YouSaid · the spoken record

Lacroix

lines on the record: 1,191
first: 2006-08-31
most recent: 2023-11-14
sittings or episodes: 115
sources: un-security-council

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“That is also in line with the AU Peace and Security Council communique of 10 October, which stresses the need for the withdrawal of the Mission to take into account the progress made in the peace process. In the months ahead, our strategy to support the Government's efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace would also require adjusting UNAMID's priorities to focus on support for the peace process, the tasks related to the implementation of the peace agreement, the Peace Commission and the strengthening of the State liaison functions and their expansion in Jebel Marra. I would like to conclude by echoing a key message that we have repeatedly heard during our visit. Effective peace consolidation in Darfur and the wider Sudan cannot be achieved without tangible progress on the economic recovery front.”
2019-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8643 (2019) · source
“The United Nations would also maintain a presence in vacated areas through the State liaison functions that would be established to bring together UNAMID, the United Nations country team and Sudanese Government institutions in support of the rule of law, human rights and durable solutions for IDPs and local communities. I should note, however, that based on our interactions with many stakeholders on the ground and our consultations last week with the African Union Peace and Security Council, our recommendation would be to adopt an approach that would align the next phase of the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Darfur with the pace ofthe peace talks in Juba, and therefore the first option would be more consistent with this approach.”
2019-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8643 (2019) · source
“As mentioned in the special report of May, while the military component would be consolidated into fewer sites, the Mission would maintain an appropriate reserve capacity to intervene in extremis situations in locations from which UNAMID has withdrawn, such as when the physical protection of civilians is required. Under the second option, UNAMID would proceed with its drawdown, as outlined in our previous report, with a view to completing the drawdown by end of June 2020. For both options, we agreed with the Government during the recent tripartite meeting that closed team sites would be handed over to the transitional authorities, in line with United Nations rules and regulations for civilian-end purposes and in accordance with the sequenced handover plan already developed by UNAMID and the Government.”
2019-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8643 (2019) · source
“In the first, consistent with the AU Peace and Security Council communique of 13 June, we are proposing to undertake a geographical realignment of UNAMID's footprint from the 13 locations currently remaining down to five team sites, mainly located in central Jebel Marra, where armed elements are still active. This option takes into account the conflict trends of the past year, as presented in the 30 May report, and prioritizes those sites that had seen no major security incidents during the reporting period. Accordingly, and for an initial period of six months, which coincides with the anticipated duration of the talks, UNAMID would retain the same ceiling of uniformed personnel.”
2019-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8643 (2019) · source
“Consistent with the political strategy outlined in the report before the Council, we stressed during our meetings in Khartoum the readiness of the AU and the United Nations to actively support the ongoing talks with a view to ensuring that the peace process remains inclusive of all armed groups in Darfur and the Two Areas. In resolution 2479 (2019), the Security Council requests the AU Commission Chairperson and the Secretary-General to provide recommendations on the appropriate course of action regarding the drawdown of UNAMID. In the light of the recent developments on the ground, the report contains two options for the Security Council's consideration.”
2019-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8643 (2019) · source
“However, during the 27th meeting of the Tripartite Coordination Mechanism on UNMAMID, in Khartoum on 7 October, we established a joint task force that should finalize options for a possible follow- on presence to be presented in the December 2019 progress report to be submitted to the two Councils. It should be noted that, in our consultations with Sudanese authorities, we have emphasized the importance for any follow-on presence to be guided by the priorities set out by the Government in order to ensure full ownership of this possible future partnership for peacebuilding in the Sudan.”
2019-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8643 (2019) · source
“In this context, our interlocutors deplored the fact that, despite Prime Minister Hamdok's initiative to meet with Abdul Wahid Al-Nur of the SLA-AW in Paris on 30 September, the latter has continued to reject the transition process and the new Government and is yet to join the peace talks process. In our view, every effort should be made to impress upon all concerned groups the imperative of seizing the momentum for peace. Looking ahead, the Government has requested more time to formulate its needs for a possible follow- on mechanism to UNAMID, making us unable to respond to the Council's request for options at this time.”
2019-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8643 (2019) · source
“In this context, Members of the Security Council will recall that among the streamlined benchmarks developed by the joint United Nations-AU strategic review of UNAMID earlier this year and presented in the 30 Mayjoint report of the African Union Commission and the Secretary- General (S/2019/445), a specific reference was made to the importance of resuming peace talks with a view to reaching comprehensive peace across Darfur so as to create the conditions for a successful exit strategy for UNAMID. During our meetings, Government officials also insisted on the need for the international community to unequivocally support the new momentum for peace in Darfur and the Two Areas, initiated with the ongoing talks in Juba.”
2019-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8643 (2019) · source
“It was also a chance to discuss the prospects for longer-term engagement by the AU and the United Nations following UNAMID's departure. During our meeting, Prime Minister Hamdok made a strong request for a well-sequenced transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Darfur, aligned with the Government's priorities and time frame, that would take the ongoing talks into consideration in defining the next steps. The Prime Minister indicated that this request was based on the concerns expressed by the armed groups during their consultations with the Government of the Sudan that led to the adoption of the Juba Declaration on 11 September.”
2019-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8643 (2019) · source
“The extension of the State liaison functions to the greater Jebel Marra area is planned to begin in January 2020, although security concerns and the limited presence of the United Nations country team in that area continue to challenge the expansion process there. Let me now say a few words on the Visit we just concluded with Commissioner Chergui, which gave us a timely opportunity to review progress made in the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Darfur, in the light of the most recent developments and ahead of the envisioned closure of UNAMID. We were able to discuss with Sudanese counterparts the challenges facing Government institutions in taking over key responsibilities entrusted heretofore to UNAMID, including for the protection of civilians and security.”
2019-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8643 (2019) · source
“Over 8 million people are estimated to need humanitarian assistance or protection. The Mission has continued to implement its mandate, including on the protection of civilians. Despite challenges, UNAMID's transition-related activities have also continued, with joint programmatic activities with the United Nations country team undertaken within the framework of the State liaison functions in four Darfur states. The State liaison functions have contributed to enhancing the United Nations country team's presence and operations in Darfur, for example in East Darfur, where nine agencies, funds and programmes are currently operating, compared to five prior to January 2019.”
2019-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8643 (2019) · source
“The humanitarian situation continued to be characterized by the trends identified in our special report of 30 May (S/2019/445). Since then, more people have been displaced as a result of intercommunal conflict and of fighting between security forces and the SLA-AW. As of the end of August, the peak of the lean season, more than 1.8 million people were facing phase 3 or phase 4 levels of food insecurity across Central, East, North and South Darfur. This represents 17 to 24 per cent of the population, depending on the state, compared to an average of 14 per cent for the whole of the Sudan. Meanwhile, the overall humanitarian situation in the Sudan is getting worse as the economic crisis compounds the impact of conflict, political instability, natural hazards and disease outbreaks.”
2019-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8643 (2019) · source
“However, the Mission has noted that the gradual shift of the attention of the authorities to the security challenges in Khartoum has contributed to leaving some gaps in the effective functioning of security institutions across the Darfur states, where incidents of criminality have increased. This has been the case particularly in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the number of incidents of farm destruction and unlawful occupation of land in various parts of Darfur was reported to be higher than during the same period last year. Meanwhile, intermittent armed clashes between Government forces and the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) continued in the Jebel Marra area, with the movement targeting Sudan Armed Forces positions around Golo.”
2019-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8643 (2019) · source
“On 16 October, negotiations were suspended for 24 hours after the Sudan People's Liberation Movement- North, led by Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu, suspended its participation, accusing the Government of violating the cessation of hostilities in Khor Waral, in South Kordofan. The authorities have indicated that the clashes involved herders and merchants, and condemned these incidents. The Head of the Sovereign Council, General Al-Burhan, also issued a decree announcing a nationwide ceasefire on the same day. While the effects of these talks on the ground are yet to be seen, the overall security situation in Darfur has remained largely unchanged since my last briefing, despite several incidents detailed in the report before the Council (S/2019/816).”
2019-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8643 (2019) · source
“The Declaration constitutes a road map and trust-building agreement for the peace process, under which the parties have agreed on, among other measures, a ceasefire, the opening of humanitarian corridors, the release of war prisoners, the end of travel bans for the movements' leaders, and the establishment of a preparatory committee for peace negotiations. As Council members are aware, negotiations began on 14 October in Juba, with the objective of reaching a peace agreement by 14 December. It should be noted that, for the first time in the modern history of the Sudan, this process is expected to be widely inclusive of almost all armed groups.”
2019-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8643 (2019) · source
“He articulated those same priorities during his remarks at the high-level event on the Sudan on 27 September in New York, which he co-chaired with the Secretary- General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission. Consistent with the priorities set out in the Constitutional Declaration signed on 17 August, including the one related to the urgent need to end conflicts across the Sudan, on 11 September the Sovereign Council and a number of armed groups, including several Darfuri groups, signed, under the auspices of President Salva Kiir Mayardit of South Sudan, the Juba Declaration for Confidence-building Procedures and the Preparation for Negotiation.”
2019-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8643 (2019) · source
“On 10 October in Addis Ababa, we also briefed the African Union Peace and Security Council. I will share my impressions from that joint visit in a moment. Since my most recent briefing on the situation in Darfur on 26 August (see S/PV.8603), remarkable developments have taken place in the Sudan. On 8 September, a new Cabinet led by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok was sworn in. Four members of the new Cabinet are women, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Prime Minister Hamdok rapidly articulated the priorities of his Cabinet, which are focused primarily on achieving lasting and comprehensive peace across the Sudan and the urgently needed economic recovery.”
2019-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8643 (2019) · source
“Mr. Lacroix: I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council, in line with resolution 2479 (2019). I have just returned from the Sudan, where I travelled from 7 to 10 October with Mr. Sma'il Chergui, African Union (AU) Commissioner for Peace and Security. During our visit, we met with Mr. Abdalla Hamdok, Prime Minister of the Sudan, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, Vice-Chair of the Sovereign Council, as well as the diplomatic community and senior officials at central and local Government levels, including the Acting Wali of Northern Darfur, during a one-day field trip to El Fasher. During our visit, we also held on 7 October the 27th meeting of the Tripartite Coordination Mechanism on the United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), together with senior representatives of the Sudanese Foreign Ministry.”
2019-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8643 (2019) · source
“(spoke in French) Considerable progress has been made in Haiti over the past 15 years but the gains of stability remain fragile and must be further rooted in democracy and development. The start of BINUH's operations tomorrow will mark a renewed United Nations commitment to the stability and prosperity of Haiti. I take this opportunity to encourage the Haitian people to continue to work closely with the United Nations in order to preserve and strengthen the progress made and to realize their aspirations for the future.”
2019-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8641 (2019) · source
“The sustained efforts to support the Government of Haiti in eliminating the transmission of cholera and alleviating the suffering of the Haitian people remain a key focus of the United Nations, under the leadership of the Special Envoy for Haiti, Josette Sheeran. Those efforts have led to enormous progress. Ms. Sheeran will make a public announcement on the results achieved and on the requirements for follow-up actions in the coming days. The United Nations will also continue to address pending sexual exploitation and abuse and paternity cases from the peacekeeping period and provide support to the victims and their families. We will work with national authorities and institutions in Haiti and other Member States concerned to ensure that the rights and dignity of the victims remain at the centre of all of our efforts.”
2019-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8641 (2019) · source
“Similarly, the new indicators, requested by the Council and presented in the Secretary-General's report (S/2019/805), reflect a stronger political orientation and include socioeconomic objectives that are essential for Haiti's stability, in line with the Sustainable Development Goals. (spoke in English) Today, we also remember the difficult parts of MINUSTAH's life and legacy, and those who have been adversely affected by it. The end of peacekeeping does not put an end to the work of the United Nations in eliminating cholera nor does it put an end to our efforts to address sexual exploitation and abuse and related paternity cases.”
2019-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8641 (2019) · source
“Through that transition, the capacities of the United Nations will be adapted to meet the needs on the ground and the political role and good offices will be undertaken by the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), which will focus on promoting political solutions while the country team will take over all programme and technical support activities. The principle of the peace, security and development nexus has guided all our planning for the transition, by identifying the specific priorities of the United Nations for the coming period and by providing integrated support for their implementation.”
2019-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8641 (2019) · source
“Lasting stability must be anchored in sustainable development. Turning that principle into practice has proved to be challenging in Haiti. (spoke in French) In that difficult context, the closure of MINUJUSTH does not mean that the United Nations will leave Haiti. On the contrary, it will lead to ongoing United Nations support for Haiti in another form. Building on the achievements and lessons learned from MINUSTAH and MINUJUSTH and facilitated by the reforms undertaken by the Secretary-General within the Organization, the transition of peacekeeping is an opportunity to refocus the priorities of the United Nations system in order to bring the right kind of support at the right time for the Haitian people.”
2019-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8641 (2019) · source
“The support provided by MINUSTAH and MINUJUSTH in the area of human rights has strengthened the ability of the national human rights institution and civil society organizations to promote and protect human rights, as well as to foster accountability for human rights violations and redress for victims. Those achievements do not, however, mask the fact that Haiti continues to need the support of the international community and of the United Nations. While peacekeeping in Haiti has done a lot to create an enabling environment for political and democratic processes to take place, there is a need for more political solutions to systemic political challenges. The unfolding crisis, in all its dimensions, is also a powerful reminder of the interlinkages between peace, security and development.”
2019-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8641 (2019) · source
“Of course, prison overcrowding remains a crippling issue, with a pretrial detention rate of 65 per cent, though down from 80 per cent in 2004. But it is encouraging, for instance, that in the jurisdiction of Port-au-Prince, the rate of prolonged pretrial detention has decreased by 14 per cent since October 2017. Throughout the past 15 years, the good offices of the Secretary-General have sought to continuously contribute to defusing periods of political uncertainty and tension. The community violence reduction programmes have also proved to be a valued element of MINUSTAH's and MINUJUSTH's work. By providing short-term employment to former gang members and disenfranchised youth, they have, for example, led to the construction of over 100 kilometres of canals and the rehabilitation and revegetation of 200 kilometres of ravines.”
2019-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8641 (2019) · source
“Their number has increased from 2,500, when MINUSTAH was deployed in 2004, to approximately 15,404 officers today - 10.5 per cent of whom are women - thereby doubling the police-to-population ratio. Today, all of Haiti's 145 communes have a full- time Haitian National Police presence, with a total of 349 functional HNP facilities, including 171 police stations that have been constructed or refurbished thanks to United Nations support. There have also been improvements in the area of justice. Key legislation has been promulgated since 2004, including on the status of the magistracy school, the Superior Council of the Judiciary and the status of the magistracy, the latter paving the way for the recruitment ofa corps ofmagistrates, including women, supported by United Nations-backed efforts.”
2019-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8641 (2019) · source
“I would also like to pay tribute to the memory of all the victims of the tragic earthquake in 2010, which left its mark on everyone. (spoke in English) The current context is not ideal for ending 15 years of peacekeeping in the country. We must, however, look at how peacekeeping has contributed to progress in many areas over those years, as reflected in the handout distributed to members of the Council. That is particularly the case regarding the rule of law. The work undertaken to support the development of the Haitian National Police has led to significant changes on the ground. Between 2004 and 2019, the yearly intentional homicide rate has been almost cut in half - a result due in large part to an increase in the number and effectiveness of Haitian National Police personnel.”
2019-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8641 (2019) · source
“I commend the efforts, right up to the very last day of the mission, of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Helen La Lime, and MINUJUSTH colleagues to maintain dialogue, in consultation with international partners, with a wide range of interlocutors in order to bring them to the table and promote Haitian solutions to current challenges. Those efforts will have to be continued in the context of the new configuration of the United Nations in Haiti and beyond the resolution of the current crisis. That will be essential to help establish the conditions for longer-term dialogue from which a national vision of reforms can emerge. As we look to the future, I would also like to honour the sacrifice of the 188 Blue Helmets - military, police and civilian - who have given their lives in Haiti over the past 15 years.”
2019-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8641 (2019) · source
“The current situation has affected the most vulnerable people's access to food. Hospitals, orphanages, civil protection units and other emergency services have been severely impacted, functioning with limited capacity due to fuel shortages, lack of safe water and medicine and other essentials. (Spoke in French) The ability and responsibility to end the crisis, which risks undermining the progress made in recent years, belongs to Haitians of all political persuasions. Only their commitment to good-faith political dialogue, their rejection of violence and their willingness to seek compromise can pave the way for finding solutions to address, through reforms, the deepest political and institutional roots of recurring instability in Haiti.”
2019-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8641 (2019) · source
“Notwithstanding a demonstration in front of the MINUJUSTH logistics base on 4 October, there have not been any direct threats against United Nations staff or premises. The Haitian National Police (HNP) has already been facing its first test in managing security without international operational support, following the end of operations of the last formed police unit on 9 September. It has performed well, but continued advisory support by the United Nations, as well as material support from bilateral partners, are still needed to boost its operational, internal oversight and human rights capacities. The fourth aspect is the humanitarian situation. A struggling Haitian population is faced with additional challenges as roadblocks and general insecurity are paralysing normal activities and obstructing humanitarian operations.”
2019-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8641 (2019) · source
“The security situation has deteriorated in the past month as large segments of the population, dissatisfied with their leaders and the socioeconomic conditions in the country, are being mobilized in renewed demonstrations by opposition leaders demanding change, including in the presidency. Some among them are ready to use violence to achieve political goals, including by attacking national institutions and destroying public and private property. Preliminary MINUJUSTH estimates indicate that at least 30 people were killed during the protests between 15 September and 9 October, including 15 by police officers; an additional 71 individuals were injured. A rise in hate speech and the use ofmedia to incite violence also represent worrying trends.”
2019-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8641 (2019) · source
“Opposition groups are putting forward the President's acceptance of the principle of his departure as a precondition for dialogue, thereby leaving little room for negotiating a unity Government. Mistrust is making compromise difficult, yet the formation of such a Government may well provide a way forward to find the lasting political solutions that are desperately needed. It remains to be seen whether the formal designation by the President of former Prime Minister Evans Paul and six other figures, on 9 October, to conduct outreach with the opposition will create more space for problem-solving and rapprochement. The third aspect is security.”
2019-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8641 (2019) · source
“The scenes of political violence in the senate were deplorable, and the absence of a follow-up session did not allow for a democratic vote to determine the senate's position. Without a confirmed Government, key tasks of the executive, such as the submission of the budget for the current year, remain stalled. As legislative elections cannot take place in the current political stalemate, the stage is set for an institutional vacuum at the beginning of next year, when the mandate of the members of the Lower Chamber and at least one-third of the Senate comes to an end. The second aspect is national dialogue. The President's call on 25 September for national dialogue and for the formation of a unity Government is viewed by the opposition as being "too little, too late".”
2019-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8641 (2019) · source
“Patrick Saint-Hilaire, Charge d'affaires of Haiti at the United Nations, and Her Excellency Mona Juul, President of the Economic and Social Council, are participating in the meeting today. (spoke in English) The current situation in Haiti certainly gives us a lot to reflect upon. The country is facing a significant political crisis, intertwined with socioeconomic challenges. Those in turn affect the security environment, which further feeds political instability - a cycle that the country has seen one too many times. I want to highlight the following key elements and latest developments in the crisis. First is institutional functioning. The President's fourth Government has not received confirmation in Parliament, following two violent interruptions of senate sessions that were expected to do so last month.”
2019-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8641 (2019) · source
“Fifteen years ago, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was deployed to Haiti to support stability in the country. Today, on the last day of the mandate of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), and with Haitians themselves, we are turning the page on peacekeeping in Haiti, but we are not turning the page on United Nations support for Haiti. The chapter that is coming to an end has been characterized by successes shared with the people of Haiti, the tragic earthquake and lessons learned about what we should have done better. On this day, we must reflect together on all the aspects that are the foundation on which we can enter the next phase of Haiti's partnership with the United Nations. In that perspective, I am delighted that His Excellency Mr.”
2019-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8641 (2019) · source
“I would like to express my thanks to all members that have accepted our request to serve as champions in the key areas relevant to peacekeeping. It is a clear demonstration of their ongoing commitment to A4P. We look forward to further discussing how we can continue to work together to maintain that momentum and strengthen our collective results on the ground. Finally, we are grateful for the Council's commitment to supporting our efforts to strengthen peacekeeping and hope to be able to continue to count on the Council's support for such efforts.”
2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source
“As I already mentioned, we circulated to Members earlier in today's meeting a document highlighting some of the key achievements we have accomplished thus far. I intend to circulate similar products on a much more regular basis to keep everyone informed of the concrete results we are achieving. We have also provided guidance to our missions on how to report on their contributions to A4P. That is an additional measure to ensure that we are doing our utmost to track and share with members the progress we are making in the various contexts in which we are deployed. I would also like to reiterate my requests for members to visit our field missions and evaluate our progress in person. We need their candid and field-based assessment to help us move forward and change course, if needed.”
2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source
“(spoke in English) The Secretariat remains fully committed to improving peacekeeping and has made significant efforts in that regard. Peacekeeping is changing for the better. It is better prepared, more robust and more reactive. But the journey has just begun; it cannot be undertaken alone. For our part, I commit to further strengthening our efforts to support political processes and to ensuring that the processes we support make a tangible difference in the lives of those we are mandated to serve. I further commit to enhancing peacekeeping performance, including by further strengthening integration at all levels, including command and control in particular. We are also redoubling our efforts to assess progress on the basis of concrete evidence-based data.”
2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source
“My department's close and deep cooperation with the African Union Commission has proved invaluable and indispensable in advancing political solutions and in implementing peace agreements on the continent. Other partners play a vital role in our collective efforts for peace through their political commitment and action on the ground. I would mention the European Union, for example, and subregional organizations in Africa and beyond. Above all, strong and tangible commitment on the part of Member States is vital to ensuring the full achievement of the objectives of Action for Peacekeeping. We need their strong and united support for political solutions. We also need their continued commitment and cooperation to improve performance across the board through our collective efforts.”
2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source
“Our progress is also due to the collective action we have taken more broadly within the United Nations, in particular with agencies, funds and programmes. A notable example is the intense and invaluable collaboration in the fight against Ebola among the World Health Organization, MONUSCO, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and other partners. I should also mention the end of peacekeeping in Haiti and the transition process under way, which is taking place via very close cooperation among the Department of Peace Operations, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and many other United Nations actors. Nonetheless, the success of Action for Peacekeeping depends on strong partnerships that extend well beyond the United Nations system.”
2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source
“(spoke in French) Partnerships are at the heart of Action for Peacekeeping. Such partnerships begin within the United Nations itself. Progress in implementing the Action for Peacekeeping initiative, which I mentioned, is the result of close collaboration among the Department of Peace Operations, the Department of Operational Support and the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance. I would like to thank my colleagues Under-Secretaries-General Atul Khare and Jan Beagle, as well as Catherine Pollard, and their teams for their joint efforts in advancing Action for Peacekeeping. I look forward to continuing to lead that effort with those two departments, as well as with all those in the Secretariat who help us achieve our objectives.”
2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source
“Nowhere is that more damaging than in the case of sexual exploitation and abuse. We have made concerted efforts, in partnership with Member States, to prevent cases of sexual exploitation and abuse. While it is hard to pinpoint the direct effect of any single initiative, our efforts are having an impact. We have seen a steady downward trend in allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, from 104 allegations in 2016 to 55 in 2018. Our continued vigilance remains the utmost priority. We will continue to strengthen prevention and accountability for misconduct and enhanced assistance to the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse. But, of course, if we are to achieve our goal to advance the fight against sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping, we also need the full cooperation of all troop- and police-contributing countries.”
2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source
“On the other hand, the number of women in formed contingents has increased only from 3.6 per cent in 2017 to 4.4 per cent in July of this year. To improve our engagement with local communities, we deployed 54 engagement platoons, half of which are women, into infantry battalions in UNMISS, MINUSCA, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and MONUSCO. Those units are extremely effective in building trust with vulnerable communities, preventing tension and helping to reduce violence. The increase in the number of women peacekeepers is encouraging but it is too slow, in particular for formed units. I call on troop- and police-contributing countries to redouble efforts to deploy more women. Even where performance is otherwise exemplary, the entirety of United Nations peacekeeping is undermined when our standards of conduct are violated.”
2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source
“We have been working to roll out or revise and update guidance in many fields, such as the weapons and ammunition management policy, the Guide for Senior Leadership on Field Entity Closure and the Military Peacekeeping Intelligence Handbook. Through such guidance, our operations and peacekeepers have clear frameworks when preparing for and performing their duties and can have a better impact on the ground. Peacekeeping has to be rules- and guidance-based, and we are working towards that objective. Improving the number of women peacekeepers is key to improving peacekeeping performance. Peacekeeping with more women is simply more effective. We have increased the number of uniformed women peacekeepers. The number of women staff officers and military observers has doubled from 2017.”
2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source
“Many of those measures will enhance our peacekeepers' safety and security, but we are also putting in place specific measures to ensure that our personnel receive the best treatment in cases of injuries or illness. Medical and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) is central to self-protection. We have embarked on an ambitious programme of health reform to formally establish a chain of reliable and safe care from the point of injury to the hospital. CASEVAC exercises regularly conducted in UNMISS, MINUSMA, MINUSCA and MONUSCO have helped each of the missions identify improvements needed and are informing a revised CASEVAC policy. Better performance will also be aided by improved standards, captured in frameworks and guidelines.”
2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source
“For example, we are reaching out directly to national force planners, conducting operational readiness seminars, which provide TCCs and PCCs with the latest policies, and giving them the chance to interact directly with senior officials from the Department of Peace Operations. To help new TCCs, we are also providing advice on force generation and encouraging them to deploy only forces that they can consistently train to United Nations standards through multiple rotations. We have deployed mobile training teams in MONUSCO and MINUSMA to provide context- and skill-specific training, ranging from much-needed jungle warfare in the Kivus to tactical military decision-making, and we have put in place and are utilizing the light coordination mechanism, which is coordinating and deconflicting bilateral training efforts.”
2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source
“The roll-out of the comprehensive performance assessment system to six missions provides the platform to assess the overall performance of our missions, including their individual components. Initial performance analysis conducted in the first four missions reveals that the comprehensive performance assessment system has strengthened unity of purpose and cross-component planning, while enhancing data collection. We are also getting smarter in our approach to training. In our drive to enhance performance, we have changed the way that we interact with TCCs and PCCS, both in terms of what we can do for them and what they can do for peacekeeping.”
2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source
“They have allowed us to take more informed selection decisions through monthly performance meetings, which I chair. Those meetings, together with the systematic independent investigation of every significant case of failure to perform, enable targeted engagement with Member States, including to implement remedial measures, when needed. Where we have encountered underperformance, we have deployed mentors or training teams, adjusted deployment timelines or even repatriated parts of or full units. In such cases, we have also looked into what had to be changed in the way missions are organized or operate, including key questions of situational awareness, integrated planning and coordination among mission pillars.”
2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source
“Our efforts to strengthen performance are also guided by the provisions of resolution 2436 (2018), and we have made significant progress in that regard. The strengthening of internal evaluations of performance is a core component of the action plan and the implementation of resolution 2436 (2018). Since January 2018, we have conducted 16 enhanced predeployment visits, which is a concept that was created as part of our efforts to improve readiness. Those enhanced predeployment visits have led to significant improvements in the operational readiness of our units. We also conduct force commander and police commissioner evaluations, which are giving us a comprehensive view of the strengths, capacities and limitations of every unit.”
2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source
“More comprehensive information on our capability requirements is circulated to the Council regularly through the uniformed capability readiness paper, which is also available on the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System website. Improved situational awareness is also a critical component of effective operations, and we are making progress in that regard. Mission peacekeeping- intelligence coordination mechanisms have been established in MINUSMA, MONUSCO, MINUSCA and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to ensure coordination among all actors involved in peacekeeping intelligence, under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Those mechanisms are already enhancing efficiency and coordination among military, police and civilian components.”
2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source