YouSaid · the spoken record

Lacroix

lines on the record: 1,191
first: 2006-08-31
most recent: 2023-11-14
sittings or episodes: 115
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“And finally, in line with A4P+ priority 7, our efforts to improve cooperation with host countries will enable smooth transitions, just as we witnessed in Darfur, where the United Nations police, in concert with the Sudan’s police force, helped facilitate the drawdown of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur and the transition to the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan, providing much-needed interim policing, police-planning capacities and knowledge transfer. In addition to integrating more technical tools and innovation in peacekeeping, the women and peace and security agenda is infused in all aspects of A4P+ and remains the foundation for improving our overall effectiveness.”
2021-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8901 (2021) · source
“Regarding priority 6, on strategic communications, in line with the joint initiatives on hate speech of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations, the United Nations police works to amplify the positive impact of our presence through enhanced strategic communications, including new engagement on social media platforms, as well as community-oriented policing and awareness-raising activities to combat misinformation/disinformation about the coronavirus disease pandemic in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, confront sexual and gender-based violence in South Sudan and encourage dialogue and trust between Cypriot communities. Further efforts will be made across all those missions to encourage more a network type of communication policies involving all mission components.”
2021-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8901 (2021) · source
“Conduct also relates to how we manage the environmental footprints of our mission, and the United Nations police continues to refine its Environmental Management Framework by aligning the initiatives of police components in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan with their missions’ environmental risk management plans.”
2021-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8901 (2021) · source
“In the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, former Police Commissioner Unaisi Bolatolu-Vuniwaqa, who recently finished her tour of duty and whom we thank for her outstanding leadership, put in place an exit analysis strategy that involves mandatory anonymous surveys of women police officers to gain insights into their experiences and areas in need of improvement, in order to foster their meaningful participation. The Mission is currently working to correct concrete concerns identified in the survey. To advance priority 5 — the accountability of peacekeepers — United Nation police reinforce zero-tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse, including through enhanced predeployment and in-mission training.”
2021-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8901 (2021) · source
“The Action Plan to Improve the Security of United Nations Peacekeepers, now in its fourth iteration, continues to structure our efforts to that end. At the same time, United Nations police carry on efforts to create an enabling environment, including by promoting women’s networks within our missions, which advise mission leadership on living conditions for women peacekeepers and how to foster gender-responsive working environments.”
2021-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8901 (2021) · source
“For example, the Police Division, together with the Integrated Training Service, continues to make progress in the development of curricula under the United Nations Police Training Architecture Programme. In addition, next week in Brindisi, the Police Division and the Integrated Training Service will organize the first police-only meeting of the Light Coordination Mechanism. The meeting will bring together capacity providers and recipients to discuss how best to deliver and receive capacity-building, share good practices, de-conflict capacity-building initiatives and target the areas of greatest need. To ensure the highest levels of accountability to peacekeepers, which is A4P+ priority 4, improving the safety and security of our personnel is critical.”
2021-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8901 (2021) · source
“The Task Force will enable us to unite efforts throughout the United Nations system and maximize our collective impact by drawing on our comparative advantages, expertise and know-how to foster representative, responsive and accountable policing services. To that end, United Nations police will also continue reinforcing its partnerships with regional and subregional organizations, particularly on strategic guidance, development and training. The Department aims to strengthen capabilities and mindsets, which lie at the core of the A4P+ priority 3, by aligning predeployment training by Member States with the Organization’s in-mission training.”
2021-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8901 (2021) · source
“Today I will discuss how, as a key component of the United Nations peacekeeping, United Nations police are helping to advance A4P+ priorities and further strengthen the effectiveness of our peacekeeping operations. I will also highlight areas in need of greater attention, and I would welcome hearing members’ own views in support of the A4P+ agenda. As we work to advance the priorities 1 and 2 of A4P+ and show the coherence behind political strategies and greater strategic and operational integration, I highlight that the Secretariat recently established the Inter-agency Task Force on Policing, co-chaired by the Department of Peace Operations and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.”
2021-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8901 (2021) · source
“Mr. Lacroix: I thank you, Madam President, for convening this briefing. I am especially pleased to be joined by two of our women Police Commissioners, who currently head our police components in Abyei and Mali, for this thematic discussion on women and peace and security in the context of United Nations police. This annual briefing to the Security Council is an opportunity to reaffirm the vital role that United Nations police play across the conflict-prevention spectrum, from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. It also provides a forum to discuss our achievements of the past year as well as priorities for the coming months. The Action for Peacekeeping initiative continues to guide our collective responses to the challenges facing peacekeeping. Action for Peacekeeping Plus (A4P+) is our implementation strategy to move that forward.”
2021-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8901 (2021) · source
“Finally, since this will be the last Security Council meeting for UNISFA’s Force Commander and acting Head of Mission, Major General Kefyalew Amde Tessema of Ethiopia, I wish to thank him for his steadfast leadership of the Mission and for his support as UNISFA transitions to a United Nations multinational peace operation.”
2021-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8887 (2021) · source
“As part of defining a strategic vision for the mission, it is important that a set of benchmarks be established in close coordination with the Sudan and South Sudan. Such benchmarks should contain specific requirements for the inclusion of women. In addition, they should be built around the joint mechanisms that the parties have already established towards the settlement of the Abyei issue. To conclude, I believe that the UNISFA strategic review has provided important recommendations for the mission’s further reconfiguration and contains solid options that will enhance UNISFA’s mandate implementation in the near future. I look forward to the Council’s further guidance on this matter and to the ongoing cooperation with the Governments of South Sudan and the Sudan in our support for the communities of Abyei.”
2021-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8887 (2021) · source
“I appreciated the 19 October statement by the Government of South Sudan in which it reaffirmed its commitment to the JBVMM and indicated that its work with communities in the Gok Machar area was ongoing. I hope that this will mean a swift return of the JBVMM to those three locations, as a lack of implementation of the Security Council mandate could jeopardize the overall peace and security in the border areas, in breach of the status- of-forces agreement between the Government of South Sudan and UNISFA. Fourthly, negotiations towards a political settlement concerning the Abyei area, with the Sudan and South Sudan in the lead, remain crucial building blocks towards an exit strategy for UNISFA.”
2021-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8887 (2021) · source
“One option would keep overall force numbers close to what they are currently; the second option proposes a lightly reduced troop ceiling, a move that will require more operational adjustments but should encourage the Sudan and South Sudan to move forward on outstanding issues with increased urgency. It is also recommended that the United Nations establish a rule-of-law support strategy. An additional outcome of the strategic review was the need for the JBVMM to remain as is. It is indeed regrettable that there have been serious challenges at three of the JBVMM’s five locations, that is, Kiir Adem/Safaha (team site 11); War Abar/As Samaya (team site 12), in the safe demilitarized border zone; and Gok Machar, in South Sudan.”
2021-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8887 (2021) · source
“Ethiopia’s women and men have done an outstanding job in Abyei over the past 10 years, as evidenced by the improved situation on the ground. I also take this opportunity to express my deepest condolences to the Government of Ethiopia and to the family impacted on the loss of one of Ethiopia’s peacekeepers in Gok Machar, South Sudan, on 14 September. Of course, we remember all the Ethiopian peacekeepers who have made the ultimate sacrifice during these 10 years. With respect to the military side of UNISFA, the strategic review proposes two viable options for the force.”
2021-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8887 (2021) · source
“I am also grateful for the continued cooperation of South Sudan in support of UNISFA. In view of the dynamics on the ground, we urge the parties to ensure effective support for our efforts to replace the contingents in the period ahead while preserving the gains made to date in building trust and providing security. The success of that process will be absolutely critical to make sure that UNISFA is able to continue as a mission and to continue implementing its mandate. Thus our planning towards a full replacement of the current military contingent with a multinational contingent will continue at full speed. I am grateful to the Government of Ethiopia, and particularly to its peacekeepers and their families, for their commitment to United Nations peacekeeping.”
2021-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8887 (2021) · source
“Secondly, the review team identified a significant trust deficit that remains between the communities in Abyei, particularly the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka, and noted an important space for United Nations peacebuilding, humanitarian, recovery and development assistance. The United Nations continues to prioritize support for that issue, and it is my hope that the Council will provide UNISFA with a continued, and somewhat strengthened, mandate in that particular area, while slowly but steadily identifying areas where the military and security side of the mission could start preparing for an eventual drawdown. Thirdly, it is too early to know what the impact of this week’s developments in Khartoum will mean for UNISFA on a day-to-day basis, but I am hopeful, as I know that all parties in the Sudan have so far supported the Mission.”
2021-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8887 (2021) · source
“What guided the team, first and foremost, was the rapidly changed situation in the Sudan and South Sudan over the past 10 years, since UNISFA was established. The improved relationship between the two Governments has started bearing fruit in the border areas as well as in Abyei, and the Secretary-General’s recommendations for the future of UNISFA build on that new reality. Despite the internal challenges that the Sudan and South Sudan each face, their bilateral commitment towards cooperation on outstanding issues remains. The upbeat political tone on the issue of Abyei that my strategic review team heard in Khartoum and Juba in June appears to have remained intact to date. I heard a similar message of hope for an overall peace in Abyei during my visit to the region last month.”
2021-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8887 (2021) · source
“At the request of the Council, a Department of Peace Operations team, jointly with the Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, the Department of Operational Support and the Department of Safety and Security, conducted in-person consultations with stakeholders in the Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia from 18 to 30 June. The recommendations on the way forward for UNISFA were shared with the Council in a letter from the Secretary-General dated 17 September. I will focus today on four main issues. First, the strategic review followed the request from the Security Council for a possible drawdown and exit strategy for UNISFA as set out in its resolutions 2550 (2020) and 2575 (2021).”
2021-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8887 (2021) · source
“Most of the new challenges during the past period related to the mandate of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), where representatives of the local community in Gok Machar made it difficult, and eventually impossible, for UNISFA to continue to support the implementation of the JBVMM mandate to a large extent. I will come back to this point when discussing the strategic review, and I appreciated the Security Council’s focus on the issue during its closed meeting held on 13 October, followed by a statement in support of UNISFA and the JBVMM dated 15 October (SC/14666). Allow me to move on to the strategic review of UNISFA.”
2021-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8887 (2021) · source
“The warming of the relations between the two countries was visible in Abyei when I was there a month ago; most of the threats to the community were of a criminal nature, not of a military one. UNISFA continued to build on that momentum in its engagement with the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan on all matters of relevance to the Mission. UNISFA — in close coordination with the Department of Peace Operations and the Department of Operational Support at the Secretariat — also spent significant energy and resources on the complex military and logistical planning that will be required as UNISFA transitions from a single-contingent to a multinational peace operation.”
2021-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8887 (2021) · source
“Mr. Lacroix: I am pleased to address the Security Council today on the situation in Abyei and on the strategic review of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). In the implementation of its mandate over the past reporting period, UNISFA successfully continued its work to protect the people of Abyei through its military and mine action presence and support to intercommunal dialogue, women’s participation in political life and the rule of law. UNISFA’s humanitarian and recovery work reached more than 103,000 vulnerable people. It is encouraging that both South Sudan and the Sudan have now established national committees on the question of Abyei.”
2021-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8887 (2021) · source
“The newly appointed acting Head of Mission/Force Commander has visited Khartoum to address a number of substantive issues pertaining to UNISFA’s mandate and the peace process. He has also visited Juba, where he interacted with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence and the South Sudan People’s Defence Force Chief of Staff, as well as with the Deputy co-Chair appointed by South Sudan of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee. He is committed to continuing his engagement with both parties. In conclusion, I would like to express my thanks for the continued support by the Security Council to UNISFA and seek the Council’s support for the Secretary-General’s recommendation to extend the mandate of UNISFA for a further period of six months, until 15 May 2021.”
2020-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8772 (2020) · source
“The Minister of Health of the Juba-appointed administration chaired the meeting, which was attended by representatives of UNISFA, the GOAL non-governmental organization and Save the Children. During the meeting, it was reported that 2,702 people had been screened within the Abyei Area to date and the cumulative number of confirmed cases since the outbreak of the pandemic was 52, while the cumulative number of related deaths was five. Since July to date, no new positive cases have been recorded in the Abyei Area. UNISFA has continued to engage with the Government of the Sudan and the Government of South Sudan to facilitate the implementation of the pending aspects of their previous agreements, despite the obstacles posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.”
2020-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8772 (2020) · source
“The reconnaissance visit for the Chinese official delegation was scheduled from 18 October and the Tanzanian official delegation is expected to conduct its field visit from 1 November. So far, the entry visas and travel permits to Abyei have still not been granted by the Sudanese authorities. Regarding COVID-19, the mission has reported 11 COVID-19 confirmed cases since the pandemic started, including one national civilian staff member, four international staff, two international contracted staff, two military staff officers and two members from troop-contributing countries. There was one suspected death of a female soldier. Locally, on 6 October, the Abyei Health Cluster meeting for COVID-19 was held at Ameth-bek Hospital.”
2020-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8772 (2020) · source
“Consequently, this situation will inevitably lead to the closure of some team sites in UNISFA and have a very negative impact on mandate implementation. The process of generating and deploying the three authorized formed police units has been hampered by the travel restrictions related to the COVID-19 outbreak, as well as the non-issuance of entry visas for the officials from those identified police-contributing countries (PCCs) intending to visit the Mission. On 4 October, two notes verbales were sent to the relevant authorities of the Sudan, requesting entry visas and travel permits to Abyei for the members of the reconnaissance teams from China and Tanzania. Those reconnaissance visits are mandatory for the PCCs, within the process of the deployment of their formed police units.”
2020-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8772 (2020) · source
“Aerial and ground monitoring missions were also put on hold due to COVID-19-related restrictions imposed by the host countries. While ground monitoring missions resumed on 27 July, the onset of the rainy season rendered most areas inaccessible. Under resolution 2519 (2020), the Security Council mandated the deployment of 640 police personnel, including three formed police units of 160 members each and 160 individual police officers. Currently, the staffing of the United Nations police stands at 35, out of which 16 officers are finishing their two-year assignment in October or November. Since no visas have been issued for any new officers who could be deployed as replacements, the strength of the police component will decrease to 19 officers.”
2020-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8772 (2020) · source
“They urged UNISFA to convene the traditional leaders conference before 1 November. UNISFA has emphasized the need to resume regular joint community peace committee meetings for the sake of peace and security within the communities. During the reporting period, minimum progress was made on JBVMM benchmarks and the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM) decisions, due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. That affected progress in the opening of the crossing corridors as agreed in the JPSM resolution of 19 February and border demarcation activities by both the Joint Border Commission and the Joint Demarcation Committee. The JPSM was unable to hold meetings as scheduled. Furthermore, planned JBVMM operational activities and meetings were suspended.”
2020-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8772 (2020) · source
“The pre-migration conference is aimed at resolving issues that could lead to conflict between herders and host communities along migration routes. On 17 October, members of the team met with officials of the Juba-appointed local administration in Abyei. The discussion centred around the need for the resumption of the joint community peace committee meeting and the proposed ore-migration conference for the forthcoming season. On 19 October, the team met with members of the Misseriya joint community peace committee at the Amiet market as part of the consultations towards the proposed pre-migration conference. The Misseriya warned that any delay in reaching an agreement between the two sides might lead to clashes and loss of lives along the migration corridors.”
2020-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8772 (2020) · source
“However, the incidents at Nainai and Kolom on 19 and 22 January, respectively, as well as the incident in Mabok on 13 April and the Ngok Dinka attack on Ibrahim village on 8 August 2020, compounded intercommunal tensions and negatively impacted peace efforts at the local level. UNISFA’s efforts to have community representatives engage within the framework of the joint community peace committee were unsuccessful. In order to address potential violence at the local level during the migration season, a technical committee of the 2020 pre-migration conference was formed, comprising UNISFA, the International Organization for Migration and the non-governmental organization Concordis International, to discuss the pastoralist movement along the three migration corridors in Abyei.”
2020-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8772 (2020) · source
“Two of the attacks against UNISFA personnel occurred on 24 April, and the third attack on 12 May, when two soldiers from the Force Protection Unit assigned to the JBVMM headquarters in Kadugli were fired upon while driving from the Kadugli base to Murta. In the fourth attack, an unknown armed group opened fire on an UNISFA convoy between Goli and Todach in Sector North, injuring three peacekeepers, one of them critically, who was subsequently airlifted to Addis Ababa for treatment. UNISFA continued to engage Ngok Dinka and Misseriya authorities and community leaders to further the local-level peace efforts.”
2020-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8772 (2020) · source
“On 20 August, the Chairman of the Sudan’s Sovereign Council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Al-Burhan, signed a decree appointing engineer Gumaa Dawood Musa Hamdan as Chief Administrator for the Abyei Administrative Area. This constitutes an unprecedented political development as it is the first time Abyei has two appointed chief administrators. The general security situation in Abyei during the reporting period remained rather volatile, with four attacks against UNISFA personnel being of particular concern and four instances of intercommunal violence, including armed attacks on villages.”
2020-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8772 (2020) · source
“The South Sudanese authorities facilitated the negotiation process that led to the signing of the agreement. Also, in a positive development, the Sudan and South Sudan have broached their intention to relaunch the political process, with senior officials from South Sudan travelling to Khartoum to meet with Sudanese authorities to discuss the final status of Abyei and border areas. However, despite this continued rapprochement between the Sudan and South Sudan, the peace process has made little progress in Abyei. The main developments at the local level were the appointments by Juba and Khartoum of their respective chief administrators. On 29 June, President Kiir Mayardit appointed Lieutenant General Kuol Diem Kuol as Chief Administrator for the Abyei Special Administrative Area.”
2020-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8772 (2020) · source
“Mr. Lacroix: I thank you, Madam President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on developments pertaining to the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), including its support to the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) and response to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. I shall also update the Council on the latest developments since the publication of the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei (S/2020/1019). The reporting period was marked by enhanced collaboration between the Sudan and South Sudan. On 3 October, a historic peace agreement was signed between the transitional Government of the Sudan, the Sudanese Revolutionary Front and the Sudan Liberation Movement-Minni Minnawi in Juba, South Sudan.”
2020-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8772 (2020) · source
“As we stand on the cusp of the historic peace agreement in Juba, we are heartened by the progress that has been made but also reminded of the significant challenges that remain. With the start of the implementation phase, it is essential that our support help to achieve improvements that can be felt by the people on the ground in Darfur, especially in strengthening the safety and security of Darfuris.”
2020-09-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8761 (2020) · source
“Taking into consideration the security situation, the impact of the peace process and the opportunities and challenges pertaining to the Government’s protection plan in Darfur, a joint AU-United Nations working group is developing options that may be presented to the Council to address protection-of-civilians needs and challenges subsequent to the expiry of UNAMID’s current mandate, in December 2020. Each option is being calibrated vis-à-vis the role of UNITAMS in order to ensure coordination and complementarity. To that end, we intend to ensure full consultation with the Sudanese Government, including by organizing experts-level and principals-level meetings of the tripartite mechanism.”
2020-09-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8761 (2020) · source
“It must be noted that with its uniformed presence focused on the greater Jebel Marra area, UNAMID is limited in its ability to respond to protection needs that arise elsewhere in Darfur, such as in the areas of significant intercommunal violence in West Darfur in July. The protection of civilians is also at the centre of the ongoing work to prepare the special report of the Chairperson of the African Union (AU) and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as requested by the Council, by the end of October.”
2020-09-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8761 (2020) · source
“This violence has coincided with a rise in protests demanding increased security by Darfuri communities, particularly internally displaced persons and others, who fear that they may fail to benefit from the final agreement and its implementation. The Government has responded to intercommunal clashes by deploying troops to quell the violence and by sending mediators to support the peaceful resolution of conflicts. However, while the Government has vowed to meet the legitimate security demands of the Darfuri people, it continues to face significant challenges, including limited capacity and a trust deficit, particularly in conflict-affected areas and IDP camps, where protection is most needed. UNAMID has worked closely with the Government to reinforce that capacity, engage the communities and calm tensions where they occur.”
2020-09-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8761 (2020) · source
“Continued intermittent clashes between Government forces and the SLA/AW, concentrated in parts of the Jebel Marra area, remain a challenge in this regard. Equally concerning, as talks in Juba have proceeded, has been the continued infighting between SLA/AW factions reportedly over disagreement on whether the group should join the negotiations, causing civilian deaths and significant displacement, mainly in parts of Central and South Darfur. The final steps towards the peace agreement have also been accompanied by a notable increase in intercommunal violence in Darfur in 2020, with major incidents in West, North and South Darfur.”
2020-09-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8761 (2020) · source
“In some locations, UNAMID police have already started joint patrols with the Sudan Police Force, including in Kutum, Saraf Umra and Kabkabiya in North Darfur. The situation concerning the coronavirus disease continues to impact UNAMID’s operations and movement, with the Mission placing focus on the provision of critical life support and core programmatic activities. Simultaneously, UNAMID has been collaborating with the Sudanese authorities to combat the spread of the virus and mitigate its impact, including prevention support to internally displaced person camps, prisons and justice institutions across Darfur. At the same time as it has been providing technical, advisory and logistics support to the peace process, UNAMID has remained focused on the protection of civilians as its strategic priority.”
2020-09-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8761 (2020) · source
“The security protocol stipulates that the permanent ceasefire committee and a third international party will take charge of the logistics of disarmament and demobilization efforts, including the establishment of gathering sites. UNAMID and the United Nations as a whole stand ready to help. As we await further indications from the parties with regard to specific actions to support implementation, UNAMID remains, for now, fully engaged with the Government, particularly in support of its national protection of civilians plan. Discussions to date have identified as priorities enhancing the capacity of rule-of-law institutions in implementing the national plan, as well as the training of trainers for the Sudanese joint forces on protection of civilians, international human rights and humanitarian law, child protection and women’s protection.”
2020-09-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8761 (2020) · source
“As the parties work to make the vision of the agreement into a reality, we in the international community have a responsibility to support them. In the agreement, the parties have called for guarantors and witnesses from the international community and the United Nations to support the implementation of the protocol on security, including through the provision of resources, expertise and advisers. It is foreseen, specifically, that the United Nations will chair the permanent ceasefire committee and have a representative in the joint supreme military committee, in the integration technical committee and in the Darfur regional disarmament, demobilization and reintegration commission.”
2020-09-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8761 (2020) · source
“This includes, as one of the key provisions of the security arrangements for Darfur, the creation of a 12,000-person joint security force within 90 days of the agreement’s signing, made up of 6,000 members from the Sudanese security forces and 6,000 from the signatory armed groups. As forces are deployed and resources are mobilized in support of the implementation, it is essential to ensure that local Darfuri communities feel ownership of the agreement and fully participate in the implementation. Financing, too, will be a key challenge and managing expectations of what the international community can deliver in the current international context will be critical. The Darfur armed movements have suggested that implementation will require $13 billion over a 10- year period, and the Government has indicated that it will commit $7.5 billion.”
2020-09-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8761 (2020) · source
“With continued armed clashes and protests in Darfur signalling the anxiety of Darfuri constituencies on the decisions being made in Khartoum and Juba, we must, now more than ever, work together to bring all stakeholders on board and work towards preventing a relapse into conflict, especially in the hot-spot areas that require continuous attention beyond the lifespan of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Furthermore, the implementation phase, which is now beginning, will be just as crucial as the drafting of the agreement itself.”
2020-09-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8761 (2020) · source
“Nonetheless, much work remains to be done to ensure that the goodwill shown in the negotiating process is translated into lasting and sustainable change on the ground. Key players, including the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW), are yet to join the process. The agreements, still a patchwork of documents negotiated on different tracks, are yet to be woven together into a single, unfractured vision of the future of the Sudan.”
2020-09-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8761 (2020) · source
“Mr. Lacroix: As Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo has just explained, after almost a year of talks the transitional Government of the Sudan, the Sudan Revolutionary Front and the Sudan Liberation Army- Minni Minawi joined their national and regional track counterparts in Juba for the initialling of a peace agreement on 31 August. This is obviously a very important milestone in the often-troubled history of Darfur, signifying hope for a more peaceful and prosperous future. I wholeheartedly commend the parties for their commitment to peace, as well as South Sudan for its critical role in mediating the agreement. As we meet here today, we are only just over a week away from the scheduled signing ceremony and the start of a new era for Darfur.”
2020-09-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8761 (2020) · source
“As part of its work in the Sahel, the Mission will spare no effort to provide the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel with operational and logistical support, in line with resolutions 2391 (2017) and 2480 (2019), and has responded positively to all requests it has received from the Joint Force. However, to date, the Joint Force has been unable to take full advantage of that support, as it does not have the capacity to transport the essential consumables that MINUSMA provides to all its sectors and contingents. Therefore, we are prepared to implement more creative and proactive solutions to ensure that the necessary support reaches the Joint Force, in line with the current mandate.”
2020-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8703 (2020) · source
“We are encouraged by the strong commitment expressed by the Heads of State of the countries of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel) to combat terrorism in Mali and the Sahel, with the support of other international forces. National and international forces play an essential role and their contribution remains vital, even if a military solution alone will not be enough to solve the problems faced by Mali and the region. The United Nations remains strongly committed to working with all its partners to address the root causes of terrorism, instability and violence in Mali and the Sahel.”
2020-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8703 (2020) · source
“I urge the Government of Mali to make it available as quickly as possible as per ongoing discussions. Increased and sophisticated capabilities notwithstanding, MINUSMA can only be as effective and efficient as the parties and partners want it to be. Political will remains the most important enabler for any peacekeeping operation to be effective. I therefore reiterate the Secretary-General’s appeal to all Malian leaders to display the necessary leadership and work together to address the challenges their country faces, with the support of the international community. (spoke in French) Lastly, MINUSMA is only one element of a broader collective response to address instability and violence and their root causes in Mali and the Sahel and to protect civilians.”
2020-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8703 (2020) · source
“The plan is ambitious and its successful implementation hinges upon the support of the Council and other member States, troop and police contributors, the host Government and other partners. Obtaining the required capabilities will be challenging, but I insist that it is indispensable for MINUSMA to deliver on its mandate. It is also an integral part of efforts to further enhance the Mission’s performance. I therefore call on all partners to support the implementation and help the Secretariat mobilize the required resources and capabilities to ensure that MINUSMA remains fit for purpose. In addition, in order to achieve the implementation of the plan and fulfil its mandate the Mission urgently requires access to additional land in both Gao and Mopti.”
2020-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8703 (2020) · source
“The plan is an integral part of an overarching strategy to support and enhance the Mission’s good offices, mediation, reconciliation, capacity-building and technical and logistical support to Malian authorities in order to stabilize and secure population hubs in the centre; create favourable conditions for the restoration and expansion of State authority across the country; and provide basic social services so that those who have suffered the most — ordinary Malians — will finally reap the benefits of the peace process. The plan provides for the establishment of a mobile task force that will enhance the Mission’s ability to implement its mandate and protect civilians. It will make MINUSMA more agile, flexible and mobile, with tailored units, enhanced capabilities and — most importantly — with additional air mobility.”
2020-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8703 (2020) · source