YouSaid · the spoken record

Mahbubani

lines on the record: 1,011
first: 1999-09-11
most recent: 2004-05-10
sittings or episodes: 106
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Let me stress here that we are not calling for any kind of premature exit from Kosovo of the international presence. We are cognizant of the dangers that that would entail for the stability of Kosovo and of the region. We have stated many times that the eventual termination of the international presence must be gradual and carefully structured to bolster, not undermine, the painstaking progress that has been achieved. Indeed, to quote the presidential note on "No exit without strategy" again, "The Security Council agrees that a major criterion for the Council's decision on the scaling down or withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation is the successful completion of its mandate, resulting in the establishment of a requisite political and security environment conducive to durable peace and/or a follow-on post-conflict peace-building process".”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4430 (2001) · source
“Hence, the International Crisis Group, in the same report from which I quoted earlier, stated the following: "it is unrealistic to expect Kosovo Albanian leaders or voters to shelve the one overriding issue that really matters to them. [The] newly elected officials will be unlikely to accept for long the straitjacket imposed by the unelected international administration. Albanian anger over UNMIK's agreement with Belgrade to obtain support for Serb participation, added to impatience with the slow progress towards independence, may be a precursor to more strained relations between UNMIK and the Albanian parties after the election." Clearly, we do not want to see an unhappy result after the elections, and we should give some thought to how to prevent such an unhappy event.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4430 (2001) · source
“However, while those accords call for the convening of an international meeting three years after the entry into force of the accords to determine the mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo on the basis of the will of the people, resolution 1244 (1999) was silent on that. I wonder whether anyone has given any thought to when such an international meeting will be convened. One reason for us to focus on this is that, as we all know, immediately after the elections, Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), which won the most seats in the Kosovo Assembly, reiterated his call for independence for Kosovo. If a rough time frame for the final settlement for Kosovo is not set, some problems could worsen.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4430 (2001) · source
“But it is also important to bear in mind that this is not merely a case of transferring administrative responsibility; it is also a case of allowing the local population to involve itself in more decision-making. We believe that this can change the political chemistry and can stabilize the situation in Kosovo even further. We also note that, in resolution 1244 (1999), the Council decided that UNMIK should facilitate "political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords" (para. 11 (e)). That is one of the final-status provisions in the resolution.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4430 (2001) · source
“It is clear that, here, one of UNMIK's responsibilities is to arrange for the transfer of its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions, along with other peace-building activities. In a pertinent list of recommendations in its report on Kosovo's landmark election, the International Crisis Group stated that "UNMIK should allow the new self-governing institutions as free a rein as possible to govern within the parameters laid down in the Constitutional Framework. The institutions should have the opportunity to learn by their mistakes and to grow in responsibility and effectiveness." We heard Mr. Annabi say that that is what is going to be done, and we are pleased that there is movement in that direction.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4430 (2001) · source
“Indeed, in paragraph 3 of the presidential note, the Security Council agreed that it was essential that clear direction should be given and milestones established that support a comprehensive and integrated approach to peace- building, where peace-building is appropriate, as well as the operation's exit strategy. Now that Kosovo has crossed one major hurdle, it would perhaps be useful for the Council to be briefed at some point by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and by UNMIK on their initial thinking on the peace-building and exit strategies for Kosovo, specifically on the next steps in gradually downsizing and finally withdrawing the international presence, on the benchmarks, and on how long each step will take. The first of these steps is actually very clear, and I am glad that Mr. Annabi spoke about the next steps.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4430 (2001) · source
“In fact, the final stage of UNMIK'S responsibilities under resolution 1244 (1999) is to oversee "the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement". (res. 1244 (1999), para. 1] (fl) Of course, the problem we have in the case of Kosovo - and this is a great handicap - is that we still have no idea what the final political settlement will look like. It may therefore be timely for the Security Council to take a long-term view of the Kosovo issue and to see whether or not we can define a clear exit strategy for Kosovo. Indeed, some Council members have stressed the need to apply the presidential note (S/2001/905) on the question of "No exit without strategy", and we agree that Kosovo is as good a test case as any.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4430 (2001) · source
“As I think was mentioned by Ambassador Franco a few minutes ago, we have to create a multi- ethnic Kosovo. The problem we face, of course, is that the social fabric of Kosovo, as we all know, has been damaged. There seems to be more separation and partition than integration. The question is whether or not we can do something about this. With the elections over, a significant stage has been reached in the implementation of resolution 1244 (1999). We acknowledge that much more needs to be done before UNMIK and KFOR can be said to have fulfilled their mandates under the resolution. We further recognize that UNMIK and KFOR have to stay until Kosovo is out ofthe woods, so to speak - that is, until it cannot slip back into another conflict. This is the essence of peace-building, and not whether or not an entity gains independence.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4430 (2001) · source
“This figure would have been even lower had not President Kostunica and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia encouraged the Kosovo Serbs to vote. We would like to thank them for doing their part. At the same time, precisely because of this, what the low-level ethnic Serb participation also shows is that not all the necessary conditions were fully in place for their full participation. Perhaps the security and freedom of movement of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo and the return of Serb refugees could be improved. We hope that UNMIK, KFOR and the ethnic Albanian leaders will work harder to improve these conditions. The aim must be to ensure substantial ethnic Serb participation in the self-governing institutions in Kosovo.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4430 (2001) · source
“We, too, would like to thank Mr. Hedi Annabi for his comprehensive briefing. We also want to join our colleagues in congratulating the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Haekkerup, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on the successful conduct of the Kosovo-wide elections. They were relatively free of violence and vote-tampering. However, while the elections saw a credible 64 per cent participation rate across all ethnic communities, it is notable that there was apparently a reduction in the voting of the ethnic Albanians. I do not know whether Mr. Annabi can explain to us if there is a specific reason for that. Also noteworthy is that only 46 per cent of the entire Serb community voted.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4430 (2001) · source
“One useful indicator as to the effectiveness of our work is a comparison of the costs of these local processes, which are doing very important work, with the costs of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda to see how we can ensure a fairer allocation of resources, with the goal being to punish all those who were responsible for the genocide in Rwanda. Finally, I think we may not have time in this meeting to reflect on what we have or have not learned as a result of today's discussions. However, in the wrap-up session at the end of the month, I will suggest some questions that we should address when we meet again next year to review the progress of these Criminal Tribunals.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“At the same time, I think a very important suggestion was made by Judge Jorda when he said that with the improvement of the domestic courts in the former Yugoslavia, we should also consider whether some cases can be transferred to the local courts so that the Criminal Tribunals can focus on the major cases. I understand that this will be a bit more difficult in Rwanda, but, as Ms. Del Ponte pointed out, as part of the traditional gachacha process in Rwanda, 11,000 local jurisdictions involving 260,000 local judges will be will be dealing over a three-year period with 120,000 perpetrators of the genocide.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“So the impact of the work of these Tribunals is not limited to Yugoslavia or Rwanda; it extends to other areas in which we have seen similar massacres, similar barbaric actions. I hope this point will be borne in mind as the work of the Criminal Tribunals progresses, because a great deal of attention will be paid to the expenses incurred by these courts. Here, I am pleased to see that efforts are already being made. I understand that seminars are being held in Dublin, Ascot and other places to look at how the courts are progressing. I hope that as a result of the lessons learned, administrative costs will be reduced and people will see that a significant change is taking place in how the courts are administered.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“Karadzic and other high-level figures, and also to those regarding whom the Security Council has passed resolutions. The more important point I intended to make here is the following. If this is the record of what the Criminal Tribunals have achieved after four to five years, what will be the long-term impact with regard to future decisions by the international community? When we consider such places as Sierra Leone, Cambodia or East Timor, where, as we know, atrocities have been committed, if any suggestion is made that we set up similar criminal tribunals, the international community walks away. It says we have already had two very expensive criminal tribunals; can we afford to have equally expensive criminal tribunals in other areas?”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“If one looks at this output, the obvious question is whether these Criminal Tribunals will succeed in accomplishing the main goal for which they have been set up - to deter future genocidal leaders and send them a message that if they repeat what has been done in Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia, they will be hauled to court. For this goal to be accomplished, justice has to be swift and effective. If this is the result after five, six or seven years, the deterrent impact will be lost. Fortunately, we have some good news. Undoubtedly, the detention and trial of Milosevic are having a dramatic impact on the whole world. This single arrest has made a louder statement than those made by many of the other arrests. But it must be accompanied by other, equally important arrests; I believe references have been made to General Mladic and Mr.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“Unfortunately, if one wanders along the corridors of the United Nations listening to discussions on these two Criminal Tribunals, there seems to be some bewilderment about the rate of progress that has been made so far. To be fair, I think all of the speakers have addressed this question. Indeed, Judge Pillay said a question asked by many members of the Council is why the output of judgements is so low: a single judgement this year and just eight in the four years since the trials started in 1997. In the case of the ICTY, I believe there have been 26 convictions and five acquittals in the same period.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“I am pleased that when Judge Jorda spoke to us earlier, he began his remarks by saying that he would like to engage in in-depth reflection, and he asked some questions along those lines. In that spirit, I will comment on the presentations and raise some questions. The only problem we have is that the Council itself, unfortunately, is not a very reflective institution. It tends to function on autopilot most of the time. When the Council makes a decision, it is as if the train has left the station and nothing can be done to change its direction. However, if the Council does not pass judgement on the progress of these two Tribunals, it will be the court of public opinion that will pass judgement on their work. The Council, in turn, will have to be accountable to the court of public opinion.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“I did not intend to be the first speaker, but I find that unless one raises one's hand very quickly one may end up being the last speaker. Madam President, I would like to join you in thanking Judge Jorda, Judge Pillay and Ms. Del Ponte for the briefings they gave us. The work being done by them is extremely important. I think that when the history of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is written, it will be said that these Criminal Tribunals have in a sense advanced the frontiers of human civilization, because they have ended the culture of impunity and have shown clearly that mankind will no longer accept the kind of barbaric behaviour that we saw in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Given the importance of the work being done by these two Criminal Tribunals, we need to reflect deeply and think hard on how they are progressing.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“A key point I wish to emphasize is that in all our discussions on this subject I hope we will not just concentrate on abstract points and principles but that we will look at the realities on the ground in conflicts existing today. We should ask ourselves how many of the points we are making will apply to those situations, and how civilians are being protected or are not being protected by the words we produce.”
2001-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4424 (2001) · source
“For example, to quote the then Foreign Minister Axworthy of Canada, who spoke last year, "the protection of civilians requires strengthening our disposition to intervene by force if necessary". (S/PV.4127, p. 24) In the final analysis, this whole question of humanitarian intervention comes in. Has this ever flowed into any of the discussions on the protection of civilians, or is it considered taboo or out of the range of our discussions? Similarly, when it comes to reaching out to young people like Alhaji Babah Sawaneh, we also have to look at things such as the root causes: what is it that creates such conflicts, what creates such young people, and what drives them to such desperation? Is there some kind of discussion along these lines in the discussions that the various agencies are having?”
2001-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4424 (2001) · source
“He had to cut limbs, to burn houses and to kill people. These were his own words. Clearly, the norms that we are creating are intended to change the behaviour of non-State actors like these. It is one thing to say we should look at best practices among nation-States, to carry them forward and say "I will copy nation-State access policies". But when it comes to non-State actors, how do you change their behaviour or their norms? Quite frankly, I wonder whether we have reflected enough on this issue, and I wonder whether Mr. Oshima has addressed it in the workshops. And, frankly, if we do want to change the behaviour of such groups, we may have to consider in some ways what I call more drastic solutions, some of which have been discussed in this Council.”
2001-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4424 (2001) · source
“So, in the process of preparing the aide- memoire or preparing the reports or in the workshops, I wonder if we can see whether there are some common traits that we can pull together and then say that it is very clear that there are some common themes that come out in all these reports. If this can be provided to us, it would enhance our work enormously, especially when we review this in November 2002, as Mr. Oshima said. My third point concerns the whole issue of non- State actors. Yesterday we heard a very moving statement from a young boy from Sierra Leone named Alhaji Babah Sawaneh. Listening to him, it is very clear that for someone like him there was no choice. Basically, he was abducted while going to visit some relatives and conscripted into a force, and he said he had to do terrible things.”
2001-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4424 (2001) · source
“We have talked about conflict prevention. You do not have to be a rocket scientist to figure out that there are common points made in each of these debates. In a sense, we are repeating points on the protection of children and on the protection of civilians. Can we do something useful and constructive - try to cluster these recommendations that we have so that we do not have to repeat them four times, at every debate? There would also be some degree of cost-saving because perhaps we do not need four different debates, four different reports and four different discussions. Frankly, from the point of view of the smaller Missions to the United Nations, we do not have to maintain four different files that basically repeat the same points on these issues.”
2001-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4424 (2001) · source
“Are we moving towards a situation in general where there is greater protection for civilians in armed conflict or - if we look at the statistics and what is happening in actual conflicts, whether in Sierra Leone, Angola, Afghanistan or wherever - are more civilians really being harmed, injured or killed? What is the trend line? I think we need to have that the next time we meet because unless we have this data, we have no way of measuring whether or not our words are having any impact. I hope that Mr. Oshima will enlighten us as to whether it is reasonable or unreasonable to request more specific indicators when we next discuss this issue. My second point is related to the first point. Yesterday, we had a very good discussion on the protection of children in armed conflict. We have had discussions on women and peace and security.”
2001-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4424 (2001) · source
“Has the situation improved since then in terms of the actual implementation of the recommendations? I make this point because the trouble that we have on this issue is that we produce thousands of words on the protection of civilians, the protection of children and the protection of women. But it is very difficult for us to find out whether or not these words actually make a difference in terms of deeds on the ground. The most specific question I have is, when we next meet to review this subject, can we get some kind of concrete information on what I call "trend lines"?”
2001-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4424 (2001) · source
“Ijoin Ambassador Kuchinsky in thanking Mr. Oshima for his briefing. Madam President, you have told us that in this meeting we will not make any statements but have a question- and-answer session. In that spirit, I would like to make three points - my questions will be rolled into three points. The first point is that, as I was reading very quickly the statement that I gave on this subject in April of this year, I recalled that I quoted paragraph 67 of the Secretary-General's report, which said as follows: "Some 18 months have passed since I submitted my first report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. I regret to note that only a few of its 40 recommendations are so far being implemented." (S/2001/33I, para. 67) This is a statement the Secretary-General made earlier this year.”
2001-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4424 (2001) · source
“At this stage, I would like to once again publicly thank the Panel members for the professional manner in which they have carried out their mandate. I commend them for the clear and compelling rendering of the report. I will now, with your permission, Madam President, turn the floor over to the Chairman, Mr. Ayafor, to make his presentation.”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“The report before us represents six months of arduous work by the members of the Panel, who substantiated their findings with extensive case studies and clear descriptions of their methodology. They also employed high standards of verification in conducting their investigations. The Panel has provided recommendations on all aspects of its mandate, including transport, weapons, the use of revenue by the Liberian Government, logging and wood processing, diamonds, the maritime and corporate registry, the travel ban, and the continued monitoring of resolution 1343 (2001). The Council is agreed that the report will be further considered after this open meeting by the sanctions Committee, which will, of course, study the recommendations in greater detail.”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“Johan Peleman, from Belgium, an expert on arms and transportation; Mr. Harjit Singh Sandhu, from India, an expert from INTERPOL; and Mr. Alex Vines, from the United Kingdom, an expert on diamonds. The report was to have been issued on 7 September, by an order to allow the Panel a full six months for its work. Since the Panel was only set up on 15 April, the Council agreed to the report's being submitted on 15 October. However, the issuance of the report was further delayed until 1 November, because of technical processing difficulties. This report, along with the report (S/2001/939) of the Secretary-General on the humanitarian impact of possible sanctions on Liberia, was considered at two meetings of the sanctions Committee, on 22 and 25 October. On Friday, 2 November 2001, I briefed the Council members on the outcome of these meetings.”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“Mr. Mahbubani: I thank you, Madam President, for setting aside the time for this open meeting of the Security Council on the report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia. I convey this thanks most sincerely, because, as you know, we were supposed to have this meeting in October, but, as a result of various delays, we are having it this month, despite your busy schedule. We are glad that you have accommodated us. I am also pleased to introduce the Chairman and members of the Panel of Experts on Liberia established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 1343 (2001). They will present the report to the Council today. The Chairman of the Panel is Mr. Martin Chungong Ayafor, on my left, and the other members of the Panel, behind me, are: Mr. Atabou Bodian, from Senegal, an expert on civil aviation; Mr.”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“I completely agree with him, and I hope that in the course of today's debate we will listen very carefully to the views of the non-members and also hear a very key point that they always make in the discussions in the Security Council, which is that they hope that the Security Council will be accountable to the members of the General Assembly. If we do that, I think we will be making a very positive contribution.”
2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source
“Thirdly - and we were very puzzled by this - Ambassador Levitte referred to the fact that France's contribution is much more than Singapore's on East Timor. We do not have the figures here, nor do we have the time to research them - but we will research them. But it is a fact that under the formula whereby contributions are made to peacekeeping operations permanent members do pay a certain premium because of their permanent membership. I think it is generally acknowledged within the United Nations community that with privilege comes responsibility. That is an agreed principle. Indeed, many Members are prepared to become permanent members even if they have to pay a bit more. Fourthly - and I think this is a very important point that Ambassador Levitte made - is that we should be sensitive to the Views of the General Assembly.”
2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source
“In View of the fact that Ambassador Jean-David Levitte referred to some of my points, I just wanted to clarify the situation for the record. First, Ambassador Levitte said that we liked to debate for the sake of debate. On this issue, we were not really trying to debate, but we were very puzzled by our difficulties in the informal consultations in endorsing a very reasonable report of the Secretary- General. We did not know how to alert the non- members of the Council that we were having these difficulties. But in some ways Ambassador Levitte has done it for us. Secondly, I heard Ambassador Levitte say that he completely agreed with the remarks made by Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, and so do we. I think that puts us in substantial agreement on the core issues.”
2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source
“Our only hope is that we will remember this presidential statement when we return here in early January to discuss the concrete structure of United Nations assistance to East Timor.”
2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source
“It is in the nature of multilateral diplomacy that not every issue is of equal or immediate significance to every member of the Council. How the Council responds to this issue, however, will inevitably colour how our region will view other initiatives that may appear as detached from our immediate concerns as East Timor may seem to some Council members. Finally, I am glad that we will endorse the report and recommendations of the Secretary-General. The reason this endorsement is important at this stage is that it will send an important signal of confidence to the people of East Timor, who must be wondering as they move towards independence how much support the international community will give them. With this presidential statement we will be sending them a very positive signal.”
2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source
“Our seventh key point - and this is, for Singapore, a very important point - is that this issue has a strategic dimension for us. East Timor's future and that of the region are inextricably linked. An unstable East Timor will unsettle the entire region, which has been undergoing various wrenching transformations. This will complicate the region's efforts to overcome the political and economic problems it faces. How the United Nations handles East Timor after independence will therefore have wide-ranging strategic consequences for our region as a whole. For us, East Timor is not an abstract matter; it is not just another agenda item. It is of vital and immediate strategic importance to Singapore and to other countries in our region. To be sure, other members of the Council may take a more detached view of East Timor.”
2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source
“Our sixth key point is this: let us think of the implications for other United Nations endeavours of failure in East Timor. We all know - it is no secret - that the United Nations is now contemplating an extremely difficult 4 indeed, possibly perilous - United Nations mission in another corner of Asia, called Afghanistan. A significant United Nations success story in East Timor will increase the prestige and standing of the United Nations. This, in turn, will boost the credibility of the United Nations as it takes on other difficult and continuing challenges, not just in Afghanistan, but in Africa and the Balkans. Clearly, we now know that, in the light of the events of 11 September and the global campaign against terrorism, it is important that we deliver such success stories from the United Nations.”
2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source
“I think that if, even with limited contributions, we can sustain the success story, we should do so, in order to avoid being penny wise and pound foolish. The fifth key point is that we have a responsibility to the people of East Timor. Indeed, in paragraph 87 of his report (S/2001/983), the Secretary- General states: "Initially, the responsibility to establish a viable state in East Timor clearly belongs to its people. The East Timorese have amply demonstrated the depth of their commitment to this task through sacrifice, imagination and determination. I urge the Security Council to ensure that these foundations are not undermined and to consolidate the remarkable contribution it has already made to this historic undertaking." I suggest we heed the words of the Secretary-General and remember our responsibility to the East Timorese people.”
2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source
“All we see is the smooth movement on the surface; we do not see the legs paddling away ferociously below. But it is the ferocious paddling below the surface that delivers the smooth movement across the lake. It is the Security Council's job to provide the ferociously moving legs that will make East Timor a success story. We think it can be done if we make the right decisions now and in the coming months. The fourth point is that the key to success in East Timor is assured funding. In this context, assured funding means assessed contributions. We believe that these are required in order to protect the investments made and the success achieved to date. But a much more important point is this: if things go wrong in East Timor, how much more will it cost us to go back in and rebuild the success that we have today?”
2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source
“But East Timor provides real potential for a real success story. For that to come about, however, we will have to learn the lesson of why we have not had success stories in the past. To take two recent examples, to which I refer in my written statement - those of the Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau - sadly, we walked away before the job was done. All we are saying is that we should not let that happen to East Timor. Success never comes easily, however. If it were a natural phenomenon, we would see it every day. But we do not see success every day. Success comes through hard thinking, shrewd judgements, hard work, dedication and commitment. The image we have suggested using to help us to understand this is that of a duck moving smoothly across a lake.”
2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source
“Interestingly enough, in connection with our discussion of exit strategies, a note (S/2001/905) was issued by the President of the Council on 25 September, which, in paragraph 6, stated: "The Security Council agrees that a major criterion for the Council's decision on the scaling down or withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation is the successful completion of its mandate". That was stated in a note issued by the President of the Security Council. Now we have a real case to which we must apply the commitment that we made. We have given ourselves a mandate, and we must therefore complete the job. I hope that all members will agree with that. The third key point is that, if we look at the recent history of the United Nations, there have, unfortunately, not been too many success stories.”
2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source
“It states: "Decides also that the mandate of UNTAET shall consist of the following elements: (a) To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor; (b) To establish an effective administration; (0) To assist in the development of civil and social services; (d) To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance; (e) To support capacity-building for self- government; (f) To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development". Those are simple requirements. Have we fulfilled them yet? Will we have done so in time for independence? The answer is, "No".”
2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source
“Sergio Vieira de Mello said. But the question is: what is the job? In that respect, I suppose that it would be normal for most people to think that when East Timor becomes independent, the job will be done and the United Nations will have completed its mission. But clearly the requirements of the job have been spelt out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1272 (1999), which I will read out, because I believe that it is important.”
2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source
“We normally say that of all the Secretary-General's reports, but it is important to bear in mind that this time the Secretary-General has produced a very careful and well-balanced report pointing out how to take the large operation that we have in East Timor today and scale it down significantly in such a manner that it ensures a successful transition. Figures are provided in the report, and the Secretary-General also gives an indication of how the United Nations presence will be scaled down as the East Timor Defence Force and the East Timor Police Service are built up. I am glad that today we will be endorsing the Secretary-General's report. The second key point - I am glad that this was emphasized by Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello - is that we have undertaken a big job in East Timor, and we must finish it. I believe that that is what Mr.”
2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source
“The third procedural question is this: when making decisions, how do we remember past decisions and commitments, and how do we bring them into play? For example, earlier today, you, Mr. President, read out a presidential statement on women and peace and security, which I think mentioned East Timor. How do we take that presidential statement and apply it to East Timor? I raised those procedural questions because they will come up in the future. Today, in response to your appeal, Mr. President, to be brief and to highlight the key points, I will not read out the text that we have distributed. But, given the importance of East Timor to Singapore and to our region, I hope that you will allow me to make seven points. First, I would like to say that, of course, we fully support the Secretary-General's report.”
2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source
“This, by the way, is enshrined in Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Charter, which states that "Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf." We think that we should bear that in mind when we discuss the situation in East Timor. The second question is this: when we produce decisions, how do we factor in the views of other Member States? We had a very fruitful discussion with the troop-contributing countries. This afternoon, we will be hearing the views of other Member States. How do we bring those Views into play when we make concrete decisions on East Timor? That is a real question that we need to answer.”
2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source
“These are important procedural points, because they may come into play when, in elaborating the draft resolution, we decide the future of East Timor. The first procedural question is this: when we, the members, produce decisions of the Council, should we factor in only our national interests, or also the concerns of the international community? Our own View is that - and this is an important point - each one of us wears two hats: our national hat, and our hat as a representative of the international community.”
2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source
“First of all, I would like to welcome you, Minister Cowen, to New York. Since this is the last day of the Irish presidency, we would like to congratulate you and your team. It has been a difficult month, and your team has done a sterling job. We would also like to welcome our friends, Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello and, of course, Chief Minister Mr. Mari Alkatiri; once again, I would like to congratulate Mr. Alkatiri on the successful holding of elections. We also welcome our colleagues from the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme. Before I go into the substance of my remarks today on a subject of great importance to us, I want to make three brief procedural points arising from the discussions that we had on the draft presidential statement.”
2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source
“We look forward to hearing the views of other delegations, both members and non-members of the Council, and we hope that our collective wisdom today will prevail over the ghosts of the past.”
2001-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4392 (2001) · source
“We therefore urge all States to refrain from any military intervention in the internal situation in Somalia; Somali territory should not be used to undermine the stability of the region. Any violation of the arms embargo imposed under resolution 733 (1992) should be reported to the sanctions Committee for the appropriate follow-up. In conclusion, Somalia has clearly been one the biggest failures of the United Nations - that is a matter of public record. As we said in January, to this day Somalia remains a stain on the conscience of the United Nations. Today, we may finally have the opportunity to turn a new page in Somalia's history and perhaps put it on the right road. We hope that today's discussion will help to establish that.”
2001-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4392 (2001) · source