YouSaid · the spoken record

Mahbubani

lines on the record: 1,011
first: 1999-09-11
most recent: 2004-05-10
sittings or episodes: 106
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“At a time when the Council should be concerned about its standing in the world, it helps the Council to have the continuation of a success story such as Timor- Leste. That is a responsibility that we hope the Council will not walk away from.”
2004-05-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4965 (2004) · source
“As the Senior Minister said only a few minutes ago, we must be wary of being overconfident or hasty, and mindful that we do not prematurely withdraw our support for Timor-Leste. The fragility of the progress made so far cannot be overstated. Let us stay the course and ensure that the gains made so far are consolidated and that a solid foundation is laid for Timor-Leste's future development. This morning, I heard Ambassador Kamalesh Sharma say that a success story is a retrospective evaluation. I also heard your comment on that subject, Mr. President. But let me add here that the continuation of this success story and the perception that it is a success story are assets that the Security Council has.”
2004-05-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4965 (2004) · source
“Such an additional investment would seem relatively modest, considering the scale of the task at hand and the difference it would make. Let me add here that Singapore strongly supports the proposed deployment of an international response unit of 125 gendarmerie, along with the earlier proposed military component of some 310 formed troops, to form a two-element security force. Given the continued possibility of challenges across the security spectrum, the complementary deployment of both the gendarmerie unit and the military component would enable UNMISET to assist the Timor-Leste Government in dealing with a range of security challenges, even while Timor-Leste builds up its own capacities in that arena.”
2004-05-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4965 (2004) · source
“Without the continued support of the United Nations and the rest of the international community, Timor-Leste's path to self- sufficiency could very well be jeopardized. The Secretary-General has once again set out in his report a compelling case for the extension of the Mission, with a modified mandate and a significantly reduced presence of about 700 international personnel. Singapore fully supports all of the Secretary-General's recommendations, and we urge the Council to support and endorse them as well. It is important that we ensure that the Secretary-General is provided with the resources he requires, across the three broad programmes that he has proposed, to allow Timor- Leste to reach a critical threshold of self-sufficiency.”
2004-05-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4965 (2004) · source
“We had no certainty then that today we would be as well off as we are. We owe Ambassador Sharma a special vote of thanks for all the success we have had. We wish him all the best. I will be concise, as Singapore's position on this issue is well known. The Council's last public meeting on Timor-Leste was held only three months ago. At that time, we heard nearly every speaker support an extension of the mandate of the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) for a further one-year consolidation phase. While some progress has been made since February, it remains irrefutable that Timor-Leste will still require assistance in a number of areas beyond May 2004 if the gains made to date are to be sustained.”
2004-05-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4965 (2004) · source
“At the outset, we would like to associate ourselves with our colleagues in expressing our condemnation of the bombing that took place in Grozny. We express our condolences to the families of those who lost who lives and our sympathies to those who were wounded. Thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting. We are pleased that the Security Council has once again provided an opportunity for concerned non- Council members to air their views on this important subject. Let me quickly thank Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guehenno for the latest report (S/2004/333). At the same time, I should like to join Senior Minister Ana Pessoa Pinto in paying a special tribute to Ambassador Kamalesh Sharma for the work he has done. I was present in this Chamber when he was appointed.”
2004-05-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4965 (2004) · source
“But multilateral negotiations could take years, and time is not on our side. Urgent action is needed. We therefore support the draft resolution under discussion. We agree that some of the details, such as the follow-up mechanisms and the reporting mechanisms, need to be ironed out. The draft resolution is only a first step. But we need to take that first step and tighten the current non-proliferation regime. The longer we take to act, the more time the terrorists have to plot against us. We therefore welcome the initiative by the Security Council to further enhance, through this draft resolution, the regime against the proliferation of WMD. We believe that it will help make the world a safer place. We urge all countries to support it.”
2004-04-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4950 (2004) · source
“We will ensure that all Singapore port facilities and Singapore-flagged ships comply with the requirements of the International Maritime Organization International Ship and Port Facility Security Code by 1 July 2004. No country can deal with terrorism, let alone WMD terrorism, on its own. We need to act quickly to close the gap in current national, regional and international regimes, which today deal primarily with States, and face up to the new challenges posed by non- State actors. Singapore understands many of the concerns expressed here in this debate by some of the other delegations. For example, they question whether the Security Council can assume the role of treaty-making or of legislating rules for Member States. We agree that a multilateral treaty regime would be ideal.”
2004-04-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4950 (2004) · source
“The bad news is this confirms terrorists' intentions on the use of WMD and related weapons. Singapore is serious about preventing WMD proliferation. We continue to do what we can in global counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism efforts. Nationally, we have tightened our export control regime. In January 2003, the Strategic Goods (Control) Act, which is aimed at countering the illicit shipment of strategic goods, WMD and related materials through our ports, came into effect. We made an early decision to participate in the Container Security Initiative, which intensifies the screening of containers. Last year, we intercepted several shipments of items that could have been used in the manufacture of chemical weapons or missiles.”
2004-04-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4950 (2004) · source
“Last year, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) gave several countries a small foretaste of what a biological or chemical attack might be like. The threat is real. A WMD terrorist attack on a small State can mean the physical end of the country. International terrorist networks are deeply embedded in Southeast Asia. It will take many years to root them out. Until they are rooted out, we will be at risk. In June 2003, authorities in Thailand intercepted a man trying to sell radioactive materials that could have been used to make "dirty bombs". The 70 pounds of cesium-137, reportedly smuggled out of Russia, were seized by Thai police after an intelligence tip-off. The timely sharing of intelligence to find and intercept such dangerous materials and to stop them from falling into the wrong hands is a positive development.”
2004-04-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4950 (2004) · source
“After the events of 11 September 2001, it is not possible to realistically discuss the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) without reference to terrorism. The global threat of WMD proliferation and the nexus between WMD proliferation and terrorism are of real and grave concern. There is ample evidence, and a growing consensus among terrorism experts, that it is possible, if not highly probable, that the more sophisticated terrorist movements such as Al Qaeda will employ biological, chemical, radiological or nuclear WMD against their enemies. It is no longer a question of whether this will be attempted, but of when. The nexus between WMD proliferation and terrorism is of particular concern to a small, densely populated country like Singapore.”
2004-04-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4950 (2004) · source
“In conclusion, we believe that Timor-Leste has certainly come a long way, but that much remains to be done before it can be self-sufficient and ready to stand on its own. We hope that the Council will pay attention to the overall situation before it makes its final decision.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“It is certainly not inconceivable that troublemakers are lying low until the United Nations withdraws its military and police presence. That is why we support this recommendation in the Secretary- General's report. I want to reinforce the point made by Jean-Marie this morning when he said that a small formed military presence with aviation and support should be retained after May 2004. He added: "By maintaining a high level of visibility through regular patrols and civil-military cooperation, that component could help limit the destabilizing effect of too abrupt a downsizing exercise." In my remarks, I have spelled out the reasons why this military presence should remain. We hope that the Security Council will support and agree to the recommendations made by the Secretary-General.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“Indeed, as the Secretary-General notes, such a comparatively modest additional effort could make a crucial difference in broadening the scope and increasing the sustainability of the remarkable achievements already registered and in allowing Timor-Leste to reach a threshold of self- sufficiency. My fifth and final point is, in some ways, the most important. As we can tell from the debate we have had so far and from listening to Foreign Minister Ramos-Horta, the recommendation for the retention of a military contingent will be the area of greatest debate. It is important to put that request in the proper context. While the security situation has remained, by and large, uneventful over the past few months, that is by no means indicative of the situation likely after May 2004.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“And, of course, we are familiar with the Brahimi principle: that the Security Council should be told not what it wants to hear, but what it needs to hear. That was put across in the report presented to us today by Jean-Marie Guehenno, in which the Secretary- General made a strong and carefully considered case for an extension of UNMISET for another year with a modified mandate and a reduced scale of some 58 civilian advisers, 157 civilian police advisers, 42 military liaison officers and a military contingent of some 310, including an infantry company with support and aviation elements. Those recommendations reflect extensive consultations among, inter alia, the United Nations, UNMISET and the Timorese leaders. They are not unjustified requests and are certainly not excessive, given the magnitude of the task at hand.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“We make this point because we are aware that, in the past, a timetable was worked out for drawing down the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) and was based on a reading of the circumstances then. Circumstances have changed, and we must take a decision on the basis of the circumstances as they stand today. Frankly, the best description of those circumstances is found in the Secretary-General's report, which points out that institutional weaknesses pervade key institutions of governance despite the progress made in many areas. The fourth point we would like to make is that we support the Secretary-General's recommendation for an extension of UNMISET. Here, as we are all aware, the man of the hour is Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi; his name is associated in the Council with the famous report that he submitted.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“When we talk about the success of Timor-Leste, we should not forget the point, just made so eloquently by Foreign Minister Ramos-Horta, that there is still fragility. We must bear that fragility in mind as we consider this decision. If members of the Council read my text, they will find that we compare building up Timor-Leste to building a house, saying that that we may have put up the skeletal framework of the house, but various key components must still be put in place. That job must still be completed. We hope that that message will register with the Council. Thirdly, we hope any drawdown will be based on a realistic assessment of the situation. It must be based on a hard-headed assessment of the realities on the ground, not carried out mechanically according to some abstract timetable.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“My first point, which I would like to emphasize to the Council, is that we hope there will be a consensus on the need for continued United Nations assistance to Timor-Leste. I think that is the most important decision we need to take at this meeting. The reasons why begin with the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2004/ll7), which points out the need to consolidate and build upon the gains already made. I have not read the report, so I cannot say whether I agree with it 99 per cent or 100 per cent. But we agree significantly with the report. The second point we would like to make is that a precipitous withdrawal could jeopardize the fragile success that we have had in Timor-Leste.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“At the outset, Mr. President, I hope you will permit me to make a small procedural suggestion. In the past, during significant debates, the Council would, from time to time, allow non-Council members to speak first. I hope that that practice will be considered in due course when we have significant debates. I make that point because I think today's debate is significant, as I will explain in my remarks. I am also, of course, obliged to thank Jean-Marie Guehenno, Kamalesh Sharma and the people and the Government of Timor-Leste. I apologize for doing so quickly, but, as I have only five minutes, I will concentrate on substance. In the four and a half minutes that I have remaining, I would like to make five points.”
2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source
“We believe that such a visit would be very helpful to enable the Council to decide how it should manage the post- UNMISET strategy for Timor-Leste.”
2003-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4843 (2003) · source
“Indeed, as Ambassador John Dauth said, the cost will be much less than that of the current situation. Therefore, we hope that these requests will receive attention. My fourth and final point is that at a time when the United Nations has to deal with one crisis after another, and, indeed, when questions have been raised about the relevance and effectiveness of the United Nations, it is all the more important for the United Nations to protect all the success stories that it has. Certainly, we should do what is right for Timor-Leste. It will benefit the people of Timor-Leste. It will also benefit the United Nations at this point in time. In this regard, we also support the invitation that has just been made by the Ambassador of Timor-Leste to the Security Council to visit the country.”
2003-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4843 (2003) · source
“But before saying that, let me also emphasize that we believe that the post-UNMISET presence should come from assessed contributions, with the emphasis on the word assessed. The four items that we would like to support are the following. The first is military liaison officers to liaise between Timor-Leste and Indonesian security forces and to monitor security-related developments. The second is police observers to monitor operations of the National Police of East Timor and internal security developments. The third is an armed back-up policing capability to respond to emergency situations. The fourth is international civilian advisers in security- related areas to be established for a limited period, such as one year. We think that these are not excessive requests.”
2003-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4843 (2003) · source
“Ambassador Kamalesh Sharma said earlier today that the Timorese leadership and the representatives of civil society, both national and international, have clearly indicated to him the centrality of the requirement of continued United Nations presence to provide both psychological assurance and substantive support in the immediate post-UNMISET period. We think this View should be taken seriously, along with some of the specific points that were made, in particular by Ambassador John Dauth. We would like to support some of the specific suggestions that have been made for a continued United Nations presence. As indicated in my text, there are four points that we would like to emphasize in any post-UNMISET presence.”
2003-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4843 (2003) · source
“The first is the point that the Secretary-General made in his report, where he said that the Council should begin considering the best means through which the country's needs can be met after the United Nations withdrawal. That assessment should be based on the thorough evaluation of the country's key requirements and should be guided by recognition, based on experience in Timor-Leste and elsewhere, of the importance of finding reliable means to meet urgent requirements and to secure the considerable investment that had been made in the country to date. We hope that equal attention will be paid to the views of the leadership of Timor-Leste.”
2003-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4843 (2003) · source
“The second point we would like to make is that, as usual, there is the mixture of good news and bad news coming out in any assessment of the situation in Timor-Leste. That assessment that is given is in the text of my statement, but I thought that Ambassador John Dauth captured it very well when he said: "Progress achieved to date in Timor-Leste is real, but it is fragile" (supra). The third point that I would like to make is that, given this mix of good news and bad news in Timor- Leste, I think it is all the more important that the Security Council think very seriously about the exit strategy that it is going to adopt in leaving Timor- Leste. In that regard, we hope that the Council will heed some very important points that have been made.”
2003-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4843 (2003) · source
“The hour is late. I will not read out the text of my remarks, but I hope that members of the Council will refer to the text when they reflect on the situation in Timor-Leste. What I propose to do instead is to summarize my remarks in four points. The first point that I would like to make is to, of course, thank the Council for addressing the subject of Timor-Leste. We realize that there are much more prominent issues that are preoccupying the minds of Council members. Certainly what is going to happen in a few hours will be a major focus of attention. But, despite all that, we hope that the Council will remain focused on the challenges faced by Timor-Leste. We would also like to thank the Secretary-General for his report and my good friend and comrade Kamalesh Sharma for his briefing and the good work that he has done in Timor-Leste.”
2003-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4843 (2003) · source
“In response to an appeal by the Singapore Red Cross Society for contributions to a fund to help refugees and victims of the war in Iraq, the Government of Singapore has contributed almost half a million Singapore dollars to provide a quick start for the fund. We have also appealed to our citizens to contribute to it. Finally, we hope that, as soon as the war is over, the international community will come together again to relieve the suffering of the Iraqi people, to rehabilitate their society, to reconstruct their infrastructure and to pave the way for Iraq's reintegration into the global community. The Security Council faces severe challenges in the coming months. We are confident that it will rise to those challenges.”
2003-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726 (2003) · source
“We believe that these obligations are clear. Both sides have a responsibility to ensure that they are fulfilled. Fourthly, we are encouraged by the pledges that many countries have already made in support of an international reconstruction programme in Iraq. However, a more pressing concern is the provision of funding for humanitarian relief operations. As the Secretary-General noted in his statement to the Security Council last week, the United Nations appeal for funds currently faces a severe shortfall of nearly $90 million. Singapore is prepared to do its part, within our limited means, to contribute to any such international humanitarian relief effort.”
2003-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726 (2003) · source
“In that regard, we are encouraged by the reports we have heard of the progress made in this morning's informal consultations. Secondly, regardless of the duration or outcome of the conflict, emergency relief must begin immediately, with priority given to the worst-affected areas. We are particularly concerned about reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that civilians in the city of Basra may be facing a humanitarian disaster. Urgent measures must be taken to restore basic utilities to the population there as soon as possible. We hope that international humanitarian organizations, including the ICRC, will be able to deploy their staff on the ground as soon as possible. Thirdly, we support the Secretary-General's call for both sides involved in this conflict to respect international humanitarian law.”
2003-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726 (2003) · source
“First, the oil for food programme must be restarted as soon as possible. Sixty per cent of the Iraqi population is dependent on food rations procured under the auspices of the programme. The World Food Programme has estimated that in the first four weeks of this conflict, 2.1 million people may need emergency assistance. If the conflict becomes protracted, the number of people needing assistance will undoubtedly use We therefore support the Secretary-General's proposals in his letter of 19 March 2003 to the President of the Security Council, and we hope that the Council will be able to reach agreement soon on a resolution that will allow the resumption of the oil for food programme to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, both during and after the hostilities.”
2003-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726 (2003) · source
“Given Iraq's long history of flouting Security Council resolutions, Singapore's view was that the Council's inability to reach a new consensus could not be taken as a reason for inaction to disarm Iraq. We cannot turn the clock back. We can only look ahead. We have to address the immediate challenges in Iraq, and we have to look for lasting solutions. We note that the members of the Security Council have struggled hard to achieve consensus on this issue. We hope that the Council will soon recover its unity on the subject, for the international community expects a great deal from it. As the Secretary-General said only a few hours ago, "the Council, which has now had Iraq on its agenda for 12 long years, must rediscover its unity of purpose". The immediate challenge is the humanitarian challenge. Here we would like to make four points.”
2003-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726 (2003) · source
“And this is why we had hoped that the Iraqi leadership would have cooperated fully and would have been able to do this without resort to use of force." We deeply regret that the Government of Iraq chose not to take the final opportunity afforded it under resolution 1441 (2002), which was adopted unanimously, to fully comply with its disarmament obligations or face serious consequences. The people of Iraq, who have already suffered greatly from their Government's failure to comply with its disarmament obligations over the past 12 years, will suffer the most from this conflict. Like many Members, we would have preferred that the Security Council had again explicitly authorized military action to disarm Iraq. But the onus was always on Iraq to avoid a war.”
2003-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726 (2003) · source
“The first Security Council resolution calling for the disarmament of Iraq, resolution 687 (1991), was passed on 3 April 1991. The most recent Council resolution on Iraqi disarmament, resolution 1441 (2002), was adopted unanimously on 8 November 2002. Throughout this 12-year period, we hoped that Iraq would be disarmed peacefully. Sadly, this goal was not achieved. Like most members of the United Nations community, we too hoped that war could be avoided. As the Secretary-General said on 17 March 2003, "War is always a catastrophe - it leads to major human tragedy. Lots of people are going to be uprooted, displaced from their homes, and nobody wanted that.”
2003-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726 (2003) · source
“Indeed, the issue under discussion today is only one example in a broader problem of weapons of mass destruction proliferation. But even as we focus on these important questions, we must never lose sight of the human dimension of the Iraq issue. Singapore attaches great importance to improving the humanitarian situation of the people of Iraq. They have already suffered greatly as a result of the Government of Iraq's failure to comply with its disarmament obligations. Their suffering should not be prolonged. Once again, we urge the Government of Iraq to make the right decision.”
2003-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4717 (2003) · source
“Mohamed ElBaradei's comments that, "what is required is a dramatic change in spirit and sincerity". He added that "the Iraqi president [could] himself announce on television that he is prepared for complete cooperation and that he is giving directives to all Iraqi officials to cooperate completely and present all the documents they have, or even if they have weapons, to reveal them". It is our hope that the Security Council will act in a way that will preserve the unity we achieved by resolution 1441 (2002). A unified position will send a clear message to Iraq from the Council that continued defiance of its obligations will not be tolerated. It will also send the signal to the rest of the world that the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction pose a grave threat to international order that cannot be ignored.”
2003-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4717 (2003) · source
“Hans Blix said in his most recent statement to the Council on 7 March 2003, "It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some longstanding open disarmament issues can be seen as active, or even proactive, these initiatives, three to four months into the new resolution, cannot be said to constitute immediate cooperation, nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance." (S/PV.47I4, p.5) Clearly, many unanswered questions remain to be addressed by the Iraqi authorities. The Financial Times today contains a report of an interview with Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei. He made a suggestion to a delegation of Arab foreign ministers travelling to Iraq that they urge dramatic action by Baghdad. We agree with Mr.”
2003-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4717 (2003) · source
“Regrettably, Iraq has not complied with many of the terms of resolution 687 (1991), even though almost 12 years have passed. When we negotiated resolution 1441 (2002), our understanding was that Iraq was in material breach of its obligations and that it would be the final opportunity for Iraq to comply or face serious consequences. Resolution 1441 (2002) was specifically designed to discourage Iraq from reverting to its past patterns of non-cooperation and evasion. It has become increasingly clear that Iraq has only a few more days to comply with resolution 1441 (2002) or face the consequences. We therefore hope that it will comply immediately, actively, fully and unconditionally with the United Nations weapons inspectors. As Mr.”
2003-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4717 (2003) · source
“Iraq has had, unfortunately, a miserable record of complying with Security Council resolutions. In fact, resolution 1441 (2002) was the Council's seventeenth resolution on the issue since resolution 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, which was designed to restore international peace and security in the area following Iraq's illegal invasion of Kuwait. Subsequently, the ceasefire terms adopted by the Council in resolution 687 (1991) of April 1991 required Iraq to end its weapons of mass destruction programmes, recognize Kuwait, account for missing Kuwaitis and third-party nationals, return Kuwaiti property and end support for international terrorism. Resolution 687 (1991) was designed as a comprehensive framework to restore peace and maintain the security of the region.”
2003-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4717 (2003) · source
“The primary responsibility remains with the Government of Iraq, not the international community, to demonstrate compliance. It is imperative that Iraq disarm immediately and comply fully with all Security Council resolutions. During Singapore's term on the Security Council, we consistently took the position that the Iraqi authorities must comply with all Security Council resolutions. This position was based on the important point of principle that international law must be observed. On 8 November 2002 Singapore voted in favour of Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) in the expectation that international law and order would be preserved. It is important to bear in mind that resolution 1441 (2002) was not the Council's first resolution on this issue.”
2003-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4717 (2003) · source
“This is the first time that I have addressed the Council since our term ended. It gives me great personal pleasure to congratulate an old friend and colleague on the assumption of the presidency. As you know, Sir, you are presiding at a crucial moment in the Council's history; we have full confidence in you. I would also like to congratulate Ambassador Pleuger and his team for the tremendous job they did last month. Today's meeting is both timely and critical. The Security Council is at a crucial decision-making point on Iraq. We all agree that the preference is for a peaceful resolution of the issue of Iraq. We also agree that war must always be a last resort. And of course all of us would like to see a second Security Council resolution adopted. At the same time, we must not overlook certain fundamentals.”
2003-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4717 (2003) · source
“And what it needs to give back is a sense that it is accountable to the United Nations family for its actions. Let me stress here that, given the Council's recent success stories, it has a very proud and positive record, and for that reason we should welcome the idea of accountability, rather than shy away from it. In conclusion, I would like to join my colleagues from Mauritius and Ireland in thanking the States Members of the United Nations for having given us the opportunity to serve on the Council. We hope that we have not let down those who elected us.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source
“It does not derive its legitimacy on its own. Indeed, if we took the 15 Member States out of the United Nations complex and created an independent global security council with the same members, it would not have the legitimacy that we have sitting here. It is the United Nations fabric that provides legitimacy to the Council - the United Nations Charter, the regular elections by the 191 Member States of the 10 elected States members of the Council and, indeed, the general recognition that the Security Council is part of the United Nations family. But that relationship with the United Nations family must be a two-way street. The Council cannot just claim its legitimacy from the United Nations family without giving something back in return.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source
“But even though the Security Council may not be formally or legally accountable to United Nations Member States, it is also clear that the Council does in some ways provide a service. It provides a service to the international community that is in some ways similar to the job done by the fire department - that is the most common analogy used. Fire departments traditionally react whenever a fire breaks out anywhere, at any time. But as we know - indeed, Ambassador Corr mentioned this - the Security Council has been more selective in its responses. Such selectivity can in the long run damage its credibility, and that is something that we need to address if we are trying to improve the Council. We also believe that it is important for the Council to understand where it derives its legitimacy from.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source
“Some have cited Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Charter, which states that the Security Council acts on behalf of the Member States, and say that the Council is accountable to the general membership of the United Nations. But the well-known book by Bruno Simma - The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary - notes that the Security Council "is not subordinate to the Assembly", as the Assembly has not been granted the power to hold the Council responsible for failing to present a report in accordance with Article 24, paragraph 3, of the Charter or for presenting a deficient report, or even for any actions by the Council listed in a report. Clearly, there are no easy answers.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source
“But clearly it has to be addressed. It is, of course, the area of the accountability of the Security Council. Frankly, I do not see any answers being supplied to this question, even within the next 10 years. But I hope to plant a small seed which will grow into a tree some day. We all know that all organizations are accountable in one way or another. Governments are accountable to their electorate. Corporations are accountable to their shareholders. The United Nations Secretariat is accountable to the United Nations Member States, who own the Secretariat. What is unclear is who the Security Council is accountable to, and what it is accountable for. There are no easy answers to that.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source
“We are aware that there is resistance, but we want to suggest to those who, in a sense, resist change that it actually may be in the interests of all 15 members to have better working methods and procedures, because in that way we will learn to use our time better. I would like to make one simple suggestion: the best way to have change is to provide leadership to that Working Group. If we could agree, for example, to have a permanent annual Chairman of the Working Group on Documentation and Procedures - that has been suggested by Ambassador Martin Belinga- Eboutou of Cameroon - I believe that we would be making a huge leap forward in that area. Finally, I would like to refer to the most difficult issue. Indeed, I raise it with some trepidation, because I am not sure whether easy answers can be found in this area.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source
“Each day when we come to work, we go to the informal consultations room, we hear a briefing, sometimes with slides, sometimes without slides, sometimes we have fact sheets, sometimes we do not have fact sheets. We go through a mechanical routine of addressing each issue almost in a set formula. But often we do not stand back and ask, at the end of the day, how much value did we add in that discussion, or did we just go through a discussion for the sake of having a discussion? That is why we think, frankly, that there is good reason to activate and make more useful the Working Group on Documentation and Procedures. We are aware - speaking candidly - that there is some resistance to the idea of making this Working Group more active.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source
“Recent innovations include the Mexican format begun in February 2002, of having open briefings followed by informal consultations. Clearly there is room for improvement. To cite an obvious example, as we know, the Security Council creates the most far-reaching international law, but surprisingly, it does not want to be bound by rules itself, except by a set of rules and procedures which we know still remain provisional after almost 60 years. At some point someone will ask the question: When will your provisional rules stop being provisional? There are also other areas where we need to improve working methods. One of the things I vividly remember about working in the Council is in some ways the mechanization of the work process.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source
“To give one example of how improvements can be made, when we chaired the Liberian Sanctions Committee, and we put up a travel banned list, we had no personal details such as passport number for some of the names on the travel banned list. Then we discovered that another Sanctions Committee actually had the details. But because each of the Sanctions Committees works in locked boxes, there is no transfer of knowledge from one to another. Clearly this is something that can be improved upon, and something the Working Group on sanctions can look at. The fourth area which could benefit from innovation and reflection - and I guess you will not be surprised I mention this - is the area of working methods and procedures of the Council. Here let us stress that there have been improvements; more open meetings have been held.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source
“We know sanctions are another key instrument of the Security Council and we have shared some of the experiences that all of us, as chairmen of the Sanctions Committees, had in the meeting you organized, Sir, on Wednesday 18 December 2002. But we do believe more reflection is needed in this area. As the Secretary- General once noted, "sanctions have had the paradoxical effect of sometimes strengthening the regime and punishing the people". And as a consequence, many questions have been raised about sanctions regimes. For example, there was an article in Harpers magazine in November 2002 that we should look at. Again, more reflection is needed in this area. I hope the Working Group on sanctions chaired by Ambassador Martin Belinga-Eboutou will be able to do more work in this area.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source