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  1. During this year’s exercises, Brazil sent its União frigate in June, at the request of its local partners, in order to make up for the fact that no other foreign ship would be patrolling the region. In addition to Operation Guinex and bilateral training programmes, Brazil is also a participant in the Obangame Express and Grand African NEMO joint maritime exercises. Brazil appreciates that the report thoroughly addresses the underlying causes of piracy and armed robbery in the region, as well as any possible or potential linkages with terrorism in West and Central Africa and the Sahel. We note the fact that to date there is no evidence of any operational, organizational or ideological links between terrorism and pirate groups in the Gulf of Guinea.

    2022-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9198 (2022) · source

  2. We also note that the tenth anniversary of the Yaoundé Architecture next year will provide an opportunity for assessing the progress made and challenges ahead when it comes to enhancing counter-piracy activity in the region. Enhancing the modalities for cooperation and naval capacity-building will be key to supporting the efforts of the region to address that complex challenge. As a member of the Group of Seven Group of Friends of the Gulf of Guinea, Brazil stands ready to continue supporting the countries in the region through a wide range of cooperation initiatives and joint naval operations. We would like to highlight the approach taken by Operation Guinex, led by the Brazilian navy, which goes beyond the scope of a patrolling mission and includes joint exercises and training activities together with our partners in the Gulf of Guinea.

    2022-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9198 (2022) · source

  3. That trend results from a series of factors, including the deterrent effects of increased naval patrols. It is our understanding that the States of the Gulf of Guinea are taking the lead and bearing the primary responsibility for countering piracy and armed robbery in the region. We commend them for their ongoing efforts, particularly their concerted action in operationalizing the Yaoundé Architecture, which is central to countering piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, as it brings together key regional actors such as the Economic Community of Central African States, the Economic Community of West African States and the Gulf of Guinea Commission.

    2022-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9198 (2022) · source

  4. I would like to start by thanking Assistant Secretary-General Pobee, Ms. Waly, Ambassador Ukonga and Commander Yakubu for their important and informative briefings. I also welcome the participation in the meeting of the delegations of Germany, Nigeria and the European Union. Brazil has been paying attention to the international security implications of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea. As a member of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone, it is our priority to strengthen the ongoing counter-piracy efforts in the region and to prevent the spread of piracy. We are working towards the goal of making the South Atlantic a zone of peace. We are pleased to see that the report (S/2022/818) outlines a decrease, since April 2021, in instances of piracy and armed robbery in the region.

    2022-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9198 (2022) · source

  5. That is how we have always worked in the Council, even in times of great division. It is not enough to agree to disagree. We must agree on what we can agree on and find the will to do more, not just through greater pressure but through a broad approach that takes into account the full complexity of the file. We all want a safer peninsula. We all want reduced risks. We all want more stability and predictability in the region, and we are all against nuclear proliferation. We have common ground. Let us build on it.

    2022-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9197 (2022) · source

  6. It seems incontrovertible to us that while sanctions may be a part of a comprehensive approach to the issue, they are not the full answer. There can be no doubt that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s repeated missile launches pose a threat to the peace and security of the peninsula, the region and the world. There is also no doubt that it is the Council’s duty to act to reduce that threat and safeguard the security of all. But we must look to new and better tools to do so. We are an organ of diplomacy first and foremost. We believe that the first step to any progress on this file is the ability to speak with a single voice. Above all, we must make real efforts to achieve convergence among ourselves in order to find common denominators and bridge the gaps between our positions.

    2022-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9197 (2022) · source

  7. We condemned that launch, as well as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s other ballistic-missile launches, in no uncertain terms. Yet we must also face an uncomfortable reality. All of North Korea’s intercontinental missile capabilities were developed when it was already one of the most sanctioned countries in the world. Resolution 2397 (2017), the last one we adopted on the file, in response to the Hwasong-15 launch in November 2017, introduced some of the harshest sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including via caps or bans on food and agricultural exports. None of that has prevented the prodigious expansion, quantitatively and qualitatively, of the North Korean arsenal over the past five years, culminating in this most recent test.

    2022-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9197 (2022) · source

  8. While condemning those missile launches is necessary and appropriate, we cannot fall into a cycle in which the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea conducts a major missile test every few weeks, after which we meet here to deliver our statements and then move on to other business. If we want to see progress on this issue, we must think critically about how to proceed. If the reports are correct, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has just done its first successful test of the Hwasong-17, its newest intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). By all accounts, it is larger and more technologically advanced than its predecessors. The missile joins North Korea’s two other ICBMs, Hwasong-15 and Hwasong-14, in an increasingly sophisticated nuclear arsenal that can reach most of the world.

    2022-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9197 (2022) · source

  9. I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for her briefing. I welcome the delegations of Japan and the Republic of Korea to this meeting. The last time we were in this Chamber to discuss this file, we remarked on the relatively short period of time since our previous meeting (see S/PV.9183). A mere month had passed between the previous missile that had overflown Japan and the salvo of launches that brought us here at the beginning of November. Now the space of time has gotten even shorter — two weeks, to be precise — and we once again condemn in the strongest terms the repeated launches in violation of Security Council resolutions. Yet it seems clear to us that something needs to change.

    2022-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9197 (2022) · source

  10. The G-5 Sahel and its Joint Force are essential tools for tackling the issues that afflict the region, but they must be complemented by the work of regional and international organizations, including in the humanitarian and development dimensions. Brazil will continue to give its full support for those efforts.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  11. We were also encouraged by the launch of the Independent High-Level Panel on Security and Development in the Sahel, in New York, during the high- level week of the seventy-seventh session of the General Assembly. We look forward to its recommendations to be included in the independent strategic assessment currently being prepared. All the efforts to bring peace and security to the region of the Sahel cannot succeed unless there are concrete results in the fight against malnutrition, unemployment and social exclusion. Peace and development are interlinked and cannot exist separately. The crisis in the Sahel is multidimensional.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  12. The response to these problems depends on continued cooperation among the Sahel countries and with the West African nations and regional organizations and the wider international community. Brazil was encouraged by the announcement in early July that Mali and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) had come to an agreement on a time frame for the return of the constitutional order and the holding of elections. Brazil also welcomed the fact that ECOWAS leaders have deemed conditions to be in place for the lifting of sanctions against that country. These are signs that regional diplomacy and dialogue can achieve concrete results. We urge the authorities of Mali and its neighbours to continue to cooperate, be it in ECOWAS or in other forums.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  13. It also limits the Joint Force activities in some of the most critical terrains in the fight against terrorism in Africa. Added to that, the recent unconstitutional change of Government in Burkina Faso, for the second time in eight months, contrasts with the progress that had been achieved in the negotiations in the return of constitutional order by July 2024. Those changes in the political reality of Burkina Faso also affect the activities of the Joint Force. These difficulties are all the more regrettable because the humanitarian situation in the Sahel remains dire. Food insecurity, displacement of people and increasing intercommunal and farmer-herder conflicts are aggravated by the expansion of the areas affected by terrorist and other illegal armed groups.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  14. Not only does the group continue to operate, but also it has managed to hold its first meeting of the Defence and Security Committee, at the level of ministers of defence and chiefs of staff of the armies, since 2021. Moreover, the Joint Force has been able to conduct military operations in all three sectors of activities, in spite of having had to deal with challenges, namely, first, the transfer of its headquarters and other adjustments owing to the exit of Mali and, secondly, the departure of Operation Barkhane from that country. Although we may take heart in the continuity of activities of the G-5 Sahel and its Joint Force, it cannot be denied that they could do more if the right political circumstances were in place. The decision of one of the five countries to leave the group presented problems that require resources.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  15. I thank Assistant Secretary-General Martha Pobee, Executive Secretary Eric Tiaré and Mr. Ramadan for their informative briefings. When the Council last met to discuss the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel) (see S/PV.9035), we had only recently learned about Mali’s decision to quit that group and all its bodies, including the Joint Force. On that occasion, we remarked how the political situation in the region was hampering efforts to combat violence. The violence and the security threats, in turn, made political solutions to conflict harder to achieve. Now, six months later, we observe that, thankfully, the G-5 Sahel has proven to be a resilient mechanism.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  16. In conclusion, we reiterate our commitment to working for the goal of a truly Libyan-led and -owned peaceful political transition, which we consider a necessary condition for peace and stability in Libya, together with progress in the security and economic sectors, all of which should be led from within Libya, with the participation of Libyan stakeholders.

    2022-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9192 (2022) · source

  17. All countries must fully respect Libya’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity. They must also abide by the measures authorized by the Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. We therefore echo the concerns about the effectiveness of the arms embargo, whose failings appear to be a direct consequence of pressure based on narrow political interests from outside Libya. The same goes for the freezing of Libyan assets abroad, whose active management in foreign countries contravenes the relevant Security Council resolutions.

    2022-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9192 (2022) · source

  18. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the unification of military and security institutions are but a few areas where foreign actions can actually be an obstacle to peace and national reconciliation in Libya when they are not undertaken under the auspices of relevant United Nations bodies such as the PBC. The same is true for the ongoing political standstill. We reiterate that the political transition in Libya must be Libyan- led and Libyan-owned, including with regard to an agreement on a legal basis and timeline for elections. At the same time, we acknowledge that the African Union is well positioned to assist Libyan stakeholders in pursuing intra-Libyan dialogue, including on national reconciliation free from interference motivated by foreign interests.

    2022-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9192 (2022) · source

  19. Given the close relationship between the situations in Libya and the Sahel, as well as the current engagement of the region with the Peacebuilding Commission, we further emphasize the importance of regional coordination, including among the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, the United Nations missions operating in the Sahel and the PBC. The international attitudes to Libya, however, have not been uniformly positive. On the contrary, some countries seem to have been fuelling the very protracted threat of armed conflict that we in the Council have been discussing for so long.

    2022-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9192 (2022) · source

  20. We will focus our remarks on one key aspect of the situation in Libya, which is the international community’s approach to the country. First of all, Brazil has taken note of the willingness of a number of actors, neighbouring countries and regional organizations to collaborate with Libyan stakeholders in the pursuit of peace and stability. We would therefore like to remind the Council of the important role that the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) can play in response to Libyans’ request for the mobilization and coordination of international efforts and goodwill for the country’s benefit. In that regard, we also want to highlight the importance of a coherent, integrated and strategic approach to peacebuilding in Libya, in full respect for Libyan sovereignty and peacebuilding priorities.

    2022-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9192 (2022) · source

  21. I thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General Bathily for his briefing and welcome the Libyan delegation to this meeting. Brazil considers it important for the Security Council to continue to keep the situation in Libya under close scrutiny. We are aware that the growing numbers of Council meetings are not necessarily helpful to our ability to discharge our collective responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations. But we should be careful not to send a message of neglect with regard to certain files, particularly the Libyan one, while we give other items on the Council’s agenda comparatively more space. The heightened tensions yesterday in Tripoli around a meeting of the High State Council emphasize the importance of closely monitoring the situation in Libya.

    2022-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9192 (2022) · source

  22. In addition, it can support the implementation of peacebuilding activities by peacekeeping operations and help mobilize political support to promote reconciliation, institution-building and other nationally defined peacebuilding priorities. Focusing solely on the security dimension of conflicts will lead to endlessly renewing peacekeeping mandates without achieving the desired results. It will also leave fragile countries chronically dependent on humanitarian aid. Resilience-building, peacebuilding and the promotion of sustainable development are essential for addressing the root causes of conflict. I once again thank the Ghanaian presidency for helping bring focus to this important issue.

    2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181 (2022) · source

  23. It certainly involves the Security Council, as the organ with the foremost responsibility on peace and security matters, but it must also involve other bodies and agencies. I refer in particular to the Peacebuilding Commission, which is well suited to working as a platform for promoting greater coordination among the relevant partners of a particular country at risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict. It can also mobilize regional organizations and international financial institutions and foster South-South and triangular cooperation arrangements in support of international peacebuilding initiatives.

    2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181 (2022) · source

  24. Building resilience in vulnerable countries is necessary to prevent the onset of conflicts, as well as to maintain the progress already achieved on the path towards peace. However, achieving this goal must not be a burden placed solely on peace operations, which can certainly play a peacebuilding role, but it must be balanced with the need to have realistic and clear mandates. Excessively ambitious, vague and open- ended mandates can result in frustration among partners and in the population of the host country. Excessively ambitious, vague and open-ended mandates can result in frustration among partners and the population of the host country. Instead, building resilience is a task for which the United Nations must offer a system-wide approach.

    2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181 (2022) · source

  25. Through you, Madam President, I thank Ghana for organizing this very important and timely debate. I thank the Secretary- General for his remarks, and I also thank our briefers for their valuable contributions. As Brazil has stated time and again in the Security Council, peace and sustainable development are interdependent and mutually reinforce one another. Conflict destroys the necessary conditions for economic activities that in turn provide the material basis for the functioning of the State. Economic growth and sustainable development are necessary to give people hope and to help reduce the appeal of violent ideologues. Strengthening international cooperation, investing in productive capacities and combating poverty and hunger are as essential to addressing conflict as security considerations.

    2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181 (2022) · source

  26. While such a protocol is not adopted, we call upon the States parties to strengthen the mechanisms of transparency and confidence-building available under the framework of the Convention by sharing the broadest possible range of information regarding research projects on topics related to the objectives of the Convention.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9180 (2022) · source

  27. Having considered the documents made available by the Russian Federation, and bearing in mind the discussions held in Geneva, Brazil believes that, at the moment, the necessary conditions for the initiation of investigations under article VI of the BWC have not been met. Brazil reiterated its commitment to the resumption of negotiations towards the adoption of a binding verification protocol that strengthens the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention regarding the exclusively peaceful use of knowledge and technology in the field of life sciences. The situation before the Council today only reinforces the need to establish such a mechanism. The next Review Conference of the States Parties to the BWC represents an opportunity for us to re-engage in such discussions, without delay.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9180 (2022) · source

  28. As many delegations indicated at our most recent meeting on the subject, held on 27 October (see S/PV.9171), we take note of the complaint lodged by the Russian Federation to the Security Council, in accordance with article VI of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Brazil participated in the formal consultations held in Geneva, from 5 to 9 September, under article V of the BWC. On that occasion, Russia presented its concerns regarding alleged biological activities developed jointly by the United States and Ukraine on Ukrainian territory. The parties to the Convention also listened to the comments of the representatives of both countries on Russia’s queries.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9180 (2022) · source

  29. We therefore encourage other regional actors to take constructive action to promote the right of the Bosnian people to decide their future.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9179 (2022) · source

  30. Brazil considers it important, however, that Bosnians themselves take the lead in undertaking the institutional reforms necessary to build a functioning State capable of ensuring the well-being and prosperity of its population. We regret the lack of progress in the implementation of the 5+2 agenda. The time has come to put an end to hesitations and increase engagement among political forces in negotiations, with the aim of modernizing legislation and strengthening the rule of law. We welcome the involvement of the United States and the European Union in efforts to mediate electoral reforms, as well as the continued engagement of the United Nations in the reconstruction of the country. The stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina is critical to preserving peace in the Balkans.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9179 (2022) · source

  31. The High Representative’s report, which the Secretary-General has shared with the Council (see S/2022/806), highlights the fragility of the political balance in the country, confirming reports from our Embassy in Sarajevo. The October elections ended without incident. We are grateful for the efforts of the High Representative in that regard, but we note with concern the rhetoric that tends to accentuate resentments and ethnic-based divisions. We encourage Bosnian leaders to remain engaged in the reconciliation process and to avoid words and actions that could result in violence. We believe that the presence of EUFOR- Althea, in the current context, remains essential to ensure peace.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9179 (2022) · source

  32. Brazil welcomes to this meeting the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia and the European Union. First, I thank Ireland for the constructive approach in the negotiations for the renewal of the authorizations of the European Union Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea). We understand that other members of the Council would prefer to deepen some aspects of the mandate, and we welcome the spirit of commitment of all in favour of a consensual text. With the adoption today of resolution 2658 (2022), the Council expresses, with one voice, its support for the stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9179 (2022) · source

  33. My first question, in the context of the reportedly growing politicization of the topic of humanitarian assistance is: What have been the main challenges in that regard for those in the field and how could the Council better assist their work? Secondly, I would like to echo the remarks of my colleague from Kenya on the transfer of funds for climate change and also follow up the High Commissioner’s briefing: How can his Office help to speed up the transfer of resources from developed to developing countries in order to combat climate change and build resilience?

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9178 (2022) · source

  34. Like many coercive measures, however, they will have unintended consequences, but humanitarian space must always be preserved. That is why we welcome the initiative led by the United States and Ireland and strongly encourage the Council to agree on an effective and comprehensive humanitarian carveout across all United Nations sanctions regimes. As we advance the preparations for convening the next Global Refugee Forum, the High Commissioner should bear in mind that we must join our efforts to accelerate deliveries that reflect the principle of shared responsibilities as the central axis of an increasingly coordinated and unified response. Brazil remains fully committed to contributing to that effort. In conclusion, I would like to ask the High Commissioner two questions.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9178 (2022) · source

  35. The current challenges are well known and include hostilities against medical and humanitarian personnel, the increased vulnerabilities faced by women, children, refugees, internally displaced persons and persons with disabilities, and the vicious cycle of armed conflict and hunger. Among the ongoing challenges the Council faces, allow me to address one in particular: the reports concerning the unintended consequences of United Nations sanctions on humanitarian assistance. Brazil encourages the Council to continue its work to adjust the sanctions framework in order to effectively minimize the suffering of the civilian population. Sanctions can be legitimate and effective when they are multilaterally created, strategically targeted and designed to have minimal impact on the civilian population.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9178 (2022) · source

  36. It is worrisome that some parties to conflicts have imposed bureaucratic measures to hinder humanitarian operations. The Council has a significant responsibility for ensuring the protection of civilians in armed conflict, as evidenced by its adoption of two important resolutions adopted last year: resolution 2573 (2021), on objects indispensable to the survival of civilian populations in armed conflict, and resolution 2601 (2021), on the protection of schools and education in armed conflict. Yet strengthening that architecture has not been enough to reduce the heavy civilian toll of armed conflict.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9178 (2022) · source

  37. Since 2018, approximately 800,000 Venezuelan migrants, refugees and asylum seekers have received some sort of assistance through the operation. Upon arrival, indigenous people, elderly people, women, children and people with disabilities are given special attention. The approximately 400,000 Venezuelans who have decided to stay in Brazil have full access to all public services, the labour market and social benefits on an equal basis with our nationals. I hope that Council members have had a chance to visit our exhibition on Operation Welcome held at United Nations Headquarters in recent weeks. All parties to armed conflict should facilitate safe and unimpeded passage for relief actions that are humanitarian and impartial and conducted with no adverse distinction, in line with international humanitarian law.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9178 (2022) · source

  38. We also underscore the urgency of providing climate financing, technology transfer and capacity-building for countries in need within the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Brazil has been granting protection through its humanitarian visa policy to people affected by the conflicts in Afghanistan and Ukraine — a policy that also benefits Haitians and people affected by the conflict in Syria. Brazil is especially grateful for the High Commission’s support to Operação Acolhida, or Operation Welcome, a multi-sectoral Government task force in charge of the integration, reception and voluntary internal relocation of Venezuelans at our northern border.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9178 (2022) · source

  39. Cooperation and solidarity are key to sustained and comprehensive humanitarian responses, and the principle of shared responsibility lies at their centre. We also understand that where people’s reasons for seeking refuge are concerned, the international community must look at the cross-cutting drivers that are often the result of manifold structural factors rather than a single trend alone. While we agree that the effects of climate change exacerbate all humanitarian emergencies, we understand that it should be integrated into humanitarian discussions in such a way that it does not overshadow the importance of prioritizing political solutions to contemporary conflicts, which continue to be the main drivers of displacement.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9178 (2022) · source

  40. In a year marked by conflict and increased food insecurity, it is worrisome to note that the number of people forcibly displaced rose to more than 100 million, not to mention those considered to be stateless or of undetermined nationality. Owing to underreporting, those numbers are probably significantly higher. That alone should serve as a wake-up call for stronger action to promote peace and address all the causes of forced displacement. The lingering social and economic effects of the coronavirus disease make it even more urgent to adopt far-reaching responses at the local, national, regional and global levels, as the pandemic continues to have a devastating impact on refugees and other vulnerable groups.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9178 (2022) · source

  41. Let me start by congratulating Gabon on its excellent presidency for the past month. We also wish your delegation, Sir, all the best for the month of November and want to assure you of the Brazilian delegation’s full cooperation. Brazil would also like to thank the High Commissioner for Refugees for his presentation. Brazil is proud of its partnership with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which extends to the national, regional and global levels. Humanitarian response and the promotion of human rights are among the seven priorities established by Brazil for its term on the Security Council.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9178 (2022) · source

  42. The announcement that Lebanese and Israeli negotiators have agreed, with the mediation of the United States, to delineate their maritime boundary permanently is indeed a historic breakthrough and a very concrete development that will, hopefully, benefit both countries and contribute to the security and stability of the region. The successful conclusion of those negotiations demonstrate that, with a political vision in pursuit of a common goal, significant progress can be achieved.

    2022-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9174 (2022) · source

  43. Numerous capabilities must be restored so that the United Nations can continue providing its indispensable work of assistance, which is necessary for maintaining stability. The civilian population, including children, must not continue to pay the price for the failure to move forward towards a viable political solution to this long-standing conflict. Brazil reaffirms its firm belief in the need for a two- State solution, within the framework of international law and the resolutions of the Council, as the way to meet the aspirations of Israelis and Palestinians and to ensure the security of all. I would like to conclude on a positive note.

    2022-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9174 (2022) · source

  44. We underscore that Palestinian reconciliation can meaningfully contribute to achieving a durable solution to the conflict. Intra-Palestinian reconciliation, alongside the improvement of living conditions in the West Bank and Gaza, which will only be possible with sustainable economic growth, are important steps towards peace. One must not forget the role played by poverty, food insecurity and lack of hope in providing the grounds on which extremist forces flourish. Low levels of funding to United Nations appeals signal the fatigue of the international community in terms of its capacity for assistance, with crises on several fronts. The humanitarian situation of Palestinian refugees remains nonetheless critical.

    2022-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9174 (2022) · source

  45. At this point, it should not be necessary to remind all parties of their obligations under international humanitarian law or of the importance of ensuring accountability and preserving the status quo of the holy sites or of the role the Waqf Council plays in that regard. Confidence-building measures are especially needed in this time of acute crisis. Brazil welcomes the signing of the Algiers declaration on 13 October by 14 distinct Palestinian political groups and thanks Algeria, and notably President Tebboune, for the successful mediation efforts. We echo the Secretary-General’s words of encouragement to all factions to overcome their differences through dialogue and to follow through with the commitments contained in the declaration, including the holding of elections.

    2022-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9174 (2022) · source

  46. Brazil remains deeply concerned about the deteriorating security situation on the ground, especially in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. We thank the Special Coordinator for his engagement with various stakeholders with the aim of reducing tensions. We join his calls for political and community leaders on all sides to act in good faith through dialogue to prevent the situation from spiralling out of control. We agree that the fragility of the situation underscores the urgency of changing the current dynamics while addressing the underlying causes of instability. We cannot risk further escalation. We call on all parties to exercise restraint.

    2022-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9174 (2022) · source

  47. In that regard, we would like to raise our own concerns at the suggestion that, while negotiating new draft resolutions, Council members should not be able to advocate for positions that depart from previously agreed texts. Such a suggestion is troubling, particularly for elected members, because it would limit our ability to contribute fresh perspectives during our time-bound mandates. Moreover, such an approach would limit our ability to respond to evolving situations, besides ignoring the fact that every text ever adopted was itself once altogether new.

    2022-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9173 (2022) · source

  48. By adopting resolution 2656 (2022) — which in its seventh preambular paragraph reproduces language taken from resolution 2282 (2016) on the Peacebuilding Commission — the Council also acknowledged, specifically for Libya, the importance of the very peacebuilding approach that PBC was designed to promote, with full respect for Libya’s sovereignty and its peacebuilding priorities. Finally, while Brazil is pleased with the outcome of the negotiations, as just indicated — as well as the constructive engagement among all Council members, including the penholder, whom we would like to thank — my delegation also observed that, throughout the negotiations, the concerns raised by some members were dismissed on account of their challenging previously agreed language.

    2022-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9173 (2022) · source

  49. Given the realization that political, development and security conditions in Libya are closely intertwined, it was only natural for the Security Council to remind Libyan stakeholders and international partners that the Peacebuilding Commission is a platform well-suited to convening all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations and mobilizing international attention towards Libya, upon the request of Libya. With the consent of the host country, the PBC can also help to promote an integrated, strategic and coherent approach to peacebuilding, including by sharing advice on peacebuilding needs and priorities.

    2022-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9173 (2022) · source

  50. Brazil is pleased that, by adopting resolution 2656 (2022) today, the Security Council recognized that the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) can play an important role in support of peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Libya. We emphasize the Council’s encouragement, as enshrined in the fifth preambular paragraph of the resolution, of further international support and regional cooperation among Libya, its neighbouring countries and relevant United Nations bodies, including the PBC.

    2022-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9173 (2022) · source