YouSaid · the spoken record

Mahbubani

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1,011
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1999-09-11
most recent
2004-05-10
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106
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un-security-council

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  1. Here I agree with Ambassador Durrant's comment that when the technical teams goes to Angola, it should have more meetings with civil society members. But until I heard the representative of France, these civil society figures appeared to be faceless, nameless heroes. I am glad that one of them has been recognized and has received the Sakharov Prize. But what else can we do to clearly help this positive new factor? Again, speaking off the cuff, for example, I wonder if it would be helpful to perhaps invite some members of civil society to come to the Council to speak to us, either in an Arria-formula meeting or in some other meeting. This may have two positive benefits.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  2. I wonder whether Ambassador Gambari can confirm that, because if that figure is right, it shows how large the problem is. Indeed, according to a World Food Programme report last week, the latest military campaigns against UNITA in central and eastern Angola have actually led to another significant increase of internally displaced persons in these regions, with acute malnutrition rates reaching as high as 25 per cent in some refugee centres. I believe several previous speakers asked what more can be done to ameliorate the humanitarian situation. If Ambassador Gambari could respond to that, that would be very helpful. Thirdly- again, this is unique in today's debate 4 everyone has emphasized the important role of civil society and the role of the churches.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  3. For example - just speaking out of ignorance - did the neighbours of Angola play a role? Has civil society been touched upon? It would be helpful if Mr. Gambari could tell us exactly what has created this new window of opportunity, so that we can, in a sense, strengthen those factors that created this window. Secondly, I think everyone has agreed in their remarks today that the humanitarian situation, to put it very mildly, is very bad. The most alarming figure we heard this morning is, ifI heard Ambassador Gambari correctly, that there are 4.1 million internally displaced persons out of a population of 12 million. That makes it one third of the population - 33 per cent. This must surely be the highest figure for any country in the world.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  4. There must have been other windows of opportunity that came and went. The question is, "How do we keep this window of opportunity truly open?" Here, I was going to ask Ambassador Gambari whether he could, in his responses, perhaps reflect a little more on the factors that have created the new window of opportunity. Some of the factors have been touched on in the discussion so far, for example the military defeats of UNITA; clearly, that is a new factor. Another factor is the willingness of the Government to get the United Nations engaged in the process of dialogue. Here, I must say Ijoin Ambassador Eldon in thanking the Government of Angola for the access it gave Ambassador Gambari; I am glad he met President Dos Santos on the first day, not the last day. I hope that becomes a pattern for his visits there. Were there any other factors?

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  5. This afternoon we are going to have a wrap-up meeting on the work of the month, but since it is likely to be the last meeting of the year we thought it might be useful to review the successes and the failures of the year as well. We were going to say this afternoon that Angola was clearly not a success story. But today Ambassador Gambari has given us a glimmer of hope. Yet he has also created a problem for us, because we now have to re-write our speech for this afternoon. I certainly agree with Ambassador Chowdhury, who said that Ambassador Gambari had been far too modest about his own personal contribution to what has happened. We have no doubt that it is as a result of his strong personal involvement that we see what he has called a new window of opportunity in Angola. But this, as everyone has observed, is a 26-year- old conflict.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  6. This is where I hope that the next time around - and I know that there will be another debate on West Africa in a few months- we will have before us a set of concrete indicators we can refer to which show how much progress we make each time we discuss West Africa so that we do not end up saying the same things that we have said the last time. We can actually demonstrate that with each passing debate we have actually taken a few steps forward.

    2001-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4439 (2001) · source

  7. My understanding is that it is supposed to come from the regular budget. The regular budget, however, is a tight and closed circle. There is no room for expansion in the regular budget. If you create a new programme, you have to delete a programme elsewhere. That is how the budget is maintained at its present level. So if we are to create a new office in West Africa, where will the money come from? I know there is sometimes some discomfort in discussing issues of money in a place like, but the best way of demonstrating our commitment to some of these things is by deploying resources. If we issue the words and say we are prepared to set up an office, but do not deliver the funding for it, then, frankly, how can people listen to us? Will they listen to our words or look to see what deeds we carry out?

    2001-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4439 (2001) · source

  8. This applies, frankly, to the key, concrete recommendations that will come out of today's meeting. This is the establishment of the Office for West Africa. We have all seen the letter contained in document S/2001/1128 that was sent to us by the Secretary-General on 29 November, three weeks ago, where he says, "I have the honour to refer to my letter of 25 June 2001 to the President of the Security Council concerning my intention to establish a United Nations Office for West Africa." That Office is scheduled to start work from January 2002 - in 13 days or so. As of now, we have no indication whether the resources will come in time for such an Office to be set up. I hope that when Mr. Fall responds to the comments made he will perhaps give us a bit more information on how the financing will come.

    2001-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4439 (2001) · source

  9. The United Nations as a whole has raised $1 billion to spend on UNAMSIL, and that is a very significant amount of money, if compared, for example, with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) core funding for West Africa, which is only $70 million. It is clear that we are able to raise money if we have to. While we are able to raise money for peacekeeping budgets, we are not able to raise money for the elements of any programmes that come before or after peacekeeping. At some point, somebody is going to ask the question, why is this so? Why are we able to raise $1 billion, which is not an insignificant sum - it is as large as the regular budget of the United Nations? For one dimension of what is happening in West Africa, why can we not apply some of it to other areas which are equally important in the region?

    2001-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4439 (2001) · source

  10. But I note that our colleague from Norway, Ambassador Kolby, had an innovative suggestion when he said that we should look for income-generating programmes to be put in the DDR programmes. As we talk of resources, it is clear that the region as a whole does not seem to lack the ability to generate resources. If one looks at the total amount of money that the United Nations has committed to West Africa, it is actually quite massive. I have just read, for example, from the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, which came out a month ago, on 14 November 2001, which says in paragraph 5: "The Advisory Committee was informed that amounts totalling $1,040.2 million have been assessed on Member States in respect of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) from its inception to 31 December 2001".

    2001-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4439 (2001) · source

  11. But if a year later, your left arm is well and your right arm is bleeding, then you show the integrated approach by being able to move your resources from one arm to the other. This is where, frankly, our challenge lies. Within the West Africa region, we must be able to show that in our deeds, we respond to where the problems lie. I believe that Ambassador Durrant also referred to this need to be flexible. One concrete area where we can apply this is in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). Again, everyone that has made a statement today so far has referred to the need to implement DDR after the peace agreements, and everyone agrees that the key is resources. I am glad that when Ambassador Durrant spoke earlier, she mentioned that we should perhaps look to the regular peacekeeping budgets to find DDR programmes.

    2001-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4439 (2001) · source

  12. Our challenge today is to convert these words into deeds and to ensure that when we speak about an integrated approach, we do so not just in our words but in deeds. We see some challenges here. First, if you take an integrated approach, it means that if you have good news in one area and bad news in other parts of the subregion, which is what we seem to have in West Africa, then you have to show that you have taken note of this change by being able to transfer the resources to the different parts. Here, to use a medical analogy, treating West Africa as one body, if you have a left arm that is bleeding and a right arm that is fine, then it makes sense to use all your resources and bandage your left arm.

    2001-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4439 (2001) · source

  13. Fall told us even then, "In that regard, during our Mission we took note of concerns expressed by ECOWAS heads of State facing the need to envisage, in the overall context of an integrated approach, the peacekeeping and security operations in particular in the region of the Mano River Union, in a way that takes the interrelationships into account." (S/PV4319, p. 11) Fortunately, this was followed up by the very constructive meeting organized by the Permanent Mission of Colombia during its presidency, and I am glad that Ambassador Valdivieso referred to the International Peace Academy paper of August 31, 2001, because I was going to quote exactly the same sentence that he mentioned: "West Africa is ripe for a regional approach to conflict management." A change in the mindset has clearly taken place.

    2001-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4439 (2001) · source

  14. In paragraph 54 (d) of the report (S/2000/992), it was noted, "No lasting progress can be made in Sierra Leone without comprehensive action to tackle the current instability in the West African region, in particular in the Mano River Union member countries." This was followed up by the Secretary-General in a message (SG/SM/7665) addressed to the ECOWAS summit meeting on 15 December 2000, in which he said, "The United Nations is determined to help West Africa solve its problems. Together, we can make sure that the region returns to the path of peace and development to which all people aspire." This was followed up, as we know, by the May meeting. At that meeting, all those who spoke - including Mr. Jean-Marie Guehenno, Ms. Carolyn McAskie and Mr. Fall - also emphasized the need for an integrated approach. In fact, Mr.

    2001-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4439 (2001) · source

  15. I would say that the most significant element we have in today's debate is that there has clearly been a change of mindset in the approach to West Africa. This is the one area where I think we are beginning to acknowledge that we have to work with the region as a whole. This change of mindset did not come easily, of course. It began with the Security Council mission that went to the region in October 2000.

    2001-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4439 (2001) · source

  16. Fall, as it touched on many key points - is that another procedural suggestion could be for the gist or a summary of the key points to be given to us in advance - for example, the challenges spoken about by Mr. Fall. If those could be given to us in advance, we could weave them into our statements when we speak. On a final procedural point, like Ambassador Jerandi of Tunisia, of course we support the suggestion of having a presidential statement issued quickly. We agree with you that it should be issued before the ECOWAS summit, and we are confident that all the views expressed here will be taken on board, including those that will be put forward by colleagues from the region who will be speaking after us. Let me now turn to the substantive issues at hand.

    2001-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4439 (2001) · source

  17. By the way, I said exactly the same thing in May this year: "Perhaps, to add value each time we discuss West Africa, we should begin by asking ourselves: What have we done in the past? What decisions have we made? Which have been implemented and which not? And in the case of those that have not been implemented, why not?" (S/PV4319, p. 27) The problem we have sometimes is that, when one makes specific recommendations like this, they seem to fall into a deep hole, without any action being taken. I hope that the next time we discuss West Africa we will get some kind of progress report before we meet. The second point I would like to make - and, frankly, I think that we, in today's meeting, may not be able to do full justice to the very comprehensive briefing given to us by Mr.

    2001-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4439 (2001) · source

  18. I must say that the comprehensive briefing by Mr. Fall was more eloquent testimony than anything we can say on the significant number of developments we have to digest. Before turning to the substantive points that were raised this morning, I just want to raise a couple of procedural points that I hope are not minor. The first, of course, is that since May we have made progress in some areas, and in some areas we have not. In fact, ifI heard Ambassador Valdivieso correctly, he began his opening remarks by saying that his delegation felt that not enough consideration had been given to Mr. Fall's report. In that regard, it is sometimes useful, when we have such a debate, to actually get some kind of a piece of paper that tries to assess whether or not we have made substantive progress on the subject we have discussed.

    2001-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4439 (2001) · source

  19. First, a quick personal note of thanks to you, Mr. President. I have just received the revised programme for the month, and I am glad that you have agreed to our suggestion to move the wrap-up session from 27 to 21 December. As we said, that is an important occasion for the members who are leaving the Council to give us their reflections before they leave, and I think 21 December will be the best date to listen to them. I thank you for that, Mr. President. Turning to the debate we are having today, this is clearly a very important and timely debate. Many significant developments have taken place in West Africa, especially since the last open debate we held on the subject, on Monday, 14 May 2001, which I think was presided over by Ambassador Jim Cunningham. It is good to get an update on what is happening.

    2001-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4439 (2001) · source

  20. In our view, now more than ever, the international efforts of mediation and facilitation, including those of the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations, as well as those of other key regional players, should be redoubled. We believe that by acting together, the international community can best succeed in its endeavours to fight against terrorism and to bring peace to the Middle East. We hope that sometime soon the international community will come together again and speak with one voice.

    2001-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4438 (2001) · source

  21. All sides should be called upon to exercise maximum restraint and not allow these extremists to drive the agenda. All parties should immediately rejoin the Middle East peace process. Fortunately for the Council, the path to peace has been comprehensively laid down by the report of the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, the Mitchell report. It is remarkable that this report has been supported by both parties - indeed, by the entire international community. Hence, we believe that immediate steps should be taken to implement the Mitchell report. In the Middle East, ultimately, there is no alternative to a negotiated peace settlement based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

    2001-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4438 (2001) · source

  22. In the past few months, Singapore has been deeply disturbed by the senseless loss of innocent lives following the escalation of violence. It is truly horrifying to wake up each morning to see more pictures of innocent civilians being targeted and killed. We share the Secretary-General's view that the targeting of innocent civilians is unacceptable, and we are pleased that in the debate, in all the statements we have heard so far, there is complete unanimity that this targeting of innocent civilians must be brought to an end. The tragedy here is that these attacks are taking place at a time when there has actually been increased international action and attention to re-engage the parties and to end the violence. Our humble view is that we should not provide the extremists with a veto on the resumption of the peace process.

    2001-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4438 (2001) · source

  23. The hour is late. We will be brief. On the Middle East issue, it is clearly very difficult to get consensus or unanimity within the Security Council. But we believe that there is total consensus today on one point: the situation in the Middle East is dangerous and getting more dangerous. No one can challenge this simple, indisputable fact. When such major threats to international peace and security surface, only one - we repeat, only one - organization has been assigned the primary responsibility to handle them. No other organ has this constitutional responsibility. Therefore, we in the Security Council have to seize this responsibility because the responsibility is ours. When we do not, the situation often gets worse. This is what we have seen happening in the Middle East.

    2001-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4438 (2001) · source

  24. In this regard, we welcome the recent steps taken by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to attract genuine foreign investment to restructure, modernize and liberalize the mining sector. Fourthly, any proposed measures against illegal exploitation should take into consideration the humanitarian and economic costs to the innocent peoples affected. I think that I will end here, with the observation that many important points have been made in the course of the debate this morning and that we hope we will have sufficient time to reflect on them.

    2001-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4437 (2001) · source

  25. Finally, the Council may recall that, in the discussions that we had in the informal consultations, we suggested some principles that we hoped would be taken on board by the Council in considering this issue. I will go through them quickly, in the hope that they will, in fact, be taken on board. First, no outside parties or groups sponsored by such parties should benefit from the exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the expense of that country. Secondly, the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should not be used to finance, or serve as an incentive to prolong, the conflict in the country. Thirdly, the resources should be used only to benefit the country and the people.

    2001-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4437 (2001) · source

  26. I should like to quote a few words from a very important study entitled "Greed and Grievance", which, in a sense, is a landmark study which points out how conflict and resources are linked. The study, carried out by Mats Berdal and David Malone, notes that: "The continuation of seemingly senseless civil wars is sometimes linked to the rational pursuit of economic goals by the warring factions." Indeed, this paradox is highlighted in the Kassem report, which notes in paragraph 60 that: "Peace could bring added pressure from many sides for greater transparency, oversight and accountability, and could ultimately prove far less profitable for some." The paradox here, therefore, is that the incentives are for conflict rather than for peace. If we want to end the conflict, we have to think about how to remove the incentives.

    2001-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4437 (2001) · source

  27. Points such as this one should be taken on board when we decide how to respond to the Panel. Similarly, just listening to the members, we heard a very interesting discussion of the pros and the cons of the moratorium, which, as we all know, was an innovative idea put forward by the Kassem Panel. We note the division of views. Our own View, frankly, is that this is a positive idea that should be taken on board. However, we would suggest that, in order to do all of that, we need more time for reflection. We hope that there will not be a rush to adopt a presidential statement, because, in our case, we have to refer it to our authorities before we can make a decision. It is also important to bear in mind the fact that the issue of the plundering of resources, as everyone has said, is linked to the continuation of the conflict.

    2001-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4437 (2001) · source

  28. Concerning the second point in terms of procedure, we share Norway's View that the Views expressed today, both by the members and the non- members of the Council, should be taken on board in the preparation of the presidential statement to be adopted following this debate. We understand the desire of some to adopt the presidential statement as quickly as possible. However, we have some concerns about that, because we feel that we should reflect on some of the views expressed here. Sll'V.4437 I will give an example. The Deputy Foreign Minister of Tanzania said earlier today, in another important observation, that the report would have been more comprehensive had it included also the end-users of the natural resources plundered from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2001-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4437 (2001) · source

  29. Secondly, there seems to be also a general recognition that Ambassador Kassem and his team have done good work, and - if I may quote what I call the "buzz" in the United Nations corridors - that buzz is that the Kassem report is better than the Ba-N'Daw report. I think that it is important for the Panel to know that. The challenge now is for the Council to respond effectively to the work of the Panel. Let me make a few small procedural points here. First, having served on the Council for a year, we have noticed that several panels have been set up and that each panel works in separate compartments, with no transfer of best practices from one to another. We hope that at some point this will be done, because I think that some of the good work done by the Kassem Panel can be shared with the other panels.

    2001-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4437 (2001) · source

  30. The hour is late. I will try to be quick. In some ways, that is easier for us, because many of the key points that we had wanted to make have already been made by several speakers today. They include the fact that the plundering of the resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is unacceptable. We must put a stop to it, and the Security Council must find effective ways and means to do so. There seems to be a clear consensus on this matter. What can we say to add value to this process? First, we want to welcome the high-level presence we see here today. I was pleased that I was able personally to listen to most of the speeches by the ministers who have come here. I think we should take on board what they have told us.

    2001-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4437 (2001) · source

  31. We will not join in the debate between Bangladesh and France on whether or not we should bid you farewell, Madam, but we look forward to continuing to work with you.

    2001-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4432 (2001) · source

  32. But we also believe - and we said this when the debate took place - that it is time to start clustering these thematic debates on issues involving the protection of civilians, of women and of children and organizing them in such a way as to respond to Ireland's call for reducing the workload; the workload is obviously becoming too great for the Council. Let me end with one concrete suggestion. Fortunately, we are having this meeting in the open. There will be a record of what has been said here, but we think that there have been many valuable, specific suggestions that have been made on how to improve the work of the Council. I hope we can try to make a kind of catalogue of the suggestions. We tried this in January at the closed, wrap-up meeting we had. We should begin to institutionalize this, and we hope that this can be done.

    2001-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4432 (2001) · source

  33. The only tragedy here is that the Working Group has still not made much progress on the establishment of a new mechanism of cooperation between the Security Council and the troop-contributing countries. I recall Ambassador Chowdhury's call for stronger efforts to be made in that direction, because we were, in a sense, moving towards a relationship of greater trust between the troop-contributing countries and Security Council members. That movement has stalled because of the fear that their views are not being heard in the Working Group. I have a quick note on the thematic debates. We think that the debates held on children in armed conflict and the protection of civilians were very important. Certainly, the presence of the child soldier from Sierra Leone was a dramatic event.

    2001-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4432 (2001) · source

  34. Finally, turning to the failures - and as I have said, it is also very important to address failures 4 the biggest failure of the Council this past month was not to complete our work on the Working Group on Sanctions. The deadline for the work was November 2000. Now it is November 2001. But what is even more tragic is that the people who actually worked on this Working Group on Sanctions, especially Bangladesh and the others - all the elected members who can actually remember what work they did will all be gone in a month. Then we have to start from scratch again. That, I think, is something that we should not accept. I also want to touch a bit on the work of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations. Here, I would like to pay tribute to Ambassador Ward for the incredibly hard work that he has done.

    2001-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4432 (2001) · source

  35. But clearly we are meant to turn to those that were members of the Council at that time to ask them the reason for these double standards. I also want to respond briefly to the comments made by Ambassador Doutriaux on the Group of Friends. I agree with him that the Group does play a useful role. I also agree that they help, in a sense, to link the Security Council with the General Assembly members. But I also would like to make a plea for greater transparency in their work. Sometimes we are not quite sure how they arrive at the various decisions that they present to us. Some indication of the background that went into their thinking would be useful to us.

    2001-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4432 (2001) · source

  36. Very briefly, on the other issues that we discussed, such as Kosovo, we thank you, Madam, for giving us the time to reflect on them before we adopted the presidential statements. But I want to add a small footnote on the Kosovo issue. This represents a small, personal discovery. When we were discussing the results of the elections in Kosovo, I asked my colleagues when we were going to renew the mandate of the Kosovo peacekeeping operation. Then I discovered - and this reflects my ignorance - that while in every other mandate, there is a six- or three- month time limit, in Kosovo, there is no time limit. It is in perpetuity. Now there must have been some good reason why this was done. But I could not figure out why, nor who did it. Again, because of the lack of institutional memory, I'm not sure whom to turn to.

    2001-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4432 (2001) · source

  37. We know that the key provisions of the resolution lie in operative paragraph 2 and operative paragraph 6 - and I will not go into the details here. In this regard, we would like to commend the permanent five for working closely together and producing a consensus text for us. We are aware that they must have worked very hard; there must have been very complex trade-offs. We do not know what happened behind the scenes, but we do know that the result was a good one. We also know that, frankly, we have a massive job ahead of us over the next six months, if we are to finalize work on the next Iraq resolution. I understand that some of my colleagues have actually read the Goods-Review List. I must confess that I never had the chance to read it before we adopted it. It is too big a volume. But we will all have to read it at some point in time.

    2001-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4432 (2001) · source

  38. There is no agreed record of it. No summary points of it are kept. And when we come to making the big decisions on what kind of peacekeeping operations are to be set up in Afghanistan, we will not have an institutional memory to draw upon. But, here, I am glad, Madam, that you organized the candid discussion that we had yesterday, together with the International Crisis Group (ICG) and the World Peace Foundation. I thought the level of the discussion was quite remarkable. I have never seen a better discussion of the question, "Can the United Nations say no?", as we had in yesterday's meeting, and I hope that some of that will be recorded and kept. The other major decision we made was on Iraq, where we unanimously adopted resolution 1382 (2001).

    2001-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4432 (2001) · source

  39. Frankly, there is no reason why we should spend $600,000 a year for that report. It should cost us no more than $50,000. This can be done, and we have discovered in the course of working on it that there is much duplication that can be cut out. Let me turn briefly to the successes on the substantive front. Here, clearly, I think the work we did on Afghanistan, including the meeting with Lakhdar Brahimi on 13 November and of course the adoption of resolution 1378 (2001), was very important. But equally important were the discussions we had in informal consultations. In the course of the discussions, I thought we were moving towards developing a sort of informal consensus among member States about what was doable and what was not doable within Afghanistan. The tragedy is that that institutional memory is lost.

    2001-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4432 (2001) · source

  40. We also thank you, Madam, for convening the informal working group on documentation and procedures, despite the busy month - and that is why it is quite remarkable. The working group, as members know, has begun work on the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. One point we do want to emphasize is that if, just after a massive debate in the General Assembly on the report of the Security Council to the Assembly, we decide to ignore the views expressed and proceed to do exactly the same thing next year as we did in previous years, then we reinforce the views of those who say the Security Council does not listen to the members of the General Assembly. If we want to show that we are listening, then it is time for us to produce some real changes. And it can be done.

    2001-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4432 (2001) · source

  41. Small missions do not have the resources to do it, but it is something that the Secretariat could try to do. At the same time, of course, I think that we really made a very important innovation with the speakers' list. I am glad that Ambassador Koonjul referred to this. It may seem to be a small thing that we switched from whatever system we had in the past to drawing lots, but frankly, because it has created regularity and predictability and we can actually know when we are going to speak during the course of the day, it has made everyone feel that we have a level playing field when it comes to the selection of the speakers. I think it has also helped to improve the chemistry among the members and to make them feel that we were all equally treated and that we do not just belong to class A or class B within the Council.

    2001-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4432 (2001) · source

  42. I think it is better to have one web site permanently on the United Nations web site, rather than to have it switch from month to month to different missions. It provides one- stop shopping for the Council's provisional programme of work, outputs, press statements, presidential statements and resolutions. I think that is a very important innovation, but we do need to try to develop it a bit further. Ambassador Chowdhury talked about how we can make our informal consultations more transparent. We can do what France did when it held the presidency of the Council. On the French web site, it provided a daily summary of what was discussed and said in the informal consultations - of course, without revealing any names or countries. We know that this is time- consuming because we tried it during the Singapore presidency and we could not do it.

    2001-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4432 (2001) · source

  43. Of course, we commend you for producing, at the very beginning of month, the objectives paper and, at the end of the month, notes for the wrap-up meeting. This sort of systematic approach, we hope, will also become institutionalized, What I would like to do now is talk a bit about the successes of the month in procedural and substantive issues. I think that, if these meetings are to be useful, we should also talk about failures. Let me reassure you, Madam, it is not about the failures of the presidency; it is about the failures of the Council. As to the successes on the procedural issues, there have been several and they are, I think, significant ones. First, of course, is the setting up of the Security Council presidential web site.

    2001-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4432 (2001) · source

  44. Perhaps one way of doing that is through these wrap-up meetings and by making them open and interactive. In that way we can probably engage the non-members. Coming to the work of this month, you, Madam, have been praised so much I am not so sure that I can add very much. What really impressed us was your time management. Increasingly, frankly, in the work of the Council, the most valuable and precious commodity we have is time. Indeed, we have found that, since we joined the Council, it is like a sponge, soaking up all our time. We just find it very difficult to manage all our other duties, but you, Madam, did it brilliantly in a month when you also had to deal with the ministerial week and, of course, the Thanksgiving holiday. Thus, in a very truncated month, you did a tremendous amount of work and we commend you for that.

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  45. But we have not done so yet. I would also like to appeal to the Members that are not here to take such wrap-up meetings more seriously. For example, we are in the middle of the plenary session of the General Assembly and I am told that, in one of the discussions in the Third Committee, there was apparently an effort to mention a Security Council resolution on women and peace and security. Several members of the General Assembly said: "No, that is the job of the Security Council. We will not endorse what the Security Council does." I think that represents a very unhealthy disconnect between the Security Council and the rest of the United Nations community. The representative of France also referred to that. We have to address that disconnect.

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  46. But to do that, at some point in time we do need to have a very serious discussion within the Council on what exactly our priorities are. I notice that Ambassador Chowdhury of Bangladesh said that our primary responsibility is to handle threats to international peace and security, but are we primarily a deliberative body, a legislative body or an operational body? I think we do bits of all three, but we have to figure out what our priorities are; then, we can decide how we allocate our time. I hope that, at some point, we will get to such a discussion. In this regard, I must say that I, like Ambassador Greenstock, regret the lack of participation of the Member States at this meeting. It is, unfortunately, a bad sign and what makes it sad is that, by having it open to the Member States, we thought that we could, in a sense, engage them.

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  47. Please allow me to begin by commending you, Madam, for organizing this wrap-up meeting. Actually, I would like to begin with a plea to my colleagues to try as much as possible to institutionalize these wrap-up meetings, because they can be useful on many counts. First, of course, we can review what we did, where we succeeded and where we failed during the month. Secondly, I think we can also reflect on long-term trends and on how our work is going over the longer term. Thirdly and equally importantly, this is probably the only window that we have in the course of the month to reflect on how we can improve the work of the Council. Clearly, we do need to develop some kind of culture of innovation within the Council. These sort of meetings, if they are institutionalized, can provide us the opportunity to do so.

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  48. Ambassador Levitte concluded his statement in that debate by saying that "the very image of the United Nations depends on our capacity to successfully manage exit strategies for peacekeeping operations, which our Council is mandated to lead to success" (p. 8). We completely agree with the sentiments expressed by Ambassador Levitte in that debate, and we hope that they will be applied systematically to all the operations in which the United Nations is involved.

    2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4430 (2001) · source

  49. However, in our View, as with all peacekeeping operations, the Security Council must be clear about what the conditions are for the scaling down and withdrawal of the international presence and when those conditions have been met. In the November 2000 debate, Ambassador Levitte referred to the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic, and he said that "the Group of Friends established a series of criteria, benchmarks to assess the Mission's performance... Even if these criteria were imperfectly met, they provided both a road map describing the objectives for durable stabilization of the situation, and a kind of tracking board making it possible to assess the results and adjust the operation's duration and mandate" (p. 7).

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  50. (S/2001/905, para. 6) That applies to Kosovo as much as it applies to other issues before the Council. Since we have spoken quite a bit about the exit strategy dimension, we wanted to cite some remarks made in our 15 November 2000 debate on that subject. One of the most thoughtful interventions was made by Ambassador Jean-David Levitte - I am sorry he has left the Chamber. I would like to quote something he said then: "[The] Security Council has established some important, even decisive, operations - I am thinking of Kosovo and Timor in particular - and it must be able to terminate them without risking the future of the peoples concerned". (S/PV4223, p. 6) And he went on to observe that "Persistence is often a key element of success" (p. 7).

    2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4430 (2001) · source