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2020-01-09
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2023-07-10
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  1. On the economic front, we underline the necessity of measures that bolster the Yemeni economy. They include the resumption of oil exports, the removal of obstacles to the overland transit of commercial goods and the improved provision of electricity, all of which are pivotal to Yemen’s path towards development. In conclusion, Brazil remains committed to continuing its work within the Security Council and elsewhere on this file. Our enduring belief is that, through diplomacy and the promotion of dialogue and mutual understanding, we can help the people of Yemen build the future of peace, stability and development that they deserve.

    2023-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9370 (2023) · source

  2. His work, supported by the international community, is central to the peace process. We also welcome the recent increase in commercial flights between Sana’a and Amman, as well we the first flight from Sana’a to Saudi Arabia since 2016. Those developments are not only milestones for regional connectivity, but also positive indicators of improvement in the regional political environment. Despite those positive strides, the dire humanitarian situation in Yemen remains a source of concern. We are troubled by ongoing access and funding challenges that impede the efficient delivery of aid. The funding shortfall in the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM) also raises significant concerns, as it poses risks to UNVIM’s important work in facilitating the flow of much-needed commercial cargo to Yemeni ports.

    2023-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9370 (2023) · source

  3. Turning our attention to the FSO SAFER oil tanker, Brazil acknowledges the recent developments in the operation to avoid a potentially catastrophic situation in the Red Sea. We recognize the complexities involved and remain hopeful that pending matters will soon be resolved, allowing for the timely commencement of the oil transfer. We express our gratitude to United Nations Development Programme, as well as to all partners and donors, for their relentless dedication in pushing this critical operation forward amid challenging circumstances. Brazil reaffirms its support for the tireless efforts made by Special Envoy Hans Grundberg. We take note of his extensive travels and meetings with different stakeholders within the region in pursuit of a political solution to the conflict in Yemen.

    2023-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9370 (2023) · source

  4. The economic and humanitarian importance of Al-Hudaydah’s ports for the entire country cannot be overstated, as they remain a lifeline for millions. The continued impact of landmines on the civilian population in Al-Hudaydah is cause for concern. As highlighted in the Secretary-General’s latest review of UNMHA (S/2023/432), the stabilization of the military situation has led to increased civilian access to former front-line areas, where remnants of war pose a high risk of serious injuries or even death. It is urgent to strengthen mine action capabilities and increase related projects. The cooperation of all parties is indispensable to ensuring the safety and well-being of the local communities.

    2023-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9370 (2023) · source

  5. I wish to extend my sincere gratitude to today’s briefers for their detailed and instructive remarks on the situation in Yemen. Their dedication, expertise and first-hand knowledge are invaluable and will guide our work to contribute to alleviating Yemen’s immense challenges. I congratulate the United Kingdom, the Council’s penholder on Yemen, for its guidance and leadership in renewing the mandate of United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) for another year. I welcome the delegations of Yemen and the Netherlands to this meeting. As a steadfast supporter of the Mission’s activities, including by contributing with military observers on the ground, Brazil regards UNMHA as instrumental in preventing further escalation in the Al-Hudaydah governorate and beyond.

    2023-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9370 (2023) · source

  6. Isolating Iran and cutting off avenues to dialogue can create a self- fulfilling prophecy, leading to exactly the outcomes that all of us here are seeking to avoid. We in the Council never tire of repeating that engagement is not a reward and that diplomacy, not isolation, is the only way to bring these files to a positive conclusion. Resolution 2231 (2015) acknowledges that when it emphasizes the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to finding a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, the recent agreement signed in May between Saudi Arabia and Iran signals willingness to reach a peaceful solution to regional challenges and to resort to dialogue as a means to promoting stability in the Middle East.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9367 (2023) · source

  7. The IAEA has continued to play a vital role in interfacing with Iran, defusing tensions and finding ways to preserve dialogue and continue the verification of Iran’s nuclear programme. Director General Grossi’s statement to the IAEA Board of Governors on 31 May indicates progress in the relationship with Iran. While gaps remain, cooperation between Iran and the IAEA remains the best pathway to ensuring transparency around Iran’s nuclear programme and is essential to rebuilding trust in any revived agreement. We must be vocal in our support to those efforts. While we understand the concerns of many here in this Chamber, we are also alarmed at the prospect of a complete breakdown of the JCPOA, with no appropriate and effective alternatives to replace it.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9367 (2023) · source

  8. While geopolitical and military concerns abounded in 2015, the JCPOA was able to focus on the nuclear issue and find common ground around a limited but crucial topic. We must be able to focus on that limited but crucial issue of ensuring sustained confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme if we are to have any hope of restoring the most significant non-proliferation agreement of our time. Arms transfers, the use of conventional weapons and even the evolution of missile technology are serious issues that should be discussed, but they should not hamper the full implementation of the JCPOA as originally intended. Finally, we must redouble our support to the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9367 (2023) · source

  9. The first step in creating a pathway back to compliance with the JCPOA is by refraining from taking any actions that might aggravate the trust deficit or make a return to the agreement even harder. All the parties should refrain from escalatory rhetoric and from taking actions that might further degrade trust in the negotiating process. That includes being extremely cautious before triggering the snapback provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), which would represent a point of no return and lead to a very perilous path. Secondly, we must focus on what is achievable. The JCPOA had a very specific and well-defined mandate, which was ensuring that Iran’s nuclear programme remained exclusively peaceful.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9367 (2023) · source

  10. Like many of the arms-control agreements of the Cold War, however, the JCPOA has been increasingly undermined as part of a worrisome trend in arms control in which the perfect has been allowed to become the enemy of the good. We regretted the decision of the United States to leave the agreement in 2018, just as we regret the recent Iranian actions in response to that decision, which have progressively undermined the letter and the spirit of the Plan of Action. Most of all, we regret the loss of confidence on both sides, which has made it harder to organize a return to the agreement’s provisions by all parties. It is now incumbent on all stakeholders to shore up that confidence. We believe that three things are necessary to rebuild trust and open a window of opportunity for restoring the JCPOA.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9367 (2023) · source

  11. I thank Under- Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for her briefing. Brazil has been actively seeking constructive diplomatic solutions to the issues presented by this file for more than a decade now. We have been willing to work on creative solutions with a range of partners in order to dial down tensions, preserve the nuclear non-proliferation regime and ensure that all parties see any agreement as legitimate and durable. It was in that spirit that we supported and continue to support the agreement that eventually emerged in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA was imperfect, as many agreements are, especially in the field of disarmament, but it represented a major breakthrough for diplomacy, laying out a path towards a comprehensive and definitive solution to the so-called Iranian nuclear dossier.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9367 (2023) · source

  12. We should always treat children primarily as victims, including those associated with groups designated as terrorists. Brazil strongly supports reintegration efforts, education for peace and justice for victims. We also encourage the Office of the Special Representative and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict to make use of the expertise of the Peacebuilding Commission. A world that abandons its children has no future. It inspires neither confidence nor hope. The primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security is also a responsibility to the children we may prevent from being included in future reports. Let us not fail them.

    2023-07-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9366 (2023) · source

  13. The most effective way to protect children from the inevitable suffering caused by war is to prevent it in the first place, and to favour the immediate cessation of hostilities and the opening of peace negotiations when peace is broken. Brazil reiterates its principled position according to which multilateral sanctions should not have adverse consequences for children. The Security Council should continue improving humanitarian carveouts in sanction regimes and including experts on children’s rights in the monitoring mechanisms of the Sanctions Committees, including Panels of Experts. Child- protection provisions should be included in all the relevant mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

    2023-07-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9366 (2023) · source

  14. (spoke in English) Children do not initiate wars, but when the Security Council fails to maintain international peace and when Member States fail to settle their disputes by peaceful means, children are killed, maimed and raped. The ultimate guarantee of children’s security is peace. When considering each of the situations covered by the report, the Council should be clear that humanitarian action alone will not end children’s suffering. Only through peace can we avoid child recruitment, abductions, attacks on schools and hospitals and other grave violations. The best approach to protecting children is by promoting dialogue rather than isolation, financing ceasefires rather than wars and engaging in the peaceful settlement of disputes rather than coercive unilateral sanctions.

    2023-07-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9366 (2023) · source

  15. Brazil fully supports the work of the Special Representative, and we encourage her to continue engaging with all parties to conflicts, including through field visits and action plans. That engagement is essential to preventing and ending violations, especially when there is no direct cooperation between the parties involved in an armed conflict. Brazil welcomes the positive results of those efforts, with reintegration support given to more than 12,000 children formerly associated with armed forces or groups in 2022. I also thank Mr. Omar Abdi, Deputy Executive Director for Programmes at UNICEF, for his dedicated work and for his presentation. (spoke in Spanish) I would like to thank Ms. Violeta for her testimony and the recommendations she presented to us.

    2023-07-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9366 (2023) · source

  16. Let me start by congratulating the United Arab Emirates on a very successful presidency of the Council during the month of June. I also wish the United Kingdom all the best in its presidency in July. I thank you, Madam President, for convening this annual debate, which provides us with a unique opportunity to discuss such an important file. Brazil is deeply committed to the children and armed conflict agenda, and we hosted a signature event on children and armed conflict during our most recent presidency of the Council (see S/PV.9096). I thank the Secretary-General for his annual report (S/2023/363) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Mrs. Virginia Gamba de Potgieter, for her tireless efforts to protect children.

    2023-07-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9366 (2023) · source

  17. My delegation also thanks Special Representative of the Secretary-General Wane for his efforts and energy dedicated to leading the Mission and reiterates its support for his work as the United Nations starts the drawdown. We hope that the engagement with the Malian authorities to prepare the transfer of MINUSMA tasks and its withdrawal will be constructive and enable Mali to continue its political transition process and the pursuit of durable peace. In that vein, we would like to reiterate our support for the leadership of Algeria in the mediation process to overcome the present impasse, and we urge all Malian political forces to remain engaged in dialogue and redouble efforts aimed at the full implementation of the peace agreement.

    2023-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9365 (2023) · source

  18. Brazil entered negotiations hoping for the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), as we still had a positive assessment of its contribution to the situation in Mali. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the concerns raised by the Malian transition authorities and the fact that the consent of the host Government is essential to any peace operation. As the Security Council comes together to formally terminate the MINUSMA mandate, we would like to pay tribute to both the peacekeepers and civilians who perished while risking their lives to fulfil their duties to help protect the lives of United Nations personnel and the people of Mali.

    2023-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9365 (2023) · source

  19. In that regard, we must recognize the concrete risks of the diversion of military equipment to non-State actors, including criminal and terrorist groups. Furthermore, we believe that the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) provides the means to curtail illegal transfers and to prevent diversion. It is essential to preserve accurate records and ensure the transparency of transactions. We encourage other Member States to take into consideration the provisions of the ATT when proceeding with their arms transfers.

    2023-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9364 (2023) · source

  20. I thank Under- Secretary-General Nakamitsu for her briefing. I also thank the other briefers for their interventions. Brazil shares the concern about the disruptive potential of arms transfers to conflict zones. Our principled position on the subject remains the same. First, we recognize the inherent right of Ukraine and all Member States to self-defence. That principle does not exempt us from the obligation enshrined in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations to seek a peaceful solution to disputes through direct negotiations, conciliation, mediation and any other means that do not involve the recourse to arms. Moreover, we have consistently asserted that the availability of arms and ammunition may become a long-term destabilizing factor and multiply threats to the security of civilian populations.

    2023-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9364 (2023) · source

  21. Regrettably, the commitments made in Aqaba and Sharm-El-Sheikh to refraining from provocative unilateral actions and pursuing de-escalation measures have not been kept. We urgently need to find ways to break those terrible cycles and promote an effective process towards sustainable peace in the region.

    2023-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9361 (2023) · source

  22. The restrictions to access affect people in need of medical care and block the availability of essential medicines. Much more needs to be done to alleviate the humanitarian situation, improve the economy and lift the closure, in line with resolution 1860 (2009). Brazil echoes the calls for renewed efforts to restore the capabilities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. Unless it receives new funding, the Agency may be unable to maintain critical services. Brazil continues to believe that mere administration of the conflict is not a viable alternative. Resuming peace negotiations is of paramount importance. But without political will, there can be no way forward.

    2023-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9361 (2023) · source

  23. Those decisions violate international law, specifically resolution 2334 (2016). As highlighted in the Secretariat’s most recent report on the implementation of the resolution, those decisions are reshaping the geography and threatening the feasibility of a two- State solution. Brazil urges the Government of Israel to immediately and completely cease all settlement activities and to fully respect all its obligations under international law. Demolitions and evictions, including of internationally funded humanitarian projects and structures related to income-generation and the provision of essential services, also represent numerous human rights violations and raise concerns about the risk of forcible transfers. The situation in Gaza also remains critical.

    2023-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9361 (2023) · source

  24. The reports tell of dangerous and hate-filled rhetoric, provocations and incitement from officials on both sides, fuelling violence. Brazil urges all the parties to promote calm and exercise the utmost restraint. We strongly condemn all violence against civilians, whether Palestinians or Israelis. Israel has an obligation under international humanitarian law to safeguard the civilian population from violence. We call on it to adhere strictly to the fundamental principles of proportionality, precaution, necessity and humanity in all of its military operations. Brazil condemns the recent decision by the Government of Israel to advance the construction of housing units in existing settlements in the West Bank, as well as its modification of settlement- approval procedures in order to expedite the process of authorization.

    2023-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9361 (2023) · source

  25. I thank Mr. Wennesland for his briefing and his valuable work on the ground. I also thank Mr. Zogby for his insights. Last week, we witnessed a worrisome surge of violence in the West Bank, in yet another of the troubling cycles of spiralling violence that have continued for years in Israel and Palestine. Israel’s escalating military actions, including air strikes — the first in the West Bank in nearly 20 years — are further exacerbating the tensions. The son of a Brazilian citizen was among those injured last week, shot in the head and shoulder during the invasion of the Palestinian village of Turmus Ayya by Israeli settlers. The scale of the hostilities, the number of casualties and the use of new armaments are reigniting the risk of an escalation of tensions in the West Bank.

    2023-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9361 (2023) · source

  26. It is very important that the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo feel represented by their political institutions. We hope that the elections take place in an orderly and timely manner. May they establish a new milestone on the path of the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo towards a more stable and prosperous future.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  27. We also take note of the continuing dialogue between MONUSCO and representatives of the Government in the joint working group on the transition, as well Under-Secretary-General Lacroix’s recent visit to Kinshasa to discuss the issue. If the Mission were to depart without meeting the benchmarks of the transition plan it would inflict even more hardship on people in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The transition must be well coordinated with the national and local authorities, as well as with the regional and other external forces present in the country, and the role of the United Nations country team in that regard should be enhanced. We take note of the efforts being made to prepare for the December elections.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  28. It is a reminder that strategic communications continue to be an important tool for increasing the Mission’s effectiveness in fulfilling its mandate. During the past three decades in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUSCO — and its predecessor, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo — has played an invaluable role in ensuring peace and security in that country. Yet we are fully aware that the Mission cannot and should not last forever. In that regard, we take note of the request of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that the Mission accelerate its departure.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  29. We look forward to the results of the quadripartite summit that will take place tomorrow in Luanda between the Economic Community of Central African States, the EAC, the International Conference on Great Lakes Region and SADC. We hope that meeting, organized under the auspices of the African Union with the participation of the United Nations, will improve the coordination among subregional bodies to address the crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. We are encouraged by the significant reduction in anti-MONUSCO sentiment on social networks. The Mission’s efforts are certainly playing a part in that, but other factors may be at play, such as the M-23 ceasefire and the perception of society that MONUSCO has played an important role in the protection of civilians against the increasing violence by other armed groups.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  30. We take note of the full deployment of the East African Community (EAC) regional force and the imminent deployment of Angolan troops, which will help enforce the M-23’s cantonment, as well as the decision of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to send its own contingent. We also take note of the EAC’s decision to create a civilian head of mission in order to enhance political contacts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The presence of foreign contingents must be accompanied by greater coordination between the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo and MONUSCO in order to maximize their contributions to the security of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  31. Unfortunately, just when the violence from the M-23 seems to be abating, there has been a horrifying surge in attacks by other illegal armed groups. Brazil condemns in the strongest terms the attack on an internally displaced persons camp in Ituri province on 12 June. There is no justification for attacks on civilians. We reiterate the Council’s call for all armed groups to lay down their arms and disband. All external support to illegal armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo must stop. Brazil has also vehemently condemned the attack on 16 June perpetrated by the Allied Democratic Forces on a school in Uganda. That attack is yet another reminder, if reminders were still needed, of the regional dimension of the conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  32. Of the dozens of illegal armed groups that are operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the one that was mentioned most often was the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23). While it is not large in terms of personnel, the M-23 has a disproportionate impact because it is highly organized and well- equipped. It has therefore been encouraging to see a marked reduction in the hostilities between the M-23 and the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the past few months. We hope that the M-23 will lay down its arms and fully comply with the Luanda communiqué of 23 November 2022. We commend the mediation efforts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s neighbours within the framework of the Nairobi and Luanda processes, which deserve the full support of the international community.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  33. I thank Assistant Secretary-General Martha Pobee for her comprehensive briefing and welcome the representatives of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to today’s meeting. When the Security Council last met to discuss the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see S/PV.9298), we had recently returned from our visit to the country. There we heard time and again from the authorities and civil society about the impact of the conflict on the population. We witnessed the plight of internally displaced people and heard directly from them about how their lives had been disrupted.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  34. While the developments on the transition process and constitutional reforms I mentioned are commendable, they are not sufficient to the lay the ground for durable peace without the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. We therefore wish to voice our support for the leadership of Algeria in the mediation process to overcome the present impasse and urge all Malian political forces to remain engaged in dialogue and to redouble efforts aimed at the full implementation of the peace agreement. Before I conclude and in view of the dire humanitarian situation, my delegation would like to seize this opportunity to underscore once again the need to address the root causes of conflict. That notion should be at the core of our work throughout the mandate renewal talks.

    2023-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9350 (2023) · source

  35. As we pointed out in previous discussions with regard to the drafting of a new constitution, the return to democratic normalcy is a collective endeavour that must include women, youth and ethnic and religious minorities. We hope that the efforts of the Malian authorities to add more voices to that exercise will reflect on a more inclusive and peaceful constitutional referendum on 18 June. In addition, we welcome the ongoing cooperation between MINUSMA and the Independent Authority for Election Management, with a view to coordinating the technical and logistical support for the elections and the provision of capacity-building to civil society organizations on gender promotion in electoral processes, to name just a couple of examples. These are encouraging concrete steps towards more inclusivity and participation in the polls.

    2023-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9350 (2023) · source

  36. My delegation believes it is crucial to ensure that the Mission is duly equipped to support the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and the political transition, as well as to protect civilians and support the restoration of the Malian State authority across the country. Regional cooperation is a key factor to help Mali pave the way towards a successful transition process. In that regard, Brazil reiterates its support to the current engagement with the Economic Community of West African States and hopes that the dialogue with the Malian transitional authorities will lead to further collaboration on the development and implementation of a transition plan conducive to the restoration of constitutional order.

    2023-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9350 (2023) · source

  37. Although the numbers improved slightly in that respect, we must renew our efforts to protect the most vulnerable. In order to carry out that task effectively, it is essential to ensure MINUSMA’s freedom of movement. In that vein, we regret that no solution for the resumption of unmanned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) flights has been reached, despite the fact that MINUSMA adopted the measures agreed with the Malian transition Government. The safety and security of peacekeepers should be a top priority. We call on the Malian authorities to work with MINUSMA on the review of the procedure for drone ISR flights, as well as on the lifting of ground movement restrictions. The Council has just started discussions on the renewal of MINUSMA’s mandate.

    2023-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9350 (2023) · source

  38. My delegation thanks Special Representative of the Secretary-General Wane for his comprehensive briefing and welcomes Minister Diop to this meeting. We received with dismay the news of the terrorist attacks against the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in Ber on 9 June. We regret the deaths of two peacekeepers from Burkina Faso and offer our sincere condolences and solidarity to the Government of that country, to the families of the victims, as well as to MINUSMA. Brazil reiterates once more its firm condemnation of terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations. There is no justification for such acts. The security situation in Mali remains unstable and continues to take a heavy toll — not just on MINUSMA, but also on civilians.

    2023-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9350 (2023) · source

  39. It is our view that sustainable peace will not be achieved as long as the root causes of conflict are not addressed. That includes ethnic, religious, cultural and ideological intolerance, but also social injustice and the scourge of hunger. For all of us, in our respective societies, there is a necessity to better understand one another, both in our differences and in our shared humanity, which is the only path to be taken towards peace.

    2023-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9346 (2023) · source

  40. The legitimacy, first-hand knowledge and cultural understanding of the root causes of contentious issues in conflicts are important assets in setting the conditions conducive to dialogue and sustainable peace. Cultivating a culture of peace and tolerance entails inclusivity. The promotion of a culture of peace and tolerance, which in many contexts involves interreligious dialogue, can effectively contribute to advancing our peacebuilding efforts in societies affected by conflict. Tackling discrimination, as well as protecting the most vulnerable groups, including victims and minorities, is key to strengthening the social fabric in post-conflict situations. A strong investment in education is also needed in order to build an environment of tolerance.

    2023-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9346 (2023) · source

  41. The spread of disinformation, misinformation and hate speech has a direct and detrimental effect on the work of the United Nations, especially on peacekeeping missions and on the safety and security of peacekeepers. In that connection, we highlight the central importance of the use of strategic communications. As stated by the Council in last year’s presidential statement on the issue (S/PRST/2022/5), strategic communications contribute to promoting the women and peace and security agenda, building trust with local communities and creating a protective environment for civilians in areas affected by armed conflicts. The role of civil society, including religious leaders, in building an environment of trust, tolerance and understanding should be acknowledged and strengthened.

    2023-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9346 (2023) · source

  42. While then the radicalization of individuals was stimulated by radio broadcasts and printed propaganda, today we witness an alarming increase in the use of hate speech on social media with the potential to exacerbate armed conflicts and threaten stability around the world. The situations in Mali, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are concrete instances of that worrisome trend. The social dimension of that phenomenon must be taken into account. Inequalities, marginalization, racism and the feeling of not belonging can drive individuals to engaging in hate speech, either online or offline, which creates a fertile environment for the outbreak, escalation and recurrence of conflicts.

    2023-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9346 (2023) · source

  43. Brazil thanks the United Arab Emirates for organizing today’s important high-level meeting. We also thank the Secretary- General and our three briefers for their valuable contributions and wisdom. Today’s briefing is in line with the importance that Brazil accords to combating the root causes of conflict, to which promoting a culture of peace, tolerance and mutual understanding is key. That is especially true for our common efforts on conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. As recalled in the concept note for this briefing (S/2023/417, annex), almost 30 years ago, hate speech was one of the main drivers of the genocide in Rwanda.

    2023-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9346 (2023) · source

  44. The IPCC indicates, for instance, that the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean will potentially be some of the most affected by the changing climate. However, our region is largely underrepresented in the Council. In conclusion, adding the issue of climate change only overburdens the mandates of missions authorized by the Council, in a scenario in which many are already under serious pressure due to the overstretching of their multidimensional roles. The treatment of the issue in appropriate forums, and above all the delivery of financial commitments under the Paris Agreement, could certainly have a more tangible impact on the ground.

    2023-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9345 (2023) · source

  45. Nothing could be further from the reality of the Security Council, which is a body that operates and is structured in a fundamentally different way. The suggestion for the Council to improve its transparency and inclusivity by actively engaging non-Council members and a wide array of stakeholders in discussions on climate, peace and security, while well-intentioned, is not going to fix that. The Security Council urgently needs a profound reform, precisely because it is unbalanced, opaque and non-inclusive. Cosmetic, superficial changes of an ad hoc nature will not turn the Security Council into an inclusive body. Moreover, the views of developing countries, which are the most affected by the adverse impacts of global warming, are not adequately represented.

    2023-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9345 (2023) · source

  46. The amount necessary to match the needs and priorities of developing countries to combat climate change, according to the UNFCCC’s first needs assessment report, ranges from $5.8 to $11.5 trillion by 2030. If climate change is really a priority for those countries, we need to see concrete and meaningful progress in that regard in the proper forums. The provision and mobilization of new, predictable, additional and adequate resources is the urgent need of the hour for developing countries. The multilateral climate change regime, grounded on the UNFCCC, its Kyoto Protocol and its Paris Agreement, is, for good reasons, already based on a number of principles that ensure balance, transparency and inclusivity, with decisions based on the consensus of all countries as parties to the Convention.

    2023-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9345 (2023) · source

  47. The UNFCCC and the development pillar of the United Nations already have the proper tools and mechanisms to address the underlying development challenges and to reduce vulnerability to climate change in fragile contexts. We must recall the commitment to addressing the root causes of climate change, including, in particular, the transitions towards low-emission energy systems. To effectively fight climate change, we all need, in the first place, to reduce fossil-fuel burning. Throughout our history, carbon emission has happened mostly in developed countries, not in conflict zones. The Council does not have the appropriate tools, for instance, to tackle the key issue of the provision of climate financing and means of implementation of our collective mitigation and adaptation efforts.

    2023-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9345 (2023) · source

  48. Let us not forget that, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which is our multilateral body responsible for climate change science, the influence of climate on conflicts is assessed as “relatively weak” when compared to other socioeconomic factors. The IPCC also stresses that vulnerability to climate change is higher in locations with poverty, governance challenges and limited access to basic services and resources, and that “development challenges causing high vulnerability are influenced by historical and ongoing patterns of inequity, such as colonialism”. Not only does the Security Council lack the necessary legitimacy to address climate change in a consistent, comprehensive and meaningful way, it also lacks the adequate tools to do so.

    2023-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9345 (2023) · source

  49. We believe that a thematic and cross-cutting discussion of this topic within the context of the Security Council is neither productive nor effective. It brings up a very serious and potentially unsolvable problem regarding the encroachment of the Council into themes typically addressed by the UNFCCC and the United Nations development pillar. The Security Council, when performing its functions, may and should contribute in that regard by supporting the efforts of host countries on the ground, at their request, to increase local resilience and build capacities. That does not mean that the Council has or should have a mandate to thematically and systematically address climate change.

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  50. We expect to have a meaningful discussion on climate change under the existing formal tracks of the multilateral climate change regime. The global stocktake to take place during COP28 will be a pivotal moment in our common efforts to combat climate change. It will point out advances and identify key implementation gaps in the regime, particularly regarding climate financing. We are convinced that the global stocktake will be fundamental for the future of the climate change regime and for a successful COP 30, to take place two years from now. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement on climate change are the most appropriate forums for discussing the global response to climate change.

    2023-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9345 (2023) · source