YouSaid · the spoken record

Lacroix

lines on the record: 1,191
first: 2006-08-31
most recent: 2023-11-14
sittings or episodes: 115
sources: un-security-council

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“There are a number of efforts that were made to that effect, and we feel it is our duty to continue. Secondly, we need adequate resources to continue implementing our mandates in environments that I think everybody around this table recognizes are very challenging and very difficult. Thirdly, it may be the case in some instances that our peace operations can be faced with unexpected situations that may have financial implications.”
2019-06-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8552 (2019) · source
“Mr. Lacroix: I will be very brief. I certainly do not want to turn the discussion into one primarily between the Security Council and myself. Most of the questions were addressed to my colleagues the Force Commanders, and they will be answering those questions. First, a question was posed directly to me regarding the financing of peacekeeping operations in Africa. I think there are two different levels for doing that. On one hand, the issue of making sure that United Nations operations in Africa have enough resources to deliver on their mandates is very important. I think, just to be very concise on this issue, there are three points there. The first is that we are committed to continuing our efforts to find efficiency and to make the best use ofthe resources that are given to us.”
2019-06-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8552 (2019) · source
“The Council will shortly hear from the Force Commander of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, Lieutenant General Leonard Ngondi; and the Force Commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, Major General Cheryl Pearce, whose experience, I am certain, will be most useful to the Council in its work.”
2019-06-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8552 (2019) · source
“I want to thank the Council and all the Member States that have expressed their solidarity and support in these difficult times. And through the Heads of military components, I want to recognize the work accomplished every day in very challenging situations by all the women and men serving under the United Nations flag, for the cause of peace. The topic that the Security Council has chosen for today's discussions, cooperation with host States, is key for the effectiveness of peace operations. I trust that this meeting will be most informative and beneficial for all of us.”
2019-06-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8552 (2019) · source
“This week also provides them with an opportunity to remain closely attuned to the major discussions happening here in New York on peacekeeping - in the Security Council, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Fifth Committee and other forums - and, ultimately, to our common efforts to enhance the impact of peacekeeping in the field. I would also like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to Major General Francis Vib Sanziri, Head of Mission and Force Commander of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), who passed away suddenly on 19 April. Through his distinguished leadership, Major General Vib Sanziri led UNDOF in a complex and challenging period. His passing away was a tragic loss for his colleagues and fellow peacekeepers in UNDOF, and for the whole United Nations family.”
2019-06-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8552 (2019) · source
“Mr. Lacroix: It is my pleasure to open this Security Council meeting on the occasion of the Head of Military Components Conference here in New York. I will be brief, as the purpose of today's meeting is for the Council to hear from the Force Commanders about their experiences in implementing the mandates negotiated and adopted by the Council. This gathering of the Force Commanders of our peacekeeping operations has become a yearly occasion, and it is a very important moment for peacekeeping. It directly contributes to our efforts to implement the Secretary-General's Action for Peacekeeping initiative. They will hold sessions on many topics of critical importance to advance the initiative, from performance to the protection of civilians, from conduct and discipline to women in peacekeeping, to name just a few.”
2019-06-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8552 (2019) · source
“That includes moving the contingents out of their camps and regrouping their equipment to El Fasher before eventually bringing them to Port Sudan and making sure that the necessary clearances are forthcoming. As I said, none of that has ever been completely easy, but we have been able to handle it so far. Of course, the interaction with the Sudanese authorities is very important in that context, and the fluid situation in Khartoum has had some impact on that, as I mentioned in my statement. Whatever potential impact that fluid situation may have on the overall security situation, not just in Darfur but in the rest of the country, may also potentially have an impact on the proceedings that I have briefly described. That is essentially what I would like to say in response to my Russian colleague's question.”
2019-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8549 (2019) · source
“Mr. Lacroix: I will be very brief. The representative of the Russian Federation asked a question regarding technical issues that could have an impact on the drawdown process. So far, UNAMID has been able to carry out the drawdown as decided by resolution 2429 (2018). A number of technical issues must be resolved, of course, but we are familiar with them and they have not prevented the drawdown process from taking place. At the same time, we have had to deal with logistical constraints and sometimes lengthy procedures, but those are things that we have been handling in cooperation with our Sudanese interlocutors. Based on that, the time frame within which we are usually able to redeploy our units out of the country is between six and nine months, more or less.”
2019-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8549 (2019) · source
“Finally, we call upon Security Council members to carefully consider the options for the drawdown and liquidation of UNAMID, in accordance with the guidance provided in resolution 2429 (2018) and in the light of all the aforementioned considerations.”
2019-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8549 (2019) · source
“With the final exit in mind, the strategic assessment revisited UNAMID's priorities to focus on, first, the revitalization ofthe political process, including through an updated United Nations-African Union strategy on the Darfur peace process; secondly, the strengthening of the Sudan's rule of law institutions; and thirdly, support to long-term stabilization through durable solutions for internally displaced persons and a sustainable rights- based approach for the Darfur population. In that context, the Mission would enhance the role of the State liaison functions as an innovative integration mechanism of the whole-of-system approach.”
2019-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8549 (2019) · source
“Moving forward, attention should be paid to the conflict drivers, namely, access to land and resources, climate change and environmental degradation, and human rights and protection. In that context, human rights violations, conflict-related sexual violence and sexual and gender-based violence remain a significant challenge, and for that reason the assessment report proposes specific medium- and long-term benchmarks. The State liaison functions framework, which the Council endorsed last year to focus on the rule of law, resilience and livelihood solutions, and immediate service delivery for internally displaced persons, will ensure the continuity of our intervention beyond UNAMID.”
2019-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8549 (2019) · source
“The special report reconfirms the continuation of those trends and concludes that peacekeeping is no longer the most appropriate tool to address the situation in Darfur, which will require UNAMID to appropriately adjust its posture, operations and capabilities towards the final stages of its existence. The report's conclusions therefore point to the continuation of the UNAMID drawdown process and its exit in 2020, in line with one of the proposed options, which were carefully crafted to shape a gradual and responsible drawdown reflecting the current realities. In addition, to ensure that this process corresponds to evolving realities on the ground, the assessment report proposes a review by November 2019.”
2019-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8549 (2019) · source
“The current context features a limited capacity of law enforcement and rule of law institutions; a prolonged humanitarian crisis, with some 1.5 million displaced persons living in camps, 90 per cent of whom cannot afford more than one food basket per day; and few viable development programmes. This confluence of factors requires a comprehensive approach beyond peacekeeping. The Security Council has acknowledged this shift since the adoption ofits resolution 2363 (2017), which called for the reconfiguration ofUNAMID along the two-pronged peacekeeping and peacebuilding approach. Last year, resolution 2429 (2018) endorsed the transition concept and supported the State liaison functions as its implementation vehicle along four peacebuilding priorities, while further reducing the footprint of the peacekeeping component.”
2019-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8549 (2019) · source
“While the assessment concluded that overall intercommunal violence has visibly declined, the conflict drivers related to access to land and resources, environmental degradation and human rights violations need to be further addressed. The Darfur political process is in a stalemate, despite a brief breakthrough in December last year achieved through intensive negotiations led by the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security. In the meantime, the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur continued, albeit at a slow pace, and the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation process was completed in all Darfur states at the locality level, formulating specific proposals for durable solutions for internally displaced persons and sustaining peace in Darfur.”
2019-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8549 (2019) · source
“In the meantime, we are putting in place plans and measures to prevent future incidents similar to the El Geneina looting. Against that backdrop, allow me to briefly introduce the main findings of the joint African Union-United Nations assessment, as reflected in the special report. The conflict trends in Darfur have remained the same since 2016. The only rebel group active there, the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid, is restricted to pockets of Jebel Marra, has limited operational capabilities and is increasingly fragmented by infighting factions. The other two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army- Minni Minawi and the Justice and Equality Movement- Gibril, while having lost their foothold in Darfur, remain active in the region and have become part and parcel of the Libyan conflict.”
2019-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8549 (2019) · source
“In that context, I would bring to the Council's attention two specific challenges faced by UNAMID to date that have unmistakably impacted its operations. These include, first, the looting the of El Geneina super camp on 14 and 15 May by civilians and members of the Sudanese security forces, which was reported to the Security Council in detail; and secondly, the Transitional Military Council decree 102 of 2019, issued on 13 May, requesting UNAMID to hand over all camps to the Rapid Support Forces, which is in contravention of United Nations rules and procedures. Given those developments, we have had no choice but to suspend the handover of UNAMID sites to the Sudanese authorities until the Transitional Military Council's decree is rescinded.”
2019-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8549 (2019) · source
“While the impact of the post-11 April events on the prevailing situation in Darfur has been so far moderate, the uncertainty of the negotiations' outcome may have repercussions well beyond Khartoum and lead to an escalation of violence. The 3 June attacks and killings of civilians, which the Council condemned, exemplify the risks. Further, the reported perpetration of such violence by actors such as the Rapid Support Forces, which are closely linked to Darfur, is worrisome for its civilian population there. I should add that while the Mission and its leadership are doing their utmost to maintain normal interactions with the current authorities, the prevailing fluid situation in Khartoum makes it more difficult for the Mission to pursue those contacts on a regular basis.”
2019-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8549 (2019) · source
“The special report before the Security Council was finalized against the backdrop of significant political developments at the national level which led to the beginning of drastic changes in the 30-year- old system of governance in the Sudan. Since then, further developments have taken place, resulting in an increasingly unpredictable situation. What started in December 2018 as social unrest triggered by socioeconomic grievances led to the removal of President Al-Bashir on 11 April and the subsequent takeover by the Transitional Military Council, which is currently negotiating with the umbrella opposition group of the Declaration of Freedom and Change Forces on the nature and the structure of the governance system.”
2019-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8549 (2019) · source
“Mr. Lacroix: I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the situation in Darfur in the context of the mandate renewal for the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). One year on from the adoption of resolution 2429 (2018), I am honoured to bring to the attention ofCouncil members a joint assessment of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on UNAMID, as submitted in their special report (S/20l9/445) of 30 May 2019, in line with paragraph 7 of the resolution. I will also shed light on the impact of the political and security developments in the wider Sudan since 11 April on the projected trajectory of UNAMID, which also led to the Council's decision to postpone the submission of the aforementioned report by one month.”
2019-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8549 (2019) · source
“In closing, let me reiterate that it is imperative that the gains achieved by UNISFA, as well as the communities in Abyei, be preserved and used to advance towards a political resolution of the border issues between the Sudan and South Sudan. I seek the continued support of the Security Council for the Secretary-General's recommendations, as set out in the report before the Council, to continue the reconfiguration of the mission and extend its mandate by another six months.”
2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source
“It is important to prevent the dispute over Abyei and the border regions between the Sudan and South Sudan from becoming another frozen conflict and to preserve the gains achieved by UNISFA. UNISFA continues to play a stabilizing role in the Abyei Area and along the border regions. However, the mission canprovide only a conducive environment for the parties, whose own efforts remain essential to progress. I am encouraged by the significantly improved relations between the two countries in the past year, as evidenced by the Sudan's role in facilitating the revitalized peace agreement reached by the South Sudanese parties and the resumption of joint oil operations. The Sudan and South Sudan should continue that positive trajectory and extend their cooperation to move forward on the resolution of their disputes.”
2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source
“In the same regard, I ask South Sudan to move forward with the joint planning exercise for the establishment of the Abyei police service. Also, pursuant to the request in resolution 2445 (2018), the report before the Council proposes an augmented civilian component in UNISFA to support the political process. The proposed civilian component would enable the mission to support the parties, the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and the African Union Commission to advance day-to- day solutions. That modest shift in the mission's role is necessary to match the reality on the ground. The proposed support is particularly pertinent given the difficult internal circumstances in both countries.”
2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source
“As for the increase in police personnel, while the selection of individual police officers and a formed police unit has been completed, the 130 visas from the Government of the Sudan necessary for their deployment remain outstanding. That particularly affects the team from Jordan needed to conduct a technical reconnaissance mission to Abyei before the deployment of the formed police unit from that country. As criminality remains the biggest challenge in the Abyei Area, I request the Council to urge the parties to take further steps to address law and order matters. I would like take advantage of this meeting to request the Sudan to issue visas expeditiously to facilitate the deployment of UNISFA's police personnel.”
2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source
“With regard to the Council's request in resolution 2445 (2018) for the reconfiguration of UNISFA, particularly the troop reduction and police increase, there have been delays in the process. In the first phase of reductions, 360 troops were set to be repatriated by 15 March. That has not yet taken place for certain reasons, including the helicopter crash on 9 February, which created a shortage in air assets, and the current situation in the Sudan. I will take this opportunity to pay tribute to the peacekeepers from Ethiopia who lost their lives as a result of that tragic incident. There are plans to start the repatriation process on 12 May, to be completed within a week.”
2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source
“In December last year, the team site at Tishwin noted the replacement of Sudanese military with police personnel at a camp within its areas of responsibility, while the Safaha/Kiir Adem and As Sumayah/Wierayen team sites within the 14 Mile Area continued to observe a South Sudanese military presence. Let me now turn to UNISFA'S operational challenges. With regard to the changing situation in the Sudan, thus far there has been no visible adverse impact on UNISFA's operations. It is too early to say whether that will provide opportunities for the settlement of the Abyei dispute. The mission maintains contact with interlocutors at the working level to ensure continuity of operations. However, it and Headquarters remain watchful of any issues that might hinder mandate implementation.”
2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source
“The Joint Political and Security Mechanism convened in ordinary sessions in October last year and March this year, meaning that they were not held under the auspices of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, as in past instances. That points to an improved relationship between the Sudan and South Sudan. The border demarcation discussions were markedly advanced, with the parties deciding to demarcate agreed sections ofthe boundary line between the Sudan and South Sudan. Regrettably, no progress was made on verifying border-crossing corridors or on establishing customs and migration offices. In addition, the redeployment of forces from the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone remains a challenge.”
2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source
“The Abyei Joint Oversight Committee has not met since November 2017. Let me now touch on the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. I welcome the adoption of resolution 2465 (2019) renewing UNISFA's support to the Mechanism. The parties made notable progress on five of the seven benchmarks outlined in the previous resolution 2438 (2018). The parties maintained standing clearance for all UNISFA patrols. Two team sites were established in the 14 Mile Area ofthe Safe Demilitarized Border Zone within the reporting period following extensive sensitization efforts by the South Sudanese local authorities to allay fears of border communities in the area.”
2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source
“In that regard, I would like to emphasize that this was first migration season since 2015 for which the situation no longer necessitated the implementation of the disengagement line, which I would recall was instituted by UNISFA to prevent large-scale intercommunal violence during the annual migration of the Misseriya and their cattle through the Abyei Area. That situation has been made possible by the communities' commitment to engage in dialogue in order to de-escalate tensions, together with UNISFA's proactive engagement with the communities and its robust military posture, particularly along possible f lashpoints. At the same time, regrettably, there was no tangible progress to further political dialogue between the Sudan and South Sudan on the issue of Abyei since the Council's previous consultations on the matter.”
2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source
“Mr. Lacroix: I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) and its support to the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, as set out in the Secretary- General's report (S/2019/319) before the Council. I shall also update Council members on recent developments since its publication. Despite sporadic incidents of violence, the situation in Abyei remained generally calm and stable. That is evidence ofthe efforts ofboth Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities to preserve peace in the area.”
2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source
“Obviously, as Minister Edmond noted, it is up to the competent Haitian authorities to pursue and complete the investigations under way. With regard to the investigation launched by the United Nations, it is advancing and we expect to share its results with the Security Council in the next report of the Secretary-General, whose date of issuance will be determined by the Security Council in its next resolution. Lastly, I should like to refer to the participation of women, in particular in the context of the coming elections. I encourage the Haitian authorities to enshrine in the future electoral law the constitutional provisions on the participation of women and to encourage their full participation in the next local and legislative consultations.”
2019-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8502 (2019) · source
“I shall briefly address several points, but first I should like to thank all speakers for their words of praise for the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and all our colleagues working in Haiti. Secondly, I also thank all representatives who expressed their intention to maintain their bilateral support for consolidating stability in Haiti. Whatever the Security Council may decide with respect to the nature of the future United Nations presence in Haiti, it is clear that maintaining and even strengthening such bilateral support Will be of particular importance. Thirdly, I should like to respond to the question concerning the investigations into the incidents that took place in La Saline.”
2019-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8502 (2019) · source
“Discussions are ongoing on targeting sectors that can be catalysts for further strengthening stability in the country. The United Nations partnership with Haiti is expected to develop in the near future, in line with our discussions with Haitian leaders and other key stakeholders. However, that partnership will remain strong and rooted in our ongoing commitment to democratic progress, security and prosperity for the Haitian people.”
2019-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8502 (2019) · source
“Options for such engagement include bilateral support to the country's development priorities, as outlined in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for 2017-2021, in particular to strengthen national capacities for stability and the rule of law. Support similar to the humanitarian priorities reflected in the 2019 humanitarian response plan, in particular food security, disaster management and the interruption of cholera transmission, which now seems achievable, will strengthen the resilience and preparedness of the Haitian people, thereby achieving continued progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals. In that context, I welcome the recent request of the Government of Haiti to the Secretary-General to access the Peacebuilding Fund.”
2019-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8502 (2019) · source
“At the same time, we would therefore phase out some activities, withdraw the operational presence of the United Nations police and prepare for a smooth transition to a post-peacekeeping presence. It will be a period of intense work, in which the sustained attention and political support of the Council to the Haitian people, the Mission and the preparations for the transition will help to maximize the impact of our collective efforts and ensure their continued success. I would like to call on the members of the Council, as well as the countries of the region, to increase their engagement with Haiti during this critical period.”
2019-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8502 (2019) · source
“We believe that the recommended small strategic advisory office, whose functions are described in the Secretary-General's report, is the ideal configuration to address such needs in Haiti at this time. Recent developments have only served to affirm that assessment. They have also again highlighted the importance of making parallel progress towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals through the activities of the United Nations country team in order to address the socioeconomic causes of instability in Haiti. If the Secretary-General's recommendations are adopted, MINUJUSTH's work over the next six months will be devoted to supporting the priorities of the Haitian leadership and people, as I mentioned earlier, as well as any other urgent priorities that meet the benchmarks.”
2019-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8502 (2019) · source
“We support the Haitian leaders' wish to end peacekeeping in Haiti and the mandate of MINUJUSTH in October of this year, as well as their desire for the Haitian authorities to take full responsibility for the country's security and the responsibility that it entails. We are confident of the Haitian National Police's ability to manage risks to the security without international operational support. For its part, the United Nations will continue to provide strategic advice to the HNP on its institutional development and on strengthening its logistical capacities, including through bilateral assistance. At the same time, the Secretary-General's recommendation to continue to support Haiti with good offices, human rights and advisory capacities is based on our assessment of the most pressing United Nations assistance needs.”
2019-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8502 (2019) · source
“While developments in the situation in Haiti since last July have underlined the country's political fluidity and economic fragility, we cannot lose sight of the progress made over the years and, more recently, in strengthening the country's institutions, with the Haitian National Police at the forefront. Looking at the matrix in annex I of the report before the Council, members can see that the Haitian National Police's five-year strategic development plan for 2017-2021 is on track. The ratio of police officers per 1,000 inhabitants is 1.32, close to the target of 1.45, and the percentage of HNP personnel present in the regions has exceeded 35 per cent.”
2019-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8502 (2019) · source
“In that respect, stronger efforts are required from all key actors to ensure the success of the committee's work and the crafting of a national vision able to bring about the economic reform essential to a healthy economy and to attracting direct investment, as well as measures for social protection, improving the rule of law, the fight against corruption, and, more urgently, the organization of the October elections in a timely manner and in accordance with international standards. (spoke in French) The end of peacekeeping in Haiti is within reach. In that context, in order to create the conditions for a successful transition, MINUJUSTH will continue to implement its mandate to continue and anchor progress in the implementation of the benchmarks.”
2019-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8502 (2019) · source
“The establishment by President Moise on 25 February of a facilitation committee for an intra-Haitian dialogue has the potential to revitalize the national cohesion process. The five-member committee, including four women, has started consultations with a broad range of stakeholders and is developing the dialogue methodology. Its report on the way forward is to be submitted by the end ofits 90-day mandate. While MINUJUSTH supports the work of the committee, including with expertise advising on technical and procedural aspects, the process of national dialogue is a complex one, especially in a context of lingering mistrust and polarization.”
2019-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8502 (2019) · source
“On the socioeconomic front, an agreement reached on 8 March among the International Monetary Fund, the Haitian Government and the Central Bank of Haiti has initially created a sense of optimism able to boost the fledging economy, which is characterized by high inflation, at 17 per cent, and a depreciating national currency. The concessional zero per-cent, three-year loan of $229 million was designed to provide support to the most vulnerable sectors of the population, while promoting governance reform and anti-corruption measures. However, it is no longer going forward, pending the appointment of a new Cabinet. The same is true for the submission of the draft 2018-19 State budget to Parliament and an electoral law for the October elections.”
2019-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8502 (2019) · source
“Through its community violence reduction expertise, MINUJUSTH is identifying areas of support for the implementation of the Commission's mandate. On the political front, on 18 March, in a tumultuous sequence of events, Prime Minister Ceant's Government was subjected to a motion of no confidence by Parliament's Lower Chamber of Deputies, with 93 votes in favour, 6 against and 3 abstentions, after an earlier interpellation session at the Senate failed to reach a quorum. President Moise has initiated consultations for the selection of his third Government since he took office in February 2017 and has appointed Minister of Culture Jean Michel Lapin as an interim Prime Minister of the caretaker Government.”
2019-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8502 (2019) · source
“In that context, we strongly condemn the attack on 27 March by heavily armed individuals against the Chilean Ambassador's convoy, which was visiting a project of a Chilean non-governmental organization in Croix de Bouquets, leaving one person dead and three individuals injured. The Haitian National Police (HNP) continued to demonstrate its capacity to handle security threats in the country, including through the planning and execution of anti-gang operations, with limited support from MINUJUSTH. Furthermore, the reactivation by President Moise of the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration on 12 March is an important step towards the assumption of national ownership in violence reduction efforts.”
2019-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8502 (2019) · source
“While efforts to improve the security situation yield mitigated results, political uncertainty has continued with the fall of the Government. No violent demonstrations have taken place since the 10 days of unrest in February, which regrettably led to 41 deaths and 100 injuries, according to the most recent estimates, and limitations to the enjoyment of human rights. The repeated mobilization calls by opposition and activist groups to the population, demanding the resignation ofthe President, gained little traction. Nevertheless, rival gang clashes, potentially mirroring conflicting interests linked to criminality, continued to disrupt life in the southern neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince and to produce isolated incidents in the North and Artibonite regions.”
2019-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8502 (2019) · source
“I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on recent developments in the situation in Haiti and on the implementation of resolution 2410 (2018), in the context of the Council's discussions on the recently issued report of the Secretary-General (S/2019/198). I am pleased to be accompanied today by His Excellency Mr. Bocchit Edmond, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Haiti, Ms. Michelle Bachelet, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and Ms. Loune Viaud, who is beside me. (spoke in English) Since the briefing by Special Representative La Lime in February and the publication of the Secretary- General's report on the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) on 1 March, developments in Haiti continue to combine progress in some areas and volatility or stagnation in others.”
2019-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8502 (2019) · source
“I am also grateful for the continued support of UNDOF troop-contributing countries. I also would like to thank members of the Council for their continued and steadfast support. The presence of UNDOF on the Golan remains essential in our shared efforts to prevent regional escalation. We continue to rely on the Council's support.”
2019-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8495 (2019) · source
“Such support and cooperation are also critical to ensuring the full freedom of movement and access to United Nations positions in the area of operations, and to reducing the delays and challenges that United Nations personnel experience in crossing the technical fence to United Nations observation posts and positions. In addition, the full utilization of the Quneitra crossing by UNDOF, in line with established procedures and Without any administrative obstacles, is important, in particular as UNDOF increases its operations on the Bravo side to facilitate effective and efficient mandate implementation. In conclusion, I wish to acknowledge and appreciate the continued dedication of UNDOF personnel and Observer Group Golan military observers serving under the leadership of Major General Francis Vib- Sanziri.”
2019-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8495 (2019) · source
“UNDOF, in consultation with both parties, continues to review the situation in the area separation in order to assess Whether the conditions on the ground would permit the return to vacated positions in the area of separation. We remain committed to supporting UNDOF in the implementation of the necessary mitigation measures, including force protection measures, at both United Nations positions and observation posts, as well as at Camp Ziouani and Camp Faouar. The importance of the continued support to and cooperation of the parties with UNDOF is of critical importance. It remains critical that the deployment of the necessary technology and equipment to UNDOF be seamless and expeditious. The support and cooperation of both Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic remains essential in this regard.”
2019-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8495 (2019) · source
“The completion of the redeployment and resumption of full operations in UNDOF's southern area of operation will be facilitated by the deployment to the Mission of a new mechanized company in July of this year, which is planned to occupy positions 85 and 68. I can reassure Council members and troop- contributing countries that in the implementation of the Mission's plan to gradually return to the Bravo side, the safety and security of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan personnel remain paramount. There is a continued significant threat to United Nations personnel in the UNDOF area of operation from explosive remnants of war and from the possible presence of sleeper cells of armed groups, including listed terrorist groups, particularly in the southern part of the area of separation.”
2019-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8495 (2019) · source
“Allow me, however, to underline that Observer Group Golan will not be deployed at observation posts in the area of separation on a permanent basis until such a time as conditions permit. UNDOF continues to regularly utilize the Quneitra crossing, which was reopened on 15 October 2018, to move equipment and personnel between the Alpha and Bravo sides. Pending the completion of the refurbishment of United Nations position at the Charlie gate and its reoccupation, UNDOF military police continued to deploy at the crossing point during the limited opening hours only to liaise with the respective sides on UNDOF personnel crossings. As Council members will be aware, the Quneitra crossing is important in facilitating efficient and effective UNDOF mandate implementation.”
2019-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8495 (2019) · source
“The refurbishment and reoccupation of United Nations position 32 was completed on 30 December 2018 through the deployment of 35 UNDOF military personnel. On 28 January, UNDOF commenced a limited reoccupation of position 37 to support engineering work related to the refurbishment of the facilities and the security infrastructure at the position. It is expected to be completed by the end of April. Following the reoccupation of position 37 we are planning for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of position 27 in the central part of the area of separation. During the reporting period, Observer Group Golan continued to maintain temporary observation posts in the central and northern parts of the area of separation.”
2019-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8495 (2019) · source