Graham Stuart
MP for Beverley and Holderness · Conservative · United Kingdom
“I hope and expect that we can move forward in the right way and get the balance right between being overly prescriptive to the banking industry and setting a clear sense of direction to make sure that no one is left behind, as so many Members have set out.”
“It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Wishart. I congratulate the hon. Member for South Devon (Caroline Voaden) on securing this debate.”
“Is my hon. Friend as astonished as I am that the Minister—I know she is new to her post—has come here to propose a six-month extension of the movement of costs from bills to the Exchequer and cannot tell the Committee how much money that will cost?”
“The Minister is being most generous again. I did not ask her about protecting consumers from energy price shocks; I asked about a clear, unequivocal manifesto pledge to reduce household energy bills by £300. She, like her predecessors, refuses to address it directly. It was a clear promise.”
“Banking hubs themselves came out of an industry response from the NatWest executive. Does the Minister agree that we must present the information from the Lloyd review to the banking groups, be clear about what we want, and give them the opportunity to respond and provide a solution, as they did with banking hubs, so that we can perhaps a…”
“I am pleased to say that Lloyds listened and, as of this morning, people can deposit cheques at those places. These issues being raised by Members across the House today are important. I trust that given the timing of the Richard Lloyd report, the Minister in her seat will make sure that they are be resolved to everyone’s satisfaction.”
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“These proposals fall under the international framework set by the WTO. We are legislating for the full suite of powers permitted under that framework, which will enable us to impose additional duties on imports that cause injury to UK industry. The message is clear: free trade and the benefits it brings are welcome, but the UK will act decisively to address trade that causes injury to our domestic industries. We cannot forget the wider ecosystem of our economy. Tackling injury is the priority, and the Bill makes clear that there is a presumption in favour of imposing additional duties when UK industry suffers injury as a result of unfairly dumped or subsidised imports.”
“I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that question. I will seek at some point in the debate to address his point. Free trade does not and should not mean trade without rules. Trade remedies are an important safety net. They can help enforce the rules that make free trade work by addressing injury to a domestic industry caused by unfair trading practices or unforeseen surges in imports. That is why all major WTO members have a trade remedies regime, and why we are taking forward the measures in the Bill. The European Commission currently carries out trade remedies investigations and imposes measures on our behalf. Once we leave the EU, we will need to be able to do that for ourselves. Clause 13, together with schedules 4 and 5, sets up the UK framework to allow us to do just that.”
“When the TRA has made an assessment and wants to help British industry, why on earth would the Opposition parties want to make a wider political point about lack of scrutiny, just for the sake of it, when it is totally inappropriate for this measure? I leave outsiders to judge whether that is for political interests or for the interests of either British consumers or producers.”
“The Opposition parties protest too much. As we all know, the point of a trade remedies system is to be balanced, proportionate and move swiftly to protect British industry. That is why we are setting up, through the Trade Bill, the specialist body to do that: the Trade Remedies Authority. We are talking about the implementation of the Trade Remedies Authority’s recommendations. Why on earth, after that exhaustive effort, with the appropriate, balanced tests in place, would anyone want to create burdensome, parliamentary oversight? It does not make any sense. The TRA makes the decision. If the Secretary of State disagrees with it, they will have to come to Parliament and make a statement, so there will be the opportunity to deal with that.”
“The legislation makes it clear that the Secretary of State should look at it, and various people who have commented on the structure have said that it is right that, although the main body of work should be conducted by experts, ultimately it should be a politician accountable to Parliament, part of a democratic process, who should make that decision. Were they in any way to disagree, they would have to come to Parliament to make a statement. That is appropriate and proportionate, and why on earth the Opposition parties would want to go to such lengths to try to stop us bringing in effective remedy to protect British producers, I cannot imagine.”
“Our purpose here is to be probed, so even when that probing is redundant or tiresome, one should deal with it in as fair a way as one possibly can. As we know, this is a framework Bill; the secondary legislation, which will have parliamentary scrutiny, will bring in the details as it does in most other jurisdictions. We will follow a balanced, proportionate and effective basis to ensure that we assess that injury in the right way, and we will do so under the aegis of the WTO. Efforts to cut and paste aspects of the WTO system on to the face of our legislation when we are subject to WTO rules anyway are unhelpful and unnecessary. Question put and agreed to. Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 4 Dumping of goods or foreign subsidies causing injury to UK industry”
“It is intended to provide the framework for the UK’s trade remedy system but, as is normal where there is a great deal of technical detail to be legislated for, that will be set out in secondary legislation. Industry has contributed its thinking to the detailed technical areas, and we shall engage with all stakeholders with detailed proposals in a series of meetings starting next month. I entirely agree with those who have spoken so far about the need for speed; but they would also agree about the need to get things right. Our aim and the purpose of introducing the Bill is to make sure we have a suitable framework for the long term. That is why we are going to get it right, as well as getting it in place in the appropriate time.”
“I thank the hon. Members for Bootle and for Scunthorpe for excellent contributions to the debate. I entirely agreed with many of the issues that they highlighted. The amendments would set out a great deal of the technical detail about the determination and calculation of dumping on the face of the Bill, rather than in secondary legislation, and would require the Government to define the meaning of “serious injury to UK producers” affected by unforeseen surges in imports, in accordance with article 4 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. Of course, we accept that it will be necessary to set out further details in legislation. As I and my right hon. Friend the Financial Secretary have said from the beginning, the Bill is a framework Bill.”
“By way of further reassurance, clause 28 of the Bill requires the Secretary of State and the TRA to have regard to their international obligations. On that basis I hope that the hon. Gentlemen can see that their concerns will be met by the approach that we shall continue to take, and that the amendment will be withdrawn.”
“All major economies have a trade remedies framework that allows alternative methodologies to be used in investigations when the normal value of a good cannot be properly determined based on information from exporting countries. The UK will be no different. We have already discussed this with industry and will continue to do so, to get it right. I recognise the underlying intent of amendment 62, to increase legal certainty for UK industry by including the requirement to act in accordance with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. However, it is unnecessary. As members of the WTO we will be required to adhere to the provisions of WTO agreements, and we have been clear about the fact that we are committed to developing the detail of the UK’s trade remedy system in a way that is fully compliant with the obligations.”
“I shall do so in due course. The detail of the secondary legislation will be constrained by and compliant with the WTO rules, but the rules that we set will be appropriate for the UK. Because they will be set out in secondary legislation there will be the necessary flexibility to allow changes to be made quickly, reflecting developments in best practice and WTO case law. I am sure that the Committee will agree that that is important, and that is why we do not think it is appropriate to include those matters in the Bill. As to market distortions I reassure the hon. Member for Bootle that the legislation will enable the UK trade remedy system to account for particular market situations in anti-dumping cases.”
“This is not the right moment or place for these proposals, because this is framework legislation. On why we should have secondary legislation, we need flexibility to adapt to developments in WTO case law and, if the Committee were to support the Opposition’s amendments, that flexibility would be removed. Changes in WTO case law are frequent: for instance, only last week there was a panel decision on article 2 of the WTO anti-dumping agreement. It is therefore important that we have the flexibility that only secondary legislation provides, so I ask the Opposition to think again.”
“It is a framework Bill—skeletal or otherwise—and the detail will come in secondary legislation, as is entirely normal for issues such as this. In response to the question from the hon. Member for Scunthorpe on when we will be ready to bring secondary legislation forward, we will do so as soon as possible. Evidently, that will need to be in time to ensure that the UK system is ready for when we exit the EU. That is the time constraint. We are working on this. We will engage in detail with industry, starting next month. We are bringing this forward as quickly as we can. If the Opposition decide to press the amendment, that is fine, but cutting and pasting WTO agreements with which we will comply is not the same as having an appropriate system in place for the UK.”
“I would go further than that. By having a system that is entirely aligned with and attuned to the interests only of UK producers, we hope to have a better system than the one we have now. I cannot give firm timelines, because the TRA is not set up yet, but hopefully it will be speedier, more proportionate and balanced, absolutely scrupulous in observing WTO case law, flexible enough to implement it, better attuned to the needs of UK producers, and more effective at averting injury to them.”
“It took the hon. Gentleman’s contribution finally to silence the hon. Member for Scunthorpe, who normally heckles throughout everyone’s address— [ Interruption. ] . As has rightly been said, that is harsh but fair. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question. The aim is that this should be an expert body, that the normal, rigorous civil service appointments process should be observed in its appointment and that we should have an organisation that has impartiality and effectiveness as its primary concerns, rather than being driven by political or indeed representative considerations. That is what we are planning to do. Question put, That the amendment be made.”
“However, as I have said, clause 28 does require the Secretary of State, and the TRA, to have regard to international obligations, which should provide any reassurance needed. It has been suggested that the injury margin is more complicated and harder to define than the dumping margin. We do not believe that that is the case. Both calculations are based on industry data and export data and involve a number of variables where the TRA would be afforded discretion to use its expertise in determining the appropriate approach.”
“These amendments seek to include specific reference to the relevant WTO agreements in the Bill. As I said in our earlier discussion, the Government have carefully considered the right balance between primary and secondary legislation. Where there are very technical provisions in a regime, those are usually set out in secondary legislation because they are very detailed. That is the case here, so we have taken powers to make the necessary regulations. As a member of the World Trade Organisation, the UK will be required to abide by the WTO agreements. We intend fully to comply with these obligations, and the regulations will therefore reflect the detail of the WTO agreements.”
“I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman. From a technical point of view, I do not believe that the EU is moving away from its approach to injury. As I say, we are subject to the WTO. The Secretary of State has to have regard to international obligations, and the detail needs to go into secondary legislation. I therefore ask hon. Members to withdraw their amendment.”
“The market share threshold is intended to give industry greater certainty in a more transparent way about how the system will operate in this country. We are learning from experiences in other countries and are seeking to improve on them to the betterment of our system. The provisions for the market share threshold fit with the industry’s calls for the TRA to focus on the cases that matter most. For instance, the British Ceramic Confederation said in its response to our White Paper that the TRA “should not spend its time investigating vexatious complaints and needs to focus on cases where there is a real UK manufacturing interest.” The market share threshold will be part of providing that.”
“I thank hon. Members for their contributions. I hope I can reassure them about the issues they raised. Perhaps there has been some misunderstanding, which I can clear up. Amendment 32 and its consequential amendments 34 to 38 seek to eliminate a market share threshold that we have designed to make sure businesses have a transparent benchmark for judging whether their complaint is likely to be successful. On the question of why we have the threshold, an independent evaluation of the EU system suggested that the system should focus on producers’ market share as a way of informing inquiries. I was also asked which other countries have the threshold. We understand that other countries consider whether cases are likely to result in measures at the point of applications, but they tend to use rather opaque systems.”
“So long as what we do is based on a proportionate, balanced approach that is fully compliant with the WTO and better tailored to the needs of British industry, I shall be proud to see us innovate. I am not afraid to innovate if it is in the interests of British industry and a better system. We should aspire to doing that.”
“I thank the hon. Lady for that comprehensive intervention. As I said in reply to the hon. Member for Bootle, our aim is to make improvements. We want a better system that provides greater certainty for UK industry, and one that makes the TRA focus, as the industry has requested, on the cases of greatest import, not an opaque system as in other countries. The TRA may quickly respond to someone with a de minimis market share who comes forward with no real case and tell them that they have no chance, but what we are doing is creating a system that is much easier to understand and more transparent. I hope the secondary legislation we implement will include other world firsts, too.”
“Let me try to come back again. The share test comes at the beginning. We have to think about the order. The point is to provide transparency at the beginning of the process and to ensure, exactly as industry has asked, that we do not waste time on complaints, vexatious or otherwise, that have no chance of resulting in measures. That is the whole point of the test. It will be quickly applied and—the Opposition do not seem to have understood this—will have exemptions for infant industries. The system will provide a more transparent form of that which is routinely applied in other countries. Question put , That the amendment be made .”
“Whether the Secretary of State accepts or rejects the recommendation, the evidence base for the TRA’s recommendation will be made available to the public, as is required under the terms of the WTO agreements. Furthermore, if the Secretary of State rejects the TRA’s recommendation to apply measures, he or she must lay a statement before Parliament setting out the reasons for that decision. Parliament will then be able to hold the Secretary of State to account if it considers the reasons to be unsound.”
“Those recommendations will be made on the basis of the framework set out in this legislation and underpinned by technical and procedural details to be set out in secondary legislation. Giving the Select Committee a role in that process will undermine the impartiality of the process—an impartiality which is supported by industry. Publishing the recommendation in advance of the decision by the Secretary of State could also further undermine impartiality by increasing lobbying of Ministers by the affected parties, and could also lead to unnecessary disruption of the markets affected. The Bill provides for public scrutiny of both the TRA and the Secretary of State’s decisions.”
“New paragraphs 12A and 11A, introduced by amendments 39 and 70, would require the recommendations made by the TRA under schedule 4 to be made available to relevant Select Committees of the House of Commons, along with an account for the evidence base of those recommendations. Let me begin by stating that transparency is one of the four design principles set out by the Government for the trade remedies framework. The inherent assumption of a lack of scrutiny implied by the amendments is simply untrue. To protect the TRA’s status as an independent public body, its recommendations to the Secretary of State should not be subject to political influence before a decision to accept or reject them has even been taken.”
“The hon. Lady has been a Member of this House for some time and will know that there is a series of means by which that can be pursued. Making a statement to the House provides the initial spur to start that scrutiny, if that is what the Select Committee or others decide. There are urgent questions, Adjournment debates, Backbench Business Committee debates—I will not list them all, as the hon. Lady is probably rather better on parliamentary process than I am. She will know that there is a huge number and they can all be used. Her Majesty’s Opposition or the SNP and their spokesmen have other means by which to raise the issue. On that basis, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.”
“Given that provisional measures can have profound wider economic impacts, we believe that the test should be met before they can be imposed, just as before definitive measures. That ensures consistency between the two stages of the investigation, and operates in the same way as the existing Union interest test in the EU’s regime, thus providing continuity for UK businesses. I understand the concerns of UK industry that the inclusion of the test at the provisional stage could delay the application of measures. However, that will not necessarily be the case. In practice, the TRA will have the ability to gather evidence on the economic impacts of applying or not applying measures in parallel, rather than sequentially, to other aspects of the investigation.”
“Let me start by explaining that the objective of the economic interest test is to ensure that measures are in the best interests of the UK. It ensures that measures are not imposed where they might have disproportionate impacts on wider groups such as downstream industries or, as the hon. Gentleman rightly said, consumers. Let me take the amendments in turn and set out why they would undermine our objective of a balanced and proportionate trade remedies framework. With amendment 40, the Opposition seek to remove the application of the economic interest test before the imposition of provisional anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures. It would mean that the test is considered only at the final stage of imposing definitive measures.”
“What I can confirm is that our system will be much more transparent. It will allow those who apply to it, or might be affected by it, to be clearer about how the system will work. That form of transparency is one of the fundamental principles on which we have built this structure.”
“Anti-dumping duties on a range of important steel products determined under the lesser duty rule have been very effective in curtailing dumped imports from China. For example, in the year to August 2017, UK imports from China of rebar hot-rolled and cold-rolled flat products were down by more than 90% compared with the year leading up to their respective anti-dumping investigations. There is, therefore, no evidence of a need to remove the lesser duty rule in the case of raw material distortions. Measures are already clearly effective in addressing the injury caused by those practices.”
“By removing the requirements around the maximum amount of anti-subsidy measures, the amendments would mean that the Bill would not be compatible with WTO rules. I am sure that was not the intention. Amendments 43 and 51 would restrict the application of the lesser duty rule in cases of raw material distortions and when the exporting country does not respect adequate levels of social and environmental standards. The lesser duty rule achieves our objective of protecting UK industry by ensuring that it can operate on a fair playing field without causing unnecessary injury to UK consumers and downstream industry. The evidence shows that trade remedy measures are effective and have a lasting impact even with a lesser duty rule in place.”
“WTO rules clearly provide that anti-dumping measures cannot exceed the margin of dumping and anti-subsidy measures cannot exceed the amount of subsidy. That is a strict requirement, applying to both provisional and definitive measures, which is reflected in schedule 4. Let me clarify that our policy intention is simply to incorporate those WTO rules and not to provide that the amount of subsidy somehow offsets the dumping margin, or vice versa—I think there may have been some misunderstanding of the Bill’s phrasing. Schedule 4 relates to both anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations, which are largely identical. That is why the provisions refer to both the margin of dumping and the amount of subsidy.”
“It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Main, and to be in this reassembled Committee, probing and holding the Government to account on this excellent framework Bill. The amendments in the group look to set the parameters around what the TRA can recommend by way of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures. I begin by reassuring the Committee that the UK trade remedies system will provide robust protections for UK industries where they are suffering injury because of dumped or subsidised imports, or because of unforeseen surges in imports. Amendments 41 and 49, and their consequential amendments, would remove the requirement that provisional anti-subsidy measures recommended by the TRA must not exceed the subsidy margin.”
“We have not heard any evidence of the lesser duty rule not working in practice. I have been able to rebut any suggestions. The hon. Member for Scunthorpe said that the US imposes measures in 45 days. As everyone on this Committee who is not as busy as he is will know from reading their papers, that is simply not true. The WTO rules prevent the imposition of provisional anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures before day 60 of the investigation. The US makes a preliminary injury determination in 45 days, but that does not mean the imposition of measures. That was completely incorrect, and I am sure the hon. Gentleman will want to correct the record. The average time that the US takes to impose provisional measures is just under five months, and in most steel cases it takes around six months.”
“The hon. Gentleman accepts that measures are not imposed in 45 days. He presented no evidence—I believe there is none—to suggest that the lesser duty rule in any way slows things down, so the slowness of the process in the EU responding to the steel crisis is an entirely separate element. I know he is scrupulously fair and always seeks to be, so he would recognise there is no linkage, although he may have wished there to be one to bolster an argument that has otherwise turned out to have no basis whatsoever. On that basis, I ask for the amendments to be withdrawn. Question put, That the amendment be made.”
“Removing the ability to do that could be detrimental to the protections available to UK industry. It is on that basis that I ask him to consider withdrawing the amendment.”
“We are not seeking to shorten the duration of definitive measures, but are seeking to allow trade remedies to be applied from a date prior to the date of those measures. The unintended consequence of the Opposition amendments would be to prevent the TRA from collecting duties for a period before the date of the section 13 notice, even though this is permissible under the WTO agreements in limited circumstances. I entirely understand why the hon. Gentleman tabled the amendment and what he was seeking to probe. I hope my explanation has been sufficient to make him see that that which he desires will not be delivered by the amendments. We believe that this is a necessary provision. We have been clear that we want to incorporate all of the protections permitted under WTO rules into the UK’s trade remedies framework.”
“If the review finds that continued application of measures is required to maintain sufficient protection for UK industry, the measures will be continued. I assure the hon. Gentleman that industry is adequately protected without the need for the amendment and I ask him to consider withdrawing it. Finally, on amendments 48 and 53, I understand the hon. Gentleman’s concerns, but I have to reassure him that that which he fears is not the intention of the provisions. The WTO agreements allow in certain circumstances for trade remedies to be applied from a date prior to the date of the application of definitive measures. The purpose of the provisions is to allow us to reflect that in secondary legislation, not to shorten the duration of definitive measures.”
“I understand what lies behind it, but I hope I have reassured him. On amendment 47, it is important to note that the WTO agreements set out that measures may remain in force for up to five years. They do not provide that five years is the default. In fact, they specifically set out that measures should remain in force only for as long as, and to the extent, necessary to counteract the dumping or subsidisation that is causing injury. The TRA analysis may suggest that a period shorter than five years will be sufficient to counteract injury, and in such cases the TRA should set an appropriate duration accordingly. On request, the TRA will initiate an expiry review before the termination of any measures, provided that UK industry can demonstrate that injury would continue or recur if the measures were to expire.”
“Gentleman is aware, once the investigation has been concluded and measures have been proposed by the TRA, the pressure on the Secretary of State quickly to come forward with the adoption of the measures to protect British industry will be great. I perhaps lack the hon. Gentleman’s imagination, but I find it hard to imagine a situation in which the pressure on the Secretary of State to get on with it would not be much greater than a pressure to delay and put it into the long grass, as the hon. Gentleman said. I think we can be confident that any Secretary of State under any Government would wish to make the decision as quickly as reasonably possible. For those reasons, I do not agree with an arbitrary two-week limit. I understand why the hon. Gentleman has tabled the amendment and I hope it is a probing one.”
“We fully recognise that a swift response is crucial to UK industry, as the hon. Gentleman said, so that the injury being caused by unfair trade practices can be halted. However, in some cases there will inevitably be difficult matters that the Secretary of State will need to reflect on. Although we expect that such matters will be rare, it is important that he has full opportunity thoroughly to consider the issues in making his decision. That might lengthen the process, but it is important to do the job well rather than quickly. To place an arbitrary two–week time limit on the Secretary of State is, therefore, not appropriate. Even though that duration might be sufficient in most cases, the legislation must provide flexibility for cases in which complex considerations must be made in the public interest. As the hon.”
“Three groups of amendments need a response. I will start with amendments 45 and 54, which seek to impose a two-week time limit on the Secretary of State’s decision to accept or reject the TRA recommendation. I will then turn to amendment 47, which seeks to create a presumption of five years as the normal, rather than the maximum, duration of definitive measures. Finally, I will address amendments 48 and 53, which seek to ensure that the duration of definitive measures is not affected by the length of any provisional measures that might have been applied against the same imports. On amendments 45 and 54, on receipt of the TRA recommendation, it is the responsibility of the Secretary of State to respond in a timely manner, while ensuring that the public interest aspect of their role is given due weight.”
“It is worth putting on the record that when discussing a public interest test, he said “you need a public interest test at the end, because there may be those extraordinary circumstances where it is or is not in the public interest to apply or not apply tariffs.” –– [ Official Report, Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Public Bill Committee, 23 January 2018; c. 73, Q111.] So in fact, UK Steel gave evidence supporting public interest tests. Other Governments, including those of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and the EU take public interest into account when deciding whether to impose measures, so we are not acting out of step with other countries. I dispute what the hon. Gentleman said.”
“Gentleman mentioned, nor to determine whether the imposition of duties would run counter to wider Government policy. When the Secretary of State receives the TRA’s recommendations, he will satisfy himself that the TRA has properly weighted the individual elements of the EIT and that imposing duties is in the public interest. Only where there is a strong argument against following the TRA’s recommendations will the Secretary of State reject putting measures in place. In the exceptional case where he does, he will be required to explain his decision to Parliament. The hon. Gentleman mentioned Gareth Stace of UK Steel and his evidence.”
“As the hon. Member for Bootle has explained so fluently, his amendments would make it clear that the Secretary of State could use public interest grounds to reject the TRA’s recommendations for the imposition of duties only in limited circumstances, namely those in which national security was deemed to be at risk. It may help hon. Members if I briefly run through the interaction of checks and balances in the trade remedies system. As we have discussed, the TRA is required to conduct an economic interest test when deciding whether to recommend the imposition of measures. There is a presumption in favour of the imposition of duties in respect of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures. However, it is not for the TRA to take into account wider public interest considerations such as matters of national security, as the hon.”
“In his recent article for UK Trade Forum , George Peretz QC said that such decisions are “best made by politicians who can, and will have to, defend those decisions in the political arena.” It is right that there is a role for Ministers to take those public interest considerations into account and intervene if imposing measures is not in the UK’s wider interest. It is also right that they are accountable to Parliament if they do so. The system that we have proposed, whereby an independent body carries out the investigation and makes recommendations, but Ministers ultimately have responsibility for acting in the country’s best interest, is the right one. I hope hon. Members agree and that the hon. Gentleman will agree to withdraw the amendment.”
“It is not really a test. It is a final common-sense check that the measures will not run against our national security interests or wider Government policy, as the hon. Gentleman set out—all the pressures that we discussed in a previous debate. The pressure will be on the Secretary of State. Industry will call for the inquiry and participate in the TRA’s investigation, then the TRA will come out and say that the economic interest test and the market share threshold have been passed and that it has decided that we need to impose these measures. After that, the Secretary of State will give it a sense check, and in extraordinary circumstances might say no.”
“However, an extension is not appropriate in every type of review—for example, the WTO specifically sets out that duties may not be applied during a new exporter review. Therefore it is more appropriate for this to be provided for in secondary legislation. The development of the review’s framework is still ongoing. It is intended that there will be targeted stakeholder engagement across the UK industry to discuss this issue in more detail, prior to setting out the details of the various review processes in secondary legislation. It is a complicated area, as my explanation of the unintended impact of these amendments shows. I therefore ask the hon. Member to withdraw these amendments.”
“I recognise the desire for clarity regarding timelines in the review’s framework, but as demonstrated by the WTO agreements and EU rules, there is no uniform timeline that is appropriate for all review types. The amendment is unnecessary, as it appears to apply to all review types, irrespective of the lack of uniform timelines currently applicable under the EU system. For example, it would not be beneficial to UK industry if it is required to wait 12 months before a circumvention review may be carried out. On amendment 56, paragraph 21(4)(b) already allows us to provide in secondary legislation that measures may be extended beyond five years where a review is being undertaken.”