YouSaid · the spoken record

Mahbubani

lines on the record: 1,011
first: 1999-09-11
most recent: 2004-05-10
sittings or episodes: 106
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Our view is that the Security Council needs to catch up with the DPKO and move from purely mechanical discussions on peacekeeping operations, to more reflective discussions. We can, for example, make better use of the Best Practices Unit of the DPKO, to draw lessons of successful and unsuccessful peacekeeping operations and apply them to current and future operations. A concrete suggestion we can make here is that in our existing Working Group on peacekeeping operations we hope there will be more reflection on how decisions are made concerning peacekeeping operations. A third idea which could benefit from innovation and reflection is, of course, the area of sanctions.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source
“Recently there was a book launch ceremony where Professor Stephen Stedman of Stanford University, speaking of his book "Ending Civil Wars", calculated how much the United Nations spends in each peacekeeping operation per victim involved in the conflict. You get a remarkable disparity where you can spend up to a few thousand dollars per Victim in the Balkans to a few dollars per victim in Rwanda. This disparity needs to be addressed because at some point, people will be asking questions as to why there is such a large gap in how you allocate your resources. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has improved over the years to deal with the evolution of peacekeeping operations from purely traditional operations to complex multi-faceted missions.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source
“We believe that is the way we can introduce the culture of reflection. The second area where we can benefit from innovation and reflection is in the area of peacekeeping operations. Clearly, peacekeeping operations have become one of the most important instruments of the Security Council for maintaining international peace and security. The amount of money that the Security Council authorizes to spend on peacekeeping - $3 billion annually - is much larger than the United Nations regular budget. But in the two years we have been on the Council, there has never been even one discussion on how we go about allocating these $3 billion.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source
“One complete suggestion we would make - and this probably builds on what both Ambassador Koonjul and Ambassador Corr have said - is that we should find time to sit back and reflect on the overall work of the Council. We tried to do this during the annual retreat of the Security Council with the Secretary-General. But often there is no follow-up to the retreats. Under your presidency, Sir, we had a very useful meeting on 11 December 2002, and I commend you for the record you have given us, because this demonstrates the value of such reflective sessions. Of course we can have more of such wrap-up sessions. We should also build on the 15-plus-15 format that Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock started in his luncheon meetings, but all in all I think we need to do more in terms of reflecting on the overall work of the Council.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source
“We can also move from assessing political considerations on how to encourage parties to abide by peace processes, to deliberating military recommendations on the size, shape and area of the deployment of peacekeeping operations. We can move from responding to a humanitarian crisis to monitoring financial embargos imposed by the United Nations Security Council. We can consider juridical questions relating to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), to examining the legitimacy and adequacy of Members States in combating international terrorism. This is a huge agenda that has grown in the Council. Each time we meet, we discuss each slice and we never sit back and reflect on the Council as a whole and on how it is performing as an institution.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source
“As we all know, the Security Council has become the busiest organ within the United Nations family. It meets daily and has grown in size and complexity. Each time the 15 members meet we discuss individual slices of the Council's work, whether it is the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Middle East or Burundi. But we never step back and look at the whole picture of what the Council is doing. If you look at the whole picture, it is amazing how much the load and complexity of the work of the Council has grown in the last 10 years. For example, in any single day we can examine conflict situations across the globe from Asia to Africa.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source
“But frankly it is an organization that is weak in the cultures of innovation or reflection. This is what we will speak about. To bring about change requires leadership from the owners of the Council. One thing which has puzzled me is a question I raised at the Security Council retreat. Who are the owners of this Council? Is it the 15 Member States? Is it the five permanent members? Is it the 191 Member States, or is it, as stated in the Charter, "we the peoples" of the world? We cannot fully address this subject, but I hope it will form the subtext of what I speak of today. The contribution we would like to make today is to suggest five concrete areas where we believe further improvements can be made in the work of the Council. The first area is to try to undertake a sharpened strategic overview of the work of the Council.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source
“Indeed, my list of success stories is the same as the ones they pointed to, so I will not list mine here. I want to emphasize a point. We thought the most useful contribution we can make in this meeting is to suggest areas for improvement in future years. We believe, to quote an old cliche, that an organization languishes if it only has unloving critics or uncritical lovers, and I hope we will be seen as a loving critic of the Council. We believe that all good organizations should have the three C's: a culture of action, a culture of innovation and a culture of reflection. Clearly in the Council, as demonstrated in the remarks made by Ambassador Corr, we have a strong culture of action. We deliver results. Whenever a crisis occurs the Council responds.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source
“Ten minutes to summarize two years: that is quite a challenge. I may have to piggyback to save time and say that I completely endorse what Ambassador Koonjul and Ambassador Corr have said about the wonderful work done by the Colombian presidency - by you and your team, Sir. I also endorse what they have said about the usefulness of this wrap-up session, because, frankly, if we did not have this wrap-up session we would be leaving the Council without having an opportunity to leave behind our impressions of what we have done. We thank you very much for this, Mr. President. We also want to emphasize the point that was made both by Ambassador Koonjul and Ambassador Corr, that the Council's record over the past two years has been a successful one.”
2002-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4677 (2002) · source
“I now give the floor to Ambassador Jagdish Koonjul, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“We hope that that Working Group on sanctions will find the solution to the problem of establishing clear guidelines. The seventh and final lesson, which ties into the point of our institutional memory, is about support. We want, at this point, to thank the Secretariat for the tremendous support they give us, in particular to Loraine Rickard-Martin, James Sutterlin and Armie Decepida, without whom, frankly, our sanctions Committee could not have worked. They did a tremendous job, and we want to thank them for it. But as we leave, we want to encourage them to work harder with our successors and to continue to provide them good advice, because, frankly, the sanctions Committee relies a great deal on the Secretariat for its work.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“The sixth lesson that we learned has to do with one of the instructions given to us when the Committee was set up and contained in paragraph 14 (c) of resolution 1343 (2001), which states that we should, as a Committee: "promulgate expeditiously such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 5 to 7 above." Unfortunately, after two years, we have not been able to agree on the guidelines for the Committee. The good news is that that did not deter the work of the Committee. We managed to get our work done, despite the absence of guidelines. But that situation is clearly unsatisfactory and it is something that will hopefully be remedied in due course. But, as we all know, a similar problem has also been holding up the work in the Working Group on sanctions.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“That is something that clearly has to be addressed. Of course, the Government of Liberia has taken advantage of this humanitarian crisis to wage a successful propaganda campaign in Liberia to convince the Liberian population that the humanitarian problems that they face are due to United Nations sanctions. There is one thing the Council can do better next year, and that is to fight that propaganda battle and convince the Liberian population that their problems are not due to the sanctions imposed on them.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“As I mentioned earlier, the sanctions that were imposed on Liberia were intended to be smart sanctions and were not intended to have any kind of adverse impact on the population of Liberia. But, as I hinted earlier, they have had a psychological impact on the population, and the sad truth is that at about the same time that the sanctions were imposed on Liberia, the humanitarian situation in Liberia worsened. The most recent report of the Panel of Experts makes it very clear that the humanitarian crisis in Liberia is not a result of the sanctions that were imposed. That is very clearly established by the most recent report of the Panel of Experts. But, at the same time, it also makes it clear that Liberia is facing a serious humanitarian crisis and that humanitarian assistance to Liberia has decreased.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“It is very difficult, frankly, when one is chairman of such a committee to be confronted with an individual who writes you a long passionate letter explaining why he should be removed from the list, and you have to reply to him saying, sorry, we cannot agree to this, when you can give him no reasons for this. The other problem we had with the travel-ban list is that we often had skimpy information on the individuals on the travel-ban list and countries have complained that they could not impose the travel ban when they have been given just the name and designation, without passport numbers and so forth. We hope that that will also be addressed in the future. Let me turn now to the fifth lesson we learned, which is the unintended consequences of sanctions.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“Consequently, individuals are usually proposed for the travel-ban list through the provision of information by some members of a sanctions Committee, and the other members of the Committee generally agree to the inclusion or deletion of names on the basis of trust. But, because there are no clear rules for listing or de-listing, situations arise where a name that ought to be put on the list is withheld because of the objection of a single member, or a name that could be deleted is retained for the same reason. I think there needs to be a more transparent process in the Committee for the designation or deletion of names from the travel-ban list.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“In addition, one problem that will also need to be addressed is the fact that the diamond embargoes imposed by the Council and the international control regime set up by the Kimberly Process may not necessarily be working in harmony and there is a need to harmonize those two tracks also. Thirdly, clearly, of all the sanctions imposed on Liberia, the most effective measure was the travel ban. That is what clearly hurt the Government of Liberia more than anything else. It is also in a way the most controversial, because there is no fixed criteria for the listing and de-listing of names on the travel-ban list.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“One specific suggestion I would have is, for example, if indeed the Panel of Experts is set up again, we should at least retain one of the experts to respond to queries from Member States, if they raise questions about the reports of the Panel of Experts. Secondly, on the diamonds embargo, there clearly is also evidence that it has not been working very well. There is a reverse trend of Liberian diamonds being smuggled out of Liberia and sold as diamonds to neighbouring countries. I also want to mention that, despite the explicit call in the resolution for Liberia to set up a diamonds certification system, the technical assistance for that has not been forthcoming.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“Then we arrive at a practical problem, because when the Panel's mandate has expired, the Panel has been disbanded and there is no mechanism available within the Secretariat to deal with responses from Member States or individuals who dispute the allegations contained in the Panel's reports or to deal with requests from Member States and individuals named in those reports who seek further information on those allegations. Here, I want to endorse the point made by Ambassador Ryan that the Council has to address the problem of continuity on this issue and clearly retain the expertise to deal with complaints from Member States.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“Also, not enough attention is being given by the Council to the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 4 of resolution 1343 (2001), which demands that all States in the region prevent armed groups from using their territory to prepare and launch attacks on neighbouring countries. Let me also raise one specific problem that arises from the procedures used by the Panel of Experts. The fundamental method they use is "naming and shaming". They name the countries involved and they hope that that will prevent the countries from violating the arms embargo. But sometimes, in some cases, the countries have come back and said that they need more information, or have asked if they can explain what happened.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“In the case of the arms embargo, I think we all know - and it is documented in the most recent report of the Panel of Experts - that the arms embargo is being visibly flouted both by the Government of Liberia and by Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Indeed, the latest period report states that, between June and August 2002, more than 200 tons of weapons and ammunition arrived in Liberia. In the same report, it was also mentioned in paragraph 7 that the Panel had observed that arms also continued to reach LURD rebels through neighbouring countries. So, clearly, the arms embargo is not functioning as it should and something has to be done by the Council in that regard.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“We lost the chairman of our Panel of Experts and, in due course, we also lost one of the experts, the Interpol expert. So information is lost when the panels are disbanded. That is why we have recommended that an early decision be made next year to set up this Panel because the more time that it is given, the better work it does. I want to stress for the record that, despite the fact that they have to work under unsatisfactory conditions, it is remarkable what valuable and insightful reports those panels have presented to the Council. The fourth lesson we learned was about the difficulties in the implementation of sanctions. I will talk briefly about the arms and diamonds embargoes and the travel ban.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“Here, the problem that any sanctions committee has - because I am sure that this applies to others, too - is that we clearly do not have the resources to monitor whether or not the sanctions are being respected. In the case of the Liberia Sanctions Committee, we had to rely upon the ad hoc Panel of Experts that was set up. But the problem with those panels of experts is that they work on what I call a stop-start basis. They are suddenly jump-started, they work for three months, they come up with a report and then they stop their work. Then there is a gap. When we need more information, we jump-start them again, they work for a few months and then they stop again. That process of stopping and starting creates problems, because what happens, for example, is that you lose some of the expertise.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“The second lesson we learned is that it is important to have a comprehensive policy for any sanctions arrangement. Sanctions alone cannot be the sole policy of the Council. Frankly, in the case of Liberia, that is one problem that we constantly had: not knowing exactly where the sanctions fitted into the overall policy of the Council. But that problem has been solved by Ambassador Aguilar Zinser. I want to congratulate him and the Mexican delegation on having succeeded in persuading the Council to adopt, on 13 December 2002, the presidential statement contained in document S/PRST/2002/36. We think that it is a very important complement to the work being done on sanctions in Liberia. The third lesson we have learned is that it is extremely important for a sanctions committee to be provided with adequate resources.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“There is absolutely no substitute for first-hand, direct contact with the country on which sanctions have been imposed and with the other countries in the region. In that regard, I must say that we had a very useful visit in April 2001, and I congratulate the Secretariat on the remarkable work they did in organizing our visit. For me, going to the region was an eye-opener. When I arrived there, I explained to all the Liberians that we met that the Security Council had imposed some very smart sanctions: an arms embargo, a diamond embargo and the travel ban. Yet I found, as I will discuss later, that the sanctions also had a psychological impact on the population as a whole. That is something that one can discover only by going to the region oneself. It is something to which we should pay attention.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“The bad news is that the three Panel of Experts reports have documented continued violations of the sanctions by the Government of Liberia and by other groups, including the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). That creates, I suppose, a dilemma for the Council next year in terms of weighing the political considerations of the goals achieved against the legal considerations of the continuing violations. That is the challenge that the Council will face next year. Turning to the Committee's work for next year, we have tried to document the lessons that we have learned. We have come up with seven lessons, which we would like to share with the Council. The first lesson is that it is very important for any Chairman of a sanctions committee to visit the region.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“All three measures were extended for another year in May 2002 by resolution 1408 (2002). Allow me to comment briefly on the question of the performance of the Committee. Basically, as we said to the Council in formal consultations, we have good news and bad news. The good news is that we have probably succeeded in achieving the objective described in paragraph 3 of resolution 1343 (2001), which "Stresses that the demands in paragraph 2 above are intended to lead to further progress in the peace process in Sierra Leone". As we all know, the good news is that the peace process in Sierra Leone has gone well, especially since President Kabbah declared the end of the war in January this year and since Sierra Leone also successfully completed its elections in May this year.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“In the other cases, the sanctions have either been lifted or suspended or have been imposed on non-State actors. Those three States are Iraq, Liberia and Somalia. Of course, the sanctions on Iraq are a much biggerjob. The sanctions on Liberia are a much smaller job. I admire the work that Ambassador Kolby has done. In our case, three measures were imposed on Liberia: the expansion of the 1992 arms embargo by resolution 1343 (2001) of 7 March 2001; the May 2001 embargo on the direct and indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia; and a travel ban on senior Liberian Government members, senior military officers and their spouses, and individuals providing financial and military support to rebel groups in the region, as designated by the sanctions Committee.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“Mr. Mahbubani: Let me begin by commending you, Mr. President, for organizing this meeting, which we believe is a very useful one to have, primarily because there is no formal mechanism for handing over the chairmanship of a Security Council committee. In our case, for example, we do not know who the next Chairman of the Liberia sanctions Committee will be. So, the purpose of our remarks today is to try and help the incoming Chairman do his work when he takes on the chairmanship of the Committee. In doing so, let me stress, as you have and as have Ambassador Kolby and Ambassador Ryan, that I will be speaking in a personal capacity and none other. By way of background, there are at present only three United Nations Member States that are subjected to sanctions on the State itself.”
2002-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4673 (2002) · source
“For this peace to be sustainable, an effective administration and a viable local economy must be in place. Relevant United Nations agencies should therefore closely coordinate their efforts in Bougainville with donor countries in order to achieve peace and consolidate the peace.”
2002-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4647 (2002) · source
“This morning we heard that the implementation of stage II of the weapons disposal plan has been slower than expected. We should not be overly concerned about this, as long as it remains clear to us that all parties remain committed and that the delay does not threaten the peace process. It is important that we not insist on fitting the implementation of the weapons disposal plan and the peace process as a whole to too rigid a time frame. An approach taking into consideration the problems on the ground, as well as local sensitivities and practices, is likely to serve us better. We therefore endorse the Secretary-General's intention to extend UNPOB's mandate by one year, to December 2003, to accommodate delays encountered during stage II of the weapons disposal plan. Finally, it is not sufficient that peace be restored to Bougainville.”
2002-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4647 (2002) · source
“There can be no doubt that the Papua New Guinea Government deserves the continued support of the international community as it strives to implement the Agreement. The Bougainville file has for some time now been a source of encouragement for Council members. This is because it reminds us that our efforts in this Council can, and often do, produce the desired results. It is all the more gratifying if we note the small outlay involved. UNPOB costs around $2 million per annum, not much more than what many other United Nations missions spend in a day. This is a very small price to pay to help the Government of Papua New Guinea resolve the Bougainville conflict and to bring peace, and with it the hope of a brighter future to some 180,000 people on the island.”
2002-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4647 (2002) · source
“For example, it has delivered on its undertaking to make the necessary constitutional amendments to enshrine its agreements with the Bougainville parties, clearing the way for subsequent steps of the Peace Agreement to proceed. The Government is also working closely with UNPOB and other parties in the Peace Process Consultative Committee (PPCC) to implement the Agreement on the ground. We are also heartened by the ministerial statement delivered by Papua New Guinea's Minister for Inter-Government Relations, Sir Peter Barter, two days ago. From his statement to the National Parliament of Papua New Guinea, it is clear not only that the Government is fully committed to the Bougainville Peace Agreement, but that it has a good appreciation of the obstacles in the way and of what needs to be done to overcome them.”
2002-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4647 (2002) · source
“Like previous speakers, I thank Under-Secretary-General Sir Kieran for his briefing. We commend the United Nations Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB) for the role it has played and continues to play in Bougainville. Ambassador Sinclair and his small team have not only helped to make possible a significant level of stability and security in Bougainville, but also have slowly but gradually moved the conflict towards resolution. We also applaud the unwavering support and assistance extended by Papua New Guinea's neighbours towards this end. Since the signing of the Peace Agreement in August 2001, the Papua New Guinea Government has demonstrated its commitment to the Agreement in very concrete ways.”
2002-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4647 (2002) · source
“In fact, UNMIK has moved on to develop a set of progress indicators, to systematically track what has been achieved and to identify areas where greater efforts need to be made. We found this document very helpful in assessing progress in Kosovo. We wonder whether the same could be done for UNMISET and for Timor-Leste. We would appreciate Ambassador Sharma's comments. Someone once commented to me that the meetings on Timor-Leste had become very boring. I think that this is a good sign. It shows that we are basically on the right track on Timor-Leste. Paradoxically, the best ways to ensure that we keep the meetings on Timor-Leste boring in the months to come is to ensure that the international community remains engaged in this process.”
2002-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4646 (2002) · source
“That is whether we can come up with more specific benchmarks for Timor-Leste's progress similar to those which Special Representative of the Secretary- General Michael Steiner has worked out for Kosovo. It is possible that we were not clear at that meeting, so maybe we should elaborate on what we meant by this. We recognized that milestones for UNMISET were included in the Secretary-General's report of 17 April 2002 (S/2002/432), which recommended the establishment of the peacekeeping mission. We would like to suggest that UNMISET produce a document similar to that produced by United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which breaks down the milestones into detailed goals and benchmarks.”
2002-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4646 (2002) · source
“Taking all this into account, it is clear that, as we move forward from here, there must be a clear understanding that the process of the devolution of UNMISET cannot move on the basis of an autopilot. It has to make constant judgements on the stage of progress we are making at each point in time. Here again, if my memory serves me correctly, I believe that Ambassador Williamson also indicated in his statement that we should constantly judge and see whether we are making progress along the lines in which we are expected to do so, and bear this in mind. This brings me to a point that we raised at the private meeting of the Security Council on Timor- Leste.”
2002-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4646 (2002) · source
“I believe Ambassador Greenstock raised some questions about the filling of the development posts that have been created. One important point that was also made is that it is important to ensure that the international experts, as someone said, are not seen to be doing their job. They must be seen to be preparing the people of Timor-Leste for the job. My fourth point - and again, this has been touched upon by several speakers - is that the development of the judicial system suffers from a lack of clarity regarding the separation of powers among the judiciary, legislature and executive. Of course, there is also a lack of crucial resources. The seriously limited national capacity may affect serious crimes investigations and proceedings, with possible implications for the reconciliation process. These are just a few of the challenges.”
2002-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4646 (2002) · source
“My first point is that, while Timor-Leste is consolidating its foundations, its emerging institutions remain fragile and its leaders will have to continue to deal with the dissatisfaction and protests of diverse interest groups, former combatants and veterans. Secondly, while Timor-Leste and Indonesia have taken concrete steps to enhance bilateral cooperation, including on border issues, we note the phrase in the report that says that "earlier assumptions about progress towards demarcation have proven optimistic" (S/2002/1223, para. 48). Thirdly, despite the efforts of the UNMISET Civilian Support Group, insufficient technical and substantive capacity within the Timor-Leste public administration continues to pose significant challenges to stability.”
2002-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4646 (2002) · source
“Therefore, a very fine balance has to be struck in this devolution. In some ways, Ambassador Sharma's job is probably more difficult than that of his predecessor, because his predecessor functioned more or less like a chief executive officer, making all the decisions. I think Ambassador Sharma, if I may describe his job, serves more like a facilitator trying gradually to allow the emergence of a strong, newly independent State. Ironically, the best test for success for Ambassador Sharma is to make himself completely redundant in Timor-Leste by 2004. Having said that, it is also clear to me, listening to everybody, that there are many important challenges that remain. They have been spelled out by virtually everyone that has spoken here, and we just want to mention three or four.”
2002-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4646 (2002) · source
“Even then, there will have to be continued United Nations development assistance for many more years to come. Clearly, the United Nations and Timor-Leste are at a very important stage of their relationship, a phase in which the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) is devolving more and more operational responsibilities to the Timor-Leste authorities. This has to be done very cautiously and gradually. It cannot be done so slowly that the Timor- Leste Government does not have the opportunity to take up the reins in the areas in which it is able to do so, but at the same time it cannot be too quick, without due regard for the actual situation on the ground. As we have said repeatedly, a hasty downsizing and withdrawal of UNMISET will unravel all the achievements that have been made by the United Nations in Timor-Leste.”
2002-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4646 (2002) · source
“If I had to add one more point to that list of strengths - and I hope my new colleague from Timor- Leste will not mind if I make this point - it is that Timor-Leste is a relatively newly independent State that can actually learn from the mistakes of all of us who became independent 10 or 20 years ago. I think Timor-Leste can benefit from seeing what mistakes have been made by others. There seems to be a sort of consensus so far in the discussions that, if we are to continue to maintain this success story, we must have a clear and balanced understanding of the achievements made so far and the challenges that remain for Timor-Leste. It is clear that much has been achieved, but it is also clear that we still have a lot to do before the mandate is accomplished and before Timor-Leste can stand completely on its own.”
2002-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4646 (2002) · source
“I think that is an important point because, frankly, if we look at the record of the United Nations in terms of its exit strategies, some of its past peacekeeping operations have been less than glorious. We hope that, this time around, the United Nations will get it right. The likelihood is that, of course, the United Nations will get it right partly for the reasons that Ambassador Sharma spelled out at the beginning of his statement, when he spelled out the various strengths of Timor- Leste as a new country. I think, too, if I remember correctly, Ambassador Williamson also spelled out a list of strengths that Timor-Leste enjoys. I think we should build on the strengths that Timor-Leste has.”
2002-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4646 (2002) · source
“I, too, would like to join our colleagues in welcoming an old friend, Ambassador Kamalesh Sharma, back here. One of his great assets is that he enjoys great confidence in the United Nations community here. I am sure that this confidence will prove to be an asset to him in the field. I also have one small suggestion to make to him. I am sure he is thinking a bit about writing his memoirs after he leaves Timor-Leste and I have found a title for him. The title should read "From New Delhi to New Dili". Let me begin, first of all, by endorsing a point that I believe Ambassador Williamson made in his statement when he said that the United Nations success in Timor-Leste provides a textbook example of a success story in exit management that we could use in other areas where the United Nations is working.”
2002-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4646 (2002) · source
“I, for one, will never forget what J ean-David did on our trips on the Great Lakes mission. I thought there were only twenty-four hours in a day, but under Jean-David, we worked twenty-eight hours a day - morning, day and night. As Ambassador Levitte said, the most crucial issues we face now are the Middle East and Iraq, and on both we can say that Ambassador Levitte has shown great leadership. I see that The New York Times Week in Review section has finally recognized his contribution by giving him a series of photographs that I think may earn him a distinction as being the only Ambassador who has been profiled in that way. It is a well deserved profile. We wish him all the best in his assignment. As he said in his own words just now, this is "au revoir" and "a bientot".”
2002-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4645 (2002) · source
“Today's event reminds me of a similar one in January 2001, when we saw the departure of another Security Council superstar, named Richard Holbrooke. I remember that at that meeting it was, I think, Ambassador Levitte who tabled a resolution calling on the Security Council to persuade the United States to delay the departure of Ambassador Holbrooke. Unfortunately, Ambassador Holbrooke exercised his veto and the resolution was not carried. This is why I regret that France too has a veto in this Council, for otherwise we would take the lead in tabling a resolution calling on the Government of France to delay the posting of Ambassador Levitte from here. Ambassador Levitte, as we all know, has become a truly indispensable member of, as he said, our family, and he has demonstrated tremendous leadership ability.”
2002-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4645 (2002) · source
“Those references came from paragraph 52 of the report. We have previously pointed out that a mechanism must be established for the consistent monitoring of Security Council embargoes. Perhaps the time has come for the Security Council to also look into the establishment of a body for that purpose. Finally, when one reads the Panel's findings regarding the fortunes that have been made and are still being made by the elite networks, and juxtaposes this with the statistics of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on malnutrition and mortality rates of children below the age of five years, it is clear that non-action by the Security Council is not an option. We cannot fail the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
2002-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4642Resumption1 (2002) · source
“Monitoring of the illegal exploitation should be maintained until the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is able to exercise effective control over the areas concerned. We are, therefore, supportive of the Panel's recommendation in paragraph 186 of its report that the Security Council should look into the establishment of a monitoring body for that purpose. And like our colleagues, we have also taken note that many of the criminal activities of the elite networks described by the Panel are related to the usual suspects that we have encountered in other Panel reports. For example, at paragraph 72, 107 and 140 of the report, there is reference to the Victor Bout connection. We are also concerned that the Panel has uncovered smuggling of Angolan and Sierra Leone diamonds despite Security Council embargoes on those diamonds.”
2002-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4642Resumption1 (2002) · source
“To underpin stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, indeed, throughout the Great Lakes region, countries in the region should develop a transparent regional trading system that would not only discourage the illicit movement of goods but also enable the countries to complement each other's economic strengths. It is to their credit that during the Security Council meeting two weeks ago on the subject of cooperation between the United Nations system and Central Africa, many African delegations emphasized the importance of regional economic cooperation as a cornerstone of the African continent's efforts. In my delegations view, the international community should support the efforts of both the region and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to stop the pillaging of the natural resources of the country.”
2002-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4642Resumption1 (2002) · source
“The Panel's description of this state of affairs was that of "a self- financing war economy centred on mineral exploitation", as aptly stated in paragraph 12 of the report. A sustainable solution would require the development of a reasonably transparent economy and good governance in the areas exploited. A precondition for both would be peace and a Government that is clearly representative of, and committed to, the people of the country. Emphasis must, therefore, continue to be placed on the political dialogue process among the Congolese parties, so that such a Government can be established.”
2002-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4642Resumption1 (2002) · source