YouSaid · the spoken record

Mahbubani

lines on the record: 1,011
first: 1999-09-11
most recent: 2004-05-10
sittings or episodes: 106
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“I apologize for interrupting the proceedings, Sir, but you referred in your introduction to the point that we are meeting here on the basis of prior consultations. We were present at the consultations yesterday. I just want to reconfirm that the proceedings this morning will proceed on the basis of prior consultations, which established that we will first hear a representation by the leader of the mission, Ambassador Jean-David Levitte, and that we will then hear the representatives of the countries that we visited and spoke to involving this issue. My understanding is that this will be followed by the participation of the members of the Council, who will signal their interest in speaking and will be recognized in the order in which their requests to be heard are made, and that there will be no speakers' list, as we agreed yesterday.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source
“I hope that the very valuable reports and the very valuable briefings we have had will not be lost and that, when we meet next time, we will come back and try to address some of these questions.”
2001-05-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4319 (2001) · source
“Here, it might be useful for us to be provided with some statistics so that we can see how we are allocating the funds for the region. For example, I am told that, as a rough estimate, we will be spending $800 million this year on the peacekeeping operations. Possibly, we may be spending up to $100 million over the next three years on the special court in Sierra Leone. How do those figures compare with the amount of money we are spending on the humanitarian side and with the amount of money we are spending on the development side? Is the balance right? If you want to try to find the right long-term solutions for the region, you ought to ensure that, as you allocate resources, you allocate them rationally, on the basis of need and not on the basis of any arbitrary decision.”
2001-05-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4319 (2001) · source
“If they are negative, do we have an obligation not just to address the present snapshot situation of the day, but to ask what we can do to make sure that the same problems will not come back to haunt the Council five years or 10 years down the road? My fourth and final point relates to the question of financing. Clearly, West Africa is a region of high priority for us, and I think that high priority is reflected in the amount of resources and attention we are devoting to it. Clearly, the very discussion we are having today and the fact that an inter-agency task force was set up show that the Council is deeply concerned about the region. But the concern is best demonstrated by the amount of money we are spending on the region.”
2001-05-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4319 (2001) · source
“Here, I hope that we will reflect on these questions that have been brought before us. My third point is about long-term indicators. One of the most vivid impressions I brought back from my visit to the region was that clearly there are also long- term problems developing in the region. Any good social scientist, looking at the demographics of the region, looking at the number of children being born and the number of children in school, can make projections and can tell that there are problems that will be coming to us five, 10, 15 years down the road. It is useful for us to balance our short-term work with questions related to long-term projections, and to ask ourselves whether the long-term trends are positive or negative.”
2001-05-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4319 (2001) · source
“Which have been implemented and which not? And in the case of those that have not been implemented, why not? In that regard, Mr. Fall's report has brought out many specific criticisms of the United Nations. Indeed, if you read paragraph 112 you will notice that several interlocutors were critical of a number of United Nations policies. The question is: How do we react to those criticisms? And, if we think they are not fair or balanced, how do we respond to them? At the same time, Mr. Fall's report has also made some specific recommendations we have to deal with. For example, several countries in the region said that the UNAMSIL mandate should be expanded. We have heard remarks here, some in support, some not in support of the expansion of the UNAMSIL mandate. What will our decision be? How do we respond to that request from the region?”
2001-05-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4319 (2001) · source
“For example, if you look at the peace process, again, the peace process within Sierra Leone seems to have improved; there seem to be, as we have heard today, discussions involving UNAMSIL, the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. But the peace process involving the three countries of the Mano River Union seems to have deteriorated and, as several speakers have noted, talks are not taking place among the three leaders. So how do we piece together the picture? My second point is on our working methods. Both last month and this month we have tried to improve our working methods to see how we can ensure that as we meet and discuss a problem we add value to it. Perhaps, to add value each time we discuss West Africa, we should begin by asking ourselves: What have we done in the past? What decisions have we made?”
2001-05-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4319 (2001) · source
“Can we take a helicopter view of the whole situation to see where we are vis-a-vis where we were in the past? For example, it is useful to remind ourselves that it was just a year ago that soldiers of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) were taken hostage by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). We have clearly come a long way since then. If you look at the military situation within Sierra Leone, it looks promising. But the military situation around Sierra Leone has got a lot worse. Are there connections between the two? What is going on here? I hope that when we review the situation we will not take just a snapshot view of each situation, but will try to look at the overall trends and see how they are going.”
2001-05-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4319 (2001) · source
“The possibility of a 'domino effect', with instability spreading rapidly from one country to another within the subregion is a source of deep and widespread concern." (S/2001/434) So the question is, how do we deal with this paradox? How do we ensure that the next time we meet we will not just get good reports; that we will get good news from the region? I guess the underlying purpose of my comments today is to help resolve that question. I would like to make four points. The first point is that, while I think we have received very useful briefings, I wonder whether in those briefings we can balance the details that we receive with more assessment. Having listened to all the briefings today, I find myself - even though I have just visited the region- lost in a forest of details.”
2001-05-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4319 (2001) · source
“Indeed, if you look at the Security Council mission report of last October, Mr. Fall's report and Ms. McAskie's report, you will see that they are excellent reports. But if you look at the contents of the reports, you find lots of bad news. For example, since no one has referred to this, I would like quickly to quote from paragraph 13 of the report: "Throughout the Mission's visit the gravity of the political and security situation in the West African subregion and the potential for the rapid spread of insecurity and instability, unless urgent steps are taken to address the causes of conflict and turmoil in several countries, were repeatedly underscored.”
2001-05-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4319 (2001) · source
“I, too, would like to begin by thanking Mr. Guehenno, Ms. McAskie and Mr. Fall for their presentations. I would also like especially to thank Mr. Fall for the excellent report that he has submitted to us. There is one main point that I would like to emphasize in my remarks today: that the Council has got to ensure that, whatever it does, it does in cooperation with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The main contribution of Mr. Fall's report is that it spells out in great detail the concerns of the region - the concerns I heard when I was there personally - and I hope that the Council will pay attention to the concerns expressed in the report. At the same time, looking at West Africa, we see a paradoxical situation. The paradox is this: it is a region blessed with excellent reports.”
2001-05-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4319 (2001) · source
“Clearly, we have to address deep-rooted problems when trying to analyse the situation here. It is doubtful that we can do so very clearly in such an open setting. But we are pleased to note that the retreat we will have this weekend with the Secretary-General will touch on the issues of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I hope that in that debate we will address openly some of the more difficult issues, which cannot be addressed in such an open session as this. Finally, let me just state for the record that we support the presidential statement to be issued at the end of the day.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317Resumption1 (2001) · source
“"Particularly vulnerable are once-colonized areas where the occupying power destroyed local institutions, plundered the countryside of its human and material resources, and departed without laying the groundwork for effective, self- financing national governments once a rebellion has erupted, the fighting often evolves into resource conflict." In the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, that legacy of exploitation began more than 100 years ago, when King Leopold II of Belgium colonized the region as his personal fiefdom and began the systematic exploitation of its natural wealth. More recently, the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide in 1994 and the rebellions in 1996 and 1998 have further complicated the situation and transformed economic activities and trade networks in the region.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The second point we want to make here is that, in looking at the whole issue, we should be aware that in some ways the issue of natural resources exploitation is only one of the dimensions of the conflict we are addressing. It may be useful to refer to a quote from a recent book by a writer named Michael T. Klare, who has just published a book entitled Resource Wars: The New Landscape ofGlobal Conflict.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Clearly, before we make any decisions in the Council, we have to be sure that they are based on sound facts and due diligence. I am glad that this is a point that has been echoed in several of the speeches that have been made in response to the Panel's findings. In some ways, we have bought ourselves some time. In giving the Panel a three-month extension, we hope that the Panel will make every effort to respond to all the points raised today - and I am glad that members of the Panel have been here listening to the statements made both by members of the Council and by the high-level envoys who are here - so that when the Panel comes back to us in three months" time we will, we hope, be in a better position to respond adequately and effectively to the many strong claims found in the Panel's report.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317Resumption1 (2001) · source
“It is a hot potato because it has created a dilemma for the Council, and the dilemma is this: if the contents of the report and the findings of the Panel are correct - and I stress the word "it" because we, as a national delegation, do not have the capacity to verify, confirm or deny the findings of the report - then the Council has an obligation to take action in response to the points made in the report. If they are not correct, then we have an obligation, as an institution, to clear the record and ensure that no false or misleading impressions are left behind. Frankly, we are not sure what institutional strength we might have, as the Council, to verify the claims made in the report; but such verification we have to do.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The advantage of speaking late in the day is that many of the points that we would have liked to make have already been made by our colleagues, including most recently by Ambassador Chowdhury, who said that we all have to reaffirm the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and that the looting and pillaging of resources are unacceptable. Thus, at this stage we have only two additional points to add to the discussion. The first point we want to make is that the Panel of Experts, in delivering its report (S/2001/357) to us, has basically delivered what may be called a hot potato.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317Resumption1 (2001) · source
“We would like to join our colleagues in welcoming the ministers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi and Uganda and the high-level envoy from Rwanda. I think that this high-level participation reaffirms the importance of the debate we are having today. We share the shock and horror that has been expressed by many of our colleagues over the killing of personnel of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); we hope that effective measures will be taken to resolve this state of affairs.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317Resumption1 (2001) · source
“24) Fortunately, the international community has demonstrated a willingness to intervene with force, for example in Kosovo and in East Timor. The latter was mandated by the Security Council, the former was not. Clearly, we need to work out clear and definite criteria for such intervention. That will not be easy, as the debate on the question of humanitarian intervention has shown. But the Council cannot avoid dealing with this issue if it is to protect civilians effectively. That is our third specific suggestion. In conclusion, let me reiterate my delegation's positive reaction to the recommendations in the Secretary-General's report. We look forward to working with you, Mr. President, to find the best and most effective means of putting those recommendations into effect.”
2001-04-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4312 (2001) · source
“Our fear is that, as inter-State conflicts are increasingly replaced by intra- State conflicts, there will be more and not fewer groups like the RUF. In that regard, I am glad that the Secretary-General will be asking the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to develop a manual of best practices for engagement with armed groups, as he notes in paragraph 50 of his report. We look forward to seeing the outcome of such efforts, and we are pleased that the representative of Ukraine also referred to the importance of this issue. Thirdly, protection of civilians cannot be done with words only. As the then-Foreign Minister of Canada, Lloyd Axworthy, told the Council last year, "the protection of civilians requires strengthening our disposition to intervene with force if necessary." (S/PV4127, p.”
2001-04-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4312 (2001) · source
“But we suspect that there will be great difficulties in bringing such a message to groups that may understand little of the language of logic and reason. When I visited the West African region I was told several times that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was led by a group of illiterate, barely educated and often barely sober young men who have had little contact with the civilized world. We need to understand the world as they see it. No rational human being would amputate the hands of innocent civilians, but that is what the RUF did with wild abandon. Why? What drove them to it? Until we understand how their minds work we will not be in a position to deal with them. Therefore, our second specific recommendation is that we develop a different sub-set of ideas and principles to deal with such groups.”
2001-04-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4312 (2001) · source
“Secondly, having just returned from a truly illuminating visit to West Africa - a region which, I note, is referred to several times in the Secretary- General's current report, I have become more acutely aware of the practical difficulties of protecting civilians in many contemporary conflict situations. The Secretary-General's report reminded us that international instruments require not only Governments, but also armed groups, to behave responsibly in conflict situations and to take measures to ensure the basic needs and protection of civilian populations. Singapore therefore supports efforts by the Secretariat and by other organizations to disseminate information on international humanitarian and human rights law to armed groups, as described in recommendation 10 of the report.”
2001-04-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4312 (2001) · source
“In some areas, we have done badly: Rwanda, Srebrenica and the Middle East. In other areas, the record is mixed: the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone. The first specific suggestion that we would like to offer is a simple one. At the end of each year, the Council should do an objective and impartial audit. In how many conflicts did the Council intervene effectively to save civilians? In how many did it not? The purpose of such an objective audit would be simple: it would remove some of the growing cynicism - cynicism which, I am afraid, is very real - about the value of such open debates on the protection of civilians when the Council fails to respond to specific situations which cry out for effective responses.”
2001-04-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4312 (2001) · source
“It states, "Some 18 months have passed since I submitted my first report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. I regret to note that only a few of its 40 recommendations are so far being implemented". Clearly, the Council will not get a good report card for its work in this area. You have asked us to be brief and specific, Mr. President. Since we fully support your efforts to make our Council meetings more interactive and constructive, we will be brief and make three points, which hopefully will be quick and punchy. First, the Council will not be judged on the protection of civilians in armed conflict by the words it produces - many words have already been produced. It will be judged by its deeds. In some areas we have done reasonably well: Kosovo and East Timor.”
2001-04-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4312 (2001) · source
“We also recommend that positive consideration be given to the Secretary-General's practical and action-oriented recommendations, in particular those that are targeted at enhancing the capacity of national Governments and the international community to prosecute violations of international humanitarian law; improving engagement by the Security Council and others with a View to obtaining access to vulnerable populations for humanitarian operations; and developing clear criteria and procedures for the identification and separation of armed elements in situations of massive population displacement. Even if Member States do not have the time to read the full report (S/2001/33l), we hope that they will at least read paragraph 67, which describes the bottom line.”
2001-04-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4312 (2001) · source
“We would like to highlight for special attention the emphasis placed by the Secretary-General on the fact that primary responsibility for the protection of civilians rests with Governments, and that, where Governments do not have the resources and capacity to shoulder that responsibility unaided, it is incumbent on them to invoke the support of the international system.”
2001-04-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4312 (2001) · source
“Canada should be commended for introducing this issue on the agenda of the Security Council and, in particular, for its contribution to the work on this issue during its presidency of the Security Council in April 2000. We would like to commend you, Mr. President, for organizing this follow-up meeting one year later. We would also like to thank Ms. Frechette and Mrs. Robinson for their valuable contributions this morning. As usual, the Secretary-General has produced a good report; we hope that it will be read widely. It is a thoughtful analysis of the political and legal context in which efforts to develop a culture of protection should be made.”
2001-04-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4312 (2001) · source
“Finally, since several delegations have spoken in support of the Security Council mission to Kosovo and Belgrade, I want to say that we are very happy to support this mission and we will also be happy to participate in it if it is helpful to do so.”
2001-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4309 (2001) · source
“Judging from all the comments we have heard and the discussions on Kosovo, it is quite clear that while we all agree on the formal outlines of the goals we want to reach, we are all aware that we have an unusually difficult mission ahead of us. Indeed, in trying to rebuild the fabric of a nation that has been torn apart and in putting it together as one nation, the task is akin to that of, as I said earlier, moving a big boulder up a mountain. So, perhaps, as we meet month after month on Kosovo, we want to ask ourselves, are we moving the boulder up or is the boulder rolling backwards when we discuss Kosovo. I hope that we will bear this in mind as we have future discussions on Kosovo.”
2001-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4309 (2001) · source
“I am aware that these are municipal elections, but in the course of municipal elections larger issues may be raised. Against this backdrop, I want to use two metaphors to illustrate some of the difficulties we face as we meet every month to discuss Kosovo. The first metaphor I will use is the one of the play Hamlet and the ghost. You cannot stage the play of Hamlet without having the scene of the ghost. In the same way, every time we meet to discuss Kosovo, there seems to be a ghost hanging around this room, asking us, what is the ultimate destination and how are we going to get there. The second metaphor is that of going where we want to go, and I like to use the metaphor moving a big boulder up a mountain.”
2001-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4309 (2001) · source
“Here I noticed that we discussed elections quite frequently today, and the general assumption will be that the elections will be a positive step forward. I think Mr. Jean-Marie Guehenno confirmed this in his answer when he said that elections are a better choice than the use of the gun. But the question in my mind is: Is it possible that the elections could have a destabilizing effect if, in the process of the elections, we have political parties that will say that their end goal is to ensure that Kosovo becomes independent, as opposed to other parties that will say that their end goal is to see the implementation of resolution 1244 (1999). Which of these political parties are likely to be more successful in the coming elections.”
2001-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4309 (2001) · source
“Given that it may be useful for us at these meetings to ask whether we are going in the right direction over the long term, I am aware that the eventual goal is spelled out in Annex 1 of resolution 1244 (1999), which says that our goal should be a political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). These goals have been spelled out. The question is whether we are moving forward in that direction.”
2001-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4309 (2001) · source
“In so doing, we should also bear in mind that of all the peacekeeping operations that the United Nations is handling, Kosovo is one of the three most expensive. According to the figures given to me for the expenditure in 2000, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) will cost us $510 million, the United Nations Transitional Administration Mission in East Timor (UNTAET) will cost us $540 million and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) will cost us $500 million. But I think if you add the other costs of the residents of the international community, Kosovo is by far the most difficult operation that we have.”
2001-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4309 (2001) · source
“But in the eyes of the international community I think what is of interest to them is whether the Council is moving forward in a common direction towards resolving this major issue. Here, frankly, I am building on a remark, the last point that was made by my colleague on my left, the Ambassador of Tunisia, when he said that when we discuss Kosovo, we should look at the global exit strategy on this issue. This is where, after attending Council discussions on Kosovo several months now, I am really not sure whether, in terms of our end goal of getting Kosovo off the Security Council agenda, we are moving forward or backwards. Sometimes I think we move forward. Sometimes we move backwards.”
2001-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4309 (2001) · source
“Like others, I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Jean- Marie Guehenno for the briefing he gave us, and I also want to add, Mr. President, that we are very happy with this format you have instituted of having an interactive session to discuss issues like this. I think this allows us, hopefully, to be a bit more reflective, a bit more thoughtful in responding to the issues that we deal with. In that spirit, I would like to put forward one suggestion, which I think is both procedural as well as substantive, on this issue. I think it is useful for us when we discuss Kosovo - and we seem to be discussing Kosovo once a month every month nowadays - to listen to the 15 national perspectives that we have.”
2001-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4309 (2001) · source
“In conclusion, we look forward very much to the reports that are going to be issued by the Secretariat on the situation in East Timor, but as it does this, we hope it will bear in mind one of the most striking lines in the Brahimi report, which is an appeal to please not tell us, the Security Council, what you think we want to hear. Please tell us how you think the situation actually is one the ground. What is actually happening? How ready is East Timor for the various transitions taking place? How many resources will we need, and what will we need to do to ensure that, when history is finally written, the history books will say that the United Nations finally did a great job in its exit strategy from East Timor?”
2001-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4308 (2001) · source
“East Timor is probably the single major United Nations operation in the entire continent of Asia. My fifth and final point - and an equally important point - is that Singapore will remain committed, within its means and where it can make a useful contribution, to supporting the United Nations and international efforts to help East Timor become a normal and productive member of the international community. A new development is that starting next month Singapore will be deploying, with the New Zealand composite battalion in the western sector, a reinforced battalion of up to 70 regular combat troops for a period of one year. The number 70 may be small for big countries, but for a small country like Singapore that is a significant number, and it indicates the level of commitment we have to helping East Timor achieve independence smoothly.”
2001-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4308 (2001) · source
“We should take note of the fact that even though Indonesia is going through all sorts of difficulties, it is taking steps, within its limited resources, to demonstrate its commitment to resolving the refugee problem in West Timor. We note that quite a few refugees have since gone back. Whatever happens in East Timor will have an impact on the region. One point I would like to emphasize is that, just as our colleagues in Europe worry about developments in the Balkans and have asked us to be sensitive to the regional dimension of many of those issues, we hope that our colleagues will take note of the fact that East Timor also has regional dimensions and that they too should be factored in. If you look overall at the quantity of resources that Asia takes from the United Nations system, it is, frankly speaking, relatively small.”
2001-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4308 (2001) · source
“J ose Ramos-Horta - until recently the foreign minister and now the President of the National Council - said, when he spoke about independence: "This could happen by the end of this year; or, if we see that some of the conditions that are essential for the foundation of independence are not there yet, we could very well postpone it until 2002." I think we should listen to voices like that in making any decision on the timing of the transition and of independence. We have to look carefully at the overall state of East Timorese society and ask ourselves how ready they are to sail on their own. The fourth point is that, in looking at the East Timor issue, we should not look at it in isolation. It has a regional context. It has an impact on the region a the region that Singapore belongs to, which is South-East Asia.”
2001-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4308 (2001) · source
“Jose Ramos-Horta privately I noted that the lesson of the past 40 years has been that, while achieving independence has been relatively easy, ensuring the success of that independence has always been a challenge. He acknowledged that point in private, and he acknowledged that a lot of work needs to be done. Perhaps, as the United Nations prepares for the future of East Timor, it should look at the big picture and at the full range of institutions and institutional frameworks that are needed for a society such as that of East Timor to succeed. It is good to get assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, but at the end of the day you have to put together a country almost from scratch. It is the big picture we need to look at. Here again, I was pleased at what Mr.”
2001-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4308 (2001) · source
“Here, I was pleased to hear what Mr. Annabi just said: let us not tamper with force levels at this stage; let us wait and see what actually happens. Here, one important point that needs to be put on the record is that there is a distinction between the holding of elections and the achievement of independence. These are two different events. Let us not tie the reduction of force levels to the election date; it should be tied to the question of independence and what comes after independence. The third point is that we obviously need to help the East Timorese more in terms of their preparations for the nationhood that is to come. I can say candidly- in line with your request for us to speak openly at these meetings, Sir - that when I met Mr.”
2001-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4308 (2001) · source
“Lakhdar Brahimi, which took place a few days ago, on 2 and 3 April. He said that the United Nations should apply the lessons learned from previous peacekeeping operations and ensure that the departure of a peace operation does not lead to a vacuum in the country in question or to a sense of abandonment. There is therefore a need for the United Nations and the international community to show flexibility and to continue to provide political support and resources both to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and directly to East Timor itself. We know that these issues will be addressed in the July report, but we have to reflect carefully on them in the coming months. The second point I want to emphasize is that there is clearly a need for a strong United Nations presence in the coming months.”
2001-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4308 (2001) · source
“But this is an indication of political troubles. At the same time, there are reports of growing Violence. I note from Mr. Annabi's remarks that there is a trend towards more and more frequent violence. We should also bear this in mind. Given that context, I should like to make five points on this issue. The first point is that the exit strategy for East Timor may not necessarily be an easy one. We would like, of course, to hope that everything will go smoothly. But if it does not, we have to consider a possibly difficult exit strategy. Here I want to refer to remarks made by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, at a recent conference in Singapore on the report (S/2000/809) of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations chaired by Mr.”
2001-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4308 (2001) · source
“But this time around, as we look at the situation in East Timor, let us consider the possibility that we may be looking at a glass that is half empty. In that regard, let us consider the possibility that 2001 is a very important and crucial year for East Timor, and that things may not go smoothly in the coming months. Several speakers have referred to the disturbing developments about which we have heard. Of course, the most disturbing development is the resignation of Mr. Xanana Gusmao. I am a bit surprised that this is being taken relatively calmly. The political significance of this event is similar to that of a hypothetical event such as President Mandela resigning before the transition took place in South Africa. I know that Mr. Ramos-Horta has stepped in, and I know that Mr. Gusmao is continuing to play an active role in East Timor.”
2001-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4308 (2001) · source
“You have asked us to dispense with formalities, Sir, so we will not congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency. But we would like to say publicly what we have told you privately: that we strongly support your efforts to reform the working methods of the Council. The interactive meeting we are having today is, I think, a good development. I want to apologize to my good friend Mr. Annabi for not having been present when he gave his briefing. But I have since then been briefed. And, speaking of the word "brief", I shall try to be brief, but I have a few substantive points to make. When we look at East Timor, I guess that the traditional thing is to say that we can look at it as a glass half full or as a glass half empty. As optimists, we like to look at it as a glass half full.”
2001-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4308 (2001) · source
“When we recently had a discussion here in the Council on Kosovo, we noted the paradoxical results of democracy: the successful democratic elections in Yugoslavia, which we all welcome, led to increased tensions in Kosovo because they dampened the hopes of Kosovars who wanted independence. My third question, therefore, is whether the elections in Yugoslavia had any ripple effects in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, if so, whether these ripple effects were positive or negative. I believe that the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh, Ambassador Chowdhury, raised a similar question in that regard.”
2001-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4303 (2001) · source
“IfI heard Mr. Petritsch correctly, I believe he hinted that such moves are only the dying gasp of old forces whose time has passed. But even if this is so, what are the measures being taken to bring the Bosnian Croats back onto the Dayton track? How can the Council complement his efforts? The second question is a more general one, and it is related to Ambassador Holbrooke's remarks that I quoted earlier. Can Mr. Petritsch inform the Council whether there are any elements of the Dayton Agreements that should be modified or amplified to better meet the objectives of establishing enduring political stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina?”
2001-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4303 (2001) · source
“Indeed, his words might now prove to have been prescient in the light of concerns over the activities of the Bosnian Croat army units following the threat of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) to proclaim self-rule in Bosnian Croat majority areas, which has, we believe, been described as the sharpest challenge to the authority of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Against this backdrop - and following on from the point that Ambassador Stewart Eldon made earlier, that we should make this into an interactive meeting at which we try to solicit new information from Mr. Petritsch -I thought that I would pose a few questions. My first question relates to whether the recent moves by the Bosnian Croats to establish a self-governing council in Bosnia mean that the nationalist genie is once again out of the bottle.”
2001-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4303 (2001) · source
“But we should note that even the key architect of the Dayton Accords, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, contemplated the necessity of modifying the approach at a conference on Dayton held in Sarajevo to mark the fifth anniversary of the Accords. Ambassador Holbrooke, in fact, described Dayton as "a living document that must adapt to new realities and confront new challenges as Bosnia grows and matures." He added, "We must not only fully implement it, we must seek to correct those flaws and defects which have become apparent." For example, one key aspect of Dayton that Ambassador Holbrooke highlighted as needing change was the establishment of a united army, instead of the current forces divided between the Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs.”
2001-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4303 (2001) · source
“16) We believe that those words of Ambassador van Walsum describe the fragility of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and perhaps in the region as a whole, if the recent events in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are anything to go by. Indeed, as I listened to the opening remarks of Mr. Petritsch earlier today, I heard him say that the sounds of gunfire have again returned to the region. As I listened to his statement, it struck me that there were grounds for both optimism and pessimism for the region as a whole. Given this backdrop, perhaps the question for us is whether the time has come for the Security Council to re-examine the approach that it is taking to Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are not, of course, suggesting that we abandon the Dayton Accords.”
2001-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4303 (2001) · source