YouSaid · the spoken record

Lacroix

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1,191
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2006-08-31
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2023-11-14
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un-security-council

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  1. Allow me to turn the Council's attention to UNDOF's incremental return and full resumption of operations on the Bravo side. Since I last briefed the Council in December (see S/PV.8432), the Mission has continued to conduct operational patrols on routes in the northern and central parts of the areas of separation and limitation. In addition, UNDOF continues to carry out assessment Visits and protected patrols to vacated United Nations positions and observation posts, including position 85 and observation post 57, in the southern part of the area of separation. UNDOF has also conducted, for the first time, route reconnaissance patrols to United Nations observation post 52 through the area of separation. UNDOF also continues to make progress in the refurbishment and reoccupation of its vacated positions.

    2019-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8495 (2019) · source

  2. UNDOF protested to the parties all violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement that it observed. The incidents of missile, rocket and other heavy weapons fire on 29 November, 20 January and 11 February, details of which the Secretary-General outlines in his report, illustrate the continued risk of escalation of the situation in the UNDOF area of operation. It is critical that the parties at all times respect the Disengagement of Forces Agreement so as to maintain stability on the Golan. The importance of the parties maintaining their liaison with UNDOF in the first instance cannot be overemphasized. We count on members of the Security Council to support efforts to sensitize both parties and regional stakeholders to the risks of escalation and the need to preserve the long-standing ceasefire between Israel and Syria.

    2019-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8495 (2019) · source

  3. Mr. Lacroix: I wish to thank you, Madam, for this opportunity to brief the Council on the situation in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) area of operation and on the activities of the Force and Observer Group Golan over the past three months, following the publication of the report of the Secretary-General on UNDOF (S/2019/248). As noted in the report, the ceasefire between Israel and Syria has been maintained, notwithstanding a number of violations observed by UNDOF of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement of 1974. They included the crossing of the ceasefire line by civilians from the Bravo side, the presence of unauthorized equipment and personnel in the areas of separation and limitation, and the firing into the area of separation and across the ceasefire line.

    2019-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8495 (2019) · source

  4. UNIFIL will continue to assist the parties to maintain calm and meet their obligations under resolution 1701 (2006). I would like to recognize the continued important role of UNIFIL under the leadership of Major General Del Col. I would also like to thank the Security Council for its continued support to UNIFIL. We will continue to keep the Council apprised of relevant developments.

    2018-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8432 (2018) · source

  5. On 16 December, about 500 people, including members of Parliament, participated in a seven-hour-long gathering in Meiss Ej Jabal. Many of them crossed the Blue Line in connection with the protest. On 17 December, in connection with works being carried out by the Israeli Defense Forces south of the Blue Line near Meiss Ej Jabal, a Lebanese Armed Forces soldier cocked his weapon, directing it towards the Israeli Defense Forces. That prompted a total of seven Lebanese Armed Forces and nine Israeli Defense Forces soldiers to take position, pointing their weapons at each other. UNIFIL's liaison branch, present throughout the entire period, intervened and was successful in de-escalating the situation. UNIFIL has deployed additional troops and liaison teams to sensitive locations along the Blue Line.

    2018-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8432 (2018) · source

  6. I commend both the Israeli Defense Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces for their stated commitment to continue to use the liaison and coordination arrangements established with UNIFIL and their intention to maintain the prevailing calm along the Blue Line and avoid any escalation. The potential for miscalculation, however, cannot be underestimated. The parties have been reminded that provocative activities along the Blue Line and heightened rhetoric contribute to an environment ofincreased risk. UNIFIL has observed subsequent gatherings of civilians in Meiss Ej Jabal (Sector West) in close proximity to the Blue Line. On 10 December, UNIFIL observed a group of 30 to 50 individuals in civilian clothes, led by a member of Parliament in Lebanon, gather near Meiss Ej Jabal, with several individuals crossing the Blue Line.

    2018-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8432 (2018) · source

  7. UNIFIL is actingjudiciously to complete its investigations of the tunnels - with technical teams on the ground - and to work with both parties to ensure that any tunnels, which are in violation of resolution 1701 (2006), are disabled decisively and safely. This is a matter of serious concern. The United Nations, including the Secretariat, has requested the Lebanese authorities to ensure urgent follow-up actions in accordance with the responsibilities of the Government of Lebanon pursuant to resolution 1701 (2006). UNIFIL has requested the Lebanese authorities to work with the mission to identify and disable any tunnels crossing the Blue Line from Lebanon in violation of resolution 1701 (2006).

    2018-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8432 (2018) · source

  8. A meeting of the tripartite mechanism took place on 5 December, at which there was an initial exchange of information between the two parties and a reaffirmation of their commitment to avoid any escalation. Based on additional information obtained by UNIFIL's technical teams, the Head of Mission and Force Commander held several meetings with the Lebanese authorities, including President Aoun. A thorough investigation to establish the trajectories and points of origin of the identified tunnels is a complex task. The tunnels are between 29 and 46 metres below ground, difficult to detect and in close proximity to areas that are sensitive for both parties. While the tunnels do not appear, thus far, to have exit points on the Israeli side, they are a serious violation ofresolution 1701 (2006).

    2018-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8432 (2018) · source

  9. Technical assessments carried out by UNIFIL further determined that at least two of those tunnels - one in the vicinity of Metulla, close to Kfar Kila, north of the Blue Line, and one near Zarit, close to Ramyah, north of the Blue Line - cross the Blue Line and constitute violations of resolution 1701 (2006). From the outset, UNIFL sought to accurately assess the alleged violations and to work with the parties to maintain the prevailing calm along the Blue Line. To that end, General Del C01, UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, in coordination with the Acting Special Coordinator for Lebanon, has consistently engaged with the authorities in Israel and Lebanon.

    2018-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8432 (2018) · source

  10. Mr. Lacroix: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on recent developments in northern Israel related to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). As members of the Council are aware, on 4 December the Israel Defense Forces announced that they were conducting Operation Northern Shield to uncover and disable tunnels believed to cross the Blue Line from Lebanon into Israel. Today, two weeks later, the Operation is ongoing. During that period, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) carried out a series of technical visits at suspected tunnel sites identified by the Israel Defense Forces near the Blue Line. Based on its own findings, UNIFIL confirmed the existence of four tunnels south of the Blue Line.

    2018-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8432 (2018) · source

  11. Nonetheless, the peace process is not yet assessed as being fully sustainable and irreversible and will need positive engagement and compromise from the parties and continued reinforcement if it is to deliver genuine hope and relief to the suffering South Sudanese populations. I also need to reiterate the imperative for IGAD and the African Union to continue their efforts in support of the peace process, and I reconfirm the commitment of the United Nations to assist their efforts.

    2018-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8431 (2018) · source

  12. In that regard, UNMISS will need to continue to dedicate adequate resources to its protection tasks in order to fully implement its mandate. In conclusion, as we find ourselves almost to the day exactly five years after the beginning of this conflict, I would like to re-emphasize our key message to the Council here today. The chance for peace in South Sudan has been created. More progress has been made in the past four months than in the previous four years. We need to acknowledge that new political reality and commend the parties, IGAD and the region for their efforts and achievement.

    2018-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8431 (2018) · source

  13. There can only be one UNMISS force to implement the Mission's mandate, and one chain of command for the force. Thirdly, as a United Nations force mandated by the Security Council, all future troop-contributing countries to be considered must satisfy United Nations standards in terms of training, equipment, human rights vetting, and political neutrality and impartiality. Last but certainly not least, in the light of the dire humanitarian situation and the continued plight of civilians, additional tasks that UNMISS could be asked to perform to support the peace process should not be at the operational or political cost of performing its protection functions, which remain absolutely essential in the current environment.

    2018-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8431 (2018) · source

  14. With regard to a possible reconfiguration of the UNMISS military component, I would like to reiterate some of the principles that we currently uphold with respect to all of our peacekeeping operations. First, the reconfiguration of UNMISS to support the transition must be preceded by the finalization of the agreement on transitional security arrangements, including a clear definition of the tasks that UNMISS would need to perform, which will then allow us to identify the capabilities required, their strength, and possible additional resources needed by the Mission. The RPF is a constituent part of UNMISS, and we will have to consider the totality of the Force requirements for its tasking. Secondly, unity of command within all blue helmets cannot be compromised.

    2018-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8431 (2018) · source

  15. We have been made aware of the IGAD Chiefs of Defence forces proposal to increase the strength of the Regional Protection Force (RPF) to support the transitional security arrangements which, as I mentioned, are yet to be agreed upon by the parties. The proposal recommends that the Sudan, Uganda, Somalia and Djibouti be added as troop-contributing countries to the UNMISS RPF. We have taken note of that proposal, which we understand will soon be communicated to the Security Council. On that issue, I would like to stress that the United Nations continues to commend the active role of the countries of the region, IGAD and the African Union, which made possible the conclusion of the Revitalized Agreement, and we are fully committed to supporting its implementation as required and mandated by the Council.

    2018-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8431 (2018) · source

  16. A security agreement will be needed to be communicated within the ranks and to reassure the commanders and combatants about their future. Without those, the institutions of transition, even when established, are unlikely to be functional. Incidents are likely to occur and the peace process will remain fragile. I would like to encourage the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to prioritize the finalization of the negotiations, which the United Nations stands ready to support. Secondly, a new Chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) also needs urgently to be appointed to shepherd the critical pre-transition negotiations and bring the architecture of the peace process to start substantive political preparations for the transition.

    2018-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8431 (2018) · source

  17. It is essential that the parties continue to build confidence and show the political will to work together to ensure a protective and inclusive environment that will allow all South Sudanese stakeholders, including civil society, women and youth, to meaningfully engage in the full implementation of the agreement. Moving forward, we strongly believe that there are two critical benchmarks that must be given top priority during the pre-transition period, which ends in May 2019. First, the parties must come to a comprehensive agreement on the security sector and on the establishment of transitional security arrangements. That is necessary to build confidence among the parties and to ensure the return and permanent presence of all the opposition in Juba.

    2018-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8431 (2018) · source

  18. The initial pessimism and outright rejection of the national dialogue by the opposition have transitioned into cautious optimism since President Kiir stepped down as convener. The national dialogue steering committee has advanced as an independent and more credible and transparent mechanism. As a result, the opposition parties suspicious ofthe process have begun to indicate possible willingness to engage in proceedings. However, we should be under no illusion that the participation of opposition groups in any subnational or community-level dialogue remains largely contingent upon the prospects they see for themselves within the implementation of the peace agreement at the national level.

    2018-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8431 (2018) · source

  19. The security-related committees have made little Visible progress, with discussions mainly focusing on the cantonment of military forces, their sustainment and subsequent reintegration process, rather than on a more holistic approach to security-sector reform, focusing on the requirements for a national army that is right-sized, affordable, depoliticized and focused on preserving the territorial integrity of South Sudan against external threat. They are expected to meet again this week in Juba and it is nonetheless encouraging that, over the past weekend, some representatives of SPLA-IO and the South Sudan Opposition Alliance are reported to have returned to Juba without force protection to participate in those meetings.

    2018-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8431 (2018) · source

  20. The National Pre-Transitional Committee, the highest- level implementation committee, has met but, most recently, failed to achieve a quorum. The Independent Boundary Commission, which is charged with settling the critical issue of state boundaries and the subsequent implementation of the Agreement within them during the transition period, is yet to meet, although the Technical Boundaries Committee met in Juba and discussed modalities before adjourning for the year.

    2018-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8431 (2018) · source

  21. Such brutality is indefensible and the parties must spare no effort in bringing to justice all those who were responsible for those atrocities. There can be no meaningful peace without an end to and accountability for the brutalizing of innocent civilians. However, that is an issue against which the international community must also continue to speak out and remind the parties that with such prevalent impunity, South Sudan will not be able to find the place it deserves in the community of nations. The responsibility to sustain the momentum in the implementation of the agreement lies solely with the parties. The positivity generated by the return of many of the committees and commissions to Juba, including opposition personnel, is mitigated by their delays and the lack of substantive discussions so far.

    2018-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8431 (2018) · source

  22. The humanitarian situation in the country remains of grave concern and is a direct consequence of the conflict. Attacks on humanitarian workers, the dangers posed to them and the impediments created by the parties to the conflict are unacceptable. We remain deeply concerned about the two UNMISS staff members arrested in 2014, whose whereabouts remain unknown. It is incumbent upon all parties, in particular the Government, to ensure a safer and more conducive environment for humanitarian workers who work tirelessly to deliver assistance to the most vulnerable of South Sudanese civilians. We condemn in the strongest terms the continued prevalence of sexual violence, of which the recent attacks in Unity are a stark reminder.

    2018-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8431 (2018) · source

  23. With regard to the horrific rapes in Bentiu, UNMISS proactively held urgent meetings with authorities and urged them to take immediate action to protect women and girls in the area and to hold the perpetrators of those terrible crimes to account. UNMISS peacekeepers immediately sent patrols to the area to provide a protective presence and the UNMISS human rights team has launched an investigation to identify the perpetrators. UNMISS engineers are also clearing foliage from the sides of the road so attackers will find it harder to conceal their presence. The Mission has also been urging armed forces in the area to guarantee command and control over their troops so as to ensure that rogue elements within their ranks are not involved in such criminal acts.

    2018-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8431 (2018) · source

  24. Between 4 and 6 December, the pro- Taban Deng-aligned forces allegedly carried out an attack on pro-Machar forces in Bil, Guit county, which resulted in 21 casualties. There are reports of fighting between the SSPDF and the non-signatory group, the National Salvation Front, in the Yei/Amadi area. We also have serious concerns about the attacks against civilians that continue unabated. More rape cases were reported following the abhorrent incidents of rape and sexual assault in areas along Nhialdiu and Guit roads near Bentiu. Intercommunal violence and criminality continue to affect the civilian population in general, and women and children in particular, the latter being the most vulnerable among civilians.

    2018-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8431 (2018) · source

  25. In Jonglei, as a result of similar meetings between the parties, there are reports that trade resumed from Ayod to Canal and from Wau to Pagong and Mogok. In Central Equatoria, a United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) patrol to Mugwo and Morobo in the Yei River area observed the return of populations from refugee camps to both places. In greater Bahr El-Ghazal, local state authorities in Raja town allowed opposition fighters to return, visit their families and interact with local authorities. On 8 December, after negotiations between SSPDF and pro-Machar forces in greater Bagari, road corridors between Wau town and greater Bagari were formally opened. Despite those positive developments, sporadic clashes also took place, indicating that improvements remain fragile.

    2018-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8431 (2018) · source

  26. That has led to the reopening of roads, the free movement of civilians, the movement of Government and opposition groups in areas under the other's control and the beginning of the return of some displaced populations to their areas of origin. In Upper Nile, routes between Malakal and Renk and from Fangak to Tonga have been reopened. According to humanitarian partners in Bunj, Maban county, South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF), formerly the Sudan People's Liberation Army, met with their pro-Machar Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) counterparts in Beneshowa and agreed to work together to ensure the unhindered movement of civilians in their respective areas of control. Similar arrangements were also agreed in a trilateral arrangement with the pro-Lam Akol National Democratic Alliance in the area.

    2018-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8431 (2018) · source

  27. Mr. Lacroix: I thank you, Sir, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the Secretary-General's report on South Sudan (S/2018/1103), as well as on the peace process and the situation on the ground. We are encouraged to report that, since the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, there has been a significant improvement in the general security situation in the country and the number of incidents among signatory parties has decreased. Commanders on the ground have reached out to one another, with and without the facilitation of the United Nations, and confidence-building measures have been initiated.

    2018-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8431 (2018) · source

  28. Under the leadership of Special Representative Zahir Tanin, the Mission will continue to focus its activities, among other priorities, on intercommunity trust-building, which is essential to the long-term normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina.

    2018-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8427 (2018) · source

  29. The recent developments in Kosovo have further deteriorated relations between Belgrade and Pristina, which have been strained for some time, with no progress on the EU-facilitated dialogue. We are concerned by the risk of tensions on the ground, particularly in northern Kosovo. It is therefore crucial that Belgrade and Pristina avoid any steps that could further worsen the situation, but rather find ways to re-engage in the dialogue aimed at the normalization of their mutual relations. In adhering to its status neutral approach, UNMIK is committed to working closely with KFOR, in line with resolution 1244 (1999), as well as with other international actors in Kosovo.

    2018-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8427 (2018) · source

  30. He underscored that resolution 1244 (1999) provides the sole legal framework for the international security presence, the Kosovo Force, which is entrusted with the responsibility ofensuring a safe and secure environment in Kosovo and that "any restriction to the discharge by KFOR of its security responsibilities would be inconsistent with that resolution." The Secretary- General has called on all parties concerned to exercise restraint and to refrain from actions that could raise tensions and cause a further setback in the European Union-facilitated dialogue for the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. Special Representative Tanin issued a similar statement in Pristina.

    2018-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8427 (2018) · source

  31. The European External Action Service stated that the mandate of the Kosovo Security Force should be changed only through an inclusive and gradual process, in accordance with Kosovo's Constitution, and expressed the expectation of the European Union that Kosovo would continue to uphold its obligations under the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations of April 2013 and its security arrangements. The Secretary-General has noted with concern the adoption of the laws by the Assembly of Kosovo.

    2018-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8427 (2018) · source

  32. They also called on the Kosovo Force (KFOR) not to allow the operation of any Kosovo army on the territory of Kosovo. Among international partners, the Secretary- General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) declared that the transition of the Kosovo Security Force is, in principle, a matter for Kosovo to decide upon. He nevertheless expressed regret at the decision of the Assembly of Kosovo, which he characterized as ill-timed and in disregard of the concerns previously raised by NATO. He also stressed the continued commitment of NATO, through KFOR, to a safe and secure environment in Kosovo.

    2018-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8427 (2018) · source

  33. Amid the tense atmosphere, the Assembly of Kosovo adopted on 14 December three laws, namely, the law on the Kosovo Security Force; the law on service in the Kosovo Security Force; and the law on the Ministry of Defence. The laws do not change the name of the Kosovo Security Force, which would require a constitutional amendment, yet they provide for substantial changes to be implemented over a period of time to the mandate, role and strength of the Kosovo Security Force. The Kosovo Government, in a statement issued following the adoption of the laws, underscored the right of Kosovo to have "an army; a multi-ethnic and professional force built under the highest NATO standards". In Belgrade, the Serbian authorities condemned the adoption of the laws as an act of "political aggression" against Serbia and a violation of resolution 1244 (1999).

    2018-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8427 (2018) · source

  34. The main Kosovo Serb political party - the Serbian List - has organized daily protests, centred in North Mitrovica, that have at times involved up to 5,000 people. Belgrade, for its part, stated that Pristina had violated the Central European Free Trade Agreement and stressed that it would resume its involvement in the European Union (EU)-facilitated dialogue only once Pristina revokes the import tax. Key international partners, including the European Union, also urged the Government of Kosovo to revoke the tax, while in Pristina Special Representative of the Secretary- General Tanin issued a statement expressing concern about the potential impact of the decision on the population of Kosovo and on the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina.

    2018-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8427 (2018) · source

  35. Mr. Lacroix: Since the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) briefed the Security Council on 14 November (see S/PV.8399), a number of developments in Kosovo have heightened tensions between Belgrade and Pristina. On 21 November, following Kosovo's failed bid to join INTERPOL, the Government of Kosovo announced an increase in the tariff on goods imported from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina from 10 to 100 per cent. In response, the mayors of the four Kosovo Serb-majority municipalities of northern Kosovo announced their resignations and the decision ofthe respective municipal assemblies to cease all official communication with the Pristina authorities.

    2018-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8427 (2018) · source

  36. In this regard, we stand ready to engage with the African Union, IGAD and our subregional partners, including with the AU- led African Women Leaders Network and FemWise, to continue to support the implementation of an inclusive and durable peace in South Sudan.

    2018-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8403 (2018) · source

  37. We understand that the assessment team concluded its one-week visit to South Sudan on 10 November. Consolidating this hard-won peace will be our foremost challenge in the weeks and months ahead, and time will be our greatest enemy. We are all too familiar with the consequences of delayed implementation timelines or realization of peace dividends for the people of South Sudan, who have suffered for far too long. During our visit, our advice to the authorities was to concretely demonstrate, without delay, their commitment to working together with all stakeholders to develop a detailed plan of action to implement the various aspects of the agreement, including security. A demonstration of such commitment would encourage international partners to play their role.

    2018-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8403 (2018) · source

  38. However, the following principles would need to be applied: first, a continuing priority of the protection of civilians in the mandated tasks of UNMISS; secondly, the need to preserve a single peacekeeping force with one unified command and control structure; and thirdly, that any addition to the force would have to be carried out consistent with the principles of peacekeeping and the standards to which we hold all troop- and police-contributing countries. We encouraged the parties, as well as IGAD, to engage with us and with Security Council members on these matters. In this vein, during the IGAD chiefs of defence staff/forces meeting held on 22 October in Khartoum, they mandated an assessment team to explore the possible addition of contingents from countries in the region to the Regional Protection Force.

    2018-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8403 (2018) · source

  39. In that respect, I cannot overemphasize the crucial role of the Security Council, the African Union, IGAD and the region to continue to hold the parties accountable and ensure that they abide by their obligations under the Agreement. It is clear that the solution to the conflict in South Sudan can only be political and not through military action. The United Nations stands ready as a continued partner of peace in supporting South Sudan. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) will continue to provide support, performing tasks within the bounds of its mandate. With respect to any possible evolution of the UNMISS mandate, including the Regional Protection Force, it will ultimately be for the Security Council to decide.

    2018-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8403 (2018) · source

  40. Sporadic clashes have also occurred between the South Sudan People's Defence Forces and SPLA-IO in various areas of southern Unity, and road ambushes and attacks between the two groups have continued in the Baggari area of Western Bahr el- Ghazal. Those incidents, together with the continuing intercommunal violence in parts of Jonglei and Lakes, continue to take a toll on civilians and exacerbate displacement and humanitarian needs. Reports of recruitment, including of children, by the parties in several parts of the country also betray our confidence in the parties to implement the agreement in full. The country's leaders and the parties will have to demonstrate their genuine commitment to making difficult decisions and compromises for its effective implementation.

    2018-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8403 (2018) · source

  41. Over the past two weeks, there have been reports of similar discussions in multiple locations across Unity, Jonglei, Western Bahr el- Ghazal, Eastern Equatoria and Central Equatoria. We are hopeful that those initial signs of goodwill are a demonstration of a stronger commitment to the current process than that which was seen in 2015. Notwithstanding those developments, I must continue to stress that there can be no viable or sustainable peace unless the parties adhere to a permanent ceasefire, silence the guns, disengage forces and include women as key players. While significantly reduced, there are still continued reports of fighting between the South Sudan People's Defence Forces and opposition forces, and between the SPLA-IO and various break-away factions of the opposition groups in Central Equatoria.

    2018-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8403 (2018) · source

  42. To that end, on 5 November the National Constitutional Amendment Committee drafted a constitutional amendment bill, incorporating the agreement into the 2011 Transitional Constitution of South Sudan. In addition, the National Pre-Transitional Committee convened its second meeting on 7 November. We have also observed some specific localized confidence-building measures in recent weeks between the South Sudan People's Defence Forces - formerly the Sudan People's Liberation Army - and the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO), indicating some efforts to open lines of communication. The first was a meeting between the two sides in Pagak, Upper Nile, in October, at which the South Sudan People's Defence Forces and SPLA-IO negotiated free movement in the town.

    2018-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8403 (2018) · source

  43. Riek Machar and other opposition leaders in the peace celebrations on31 Octoberin Juba, PresidentKiir's apology to the people of South Sudan for the immense suffering exacted by the conflict, and the release of political prisoners - including two high-profile political opposition detainees - are all positive gestures towards confidence-building and reconciliation. During the peace celebrations, President Kiir and Riek Machar had a face-to-face meeting that served as a confidence-building event in itself and paved the way for the National Pre-Transitional Committee and the reconstituted National Constitutional Amendment Committee to hold meetings in Juba.

    2018-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8403 (2018) · source

  44. Turning to developments in South Sudan, although slow, the parties are taking initial steps towards the implementation of the agreement. Since our visit on 15 October, the transitional national legislature has ratified the revitalized agreement, paving the way for its incorporation into the Transitional Constitution. On 21 October, the National Pre-Transitional Committee held its first meeting to begin coordinating activities for the pre-transitional period. The participation of Mr.

    2018-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8403 (2018) · source

  45. The women representatives from civil society and the Government in Juba echoed similar sentiments and stressed the need to respect the cessation of hostilities and to prioritize women's engagement in monitoring the quota implementation. They also called on the African Union and the United Nations to use all avenues to encourage their leaders to implement the agreement. It is imperative that women be represented in the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism, the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board and the transitional justice and reconciliation mechanisms, as stipulated in the agreement. At the local level, mechanisms enabling their voices to be heard would also be critical.

    2018-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8403 (2018) · source

  46. Honouring the provisions for women, in particular the guarantee of their 35 per cent representation across the executive arm, the IGAD Council of Ministers and the pre-transitional institutions will be of particular importance to achieving an inclusive and durable peace. Our consultations in the country were telling in that regard. While hopeful, the confidence of the women we spoke to in Bentiu - both from the town and the protection-of-civilians site - was low. They noted that, despite the agreement, their families were still falling victim to the violence. They stressed that this is not their war. They appealed to us and their leaders not to forget them, to create a protective environment and to ensure that women are included as key actors in the full implementation of the agreement.

    2018-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8403 (2018) · source

  47. I wish to again commend the mediation efforts of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which was supported by the African Union and international partners and was critical in securing the revitalized agreement. The agreement provides a road map for an inclusive political settlement of the conflict, but its signature is only the first step in a process that still has many challenges ahead. The pre-transitional period is critical and will require the South Sudanese leaders to assume their responsibilities and pave the way for the full implementation of the agreement.

    2018-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8403 (2018) · source

  48. I represented the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. As the Council knows, the revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan had just been signed on 12 September, and while it is pivotal to the peace process, scepticism about its ability to deliver a sustainable peace this time around remains a concern. Our objective was to express support for the revitalized peace agreement and to encourage its full and timely implementation, while emphasizing the importance of the representation and meaningful participation of women in the peace process and the need for the Government to ensure a protective environment for civilians, in particular women and girls.

    2018-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8403 (2018) · source

  49. Mr. Lacroix: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the joint African Union-United Nations high-level visit to South Sudan, which we undertook from 7 to 9 October. That was the first joint visit that also included UN-Women and focused on strengthening the partnership between our two institutions to achieve inclusive and gender-responsive peace and security in South Sudan. The African Union (AU) was represented by its Commissioner for Peace and Security, my friend and colleague Ambassador Sma'il Chergui; former Vice-President of Uganda, member of the Panel of the Wise and co-Chair of the Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation, or FemWise-Africa, Dr. Specioza Kazibwe; and the Executive Director of UN-Women, my colleague Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka.

    2018-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8403 (2018) · source

  50. The Malian peace process remains critical in that regard as a cornerstone of political efforts to address long-standing grievances. It is our shared and collective responsibility to ensure that the Joint Force succeeds. As such, I call on each and every one of us to do our part. The United Nations remains deeply committed to this important initiative.

    2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source