YouSaid · the spoken record

Mahbubani

lines on the record: 1,011
first: 1999-09-11
most recent: 2004-05-10
sittings or episodes: 106
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“If the United Nations stops its support for prosecutions, "that might be the end of justice, period", to quote the words of one participant. Thirdly, there are also ongoing needs for capacity-building and technical assistance both in the general area of civil administration and in specific functional areas such as banking, finance, immigration and customs, and air and seaports. International staff will also be needed to perform functions with a high technical content, since local expertise will be unavailable in the beginning. One point worth stressing is that these tasks were indeed spelled out in resolution 1264 (1999), which first established UNTAET.”
2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351 (2001) · source
“There is a real risk that militias would escalate violence significantly if the United Nations security presence were to be withdrawn. The international force should therefore be scaled back only when the East Timor Defence Force reaches critical strength and is fully trained, equipped and deployed alongside the international troops. The process should only begin after independence is declared. The United Nations civilian police should be replaced only when there are adequate numbers of well-trained, well-equipped and well-disciplined police acting within the established rule of law. The second point they made was that one of the most urgent needs is for the international community to assist the United Nations with basic law-and-order functions, providing, for example, judges, prosecutors and investigators.”
2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351 (2001) · source
“The exit strategy from East Timor must therefore be carefully worked out with the elected representatives of East Timor, based not on past costs or anticipated needs in other crises, but on the continuing needs in East Timor. A continued United Nations presence, albeit a scaled-down one 4 and we agree with both Mr. Vieira de Mello and Mr. Ramos- Horta when they say that it will have to be a scaled- down own - is going to be crucial. Areas such as defence, public safety, justice and governance are critical areas which need international support even after independence. More specifically, the speakers at the Arria- formula meeting felt that, first, the United Nations has no other responsible choice but to stage its drawdown with the gradual establishment of the East Timor Defence Force and the East Timor police.”
2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351 (2001) · source
“They reminded us that ensuring sustainable peace and development in East Timor cannot be done on the cheap or in accelerated time. A precipitous withdrawal of either the civilian or military components of UNTAET would entail serious risks by heightening levels of uncertainty, both locally and internationally, and by undermining stability in the transitional period that really counts. No one wants two years of investment to produce a failed State. The success or failure of East Timor will either bolster or undermine the United Nations credibility. At the same time, the regional context must be borne in mind, not least because of all the political transitions which East Timor's neighbour Indonesia is currently going through.”
2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351 (2001) · source
“Sergio Vieira de Mello said this morning, speaking boldly and clearly, we will need to retain funding from assessed contributions, not from voluntary funding. We should heed his careful words of advice and I believe that Mr. Ramos-Horta also made a similar appeal to us. During the Arria-formula meeting organized by the Singapore mission on 26 July 2001, Council members were briefed by four very distinguished speakers: Mr. Shepard Forman from the Centre on International Cooperation at New York University, Ambassador Nancy Soderberg from the International Crisis Group, Ms. Sidney Jones from Human Rights Watch and Ambassador David Malone from the International Peace Academy. The unanimous message at that meeting was that East Timor is a half-finished project.”
2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351 (2001) · source
“Should post-independence East Timor unravel, the costs to the United Nations to again enter and rebuild East Timor would be much higher than if the international presence were sustained until East Timor is able to stand on its own two feet. We believe that the United Nations should not be penny-wise and pound-foolish. We believe that it is not sufficient for us to rely only on voluntary contributions to fund the United Nations presence. Voluntary contribution on its own is not enough. It would be better if the United Nations presence were supported by a regular and reliable source of funding that would give East Timor the maximum chance of viability over the long term. Indeed, again, as Mr.”
2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351 (2001) · source
“As the Secretary-General's report has highlighted, some hard-line militia elements have plans to resume operations designed to destabilize the situation in East Timor in the lead-up to the elections and independence. There is also concern that some militia elements have adopted a strategy of lying low until independence in the belief that the military presence will then be removed from East Timor. Therefore, although great strides have been taken to Timorize the East Timor Transitional Administration, it is clear that certain critical areas of government will continue to need the support of the United Nations.”
2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351 (2001) · source
“It is in no way an indictment of the good work done by UNTAET and that of the East Timorese people for us to say that the tasks ahead remain large. The United Nations still has a long way to go. Indeed, as Special Representative Sergio Vieira de Mello said this morning, we have come a long way but we have much further to go. Before it signed the 5 May 1999 agreement, East Timor wanted five years of political transition to prepare itself for independence. Given that it has been barely two years since the popular consultations in East Timor and the events that followed, it is only understandable that more remains to be done. What East Timor has achieved thus far remains fragile and reversible.”
2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351 (2001) · source
“As such, the Security Council should view this period with vigilance rather than as an opportunity for an early exit or drawdown from East Timor. At the same time, to make plans for the United Nations exit or substantial withdrawal from East Timor at this juncture would send precisely the wrong signal to the East Timorese. UNTAET has certainly come a long way. The dedication and devotion of the staff of UNTAET, not least of the Transitional Administrator, Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, are qualities which Council members have repeatedly paid tribute to. We would be remiss if we did not reaffirm that tribute again today, as it is truly well deserved. We also remain impressed by the determination and resolve demonstrated by the East Timorese to maintain their road to independence.”
2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351 (2001) · source
“Given their recent experience with elections, many East Timorese believe that the potential for violence during and after the elections may be even higher than before. Many previous United Nations peacekeeping operations have also shown elections to be a highly unstable time at which to withdraw from an operation. The United Nations should therefore learn its lessons from past experience and not repeat these mistakes in East Timor. Planning for a phase-down before the elections take place assumes a best-case scenario, which the Brahimi report opposed. The Brahimi report also warned against forcing a situation on the ground to fit political and other extraneous criteria in New York. The Constituent Assembly elections and the period immediately after that could be a moment of vulnerability.”
2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351 (2001) · source
“If I may borrow the words of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke at the open debate on "no exit without strategy" last year, the Council "must be very careful, when we talk about exit strategies, not to confuse them with exit deadlines an exit strategy must be directed towards a defining overall objective, not an arbitrary, self-imposed, artificial deadline". (S/PV4223, p. 4) Thirdly, in exactly a month's time, East Timorese will go to the ballot booth to democratically choose their representatives to the 88-member Constituent Assembly. The election is one of the most important events in the calendar of East Timor's political transition, but we must not forget that, while the election is an important milestone in UNTAET's mandate, it is not UNTAET's final destination, nor should it be that of the United Nations.”
2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351 (2001) · source
“Secondly, the Secretary-General has provided us with a very important progress report on UNTAET. We are pleased to note the number of projects which UNTAET has collaborated on with such bodies as the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank and the Asia Development Bank. More importantly, the Secretary-General has provided us with a concept of operations for the successor mission following East Timor's independence. Using the framework provided by the Secretary-General, intensive discussions must now ensue within East Timor and with the United Nations community. Discussions should start here and now to build the best possible foundation for the successor mission and not because, as some have asserted, the Council is anticipating a precipitous withdrawal from East Timor.”
2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351 (2001) · source
“We are pleased to welcome once again Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello and Mr. Jose Ramos-Horta to the Security Council, especially at this critical juncture in East Timor's political transition. We also endorse the wise words of advice they have both given to members of the Council. Why are we at a critical juncture today? First, it is midway through the current mandate of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which the Security Council decided in resolution 1338 (2001) will last until 31 January 2002, although we must bear in mind the possible need for adjustments related to the timetable for independence. This is therefore an opportune time for a mid-term review on the progress of UNTAET and to hear more about the political timetable for East Timor.”
2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351 (2001) · source
“But we do believe a coordinated approach involving the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region is important for ensuring the long-term peace of the region.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“Secondly, clearly we need to continue to pay attention to the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Panel has done some good work. We hope, when the final report comes out, that we will pay even greater attention to the issue. Thirdly, we think that preparations should also begin soon for a conference on the Great Lakes to push the peace process forward and to try to suggest long- term solutions to all the interrelated crises in the region. In this regard, we wonder whether the time may have come to also send to the Great Lakes an inter- agency mission similar to the one we dispatched to West Africa under Assistant Secretary-General Ibrahima Fall. Here we would, of course, defer to the judgement of the Secretariat on this.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“In that sense, the international community and the parties can work together. Finally, the last challenge is to ensure that we build long-term peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Again, let me confess that we have no new ideas to suggest for this long-term peace, but we would like to endorse at least three ideas put across in this debate so far. The first is, of course, the importance of the inter- Congolese dialogue. Everyone has stressed it. We support it. Certainly, we commend President Masire for his efforts; but as President Masire told us when he met the Security Council mission, he hopes that the international community will show its commitment to the inter-Congolese dialogue by also showing that it will come forth with resources to help the operation.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“Similarly, we are pleased to learn that during Belgium's Presidency of the European Union for the next six months, greater priority will be given to the issue of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Of course, the decision that we take on when we will move to phase III will itself be a very important signal of our commitment to the process. Here, of course, we would like to support the point made by the Ambassador of Bangladesh. We would say that one way of expediting the move to phase III is for the parties concerned to also show a greater commitment to the process; and certainly, as the Ambassador of Mauritius highlighted, we have to show greater commitment to what is called the process of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement or repatriation (DDRRR).”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“In this regard, it is useful to bear in mind that in any peace process there are essentially two parts. Part one is the role and the contribution of the parties on the ground - the Congolese parties, the neighbours, and so forth. Part two is the role and the contribution of the international community at large. Both parts have to work together to ensure that the process of the Democratic Republic of the Congo works well. Frankly, our actions both in the Council and elsewhere, can send valuable signals. I was going to say, for example, even though the Secretary-General has now left, that his personal presence for much of this debate I think sent a very important signal of the importance of this issue.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“If you want to judge in terms of whether we are moving forward or backward, clearly Kisangani holds important symbolic significance, and we must show that we are moving forward in that area. Fourthly, we must also show that all the parties have a clear understanding of the division of responsibilities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As several speakers again have noted that MONUC's mandate does not permit it to assume responsibility for the safety of civilians, clearly the Congolese parties must realize that they are responsible for the maintenance of law and order and for the safety and security of civilians under their de facto control. The second challenge, as you said, Mr. President, is to show that we have a commitment to keep going uphill.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“I think that we are also pleased to learn that there was a good meeting between the Presidents of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, and we are also pleased that the Secretary-General, as several other speakers have commented earlier, made a valuable contribution in helping arrange good meetings on these issues. Thirdly, clearly - and this is a point that several speakers have highlighted - Kisangani and its environs must be demilitarized completely and without further delay. It is unfortunate that the Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD) continues to maintain several thousand troops in the Vicinity. This is in direct violation of resolution 1304 (2000), adopted by the Council more than a year ago. Clearly, this is unacceptable.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“First, clearly the Council must continue to keep the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo under close review. In this regard, we want to say that today's debate is actually a useful contribution. From time to time we wonder whether these open debates have any impact on the situation, but for a delicate problem like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it does help to put the spotlight on the issue from time to time, and so here, Mr. President, we commend you for organizing this debate at this time. Secondly, of course, the relations between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours must continue to improve.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“To be completely honest, our answers on how to deal with these challenges, unfortunately, will not be new. We will probably repeat points we have made before, and indeed probably repeat points that have actually been made earlier in the discussion this morning. Perhaps some day when the Security Council goes truly high-tech and we have in front of us a screen that prints out the text of what every speaker is saying, we can probably have a button to indicate that we agree with the points being made, and that might save us a lot of time in this debate. But in the absence of this high- tech equipment, we will try to put across our points in brief, summary form. As we said, the first challenge is to prevent the peace process from sliding backwards. How do we do it?”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“But also, as many speakers have noted, the peace process remains fragile and reversible. In trying to find an appropriate analogy for where we stand in the peace process of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we thought perhaps it could be compared to a cracked boulder being pushed uphill with great effort and which still remains far from the peak. The real danger exists of this cracked boulder sliding back downhill. Given the situation, we see three main challenges. The first challenge is to prevent any backsliding in the peace process. A second challenge is to demonstrate that we have the will and the resources for the long slog uphill. The third, and the more difficult long-term challenge, is to see what we do when we discover at the top a huge plateau where we need to build a durable peace in the Congo and in the region.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“There is no doubt that Ambassador Kamel Morjane has made a huge difference personally. In this regard, I want to mention that in addition to the legendary diplomatic skills that he has, which most Tunisian diplomats seem to have - I think it is part of the genetic code of being a Tunisian - what we found quite remarkable when we visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo was the tremendous managerial skills that Ambassador Morjane showed in the management of the huge and complex operation in the Congo. We could certainly see with our own eyes that the sheer presence of United Nations personnel made a huge difference in the chemistry of the region. All this was carefully and well done by Ambassador Morjane and his staff. We are glad that we are here to join in the tribute being paid to him.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“It is no secret that the file on the Democratic Republic of the Congo is one of the more difficult files the Security Council has to deal with. Indeed, if we had received more bad news than good news today, we would not have been surprised. However, as Ambassador Morjane said earlier this morning, the prospects for peace have never been as good as they are today. Of course, we need to find out the reasons for this. The reasons are complex, but one of the reasons is clearly evident before us in the form of Ambassador Kamel Morjane. There is of course an age-old debate about whether history is moved by larger forces or by the actions of individuals. Certainly, the answer is a combination of both. But in some cases, the contributions of individuals do matter, and certainly so in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“10Â® We therefore strongly endorse and echo the Secretary- General's call to regional heads of State to urge the armed groups to refrain from violence and to enter into negotiations immediately. We did the same when we were part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo mission. The sheer complexity and intractability of the crisis in Burundi defies any easy solution. But the formidable challenge it poses requires us to continue to pay close attention to the unfolding situation. In that regard, it may be useful at some point for us to reflect on what role MONUC could usefully play in the border region with Burundi. Let me join my colleagues in paying tribute to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Kamel Morjane, who is soldiering on despite, I gather, having fallen ill. We wish him a speedy recovery.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“We also look forward to working with Ambassador Otunnu on his five-point plan of action to address the grave situation of war-affected children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Our final observation is on Burundi. The situation in Burundi presents a conundrum for this Council. We all agree that we cannot afford to ignore this dimension of the conflict in the Great Lakes. We all also agree that failure to contain the crisis in Burundi will have repercussions for peace in the entire subregion. It will perpetuate the vicious cycle of ethnic conflagration that has plagued the region. Indeed, as the Secretary- General notes in his report, "there can be no lasting peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo without a comprehensive settlement of the situation in Burundi". (S/2001/572, para.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“In our view - and this is perhaps an obvious but nonetheless useful point to make here - one sure way to create a substantial "humanitarian credit" is for the parties to the Lusaka Agreement to end the fighting immediately and to fulfil all their commitments. The mortality study released by the International Rescue Committee on 8 May makes it clear that "excess" civilian deaths will continue to mount as long as all sides insist on pursuing the military option. In the meantime, we would urge the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the rebel groups to agree to the establishment of humanitarian corridors between Kinshasa and the eastern and northern provinces.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“Here, like all our colleagues, we were struck by the sobering figures presented in the Secretary- General's latest report and, I think, in Ambassador Otunnu's presentation this morning: more than 2 million people have been displaced, 16 million have critical food needs, 2million are affected by AIDS, and, in some areas such as Moba and Kalemie, an estimated 75 per cent of children born during the conflict have perished or are expected to die before they reach the age of two. That random sampling of grim statistics amounts to what the Under-Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Kenzo Oshima, has called the country's "massive humanitarian deficit" (S/2001/5 72, para. 62). Clearly, further resources are required to tackle the problem.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“In that regard, we would like to recall the recommendations contained in the 15 December 1999 report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, the Carlsson inquiry, which stated that "The United Nations - and in particular the Security Council and troop-contributing countries - must be prepared to act to prevent acts of genocide or gross violations of human rights wherever they may take place. The political will to act should not be subject to different standards." (S/1999/125 7, annex, recommendation 3) Our second observation is on the humanitarian aspects.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“That function and general law and order duties remain the primary responsibility of the parties to the Lusaka Agreement. At the same time, the tragic experiences of Rwanda and Srebrenica remind us that it is morally unacceptable for the United Nations to remain inactive in the face of massive human rights violations. By its very presence - and even though we would not wish this to be the case - MONUC will be expected to provide protection for civilian populations. Although it has neither the mandate nor the resources to protect civilians, at the very minimum MONUC can nevertheless carry out a valuable monitoring function by alerting the Council to any serious threat to the security of civilians. When that happens, the Council will be obliged to consider and devise an appropriate response.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“I hope we will address it. Another key challenge we face at this stage concerns responsibility for the protection of civilians. I realize that this too is a very delicate issue. We have taken note of the concern expressed in paragraph 93 of the Secretary-General's report on the problem of assuring effective civilian administration, including the safety and security of the civilian population, in areas to be evacuated by foreign forces. Paragraphs 67 to 69 of the Secretary-General's report highlight the pressing challenge of ensuring the security of the Congolese population. But paragraphs 93 to 95 of the report make it equally clear that the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) cannot be expected to assume that responsibility.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“This is obviously a complex issue, and we probably cannot address it in great detail here, but I wanted to draw the attention of members of the Council to a report that has just been put out by the International Crisis Group, entitled "Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention". The report tries to discuss this issue at great length. Of course, we do not agree with all the conclusions and recommendations of the report. But I recall that during the Security Council mission, many of us were sitting in the plane reading reports published by that organization to get the background on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Burundi. I hope that members of the Council will refer to the report I have mentioned as well; it points out that this is a serious problem that the Council has to address.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“But the positive momentum generated by the disengagement of forces and the withdrawal of foreign forces must be maintained. The problem we have is that there are many obstacles and dangers. And - perhaps this is not surprising - we are witnessing signs of backsliding by some of the parties, particularly by the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), and the Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD (Goma)). As several speakers have noted, one key challenge we face in this process is the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or resettlement of the armed groups in the region.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“Guehenno, and my good friend Ambassador Olara Otunnu for their presentations. Previous speakers have already mentioned many of the key points, and we also had an opportunity to discuss them two weeks ago in a public meeting, when we discussed the Security Council mission to the Great Lakes region. Therefore, we wish merely to add three observations which we hope will be helpful for today's discussion. The first observation we want to make is that we cannot take for granted that the window of opportunity that has been referred to several times will remain open forever; this must be stressed. Certainly, as we agreed at that earlier meeting, the Security Council mission has given further impetus to the Lusaka Agreement. A fragile peace is beginning to take root in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“Let me begin with a brief word of apology and a brief word of thanks. I would like to apologize to my colleagues for not having been here earlier this morning. But like you, Mr. President, I was called to another room by a meeting of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council. And I would like to thank my Irish colleague for allowing me to speak this morning, as I have a flight to catch this afternoon. I commend you, Sir, for convening today's meeting. We welcome Mr. Leonard She Okitundu, and I take this opportunity to thank him for his warm and generous hospitality when we were in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I also want to thank the Under- Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“We saw this while visiting a town like Mbandaka and seeing how, from virtually nothing, the United Nations had built an infrastructure to accommodate its contingents, and that had given a tremendous boost in confidence. I think that sort of contribution on the ground is rarely noticed. The tragedy here, of course, is that the United Nations never gets sufficient credit for the contribution that it makes. I think it is quite clear, both from the mission and from the work on the ground, that the United Nations has actually made many positive contributions, which we hope the international community will take note of. To those who want to deny that, I would challenge them to come and do a better job than what the United Nations has done in this region.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323Resumption1 (2001) · source
“I guess we had the good fortune that, this year, several positive developments led to a change of attitude among many of the key parties involved in these issues. In that sense, the timing of our mission, I think, was just right in providing just the right boost to build on the positive developments that have taken place since January this year. I think this is a point to bear in mind when we send out missions in the future. Fifthly and finally, and I am glad that several speakers have spoken about this, this was a very good mission with regard to the political, logistical and administrative support given by the entire United Nations family. I would say that we were truly impressed by what they did wherever we went, not just in terms of supporting our mission but also in terms of the work that they were doing on the ground.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323Resumption1 (2001) · source
“It was the combination of large size and cohesiveness that I think added to the impact of the mission wherever we went. Thirdly, I think the mission should be given a realistic mandate. Wherever we went, we tried to ensure that we neither raised expectations nor dampened them. We tried, I think, each in his own way, to give a very realistic picture of what the Council could and could not do to ensure that, at the end of the day, there were no unrealistic expectations of it. That is very important, because if the Council does not do that and people expect some major actions, they might, in a sense, miscalculate their own responsibilities in the situation. The fourth factor is timing.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Now, however, that we have a valuable success story, we should try to study why this mission was successful. Here, to get the discussion going, let me suggest five factors which I think helped to ensure that the mission was a success. The first and most important one - and I am glad that several people have emphasized this - is leadership. Here, I would like to tell Ambassador J ean- David Levitte that his work is not complete - he has to write the manual on how to lead missions for all future mission leaders. Secondly, we clearly need unity of purpose. Here, I believe that Ambassador Greenstock said that it was remarkable that this was probably one of the largest Security Council missions ever sent out and yet one of the most cohesive.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323Resumption1 (2001) · source
“I sincerely hope that these messages have had an impact and I am glad that, in the review that we have had today, virtually every speaker has stressed the importance of paying very careful attention to the Burundi question. My third and final point is on the question of Security Council missions. Here, I am, in a sense, following up what our colleague from Ukraine said. It was, as we have all agreed, a successful mission, but if it was successful, perhaps we should try to reflect on why it was successful. I hope in this regard that the Security Council will try to become more self- reflective as an institution, because it neither reflects on its failures - including such spectacular failures as Rwanda and Srebrenica - nor on its successes.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323Resumption1 (2001) · source
“133) This, I would say, is a very strong warning to the Council and, insofar as the Council has Charter responsibilities, I hope its members will take note of that sentence. At the same time, I hope that they will also take note of paragraphs 39 to 45, which describe - I think well - the conversation that members of the mission had with Mr. Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, as well as paragraphs 88 and 89 on the meetings with the Forces nationales pour la liberation, at which I think the members of the mission tried, with as much persuasive force as they had, to send a signal to both these parties that they have to come aboard the Arusha process, that they should renounce violence and that they should join the rest on the road of peace.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Thus, I hope that the positive results of this mission will not be fleeting and that they will persist. Again, as I said in the informal consultations yesterday, there is some obligation on our part, having gone on the mission, to ensure that there is follow-up and that whatever concrete follow-up action is needed is taken in the next month or so. My second point is on Burundi. Here, I hope that, even though the report has come out only today and I doubt whether many people have had time to read it in full, some attention will be paid to the first sentence of paragraph 133, which actually conveys a very strong statement. It says: "The mission was struck by the complexity and intractability of the situation in Burundi, and its serious potential for large-scale violence." (5/2001/521, para.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323Resumption1 (2001) · source
“In this regard, I should like to mention that perhaps, for me and as hinted by our colleague from Ireland a few minutes ago, one of the most encouraging meetings was the one we had with the signatories of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. No doubt, a lot depends on the actions of the signatories. In this regard, hopefully, in our meeting with them, we have developed what I would call a healthy symbiotic relationship: they, in a sense, take positive actions that lead to positive responses from the Council. Of course, if they do not, if they take negative steps again and again, as our colleague from Ireland hinted a few minutes ago, if there is a repetition of the negative rhetoric instead of the positive words that we heard at the meeting in Lusaka, that could in turn create a negative, vicious circle.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323Resumption1 (2001) · source
“I hope, however, that we will all be aware that windows of opportunity are, almost by definition, fragile and fleeting. You do not have windows of opportunity in areas of light and hope; you have windows of opportunity in areas of doom and gloom. Therefore, it is important that, after this mission, if we have achieved any positive results, we maintain the momentum. In this regard, several speakers have pointed to many individual elements that are encouraging: the ceasefire, the disengagement, the withdrawal of foreign forces and the inter-Congolese dialogue. All these elements, however, add up to a larger process and it is important that the larger process keep moving on, in addition to all the individual elements.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Indeed, I can say that, from my personal point of view, as someone who was not scheduled to go on the mission and was a last-minute addition, I was very pleased to be included, because, frankly, it was both personally and professionally one of the most rewarding experiences I have had. It was professionally rewarding, as many have said, thanks to the leadership of Ambassador Levitte of this mission. He was truly dedicated and indefatigable and, as I said in informal consultations yesterday, he makes Singaporeans look lazy in comparison. I just want to add three points which I hope will help to complement some of the points that have been made in the discussion so far. The first point is that I think the phrase that has been used most frequently today in the discussion of our mission has been "window of opportunity".”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Since I began the proceedings this morning on a slightly discordant note, I would like to ensure that they end on a sweet note. I would like to explain to Ambassador Jean-David Levitte that my intervention was not intended in any way to spoil the atmosphere. From time to time, however, after 20 years of experience in multilateral work, I have discovered that, sometimes, to make strong substantive points, you have to raise procedural issues. But this will be pursued in informal consultations. I am actually very happy to be the last speaker because, as the last speaker, I can happily endorse and reconfirm all the thanks and tributes that have been paid.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323Resumption1 (2001) · source
“I hope that is not an unreasonable request to make. The only reason why I have raised it today is because, before the meeting, I checked with several members of the Council and they all have exactly the same understanding that I had yesterday, which is that there would be no speakers' list. So in the process of the last 24 hours a change has been made without consulting the members of the Council. I think that is not quite appropriate. That is the only reason why I have raised the issue. I apologize to all members of the Council for raising the issue the way I did, but I think it is an important issue that all of us should be aware of, namely, that there is a problem that needs to be solved in due course. Again, my apologies.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source
“I will not hold up the proceedings any more, but there is a reason for my intervention. I think I owe an explanation to members of the Council for holding up the proceedings. From time to time, several of us have met privately and have indeed expressed concern about the way these speakers' lists are prepared; that this is not done in a transparent fashion; and that there is no level playing field for all members of the Council when it comes to speaking before the Council. It is unfortunate that it had to surface in the way it did. I really do not mean to disrupt the proceedings, but I hope that this will be a useful signal to all members of the Council to ensure that, henceforth, when it comes to preparation of the speakers' list, it will be done in an open, transparent fashion, with a level playing field for all of us.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source
“My understanding is that, at the informal consultations, we reached an understanding that there would be no speakers' list. I am curious to see who made the decision to change the Council's decision.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source