarial propaganda. TITLE V--DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS Sec. 8501. Report on Consular Affairs officers joining United States missions to Pacific Island countries. Sec. 8502. Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022 implementation report. Sec. 8503. Counterintelligence unit at all critical counterintelligence threat posts. Sec. 8504.”
“Additions to reporting requirements for deaths at post. Sec. 8109. Policy on negotiation of bilateral work agreements. Sec. 8110. Coverage of return costs. Sec. 8111. Requirement for Uyghur language training. Sec. 8112. Extension of post-employment restrictions on Senate- confirmed officials at the Department of State. Sec. 8113. Reducing foreign language training related delays in Foreign Service assignments. Sec. 8114. Ensuring full staffing of the countering Russian Influence Fund. Sec. 8115. Facilitating moves for domestic employees teleworking overseas. Sec. 8116. Strengthening the Department's capacity for economic and technology competition. TITLE II--ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS Sec. 8201. Streamlining move procedures. Sec. 8202. Streamlining Arctic Ambassador responsibilities. Sec. 8203. Adversary alignment. Sec. 8204.”
“SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This division may be cited as the ``Department of State Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of content for this division is as follows: DIVISION F--DEPARTMENT OF STATE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027 Sec. 8001. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 8002. Definitions. TITLE I--WORKFORCE MATTERS Sec. 8101. Mid-career training float. Sec. 8102. Rebidding for personnel at closed posts. Sec. 8103. Report on Pacific Islands embassy staffing incentives. Sec. 8104. Enduring foreign language proficiency incentive pay. Sec. 8105. Support for regional medical officer psychiatrists. Sec. 8106. Workforce exit interviews. Sec. 8107. Integration of Marine Security Guard Detachments at United States diplomatic posts. Sec. 8108.”
“International Development Finance Corporation to help ensure all projects of the Corporation are appropriately informed and strategically executed in accordance with the purpose of the Corporation as described in section 1412(b) of the BUILD Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9612(b)). SEC. 803. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS. (a) Definition of Armed Forces in National Security Act of 1947.--Section 605(8) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3126(8)) is amended by inserting ``Space Force,'' after ``Marine Corps,''. (b) National Intelligence University.--Section 6801(a)(4) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking ``3327'' and inserting ``3227''. DIVISION G--DEPARTMENT OF STATE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027 SEC. 8001.”
“4865 note; division E of Public Law 119-60) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services,'' after ``Foreign Affairs''; and (2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``, the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services,'' after ``Foreign Relations''. SEC. 802. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION. The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the other elements of the intelligence community, may provide intelligence and analytic support to the U.S.”
“(e) Cure.--If a covered application is identified for removal or is disqualified from use or acquisition pursuant to this section, the head of an element of the intelligence community may offer the provider of the covered application an opportunity to cure performance to avoid removal pursuant to subsection (b)(2). TITLE VIII--OTHER MATTERS SEC. 801. MODIFICATION TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTHORIZED AND ORDERED DEPARTURES. Section 5173(e) of the Department of State Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (22 U.S.C.”
“(2) Congressional notification.--Not later than 7 days after issuing a waiver pursuant to paragraph (1), the head of the element of the intelligence community that issues such waiver shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a notification that includes-- (A) an identification of the national security or research justification for such usage; (B) an estimate of the approximate cost of such usage; and (C) a plan to implement a safeguard in such a way as to allow for continued usage consistent with the general prohibition described in subsections (b)(1) and (c)(1).”
“(d) National Security and Research Waiver.-- (1) In general.--The head of an element of the intelligence community may issue a waiver for any artificial intelligence model that would otherwise be subject to the prohibition under subsection (b) if the head identifies a national security or research justification for such artificial intelligence model that benefits the intelligence community.”
“(2) Certification required.--The head of an element of the intelligence community shall certify to the Director of National Intelligence that safeguards implemented under paragraph (1) are sufficient to prevent misuse of covered applications to generate child pornography or intimate visual depictions of a minor. (3) Congressional notification.--The head of an element of the intelligence community that issues a certification pursuant to paragraph (2) shall notify the appropriate committees of Congress of such certification not later than 7 days after issuing such certification. Such a notification shall identify the safeguards implemented pursuant to paragraph (1).”
“(B) Subsequent removals.--Beginning after the 180-day period described in subparagraph (A), any artificial intelligence model that becomes a covered application shall be required to be removed from national security systems operated by an element of the intelligence community or a contractor of such element not later than 180 days after the date that the model is confirmed by the head of an element of the intelligence community, or their designee, to be a covered application. (c) Safeguards.-- (1) In general.--The head of an element of the intelligence community may implement additional safeguards that prohibit the generation of child pornography or non-consensual intimate visual depictions of an identifiable adult or a minor.”
“(5) Intimate visual depiction.--The term ``intimate visual depiction'' has the meaning given that term in section 1309 of the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022 (15 U.S.C. 6851). (b) Prohibition.-- (1) In general.--The acquisition or use of any covered application on national security systems operated by an element of the intelligence community or by a contractor of such element is prohibited unless the appropriate safeguards described in subsection (c) can be implemented. (2) Implementation.-- (A) Initial removal.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, any covered application shall be required to be removed from national security systems operated by an element of the intelligence community or a contractor of such element.”
“(4) Covered application.--The term ``covered application'' means any specific artificial intelligence model that has been confirmed by a head of an element of the intelligence community, or their designee, as-- (A) failing to adhere to the National Institute of Standard and Technology Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile with respect to ``obscene, degrading, and/or abusive content'', or a successor standard or framework, to the extent the framework applies to synthetic child sexual abuse material or non-consensual intimate images of adults; (B) subject to a Federal court determination that such artificial intelligence model has generated content depicting child pornography; or (C) subject to a Federal court determination that such artificial intelligence model has generated non-consensual intimate visual depictions of an identifiable adult or a minor.”
“(2) Artificial intelligence model.--The term ``artificial intelligence model'' means a capability or series of capabilities combined that can, for a given set of objectives, generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or decisions without human intervention or input. (3) Child pornography.--The term ``child pornography'' has the meaning given that term in section 2256 of title 18, United States Code.”
“(e) Consultation Required.--The Director of the National Security Agency shall carry [[Page S4042]] out subsections (b), (c), and (d) in consultation with-- (1) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; (2) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and (3) other entities as the Director of the National Security Agency considers appropriate. SEC. 710. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MODELS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SYSTEMS. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the following: (A) The congressional intelligence committees. (B) The Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. (C) The Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.”
“(d) Briefing on Vulnerabilities Identified by Artificial Intelligence Systems.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency shall provide the congressional intelligence committees with a briefing on-- (1) the volume of vulnerabilities of information systems identified by artificial intelligence systems; (2) the impact of any change in such volume on the functioning of the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and (3) whether the increasingly rapid discovery and exploitation of such vulnerabilities by external cyber actors using artificial intelligence systems materially alters the equity of disclosure.”
“(c) Process.--In carrying out subsection (b), if the Director of the National Security Agency determines that the existing Vulnerabilities Equities Process does not sufficiently accommodate the submission and review of artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities identified by elements of the intelligence community, and that such vulnerabilities present public interest considerations meriting review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process, the Director shall establish a process for the submission and review of such vulnerabilities under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process not later than 30 days after the date of such determination.”
“(b) Evaluation; Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency shall-- (1) evaluate whether the existing Vulnerabilities Equities Process sufficiently accommodates the submission and review of artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities; and (2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing the applicability of the Vulnerabilities Equities Process to such vulnerabilities, including whether the submission and review of such vulnerabilities under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process would result in an unduly large volume of notifications to affected vendors and, if so, an assessment of mechanisms to manage the volume of such notifications.”
“(2) Artificial intelligence system.--The term ``artificial intelligence system'' means a capability or series of capabilities combined that can, for a given set of objectives, generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or decisions without human intervention or input. (3) Vulnerabilities equities policy and process document.-- The term ``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document'' means the executive branch document entitled ``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process for the United States Government'' dated November 15, 2017. (4) Vulnerabilities equities process.--The term ``Vulnerabilities Equities Process'' means the interagency review of vulnerabilities carried out pursuant to the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document or any successor document.”
“(a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Artificial intelligence security vulnerability.--The term ``artificial intelligence security vulnerability'' means a weakness in an artificial intelligence system that could be exploited by a third party to subvert, without authorization, the privacy, integrity, or availability of an artificial intelligence system, including through techniques such as-- (A) evasion attacks; (B) poisoning attacks; (C) privacy-based attacks; (D) model theft or extraction attacks; and (E) attacks designed to circumvent or degrade the safety, alignment, or access control mechanisms of an artificial intelligence system.”
“(2) Intelligence community.--The Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall brief the heads and Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the intelligence community on the findings and recommendations of the research campaign required by subsection (a), as appropriate. SEC. 709. REVIEW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY VULNERABILITIES UNDER VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS.”
“(c) Briefings.-- (1) Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, or 30 days after the date of completion of the research campaign required by subsection (a), whichever occurs first, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall brief the congressional intelligence committees on the findings and recommendations of the research campaign.”
“(b) Elements.--The research campaign required by subsection (a) shall-- (1) pursue sandbox demonstrations with frontier artificial intelligence models or leverage other tactics necessary to uncover vulnerabilities to intelligence community systems, infrastructure, or personnel that may result from-- (A) the accelerated development of artificial intelligence capabilities by foreign nations; (B) the increasing access that non-state and criminal actors have to commercial artificial intelligence tools that can identify vulnerabilities and propose or orchestrate attacks; and (C) the potential for artificial intelligence systems to interact directly with each other during an attack; and (2) pursue findings, including-- (A) an identification of potential mitigations for unique vulnerabilities discovered; or (B) if no mitigation could be identified, an identification of vulnerabilities that require follow-up action by the intelligence community.”
“(a) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall commence a research campaign to deepen the understanding of the intelligence community with respect to novel dynamics and vulnerabilities that may arise when an adversarial artificial intelligence system interacts directly with systems of, or contracted by, the intelligence community that include artificial intelligence components.”
“(2) Intelligence community.--The Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall brief the heads and Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the intelligence community on the findings and recommendations of the research campaign required by subsection (a), as appropriate. SEC. 708. RESEARCH ON INTERACTION OF ADVERSARIAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS WITH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SYSTEMS.”
“(c) Briefings.-- (1) Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, or 30 days after the date of completion of the research campaign required by subsection (a), whichever occurs first, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall brief the congressional intelligence committees on the findings and recommendations of the research campaign.”
“(b) Elements.--The research campaign required by subsection (a) shall include-- (1) the identification of scenarios in which artificial intelligence capabilities could contribute to inadvertent escalation with foreign nations or actors, including-- (A) analytic judgments that fail to properly consider or weigh alternative explanations; (B) automation of imagery classification or signals intelligence; (C) distinguishing between civilians and authorized targets; (D) operational uses of artificial intelligence, such as time-constrained uses that do not allow for independent verification; and (E) such other scenarios as identified by the Director or participating subject matter experts; (2) a simulation of select scenarios to discern where miscommunication or miscalculations have a higher likelihood of occurrence; and (3)(A) an identification of potential mitigations for vulnerabilities discovered; or (B) if no mitigation could be identified, an identification of vulnerabilities that require follow-up action by the intelligence community.”
“(a) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall commence a research campaign to deepen the understanding of the intelligence community with respect to specific ways in which the use of artificial intelligence systems by the intelligence community could contribute to inadvertent escalation with foreign nations or actors.”
“(b) Reports on Risk Mitigation Measures.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the head of each element of the intelligence community to which the policy described in subsection (a) applies shall submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees describing risk mitigation measures undertaken by the given element regarding artificial intelligence systems that generate intelligence that could reasonably be judged useful to develop or inform targeting with lethal effects. SEC. 707. RESEARCH ON USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO INADVERTENT ESCALATION.”
“(a) Labeling Policy.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the intelligence community, establish a policy that applies to elements of the intelligence community, which generate intelligence that could reasonably be judged useful to develop or inform targeting with lethal effects, and that requires-- (1) labeling of outputs from any artificial intelligence system used in the development of such intelligence are clearly marked to indicate-- (A) that artificial intelligence was used; (B) the artificial intelligence system or model used; [[Page S4041]] (C) the manner in which, or task for which, the artificial intelligence was used; and (D) a point of contact such as the relevant Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer, who can address questions about data inputs, system access, or artificial intelligence system performance; and (2) the label or indicator that is used pursuant to paragraph (1) is attached to the resulting data or work product in a manner that remains prominent and visible to any person who subsequently interacts with that data on a system of the intelligence community, regardless of organizational affiliation of the person or the role of the person in developing the data.”
“(d) Form.--Each report submitted pursuant to subsection (b) shall be submitted in classified form. (e) Sunset.--This section shall expire on October 1, 2032. SEC. 706. CLEAR LABELING OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OUTPUTS FOR TARGETING WORKFLOWS.”
“(c) Contents.--Each report submitted pursuant to subsection (b) shall describe the proposed novel use of artificial intelligence technology, including-- (1) hardware and software requirements; (2) the proposed application of the technology; (3) the risks and advantages assessed with respect to the proposed novel use; (4) any specific risk mitigation measures contemplated, including measures specific to the proposed novel use; (5) any test and evaluation activities conducted in conjunction with the proposed novel use; (6) any additional test and evaluation activity that is still needed, and whether the intelligence community has resources to conduct and fund such activity; and (7) any estimated cost increases anticipated in connection with the proposed novel use.”
“(b) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the other elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a consolidated report detailing any novel use of artificial intelligence technology that any element of the intelligence community is considering employing within the one-year period following submission of such report.”
“(a) Definition.--In this section, the term ``novel use of artificial intelligence technology'' means-- (1) an artificial intelligence capability or series of capabilities combined that has not previously been included in an intelligence community element's inventory of artificial intelligence use cases consistent with guidance issued pursuant to section 6702(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m(b)); (2) a use of an artificial intelligence capability that contravenes a restriction on the use of artificial intelligence contained in such an inventory; or (3) a use of an artificial intelligence capability that constitutes a high-impact artificial intelligence use as that term is defined under policies of the executive branch.”
“``(e) Reports on Test-bed Access.--Not less than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027 and annually thereafter, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the test-bed established under subsection (c)(3) that includes -- ``(1) a list of persons that requested access to the test- bed during the period covered by the report; ``(2) a list of the persons that were granted access to the test-bed during such period; ``(3) a list of the persons that were denied access to the test-bed during such period, and a justification for each such denial; and ``(4) a full copy of the terms of usage established under subsection (d)(1).''. SEC. 705. REPORTS ON NOVEL USES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY.”
“75191; relating to safe, secure, and trustworthy development and use of artificial intelligence). ``(3) Voluntary security guidance.--In order to incentivize participation by vendors of leading commercial models and to promote the national security of the United States, the Director shall share relevant guidance, informed by pre- deployment testing in the secure test-bed environment identified in subsection (c), to inform voluntary vendor actions to mitigate against potential security threats to such models, or the ability of foreign actors to utilize such models for computer network exploitation campaigns, the design or development of weapons systems, or to further foreign surveillance capabilities.”
“``(iv) Preservation of authority.--Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed as limiting the authority of the Director to condition participation on a researcher's ability to protect classified or sensitive intelligence information, a researcher's agreement to comply with intelligence handling, use, and nondisclosure requirements, or other valid counter-intelligence concerns. ``(B) Availability to federal agencies.--The Director shall ensure that the test-bed made available under subsection (c)(3) is also made available to other Federal agencies on a cost-recovery basis. ``(2) Use of certain infrastructure and other resources.-- In carrying out subsection (c)(3), the Director shall leverage, to the greatest extent practicable, infrastructure and other resources provided under section 5.2 of Executive Order 14110 (88 Fed. Reg.”
“``(ii) Equitable access.--In establishing terms of usage under clause (i), the Director shall ensure that access to the test-bed is made available to academic and private sector researchers in an equitable, impartial, and nondiscriminatory way. ``(iii) Ideological and political viewpoints.--Terms and conditions under clause (i) may not deny or condition access on the basis of the ideological or political viewpoints of the given researcher or the institution with which a given researcher is affiliated.”
“SEC. 704. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY CENTER. Section 6504 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (division F of Public Law 118-159) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c)-- (A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and (B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph (3): ``(3) Making available a research test-bed to private sector and academic researchers, on a subsidized basis, to engage in artificial intelligence security research, including through the secure provision of access in a secure environment for pre-deployment testing of to proprietary third-party models with the consent of the vendors of the models.''; (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (f); and (3) by inserting after subsection (c) the following: ``(d) Test-bed Requirements.-- ``(1) Access and terms of usage.-- ``(A) Researcher access.-- ``(i) In general.--The Director shall establish terms of usage governing researcher access to the test-bed made available under subsection (c)(3), with limitations on researcher publication only to the extent necessary to protect classified information or proprietary information concerning third-party models provided through the consent of model vendors.”
“``(4) Specific issues relating to agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes.--In carrying out paragraph (3), the Director of National Intelligence, at a minimum and to the extent such requirements are not already replicated in existing processes or policies, consider-- ``(A) establishing a taxonomy of autonomy and security risks associated with agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes that operate on, or have the possibility of accessing, information within the intelligence community; and ``(B) establishing technical controls, processes, and other mitigation measures to address the risks identified under subparagraph (A), including, at a minimum-- [[Page S4040]] ``(i) requirements that any element of the intelligence community or external department or agency incorporating information from an intelligence community element as part of an agentic artificial intelligence system or process provide the relevant element of the intelligence community controlling such information with documentation of-- ``(I) the properties of the agentic artificial intelligence system or process, including the range of additional systems or data sources it may access (whether as a system or process input or as an agent action), the permissions and classification entitlements associated with such access, as well as any relevant model or system documentation, such as model and system cards; ``(II) anticipated mission use cases for any access to information within the intelligence community in the context of an agentic artificial intelligence system or process, including whether any use case constitutes a high-impact artificial intelligence use as those terms are defined under existing Federal policies; ``(III) procedures to notify relevant intelligence community elements controlling such information of any changes to the properties of the agentic artificial intelligence system or process, to permissions and classification entitlements, or to anticipated use cases of such system or process, that might significantly limit the utility, confidentiality, integrity, or availability of such information; and ``(IV) procedures for intelligence community elements to promptly notify external intelligence community elements or departments or agencies of any material changes to upstream classified data or systems that might significantly limit or impair the utility, confidentiality, integrity, or availability of any downstream agentic artificial intelligence system or process maintained by that external intelligence community element or department or agency; ``(ii) policies and procedures to log any actions, as well as associated inputs, taken by an agentic artificial intelligence system or process to information within the intelligence community, including mechanisms to reverse or negate unauthorized actions or actions that pose a risk to the user intent or confidentiality, integrity, or availability of such information; ``(iii) policies and procedures for safeguards, continuous monitoring, and the detection of security incidents or other unexpected behavior of an agentic artificial intelligence system or process, or failures of associated safeguards, that may pose a threat to the confidentiality, availability, or integrity of information within the intelligence community; ``(iv) policies and procedures for system-level controls of agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes, tailored to address each system or process component; and ``(v) criteria for the selection of interoperability standards for agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes, with preference, to the extent practicable, for standards that are openly specified, governed in a vendor- neutral manner, supported by multiple model providers, extensible to future requirements, and subject to ongoing independent security review.''.”
“``(3) Policy guidance.--Upon completion of the review required by paragraph (2), the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, shall issue appropriate policy guidance on-- ``(A) the use of agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes within the intelligence community; and ``(B) the access of agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes to information within the intelligence community.”
“``(B) Evaluation of effectiveness of mechanisms for agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes to authenticate as non-human actors.--The review required by subparagraph (A)(i) shall include an evaluation of the effectiveness of mechanisms for agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes to authenticate as non-human actors, including the appropriate delegation of clearance entitlements and the traceability of any action taken by an agentic artificial intelligence system or process to a cleared individual on whose behalf the agentic artificial intelligence system or process is acting.”
“3024(g)), the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the National Manager for National Security Systems, shall-- ``(i) not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this paragraph, complete a review of the adequacy of existing identity, credential, and access management systems for information within the intelligence community used by agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes; and ``(ii) not permit access to any information within the intelligence community by an external department or agency for use in an agentic artificial intelligence system or process until the review required by clause (i) is completed.”
“``(2) Review of the adequacy of existing identity, credential, and access management systems for information within the intelligence community.-- ``(A) In general.--Consistent with authority under section 102A(g) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.”