YouSaid · the spoken record

Lacroix

lines on the record: 1,191
first: 2006-08-31
most recent: 2023-11-14
sittings or episodes: 115
sources: un-security-council

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“We welcome the signature of a partnership agreement between the G-5 Sahel secretariat and the Sahel Alliance in Niamey on 30 October, which was an important step to enhance coordination and cooperation in the Sahel. Furthermore, we echo the Secretary-General's calls on the G-5 Sahel member States to urgently create the Joint Force's support group to provide a forum for member States, donors and partners of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force. The African Union has a key role to play in that regard. Under its chairmanship, the support group could ensure linkages with other regional and political initiatives. We call on G-S Sahel countries to continue to address the critical governance shortfalls in the region that provide a fertile breeding ground for terrorism.”
2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source
“We therefore call on the Force leadership to take advantage of the technical support provided by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and to consolidate the achievements that have already been made on important dimensions of its compliance framework. Finally, any security initiative in the Sahel can be successful only if it is part of a larger, more holistic strategy for the region that addresses the underlying causes of instability while seeking political solutions to prioritize inclusive socioeconomic development. The United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, in conjunction with the G-5 Sahel's priority investment plan, provide the framework in which the Joint Force must be embedded.”
2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source
“We are encouraged by progress made by the Joint Force in the operationalization of the police component and the establishment of its compliance framework. Investigations into the two incidents in Boulekessi, and the transparency and cooperation demonstrated by both Malian authorities and the Joint Force's leadership are commendable. Respect for human rights is integral to achieving the operational aims of the Joint Force and a prerequisite for the overall success of that initiative. In fact, it will stand a chance only ifthe people of the Sahel are confident in the actions of their defence and security forces.”
2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source
“That points to the shortcomings of the current support model for the Joint Force, despite the best intentions of all actors involved. The Secretary-General has stated repeatedly that the Joint Force requires a different support mechanism, namely, a dedicated support office funded through assessed contributions. That would allow for more predictable and sustainable planning of support measures to permit the extension of support to the G-5 Sahel Joint Force beyond Malian territory and enable MINUSMA to focus exclusively on mandate implementation. I also echo the calls of the Secretary-General and the Heads of States of the G-5 Sahel a mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations for the Joint Force.”
2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source
“MINUSMA continues to face a funding gap of almost$30milliontoprovidethesupportitwasmandated to provide to the Joint Force pursuant to resolution 2391 (2017). While the Mission responded immediately and favourably to all of the Joint Force's requests for life-support consumables and transportation, it has lacked the funding to provide engineering support for the enhancement and fortification of the Joint Force's camp, which remains the biggest obstacle to its operationalization. Indeed, the Mission has undertaken all required assessments, presented scopes of work for four camps on Malian territory, and stands ready to begin engineering support as soon as the required resources become available. However, in the absence of funding there is not much the Mission can do.”
2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source
“However, much remains to be done. The Joint Force has still not attained full operational capacity. Major equipment shortfalls, capability gaps, insufficient infrastructure and a lack of secured operational bases continue to delay its full operationalization. We extend our deepest gratitude to the European Union, which has done an outstanding job in matching the Joint Force's needs with corresponding donor pledges and has also been an important donor to the Joint Force since its inception. Contributions by all the donors, which came swiftly forward, were instrumental in the start-up phase of the Joint Force. However, to date almost 50 per cent of pledges made have not been earmarked, let alone disbursed. We therefore urge donors to deliver on their commitments and to provide the financial support the Joint Force so urgently requires.”
2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source
“But in the long term, only an operation with a regional mandate and more clearly defined roles and responsibilities among the Joint Force, national armies and international forces will be effective in combating terrorism and transnational organized crime in the Sahel. We therefore encourage G-5 Sahel member States to agree on a common vision of the final status of the Joint Force. (spoke in English) Now more than ever, the G-5 Sahel Joint Force depends on the support of the international community. Remarkable progress has been in made in the area of force generation. The G-5 Sahel member States have deployed more than 80 per cent of their troops, manned all sector headquarters and completed the transfer of authority for all command posts. That is no small feat just over 12 months after the Joint Force reached initial operational capacity.”
2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source
“I therefore urge the leaders of the Joint Force to spare no effort to finalize the planning efforts and launch its next operations as soon as possible. That will send a strong signal to terrorist groups seeking to undermine State authority and destabilize the region, and will strengthen the confidence of the G-S's international partners. We also call on the G-5 Sahel to step up its efforts to coordinate the forces sent under G-5 framework and to further clarify the concept of operations of the Joint Force. The cross-border operations of the Joint Force, as part ofthe first phase of the concept of operations, are important and should be continued.”
2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source
“However, G-5 Sahel member States and Joint Force leaders have persevered in the face of what could have been a fatal blow to this important initiative. I take this opportunity to thank the outgoing Commander of the Joint Force, Brigadier General Dacko, for his service and to congratulate the new Force Commander, Brigadier General Hanena, on his appointment. I commend his leadership and the swift actions he has taken to ensure that efforts to operationalize the Joint Force are actively pursued. The decision taken by the G-5 Sahel Defence and Security Committee on 25 October in Niamey to relocate the Joint Force headquarters to Bamako should help to restore the momentum of the Joint Force. It is now essential that the Joint Force resume its operations without delay.”
2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source
“If we do not take forceful and coordinated measures forthwith to prevent terrorism, that scourge will spread even faster and further, and it will become even more difficult to address. In this hostile environment, the operationalization of the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel has not been easy. Over the past six months, it has faced serious obstacles, but has also overcome significant challenges. The attack on its headquarters in Sevare on 29 June was a striking reminder of how well informed, prepared and determined terrorist groups operating in the Sahel region are. The attack destroyed critical infrastructure and communications equipment, resulting in the temporary suspension of Joint Force operations.”
2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source
“The security situation in the Sahel remains extremely concerning and the recent trends detailed in the Secretary-General's report (S/2018/1006) are worrying. The increase in terrorist attacks against civilians, Government officials and security and defence forces, particularly in north-eastern Burkina Faso and the Niger, shows that the terrorist threat in the Sahel is spreading. As always, civilians are paying the highest price. Schools are closed, basic social services are no longer delivered, potential investments are being abandoned due to the climate of terror and fear that is taking hold there. This situation robs young people who are without prospects for a better future and real opportunities of hope, thereby creating a fertile ground for terrorism to thrive.”
2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source
“I am grateful for the opportunity to address the Council today, together with His Excellency President Buyoya, Permanent Secretary Sidikou and Deputy Secretary-General Serrano, with whom we enjoy a strong and fruitful partnership. It is a pleasure for me to update the Council on the operationalization of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-S Sahel) and the international support provided to it, including by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). I shall also identify the challenges encountered to date and list the measures that we believe are necessary for the success of the Force, in accordance with resolution 2391 (2017).”
2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source
“However, we must, of course, remain cautious; we do not know what tomorrow will bring. We will certainly continue our efforts to change mindsets and improve training and equipment, so that our peacekeepers can continue to deliver the Mission's mandate in the best possible conditions for their security and effectiveness.”
2018-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8376 (2018) · source
“That is an aspect that will be reflected in the six-month progress report requested by the Security Council to be submitted in March 2019. Before concluding my remarks, I wish to draw the Council's attention to a more hopeful sign in the midst of this challenging situation. We are indeed pleased to report that the past months have shown a consistent and marked decline in the number ofpeacekeepers killed or injured, despite sustained attacks by violent extremist groups. At this stage, while we should not attribute that decline - at least not exclusively - to the impact of the implementation of the recommendations of the report of retired Lieutenant General Santos Cruz, entitled Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers, this is, of course, an encouraging trend.”
2018-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8376 (2018) · source
“In that context, the G-5 Sahel Joint Force, for which the Secretary-General continues to provide his steadfast support, remains as relevant as ever. What is needed is a regionally driven solution to address instability in Mali and the region, which must be complemented by initiatives aimed at improving governance, resilience and development. Yet, if the Joint Force is to achieve any positive results in its fight against terrorism and transnational organized crime, it will require sustained and appropriate support from its international partners. Moreover, given the inter-operability and complementarity of the Joint Force with MINUSMA, it will be important to continue evaluating the impact of the Mission over and against the progressive operationalization of the Joint Force.”
2018-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8376 (2018) · source
“That framework will enable them to coordinate their actions in support of governance, peace and stabilization in order to improve their impact on the ground in a comprehensive way. (spoke in English) Over the past few months, we have also been witnessing an intensification in violent extremist attacks in neighbouring Burkina Faso. Insecurity is spreading fast, across and inside borders, with consequences ranging from the forced displacement of local communities to the erosion of State authority and the sharply diminished delivery ofbasic social services. That dire situation threatens not only the security of the peoples of Mali and the Sahel, but international security as a whole. We are all running against the clock.”
2018-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8376 (2018) · source
“In addition to exacerbating the situation with regard to humanitarian development in the country, as well as human rights, it could perpetuate a sense of frustration in the Malian population, which is struggling to see the concrete benefits of the agreement's implementation materialize. The restoration and extension of State authority must, therefore, be a priority in order to contribute to the delivery of concrete and measurable peace dividends on the ground. In that regard, as requested by the Security Council in resolution 2423 (2018), MINUSMA and the United Nations country team have begun developing a comprehensive strategic framework in support of the Malian Government's comprehensive security plan for the central regions.”
2018-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8376 (2018) · source
“I would like to express to the Security Council my extreme concern about the security situation in Mali, especially in the centre of the country - a region in which, during the two rounds ofthe presidential election, almost 80 per cent of the polling stations affected by a lack of security were concentrated. The Secretary- General notes in his latest report that that three-month period was the deadliest since the establishment of MINUSMA in 2013. Some 287 civilians were killed in targeted attacks, including by improvised explosive devices or mines and intercommunity clashes between armed self-defence or violent extremist groups. That situation continues to restrict the access of humanitarian actors to those who are most vulnerable and to limit the scope of action in terms of development interventions.”
2018-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8376 (2018) · source
“It was also an opportunity to highlight the complementarity of the political response in Mali, the support provided to the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-S Sahel), and the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. At the same time, I was encouraged during my visit to Mali by the willingness of all parties to the agreement to accelerate its implementation. The creation of a ministry that is specifically responsible for the implementation of the Agreement, headed by Mr. Lassine Bouare, is also a sign of the Government's strong commitment to pursuing that goal.”
2018-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8376 (2018) · source
“Progress on the implementation of the pact, as well as on the key provisions of the agreement, will be brought to the attention of the Security Council six months after the inauguration of the President of the Republic. If no progress has been made, those elements, supported by the work of the independent observer, will provide a solid basis for considering appropriate measures, if necessary. In that regard, I welcome the convening of the high-level meeting on Mali and the Sahel on 26 September on the sidelines of the general debate of the General Assembly here in New York, which enabled us to reaffirm the key role played by the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, including in response to the challenges that have arisen in the centre of the country.”
2018-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8376 (2018) · source
“The pact for peace, as requested by the Security Council in resolution 2423 (2018) and signed on 15 October by the Government and the United Nations at the meeting of the Agreement Monitoring Committee, is an essential tool to spur the efforts of the Malian parties, supported by the international community, to implement the Agreement and give new impetus to the peace process by focusing on inclusiveness. The pact does not replace the peace agreement. It underlines the importance of implementing the main provisions of the agreement, as stipulated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution and in the road map adopted by the parties on 22 March.”
2018-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8376 (2018) · source
“I therefore urge the Government and the opposition to engage in constructive political dialogue, based on inclusiveness and bearing national interests in mind. I also encourage Malian political actors to take the opportunity afforded by the presidential elections to build a more representative Parliament by promoting young people and women as candidates. In that regard, I welcome the composition of the new Government, which, in keeping with Malian law, is now more than 30 per cent female.”
2018-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8376 (2018) · source
“Delays in implementing the Agreement, along with certain crucial but stagnant initiatives to strengthen political dialogue, such as the charter for peace and national reconciliation, have also resulted in a lack of national cohesion, underscored by a fragmented political landscape. Differences in the electoral law and electoral register have also increased the number of opposition challenges to the results. I remain convinced that ongoing discussions for a possible postponement of the parliamentary elections will create a climate of consensus for successful constitutional review and electoral governance reforms. The elections will serve as a new litmus test of the cohesion of Mali's political class and society and as an important step towards the consolidation of democratic institutions.”
2018-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8376 (2018) · source
“At the same time, the holding of the elections should have been underpinned by further progress in the implementation of key institutional reforms, including the operationalization of interim authorities, constitutional reform, security sector reform and the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration process. In addition, the important role the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was forced to play in providing security at election sites has highlighted the low level of operationalization of the various Operational Coordination Mechanism units.”
2018-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8376 (2018) · source
“The successful holding of the elections demonstrated the political maturity of the Malian people and the commitment of the political class to the democratic process. In a particularly volatile security environment, the successful organization of the election also highlighted an important achievement of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali - the consensus reached among the signatories to the Agreement, as reflected in the vital role played by signatory armed groups in providing security at several election sites in the north of the country. Such consensus was undoubtedly the key factor that enabled the election to be held according to the electoral calendar and without major security incidents, despite reports of unrest in the centre of the country.”
2018-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8376 (2018) · source
“I thank you, Madam President, for this opportunity to brief the members of the Security Council on the most recent report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/20lS/866), and to inform them of the latest political, security and humanitarian developments in the country. The past three months were marked by the holding of a presidential election, which, as acknowledged by all election observers, took place in a generally peaceful atmosphere. I commend Prime Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga on his efforts to promote constructive political dialogue throughout the process. I also congratulate our colleague the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali, Mr. Annadif, whose good offices played a crucial role in easing tensions.”
2018-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8376 (2018) · source
“In the case of UNISFA, the support to the implementation of the 2012 cooperation agreements and the resolution of the status of Abyei and of the border needs to be reframed in such a way as to enable the parties to make meaningful progress. The Secretary- General's letter outlines recommendations that aim to achieve that goal.”
2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source
“Extensive consultations were undertaken by the Secretariat with the parties and the African Union to formulate these recommendations, which endeavour to match the situation on the ground by reducing troops from the Abyei area, introducing police to manage law and order, and enhancing the Mission's mandate to seize and advance progress on the Border Monitoring Mechanism, as well as to operationally support the African Union High-level Implementation Panel in its political efforts. The further engagement of the Council with the parties is necessary to agree on a mandate for UNISFA that would serve the parties as well as their border communities. In closing, let me reiterate that it is imperative that all peacekeeping missions address the changing needs on the ground and work towards achieving a political resolution.”
2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source
“With criminality increasing in the Abyei area, the recommendations call for the deployment of three formed police units and additional specialized individual police officers to enhance the Mission's focus on maintaining law and order and continue furthering peace between the local communities. These proposed changes are accommodated within the current uniformed personnel ceiling of 4,550.”
2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source
“The recommendations envisage the establishment of two further sector headquarters and team sites within the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, as required, to provide more comprehensive coverage of the border region. Troops would be transferred from the Abyei area to achieve full operating capability for the Border Monitoring Mechanism. This would harmonize the diminishing military threat with the corresponding reduction in military need for the Abyei area. With regard to the Abyei area, the military component of the Mission would concentrate its deployments along the borders of the area to safeguard against armed incursions.”
2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source
“Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism operations have markedly increased and picked up momentum within the past year due to the proactive push by the Security Council and UNISFA to further activities, including the establishment of team sites. The Border Monitoring Mechanism remains a vital part of the framework that regulates the relationship between the two countries and its normalization. It is in this regard that I request the Council to consider the recommendation in the Secretary-General's letter and allow for a modest adjustment in UNISFA'S mandate on the Mechanism, within current resources. This would provide the Mission with the ability to better support border-demarcation efforts by the African Union border programme, including the much-needed sensitization of the border communities that I highlighted earlier.”
2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source
“The Joint Border Commission is scheduled to meet in October. Despite only partial completion of the conditions contained in resolution 2412 (2018), the past few months witnessed a number of other positive developments in the relationship between the Sudan and South Sudan, not least among them the efforts undertaken by the Sudan in facilitating talks between the South Sudanese parties in Khartoum. Building on this promising collaboration between the parties, I call on the Council to consider the reconfiguration recommendations outlined by the Secretary-General in his letter of 20 August to adjust UNISFA to the current realities so as to best support both Governments in their efforts to implement their agreements.”
2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source
“Sensitization efforts are necessary to allay the concerns of the border communities, while emphasizing that in no way do the marking of border-crossing corridors and Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism operations prejudice the current or future legal status of the border. The upcoming meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism is expected to address sensitization issues with the border communities. Lastly, the African Union Border Programme convened the Joint Demarcation Committee - which is the sixth benchmark - from 10 to 13 September, in order to resume border demarcation discussions. However the parties were unable to advance their discussions on the boundary delimitation document, which would guide the demarcation exercise. Progress on that document stalled in 2017.”
2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source
“The meeting to be held on ll and 12 August and the subsequent meeting scheduled for 6 and 7 September were postponed to accommodate talks between the South Sudanese parties in Khartoum and subsequent consultations on the agreement reached on 30 August. The meeting scheduled for 17 and 18 September was postponed by the Sudan due to prior commitments of the Government. The African Union High-level Implementation Panel has scheduled the next meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism for 23 September. With regard to advancing the establishment of the border-crossing corridors - which are the fourth and fifth benchmarks - progress remains contingent on parties undertaking sensitization exercises with their border communities.”
2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source
“As a result, the committee recommended that the matter be referred to the Joint Political and Security Mechanism. With regard to the establishment of the fourth team site in the Abu Qussa/Wunkur area, the decision remains with the Joint Political and Security Mechanism to consider an alternative location due to the presence of rebel entities. Despite the efforts of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel to convene meetings of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism within the reporting period - which is the third benchmark - the three scheduled meetings were postponed by the parties.”
2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source
“Since March, both countries have authorized their senior national monitors based at the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism headquarters in Kadugli to provide approval. Consequently, all patrols undertaken by UNISFA since April have received approval without delay. On the second benchmark, which is finalizing the agreement on the four Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism team sites, UNISFA continues to operate a team site at Tishwin/Panakuac Within the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, and efforts continued within the reporting period to establish the other three team sites. The ad hoc committee for the 14 Mile Area met on 28 August, when the South Sudanese delegation stated that it was unable to convince local leaders to allow the establishment of the tweam sites in Safahah/ Kiir Adem and As Sumayah/Wierayen.”
2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source
“Mr. Lacroix: I thank you, Sir, for this opportunity to brief the Council on the continued support of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) to the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, specifically as per the Council's request to inform it on the progress made by the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan towards implementing the benchmarks outlined in resolution 2412 (2018). I would also like to briefly elaborate on the Secretary- General's recommendations to reconfigure UNISFA, as submitted in his letter of 20 August (S/2018/778). With regard to the first benchmark, which is facilitating the full freedom of movement, the Sudan and South Sudan maintained standing clearance for all UNISFA air and ground patrols within the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone.”
2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source
“At the same time, we must ensure that any further tasks are subject to the clear and detailed agreement of the parties to the conflict, as well as the United Nations. That will ensure that each task can be effectively carried out. Finally, we look forward to working with the Council, IGAD, the AU Peace and Security Council, the parties and all stakeholders to support the Agreement.”
2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source
“Several considerations of principle and practicality, however, must continue to guide these deliberations, including: first, the need for the protection of civilians to remain a key priority within the broader framework of the four pillars of the UNMISS mandate; secondly, the requirement to preserve a single, unified force, including a unified command and control structure, to ensure the continued effectiveness of the peacekeeping operation; and, finally, while UNMISS can contribute to a secure environment conducive to progress in implementing the Agreement, any further role in support of the envisioned security arrangements must be consistent with the principles of United Nations peacekeeping, as well as the standards to which we hold all troop- and police-contributing countries.”
2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source
“UNMISS will continue to perform the tasks required by its current mandate, with the required emphasis on the protection of civilians, which remains a priority for the Mission. The Regional Protection Force, an integral part of UNMISS, will also continue to play its role, according to its existing mandate. Should the Security Council deem it necessary and appropriate to amend the terms of the UNMISS mandate, we stand ready to support accordingly.”
2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source
“That verdict is a first step towards delivering justice to the victims of this war and curbing the culture of impunity. Let me end by reiterating that the signing of the revitalized Agreement offers an opportunity for South Sudan to turn a new page. Recognizing that the road ahead will be difficult, I cannot emphasize enough the critical role that IGAD must continue to play at this critical juncture in the search for peace in South Sudan. IGAD must continue to bring its influence to bear on the parties to the conflict to meet their obligations under the Agreement, including by ensuring that those responsible for Violating the Agreement are promptly identified and held to account. For our part, the United Nations stands ready to assist South Sudan to achieve the goals of the Agreement.”
2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source
“We must therefore send a strong message to the parties that, with the conclusion of the revitalized political Agreement, there is no justification for the continuation of violence, which continues to exact a heavy toll on the civilian population. We must once more call upon them to demonstrate leadership by taking the necessary steps to silence the guns, disengage forces, facilitate the free and unhindered movement of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and humanitarian partners and reverse the massive humanitarian and human toll of the conflict. With regard to taking measures to address the human rights and protection situation in the country, I wish to note the recent finding of a military court that 10 soldiers were guilty of committing Violence against civilians at the Terrain Hotel in Juba, in July 2016.”
2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source
“In advance of the integration of Taban Deng's forces into the SPLA, we also understand that there is a scramble to assemble fighters, including children, while we have yet to confirm any disengagement of forces, in accordance with the timelines of the revised Agreement. The continued fighting has worsened the already dire humanitarian and human rights situation in the country. Five years on, approximately 1.8 million persons are displaced within South Sudan, another 2.5 million are living in neighbouring countries. Extreme violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, threats and harassment experienced by civilians continues to be a key hallmark of the conflict.”
2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source
“Reports indicate that those hostilities are in response to alleged Government attempts to install local authorities in opposition-controlled areas. Both sides appear to have mobilized reinforcements to support those operations to secure territory. On 15 September, small-scale clashes were also reported around Nying, in Guit county in Unity state, between Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Opposition forces and Taban Deng Gai-aligned forces. Those incidents are reportedly associated with a push by Taban Deng to consolidate influence in his stronghold of Guit county. We remain concerned about the potential for further clashes where Government and opposition forces are in close proximity, particularly in parts of Central and Western Equatoria, Unity and Western Bahr el-Ghazal.”
2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source
“It will be crucial for the parties, notably the Government of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition, to build trust and muster the political will to work together to ensure a more protective environment that will allow all South Sudanese stakeholders, including women, to meaningfully engage in the full implementation of the Agreement. A full and immediate cessation of hostilities is an imperative first step. In that regard, it is of great concern that, within days of the signing of the Agreement, there have been reports offighting in Central Equatoria and Unity states. In particular, on 16 September in Central Equatoria, heavy clashes are said to have taken place in Jamula Centre and Mbudu in Kopera county. Hostilities were also reported in Kendiri and Mangalatore in Kajo-Kaji, on 13 September.”
2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source
“All the ingredients for success are present. However, there are legitimate questions and concerns about the commitment of the parties, and many practical aspects related to the implementation of the Agreement still require clarification. Despite those concerns, the need for peace in South Sudan is so urgent that we must seize this opportunity and work together to make the Agreement a basis for lasting peace. Moving forward, the onus of ensuring the implementation of the Agreement will, of course, be on the parties.”
2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source
“I commend the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), supported by the African Union (AU) and its international partners, for its sustained efforts to restore peace in South Sudan. The unity of purpose demonstrated by that collective group is indeed what contributed to that progress, including by impressing upon the parties that a military solution will not deliver sustainable peace. While Special Representative Haysom and Special Envoy Wais will provide a detailed assessment of the revitalized Agreement, let me just say that its signing is an important milestone in a crisis that is now entering its fifth year. Much like the 2015 Agreement, the revitalized Agreement, by and large, provides a road map for peace through reform, political transformation, security, social and economic development and national reconciliation.”
2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source
“Mr. Lacroix: I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the situation in South Sudan and the ongoing peace process since the publication of the Secretary-General's 90-day progress report (8/2018/831), on 11 September. As the Council is aware, there have been several developments, most important the signing, on 12 September, of a revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. The revitalized peace Agreement is the result of recent intensive engagement by leaders of the immediate region, supported by the international community, to bring about an inclusive and comprehensive resolution to the crisis in the country.”
2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source
“We hope to be able to count on the continued support of all Council members for Action for Peacekeeping and all our ongoing initiatives to foster a culture of continuous improvement and adaptation.”
2018-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8349 (2018) · source
“I am happy to report that, as of today, 55 Member States have endorsed the Declaration. The many troop- and police-contributing countries that have done so account for 65 per cent of all personnel contributions, a number that is increasing every day. The broad and cross-regional support for the Declaration reflects the strong consensus around the key objectives that it lays out. I want to express my thanks to all States that have already endorsed the Declaration. We look forward to a substantial number of additional endorsements before the high-level event on Action for Peacekeeping on 25 September. We also look forward to building upon the Declaration to continue strengthening United Nations peacekeeping. Finallly, we are gratified to see the Security Council's commitment to supporting our efforts to improve peacekeeping.”
2018-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8349 (2018) · source