Pat McFadden
MP for Wolverhampton South East · Labour · United Kingdom
“In his review Alan Milburn considered that issue and said that, “the UK’s NEET crisis is much more long-term and deep-seated than any decisions taken in the last few years.” As I said earlier, 400,000 more people are in work this year than last year, and the number of young people in employment is up since the election.”
“Since our last DWP questions, both Alan Milburn and the Pensions Commission have published their respective interim reports on young people and on the current state of saving for retirement. I look forward to receiving their final reports later in the year.”
“As Alan Milburn pointed out in his recent report, the UK’s NEET crisis is much more long-term and deep-seated than any decisions taken in the last few years. There are 400,000 more people in work than last year. The number of young people in employment is up by 74,000 since the election.”
“I thank the right hon. Gentleman and send him commiserations for whatever has left him reliant on his crutches today. I am happy to congratulate the businesses he mentioned in his constituency. He raises a serious point: it is important not only to come up with the right policy, but to make it simple for businesses to use.”
“My hon. Friend is right, and I thank Cardiff football club for being a partner. We are supporting nearly 1 million young people and creating up to half a million opportunities for jobs and training.”
“We are making strong progress on expanding youth hubs, with around 130 already in operation across Great Britain. In March, I announced the locations that we want to open in this year, and I have just announced a further 180 locations for the following two years.”
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Every one of 5,181 lines we hold for Pat McFadden, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 32 of 104.
“Member for Glasgow Central pointed out, the one Companies House-related prosecution that took place was simply intended to show how weak the system of scrutiny was. In discussing the role of Companies House, the report concluded that it represented “a weakness”. That is quite a damning conclusion for a very eminent Committee of this House to reach, and it painted a picture of an organisation that saw its role as keeping a register—being a librarian rather than a partner in law enforcement. There is a history to this, of course. We have always prided ourselves on being a country where it is easy to set up a business—it is a fast process and there are not many barriers. That approach has a lot of strengths, but given that only a few individuals control literally thousands of companies on the register, we cannot afford to be so lax.”
“The Treasury Committee’s report highlighted that in a post-Brexit situation, new trading opportunities could also “provide opportunities to those wishing to undertake economic crime in countries that are more vulnerable to corruption.” That is why I am asking the Minister how these things will be monitored and how we will insulate ourselves against the temptation to strike trade deals here, there and everywhere and, in so doing, perhaps not always looking as deeply as we would into the regulatory systems and so on. The Committee pointed out in its report: “There is a clearly identified risk that company formation may be used in money laundering.” The Treasury Committee heard evidence that there had been no fines or criminal proceedings relating to the issue of beneficial ownership. As the hon.”
“Of course, by definition, as the Minister said a few minutes ago, it is difficult to pin down the size of an unknown, and we cannot be certain, but these were credible witnesses. Even the Government’s then Security Minister, the right hon. Member for Wyre and Preston North (Mr Wallace), told the Committee in his evidence that the figure of £90 billion was probably “a conservative estimate”.”
“Otherwise known as a portmanteau Bill. It is a shame that they could not find more in the cupboard. A couple of small measures are not objectionable in themselves, but we have to ask whether they are up to the challenge. This measure deals with money laundering and trustees based overseas. I do not think that Opposition members of the Committee will object to that, but we must ask, given the scale of money laundering, whether the Government could not have done more. The membership of this Bill Committee includes a few illustrious members of the Treasury Committee, which has looked into this issue. In fact, it reported on it last year. In compiling that report, it took evidence from witnesses who suggested that the scale of the problem could run to hundreds of billions of pounds.”
“People should have access to thr debt respite scheme, so I would be grateful if the Minister set out a little more about the timetable for introducing the scheme after Royal Assent.”
“That would be a truly shocking thing for anybody on a Public Bill Committee to do, so I hope that we will not see any of that in the next few hours. I will not push amendment 29, which I am sure is in scope even if it is not perfect, to a vote; rather, I will use it to ask the Minister a question. The purpose of tabling the amendment was to make the point that we want to get a move on with this debt respite scheme, which has support on both sides of the House, because of the current pandemic situation and the difficult economic impact it is having on the household finances of a large number of people. Unfortunately, this will lead to increased problems of debt and to more people looking for the kind of help that is envisaged in the clause.”
“I beg to move amendment 29, in clause 32, page 38, line 22, leave out subsection (2) and insert— “(2) Section 7 of that Act (debt respite scheme: regulations) is amended in accordance with subsections (2A), (3) and (4). (2A) For subsection (2), substitute— (2) After receiving advice from the single financial guidance body under section 6, the Secretary of State shall make regulations establishing a debt respite scheme within 12 months of this Act coming into force.” This amendment would require the debt respite scheme to come into force within 12 months of this Act being passed. I cannot think that anyone on this Committee would try to push the boundaries of what it is legitimate to include in our debates, Mr Davies.”
“My hon. Friend has done a huge amount of work on this over the years. Amendment 34 seeks to extend the breathing space period to 120 days. Does she think that covid factors add to the case for having a longer period than was initially envisaged?”
“Is my hon. Friend’s fear about the midway review that it is too onerous a burden on the debt advisers, or that it may exclude from the breathing space people who still need it, but who are pushed out halfway through?”
“We had an exchange in Treasury questions an hour or two ago about corporate debt and small business debt. I therefore do not think that the new clauses on review are in any way a threat to the basic integrity of the scheme. They simply ask for a look back at the scheme after a year or so of operation. I could give the Committee a long and enthusiastic speech about the merits of the third way, but I suspect I will fall foul of your instructions about scope, Mr Davies. I award the prize for word of the day to my friend the hon. Member for Glasgow Central who has given Hansard the challenge of spelling “wheeched”, which I can roughly translate as forcibly or speedily removed. I think we would agree on that definition, but I look forward to seeing how that appears in our record.”
“I should begin by acknowledging that the Minister has put an awful lot of work into the debt respite scheme. He has encouraged it, consulted the sector widely and really tried to get it right. As I said at the beginning, the Opposition support it. It is a valuable addition and a source of help for people in debt. The new clauses call for a review of the scheme at some point in different ways, which is the right thing to do with a new scheme. It makes sense to look at how it works and see if any changes need to be made to it. We have already had a debate about whether 60 days or 120 days is the best timescale, and a review could consider that sort of thing. Of course, there is also the covid impact, which new clause 12(2) specifically references. Covid will have an impact on household finances.”
“I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 34, page 40, line 33, after “performance” insert “including information relating to environmental, social and governance standards.” This amendment would require that consumers are given information about the environmental, social and governance standards of PRIIPs.”
“They are about trying to make sure that public bodies are on the consumer’s side when it comes to making decisions about buying these kinds of products, and that the consumer has someone to look to for help with the information mismatch inherent in the sale of these kinds of products. They are modest and sensible amendments, and I commend them to the Committee.”
“This is not about interfering with investor choice; it is about helping investors to make a choice, and giving them the information to do that. Amendment 31 deals with the broader issue of the information balance that I spoke about between sellers and buyers. It is a no-detriment clause. It does not seek to prevent the abolition of the performance scenarios referred to in clause 34; it seeks to ensure that whatever replaces these scenarios does not result in consumers having less understanding than at present of the risks involved in a particular investment. Both amendments are about the regulator taking seriously its duty on consumer information.”
“The founding statement of that organisation says: “Without reliable climate-related financial information, financial markets cannot price climate-related risks and opportunities correctly”. The Financial Stability Board wants this to happen, and has set up the TCFD to advise companies and market regulators on how to do it. Why not take the opportunity in the Bill to ensure that consumers are provided with this kind of information? They can, of course, still make their own investment choices. They can ignore the information and say, “I don’t care about any of that; all I care about is the rate of return.” Investors are completely free to do that, but an increasing number of them do not want to, partly because they see the rate of return and the sustainability of their investments as being closely related.”
“People care about the working conditions under which goods and services are produced, and about good governance—about companies being well run. So why not make this information available to investors? That is what amendment 30 calls for. If the argument against making that the regulator’s job is that investors are making these decisions for themselves, let us at least give investors the tools to do that job—the information to make those judgments. The Chancellor has spoken warmly about the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, which was set up by the Financial Stability Board a few years ago precisely to help companies inform investors about risks related to climate change in investments.”
“There is a major information mismatch in these situations. Who can the consumer look to, to redress that to some extent? It has to be the Government and the regulators, through legislation on the kind of information to which consumers are entitled before making a purchase. How do the Government and the regulator equip the consumer to make a reasonably informed choice? That is where amendments 30 and 31 come in. Earlier, when talking about capital requirements and the regulator’s duties, we had a debate about environmental, social and governance criteria being part of the regulator’s remit. The Minister rejected the idea, and the Committee voted it down, but what about making this information available to consumers? More and more investors want to invest in a way that helps, rather than damages, the planet.”
“It is in no one’s interest to defend misleading or potentially misleading information for consumers. Removing or substantially altering the requirements of the key information documents does prompt the question of what should be put in their place. It is important that the Government and the regulators take this seriously. In selling anything like this, there is always a major information mismatch between what the seller knows about the product and what the consumer knows. The products are sold and designed by professional staff working for financial services companies, and bought by retail investors. Unless those investors have a professional background in the industry, they are likely simply to be looking for somewhere safe for their money that can hopefully earn them a decent return.”
“In this portfolio Bill we now move on to another different subject, that of PRIIPs—packaged retail and insurance-based investment products. Clause 34 amends the consumer information requirements for the sellers of these products. These requirements are also known as key information documents—or KIDs—and we heard in the oral and written evidence that the current information requirements can be misleading for consumers. It is said that this is because they imply that past performance can be too much of a guide to future performance, which we know is not the case. At the European level, where the regulation of these products has taken place, there has also been a big debate about these key information documents and their deficiencies, so this has been an ongoing issue for some time now.”
“Then, as is the way of these things, what we did when we had the chance to make a decision about this, both at the level of the regulator and at the level of the investment product, will be on the record.”
“At this stage in our proceedings we begin to recognise the debates that we are having, because we have had them more than once. I find the Minister’s answers on the subject of ESG slightly circular. He says—and I believe him—that he has great sympathy with the intent, but now is not the time or this is not the quite the way to do it, and so on. The reason I find that unconvincing is that I think the Government will do this, or something quite close to it, and will then claim credit, saying that doing it makes the UK a more friendly environment for environmentally sustainable investments. Because of that, I will press the amendment to a vote.”
“It acts as what could be called a circuit breaker to ensure that if one party to the transaction gets into trouble, we do not have a domino effect right throughout the system, so the clause is designed to ensure that smaller traders have access to this circuit breaker or clearing activity. I ask the Minister: is what we are doing here mirroring what the EU have done through this EMIR refit process, or are the two measures in this clause—the data one, and the fair and transparent one—a departure in any way from that?”
“I have just one question. As the Minister said, this clause deals with the EMIR directive, which governs the sale of over-the-counter derivates. To add to our joys, we have EMIR and something called EMIR refit. The clause is about access to clearing for people dealing in these products. Over-the-counter derivates are perhaps among the more opaque financial services products on the market, but we learnt during the financial crisis that whatever their other qualities, these products exposed the interconnection between different companie, and the vulnerability of that interconnection. That is why clearing is important.”
“This weekend, we will mark Small Business Saturday, when we all have the opportunity to praise the work of the fantastic small businesses that contribute so much to our local economies and have been through such a tough time this year. Bounce back loans have helped small businesses, but because of the ongoing pandemic, they have, by definition, also left some businesses with debts that they may not be able to pay. What is the Government’s estimate of the likely rate of default on bounce back loans, and what further support can the Government give to small businesses whose trading conditions will continue to be severely impaired for months to come?”
“The average constituent probably does not know much about LIBOR or what it does, but the truth is that the financial products they buy are often related to this benchmark, so it does have an impact in the real world. No matter how esoteric the financial products are—they have become too esoteric—in the end there is a customer, and the customer should only pay a fair price. The imbalance of information should not result in the customer being fleeced or the trader being unfairly enriched, and it is the job of the regulator and the financial institution for which that trader works to ensure that is the case. That is the intention behind our amendment: to set that as a clear goal for the regulators before we get into the meat in the clauses of how we will transition from LIBOR to other kinds of benchmarks.”
“When the LIBOR scandal unfolded some seven or eight years ago, I remember that both the Treasury Committee and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards heard evidence from chief executives of the major banks. Often, their defence was, “I had no idea what my traders were doing. I did not know that they were doing this.” There was a constructive ignorance built into the system. Although that did not make the chief executive look good, it was far better than the chief executive admitting that they knew what the trader was doing but they looked the other way because it was making more profit for the bank and the trader. The sanctions and the responsibility up through the institution are very important. All that is hugely important for trust in the system.”
“That raises the problem, which the Minister and I will get into discussing: how to take contracts based on an internationally used benchmark and try to ensure fairness to those who signed up to contracts under it when the countries legislating for successors to it are all choosing slightly different overnight rates for those successors. The amendment, therefore, goes with the grain of how trades are moving. We all agree that a benchmark based on large liquid markets will be more accurate than one based on opinion. The second and third elements of the amendment give the regulator a duty to prevent manipulation by those submitting information to the benchmark and to have robust sanctions, including custodial sentences, when that occurs. We will get back to debating that elsewhere in the Bill.”
“That use of expert judgments has created the potential—and, as we have seen, more than the potential—for manipulation. We also learned that SONIA, the sterling overnight index average and the favoured successor to LIBOR in the UK, is based on much more liquid markets. That is a good thing, but there is also a potential problem. LIBOR is an internationally used benchmark. While we are debating this legislation, the United States is also legislating, the European Union has parallel legislation and the Swiss have parallel legislation—and they have all gone for slightly different successors.”
“Our amendment does not try to get into the contract issue, which we will come to later when we debate a few clauses further on, but rather tries to set out some ground rules for the regulator in establishing and sanctioning successor benchmarks to LIBOR. The criteria that we have set out ought to be uncontroversial. The first is that the benchmark should be based on actual trades in the market for which real prices were paid. I confess I have been away from the issue for a while, although I served on parliamentary inquiries into it some years ago, but we learned last week that those so-called expert judgments are still being used to set LIBOR prices. That is someone’s opinion of what a trade might cost, not necessarily what it does cost in a real marketplace.”
“That matters because this benchmark underpins trillions of pounds’-worth of trades, yet was found to be vulnerable to the kind of manipulation I have just tried to illustrate. I have tried to show that even the tiniest movement in the daily benchmark could make a big difference to traders because of the volumes of money that they were trading. The benchmark’s flaws were exposed a number of years ago, yet its use to underpin trading has persisted because of the volume of contracts linked to it. One of the problems in the complexity of this set of clauses is that it takes us into the area of contract law, which is both complex and, in this case, international. Huge volumes, contract law and international jurisdictions are involved, so—to be fair to the regulators and the Treasury—it is not easy to get this right.”
“The volume of money being traded meant that even a tiny proportion—0.01% or something like that—could make a huge difference to their own trading account over the course of the year. That is the problem that this set of clauses is trying to deal with. How do we deal with the problem? We focus a lot on what the Bill calls the representativeness of the benchmark, because there is not really a problem when millions of loaves are being sold and there is a competitive environment; if I do not like the price at Tesco, I can go to another supermarket and try my luck elsewhere. But when wholesale markets were not very liquid and relied more and more on expert opinions, there was the potential for—indeed, the reality of—manipulation. That is what happened.”
“Alternatively, a benchmark price of £1.09 instead of £1.10 could mean that they would lose a lot of money on the bread they had to sell. That is basically what was happening with LIBOR. That is the problem that was unveiled. The problem is exacerbated where there is not a liquid market for bread and where the benchmark relies more and more on what our oral witnesses last week called “expert judgment”. That is one phrase for it, but we could also call it opinion, and if we did not have supermarkets selling millions of loaves every day and the price of bread was down to the opinion of only the bakers, we can see there would be the potential for price manipulation. That is what was happening with LIBOR and what was uncovered as traders around the world shaved tiny proportions off the daily rates.”
“Now I want Members to imagine a different way of setting prices, where we were setting the price of a loaf and could all submit our opinion on what the price of the loaf might be—and we owned bakeries, and were selling loaves. We would have a debate every day to set the price of bread. Perhaps the Minister and I would converge on about £1.10, but someone else might say, “Look, could we just edge that price up? Could you do me a favour and make today’s price £1.11 or £1.12? It would be a really good favour and, by the way, if you do it I might send you a case of champagne at Christmas.” The trader might be saying those things in the knowledge that they had a lot of loaves to sell that afternoon—maybe millions. The penny difference in price could make a great difference to the profit.”
“If we were all asked what the benchmark price of a loaf is, it would be easy to establish it. We would go to a supermarket, look on the shelf, and see the price of a loaf. If we were keen shoppers with a good eye for a bargain, we might go to two or three supermarkets and compare the price of a loaf. I could pop-quiz the Committee, but I shall not put anyone through that. The price of a standard loaf in one of our supermarkets is roughly £1.10, give or take; people who want to go for one of those sourdough loaves can pay a bit more if they want, but for what I would call a normal brown loaf it is about £1.10. That is the benchmark price of a loaf, dictated by the supply and demand of a competitive supermarket environment.”
“Thank you for your chairmanship today, Mr Davies. Perhaps with your indulgence I may, as I did the other day, explain how I shall try to approach this morning’s sitting. I believe that within a sometimes impenetrable Bill the clauses we are to debate this morning may be the most impenetrable. That is often the case when clauses change provisions elsewhere, as in this instance. I shall, as I go through my remarks on the provisions, ask the Minister some questions. The real meat will come at about clauses 13 to 16, and I will speak for a bit longer. I just want to give the Committee the shape of my approach. To return to the amendment, it begins, I guess, with LIBOR. I want by way of illustration to ask the Committee to think about the price of bread.”
“I beg to move amendment 28, in clause 8, page 7, line 38, at end insert— ‘(7) In reviewing critical benchmarks in accordance with Article A20 of the Benchmarks regulation as amended by this Act the FCA must have regard to— (a) ensuring a benchmark is based on actual trades or contracts; (b) preventing a benchmark from manipulation for the benefit of anyone submitting information to that benchmark; and (c) robust sanctions up to and including custodial sentences for anyone found to be engaged in manipulation or attempted manipulation of a benchmark.’ This amendment would require the FCA to have regard to ensuring a benchmark is based on actual trades or contracts, that it is not open to manipulation and that robust sanctions are in place for those who manipulate, or attempt to manipulate, a benchmark .”
“Amendment, by leave, withdrawn . Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“I listened carefully to what the Minister said. I do not think anyone looking at the issue would conclude that the responsibility for these actions had been fairly allocated, so there is an issue. I am not saying we want to go around looking to put people’s heads on spikes—we do not want that sort of politics—but it does rankle with our constituents when certain types of crime that are, candidly, easier to understand are met with heavy punishments while somebody who does a very complex crime that is more difficult to understand can somehow get away with it. Having said that, I accept that legislation for criminal offences, and particularly for custodial sentences, needs to be very carefully drafted in exactly the right way, and I cannot say that I am 100% certain that my amendment is, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.”
“What I am really asking is whether the clause is putting the brakes on LIBOR or, in some ways, continuing a facilitation of LIBOR after the end of 2021, for some things.”
“Yet it seems that the clauses both facilitate that and facilitate the continued use of such benchmarks. My reading of the clause and the one that follows is that the FCA will retain the power to compel organisations to submit information to a critical benchmark, even though the policy decision has been made to move away from that benchmark. The question then is why the regulator would want to do that, and what the power means for the 2021 LIBOR end date. Does the power mean that the FCA could compel submitters to keep submitting information to LIBOR, and is that because so many contracts depend on it? Is that really why the power to continue submitting information to critical benchmarks is engaged in this?”
“For our understanding of the matter, should we, wherever the provisions refer to a critical benchmark, just be thinking about LIBOR—because that is what we really mean; and is there some parliamentary drafting reason why the Bill does not say that? Secondly, the clause deals with a review of which benchmarks are critical benchmarks. The Minister said, and the clause says, that that seems to be a benchmark for which a market-led substitute exists, although for some reason it is not practical to transfer activity to such a market-led substitute. That is what is confusing about the clauses. We are told that the policy decision, and the regulatory decision, is to move away from LIBOR and to cease using it by the end of 2021. That is my understanding.”
“The questions asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Thamesmead expose the potential for litigation if the Government and regulators are moving contracts from one basis to another; some of the people involved will have deep pockets and expensive lawyers. The Minister tells us that it will all be sorted out—thrashed out—and I hope he is right; but I am not sure that we can guarantee that. I have a couple of questions about the clause and those clauses that follow. First, is it all about LIBOR, even though it talks about critical benchmarks, or is it more general? For example, might the provisions be used on a benchmark related to the price of a particular metal, or something like that?”
“It says that the FCA will always give either “a written notice stating that it considers that the benchmark is not representative of the…economic reality”— perhaps it has become too illiquid, in the way we discussed, or too reliant on expert opinion—or “a written notice stating that it considers that the representativeness of the benchmark is not at risk.” In other words, we have a good competition going here for the price of the bread. Does the 10-year period of extended mandatory information apply when the FCA has judged that the benchmark is not representative, or could it apply in cases where it is judged that it is representative as well? Subsection (3) seems to indicate that the assessment could go either way. I am trying to get at what this 10-year power is for and to which kind of benchmark it applies.”
“The clause takes us, in a sense, to the next step after a review. Again, I have a couple of questions. First, subsection (2) refers to a period of 10 years. The Minister made clear a few minutes ago that LIBOR is definitely winding up by the end of 2021, so to what does 10 years refer? With something that is supposed to be winding up in one year, I still cannot quite understand why we are giving the regulator powers to continue it in a form for up to 10 years. I am confused about that, and I do not know if I am the only one. Secondly, subsection (3) refers to an assessment of a benchmark. That assessment revolves around the question of the representative nature of the benchmark.”
“I do not know what the implications of that are for the quality of the ghost of LIBOR; we must remember that the reason it has been designated in the first place is that it is failing the market representativeness test. How is it, therefore, that for up to 10 years we can compel submitters to submit information to something that the regulator has judged invalid?”
“The Minister’s phrase, “synthetic LIBOR”, helps us to understand this. I think it might mean something like this: that the regulator has the power to designate a benchmark as critical when it is unrepresentative of market reality, but in a way LIBOR is not really ending at the end of 2021, because we have synthetic LIBOR—the ghost of LIBOR, we might say—and the ghost of LIBOR is necessary because of those legacy contracts. Where I still get confused is that the reason LIBOR is being wound up, and the reason that the FCA can designate it in this manner, is that it is unrepresentative—yet for the ghost of LIBOR, or synthetic LIBOR, to have any validity, the FCA has to continue to compel submitters to submit information to it.”
“I assume that those criteria about the protection of the consumer and so on that the Minister referred to are in the Bill to protect the FCA from litigation risk by making clear that in acting on this, it was doing so in line with its statutory objectives, because the danger of litigation risk runs right through this.”
“My third question is about paragraph 4 of new article 21A, which says that the FCA must have regard to effects outside the UK of any decision to cease use of a benchmark. I can see why such a provision would be there, because LIBOR is used to underpin contracts all over the world. However, what can the regulator, which only has jurisdiction in the UK, do to stop the use of a benchmark elsewhere in the world? To what degree does this require work with other regulators through, for example, the Financial Stability Board, or is the judgment that action by the FCA alone would be enough, even though that action might have international effects, because of the importance of UK benchmarks? I suppose it is as if some jurisdiction has a particular influence in a sport, so when they change the rules, everybody else has to change the rules, too.”
“I thank the Minister for his explanation. This clause is about the prohibition of the use of benchmarks. Again, I have a few questions. Is it the case that prohibition can take place only after the kind of assessment of the representative nature of the benchmark that we discussed under clause 9(3), or are there other grounds for issuing a notice prohibiting the use of a benchmark, such as suspected criminal activity or manipulation in some other way? My second question is about use. New article 21A prohibits “new use” of a benchmark. I think the Minister is saying that there should not be new use of a benchmark, but there may be continued use for the reasons that we have discussed—for legacy reasons. Could the Minister confirm that existing contracts referenced in the benchmark would not be covered by this “new use” provision?”
“I have one or two questions to the Minister. The clause gives the FCA the power to mandate contributors, including those outside the UK—it will be interesting to see how that works—to continue to submit information to a benchmark for up to five years. However, clause 9 states that synthetic LIBOR—the ghost of LIBOR—can be kept going for up to 10 years. Why is it five years in this clause but 10 years in clause 9?”