YouSaid · the spoken record

Lacroix

lines on the record: 1,191
first: 2006-08-31
most recent: 2023-11-14
sittings or episodes: 115
sources: un-security-council

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“It should also be seen as only one part of a broader, ongoing effort by the Secretariat to make peacekeeping operations a more efficient, effective and accountable tool for the international community.”
2017-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8064 (2017) · source
“Finally, I ask for the support of the Council in our efforts to foster a culture of continuous improvement and adaptation through strategic force generation and other reform efforts. We aim to create a virtuous cycle of performance improvement through assessment and advisory Visits, regular in-field performance assessments, better planned rotations and deployments of new capabilities and training and capacity-building improvements. We will do all that together, working closely with troop- and police-contributing countries. Strategic force generation is an important and still relatively new initiative. I am confident that it will help us to improve our uniformed capabilities significantly over time.”
2017-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8064 (2017) · source
“Secondly, challenges relating to the timely deployment of capabilities, particularly for missions like UNMISS, are often associated with the consent and capacity of the host Government. Council members should engage collectively and individually to ensure that host Governments fully comply with the status-of- mission agreements and that the Council act accordingly when host Governments fail to do so. Thirdly, strategic force generation is intricately linked with performance. The leadership of the Council is critical in ensuring the full implementation of our performance, training and conduct requirements. In instances where action must be taken to address underperformance or misconduct, the Secretariat relies on the consistent support of Council members.”
2017-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8064 (2017) · source
“The trilateral partnership between Japan and several African troop-contributing countries is a good example of that kind of initiative, and we strongly encourage further partnerships of that kind. There are a number of additional ways in which the Council can assist in helping us meet our capability requirements, and I will refer four of them. First, the Council can take into account current or potential capability gaps, such as those in MINUSMA, when drafting or renewing mandates. That should be done in close consultation with us and is critical to managing expectations. Clear, prioritized mandates will enable us to better guide and assess the performance of uniformed capabilities.”
2017-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8064 (2017) · source
“The Security Council has a crucial role to play in defining and helping us meet the capability requirements of our missions. A number of permanent and elected Council members have stepped up to host high-level meetings, pledge and prepare new capabilities, offer training and capacity-building support and provide direct financial and political support to our strategic force generation efforts. That is fully consistent with the call for a more active role of the Council itself in force generation, and I strongly welcome it. I also encourage Council members to come forward with new, innovative contributions, including through the provision of tailored and sustained training and capacity-building efforts to address our mid- to long-term capability gaps.”
2017-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8064 (2017) · source
“One thing we have learned is that strategic force generation needs to be better linked to regular force planning for each mission, which also needs to be improved. The MINUSMA force generation conference in May was an important milestone in that regard. Member States discussed their plans for future contributions to Mali and potential partnerships for critical capabilities. We hope to build on that new effort to find creative ways to fill the most stubborn gaps, including by allowing troop-contributing countries to rotate scarce capabilities. However, no matter how creative we can be, we will need Member States to step forward, contribute new capabilities and help share the burden, particularly in Mali and especially in the most volatile areas.”
2017-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8064 (2017) · source
“Despite the success of the past two years, a number of specialized capabilities remain in short supply, particularly high-value enablers such as helicopters, quick-reaction forces, explosive ordnance disposal units with counter improvised explosive device training and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance companies. Pledges to the PCRS of those kinds of units are welcome, but it is precisely in our most challenging missions that we need them the most. I am also disappointed with the lack of progress towards our targets for female peacekeepers, and very much hope that Member States will attend the Vancouver Defence Ministerial Meeting in mid-November with concrete pledges and proposals.”
2017-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8064 (2017) · source
“I am pleased to say that we recently received sufficient pledges to fulfil nearly all the requirements for a vanguard brigade of roughly 4,000 troops and police for the remainder of2017 and the first half ofnext year. We plan to conduct an exercise of key personnel on the rapid deployment level and key United Nations personnel to further strengthen our ability to respond to future rapid deployments in the area. We are also developing an overarching rapid development concept and related training materials that bring together all of the civilian military police and support elements needed for rapid deployment.”
2017-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8064 (2017) · source
“With the support of Member States and thanks to the concerted effort across the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, we have been making significant progress towards more rapid deployment. Just to take a recent example, we replaced a battalion in MINUSCA, in the Central African Republic, that was facing conduct and discipline issues with three different contingents in less than 60 days, two of them had registered in the PCRS. We are very grateful to the countries that contributed those units. Members States also agreed earlier this year that units accepted to the rapid deployment level of the PCRS would receive financial compensation for maintaining the readiness of their major equipment during their time on the rapid deployment level.”
2017-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8064 (2017) · source
“(spoke in English) One ofthe key aims of our strategic force generation efforts is to facilitate more rapid deployment of uniformed capabilities to the field. Rapid deployment is a costly, complex and difficult process that requires the commitment of the contributors as well as the host country and neighbours. In the weeks and months that pass from the issuance of the mandate until the mission reaches a minimum operating capacity, lives can be lost and our credibility undermined from the outset. There are financial implications to long-deployment timelines, as a peacekeeping operation deployed too late will have a more intractable situation to address, potentially requiring a larger footprint and prolonging the life of that mission.”
2017-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8064 (2017) · source
“Resolution 2378 (2017) calls on the Secretary-General to report on mechanisms to address capability gaps, and we will take the opportunity to outline how that is being done today and present a few ways of improving the coordination of efforts in the areas of training and capacity-building. To date, 81 Member States have provided contributions to the PCRS, which is an impressive success only two years after its establishment. Twenty- nine PCRS units have already been deployed to missions, including in MINUSMA, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). In recent weeks, we have received new pledges of contributions, the most recent of which came on behalf of China and Germany. I am very grateful to those two countries.”
2017-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8064 (2017) · source
“Those visits make it possible not only to identify which units are the most suited to certain operations, but also to explain in detail to contributing States the standards and technical specificities that are expected. Such dialogue is also essential as part of the general strategy to improve the conduct and discipline of deployed personnel, in particular as part of the strategy to prevent and combat sexual abuse and exploitation. Those Visits also sometimes make generating additional contributions possible, such as Jordanian helicopters to be deployed in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) or to identify priority areas for improvement with contributing States.”
2017-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8064 (2017) · source
“The final communique, which was endorsed by 63 Member States, set our new objectives for 2017 and beyond. In Paris, the specific needs were considered for peacekeeping in French-speaking areas and commitments were made to provide more French-speaking military troops and police personnel. The creation of a Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) was a determining factor in our new approach for strategic force generation. The PCRS is constantly updated, thereby enabling us to understand which units are available by conducting evaluation and advisory visits, and to better understand their readiness levels and ability for deployment. Since March 2016, we have conducted 39 evaluation visits concerning 105 deployable units.”
2017-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8064 (2017) · source
“Various States representing all regional groups have participated in those events, including Member States of the Security Council. The subsequent meetings between Heads of State and police have allowed us to strengthen our commitment to Member States. It is no exaggeration to say that Heads of State, Heads of Government, Defence Ministers, armed- forces officials and police forces around the world have never been so involved in supporting peacekeeping. The commitments and subsequent pledges have made it possible to fill capacity gaps in current missions, strengthen certain missions and cope with any new deployments that the Council has considered or might consider in the future. In London, the system marked the first contribution pledges for rapidly deployable units.”
2017-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8064 (2017) · source
“Strategic force generation is a tool to implement that vision. It entails identifying current and future operation needs and communicating them in a targeted and sustained way to Member States that may be able to satisfy those needs. High level events, which began with the first summit on peacekeeping in 2014 and the creation of a Strategic Force Generation and Capabilities Planning Cell in 2015, have played a crucial role in that effort. The Cell worked closely with co-organizers and with other Member States to organize the summit of Heads of State and the Ministerial Meetings that took place in London and Paris. Of course, we are eagerly awaiting the Vancouver Meeting. From the beginning, those events have brought together the major troop- and police-contributing countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America, and have generated impetus.”
2017-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8064 (2017) · source
“That is done by a small team of dedicated officers, and I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to it. Dozens of Member States have made substantial investments in their capabilities for United Nations peacekeeping by improving their equipment, training and levels of readiness. I am grateful to those Member States and I look forward to hearing more today on how we can continue and further deepen that productive partnership. (spoke in French) In April, the Secretary-General presented an outline of what peacekeeping should strive for - a more adapted, agile and flexible instrument capable of responding rapidly and aptly to requirements on the ground, through being supported by strong competencies and good equipment based on the mandate provided by the Council.”
2017-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8064 (2017) · source
“Mr. Lacroix: I would like to start by thanking the Security Council for convening this briefing on strategic force generation. This is the first time that the Council dedicates a meeting to this topic, and today's discussion follows the adoption of resolution 2378 (2017), which showed the Council's strong commitment to strategic force generation as one of the core elements of peacekeeping reform. Generating uniformed personnel and units for United Nations peacekeeping is a tireless and enormous task. It means generating and rotating more than 300 units, including 76 infantry battalions, with tens of thousands of troops and police from over 120 countries, while selecting and deploying several thousand individual staff and police officers throughout the year.”
2017-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8064 (2017) · source
“In the current financial context, it will be critical to ensure that the Mission makes the best possible use of the resources at its disposal by focusing on a limited set ofkey priorities. The strategic review of the Mission is under way and, as requested, we will be presenting the Council with options by 30 September. The current political impasse, the rising insecurity, and the worsening human rights and humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo require a concerted response from regional and international partners. That response must aim to help to create the conditions for a successful transition and the holding of free, fair and inclusive elections, in accordance with the Constitution. The Secretariat and MONUSCO are determined to work with the Congolese Government and people to achieve that goal.”
2017-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7998 (2017) · source
“The level of cooperation and support that the Government provides to the team of international investigators appointed by the Human Rights Council will be a test of its commitment to accountability. MONUSCO continues to adjust its posture in response to a rapidly changing environment and to focus on supporting the implementation of the 31 December agreement in order to pave the way for holding elections and to protect civilians. I count on the Council's continued support to our ongoing efforts to transform the Mission into a more agile, flexible and responsive tool. I am committed to ensuring that MONUSCO delivers on its core mandated objectives as efficiently and effectively as possible and that it continues to evolve in response to the changing situation on the ground.”
2017-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7998 (2017) · source
“Throughout my recent visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I stressed the importance of prioritizing political means in addressing the situation in the Kasai provinces and emphasized the urgency of ensuring accountability for the crimes committed, including crimes by members of the security forces. I also underscored the determination of the United Nations to ensure that those responsible for the killing of our colleagues Michael Sharp and Zaida Catalan are brought to justice. I was encouraged by the assurances that President Kabila gave me regarding his determination to ensure that the crimes committed in the Kasais do not go unpunished. Such statements of intention must, however, be followed by concrete action.”
2017-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7998 (2017) · source
“Schools and churches have reopened and the Mission is supporting the local authorities in their mediation work. Despite those efforts, there continue to be disturbing reports of human rights violations and abuses on an almost daily basis. Dozens of mass graves have been reported. So far, national investigation efforts have been slow. The Mbuji-Mayi military court's recent conviction of seven FARDC officers involved in the killing of civilians in Mwanza Lomba is a small but encouraging step in the right direction. I welcome the Human Rights Council's recent resolution requesting that international investigators be appointed to assist the authorities in that regard.”
2017-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7998 (2017) · source
“MONUSCO has also received reports of summary executions and rapes, including of civilians by the security forces. In response to the developments in the Kasai provinces, MONUSCO has established a small and mobile presence in various locations in order to help protect civilians. It has deployed personnel in Bulungu, Luiza and Tshimbulu, in Kasai Central province, and reinforced its existing presence in Kananga and Mbuji-Mayi. Through a combination of human rights monitoring and political outreach, supported by a light but increasing military presence, the Mission is helping to bring back some measure of stability wherever it can. In Tshimbulu, for example, the deployment in May of a standing combat deployment has helped to enable internally displaced people to return.”
2017-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7998 (2017) · source
“The violence in the Kasai provinces, in the western region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has reached disturbing levels. The Kamuina Nsapu militia has targeted and killed dozens of civilians, customary chiefs, public servants and security officers. It has also attacked voter registration centres, schools and religious institutions. For example, in a series of clashes with the FARDC in Kazumba territory between 25 and 28 April, 41 militia members and 12 soldiers were killed. The recent increase of inter-ethnic violence in the Kasai region is just as worrying. In April, for example, violence between Pende and Tshokwe communities reportedly aligned with the Government, and Luba and Lulua communities reportedly associated with the Kamuina Nsapu militia, led to the deaths of 38 people in Kamonia territory in Kasai province.”
2017-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7998 (2017) · source
“In Ituri, the Force de resistance patriotique de l'Ituri (F RPI) continues to pose the single greatest threat to civilians. Conflicts in neighbouring Burundi and South Sudan have been spilling over into the eastern provinces of Ituri and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In response, MONUSCO has continued to support the FARDC in operations against the FRPI in Ituri and the Lord's Resistance Army in Haut-Uele. The Mission is also supporting local and community dialogue efforts in North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema and Tanganyika, in an approach based on the belief that, while military means may sometimes be necessary, only a political solution can effectively address the root causes of the various conflicts that threaten civilians.”
2017-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7998 (2017) · source
“(spoke in English) As noted in the Secretary-General's report, the security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to be a major worry. Instability persists in a number of areas in the east and west. In the east, a recent spate of attacks by armed groups against the Forces armees de la Republique democratique du Congo (FARDC) has added a layer of complexity to an already volatile security landscape. In North Kivu province in particular, Mayi-Mayi groups, among others, recently conducted raids against FARDC positions, a new phenomenon that MONUSCO is assessing. In the meantime, clashes between ethnically based militias in North Kivu have continued. In South Kivu, armed groups have been increasingly involved in disputes related to customary succession and in intercommunal and transhumance-related disputes.”
2017-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7998 (2017) · source
“We should also be concerned about the Commission's delay in publishing the election calendar, as well as the continuing uncertainty surrounding the financing of the elections, despite the Government's efforts to disburse the agreed budget in the past few months. Finally, the Chair of the Commission's recent announcement about the impossibility of holding the elections by the end of the year is another reason for concern. At a time when the Democratic Republic of the Congo is midway through its transition, it is more essential than ever to ensure that the national political actors and international partners, including the members of the Security Council, mobilize once again to get the political agreement of 31 December 2016 back on track.”
2017-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7998 (2017) · source
“It was with the aim of supporting their efforts that I visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo in mid-June. During my discussions I stressed the crucial importance of implementing the commitments made six months ago, and I had an opportunity to reiterate my appeal to President Kabila. I would like to note, however, that despite the sense we have at times of an impasse, the progress being made on voter registration in 24 of the 26 provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a source of encouragement. By 10 July, under the leadership of the Independent National Electoral Commission and with MONUSCO's active support, at least 33 million voters, of an estimated total of nearly 41 million, had been registered. However, the security issues in the provinces of Kasai and Kasai Central have made registration there problematic.”
2017-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7998 (2017) · source
“On 16 May, its members were absent when Parliament inducted the transitional Government, and we fear that this erosion of the political consensus has also been detrimental to the establishment of the Conseil national de suivi de l'accord. The situation could make it even harder to maintain the spirit of collaboration and consensus approach that the political landscape in the Democratic Republic of the Congo needs. That is why Mr. Maman Sidikou, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and Mr. Said Djinnit, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to the Great Lakes Region, have been making every effort to exercise their good offices with a View to convincing all the relevant political actors of the importance of implementing the agreement as fully and quickly as possible.”
2017-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7998 (2017) · source
“The agreement marked the culmination of many months of tension and negotiations and outlined the transition to elections at the end of 2017, which is currently under way. With less than six months to go before the elections, however, not all the transitional institutions are in place, and the consensus that characterized the progress being made a few months ago has gradually eroded. The Rassemblement des forces politiques et sociales acquises au changement, the platform uniting various opposition parties, has dissociated itself from recent developments. On 27 April it was not among the signatories to the special arrangement for implementing the agreement.”
2017-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7998 (2017) · source
“In part, that situation is responsible for the disturbing increase in violations of human rights. It is also the reason for the deterioration in the humanitarian situation. Between May and June, the number of people displaced in Democratic Republic of the Congo increased by 26 per cent, totalling 1.3 million persons. In that context - and this will be my third point - the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) is working to respond to the challenges facing the country and continuing its adjustment efforts, as I was able to observe during my visit to the country few weeks ago. Six months ago, when President Kabila's second term was ending, the signing of the 31 December 2016 agreement by all the political stakeholders involved helped to avert a serious crisis.”
2017-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7998 (2017) · source
“I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. My statement will focus on three points. First, I will address the political situation, specifically with regard to the implementation of the agreement of 31 December 2016, which is designed to govern the transition under way and lay the groundwork for elections. As indicated in the report ofthe Secretary- General dated 30 June (S/2017/565), the implementation of that agreement by and large remains insufficient. Secondly, I will refer to the security situation in certain areas of the eastern and western parts of the country, which is characterized by an increase in clashes between armed groups and national security forces.”
2017-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7998 (2017) · source
“In conclusion, let me emphasize that the Secretariat is continuing to make every effort to take forward the core tasks of its mandate, including with respect to expediting the deployment of the RPF. Meanwhile, although the President declared a unilateral ceasefire and the launch of the national dialogue on 22 May, it remains to be seen whether these developments will yield any tangible improvement in the security or humanitarian situation on the ground. We cannot lose sight of the fact that neither the RPF nor UNMISS is a panacea for this crisis. Only a truly inclusive political process and the genuine political will of the key protagonists to end the conflict and implement the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan will bring peace to this country.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“The persistence of significant military operations on the ground, the lack of dialogue between the parties and the absence of authentic inclusivity within the governmental structures in South Sudan mean, unfortunately, that UNMISS's mandate, as currently structured under resolution 2327 (2016), remains relevant and suited to purpose; this includes the role of the Regional Protection Force in enhancing security and the protection of civilians in the capital. Should a genuine cessation of hostilities take hold, buttressed by the full implementation of the peace agreement, revisiting the UNMISS mandate and the tasks of the Regional Protection Force would be warranted.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“Operative paragraph 34 of resolution 2327 (2016) requested that the Secretary-General provide the Council with a review ofthe progress made by the parties in ceasing hostilities, returning to the path of dialogue and achieving inclusiveness within the Government, as well as recommend any relevant adjustments to the UNMISS mandate. In the light of the lack of real progress in these key areas and the continuation of the political and security crisis that plagues South Sudan, we cannot recommend any adjustments to the Mission's current mandate.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“Under the 2015 peace agreement, elections are to be held towards the end of the transitional period, which was originally estimated to be in 2018. We must be clear that if the current situation of armed conflict, political paralysis, massive displacement, humanitarian and protection needs, and ongoing human rights abuses were to persist, then credible, free and fair elections will not be possible in South Sudan. Elections are the ultimate democratic process and would require pervasive stability and an environment in which people can freely express their political opinions.They would also require that the transitional institutions established by the peace agreement be genuinely inclusive of all groups and political persuasions, as envisaged in the agreement.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“We are encouraged by the communique of 13 June from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which included a number of concrete steps aimed at resuscitating the South Sudan political process. The proposed high-level revitalization forum to be convened by the IGAD Council of Ministers and the meeting ofthe chiefs of defence staff of the RPF are welcome initiatives that we hope to see happen soon. Allow me to register our strong support for IGAD and regional partners as they move forward to actualize the various initiatives spelled out in the communique. The Mission and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations are ready to provide whatever support may be required to that end. I believe it important to take this opportunity to emphasize our views on recent references to the prospect of elections in South Sudan.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“With regard to his pledge to release political prisoners, I should point out to the Council that, while one United Nations staff member was recently released, two others have been held for two years without being charged and another has recently been detained in Rumbek. We must judge the President's commitments by his actions. And, critically, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism should finally be granted full freedom of movement to monitor and verify ceasefire violations. UNMISS and the Monitoring Mechanism have been dealing with far too many obstructions of their movements, making their work extremely challenging and in some cases impossible.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“The Mission has a number of reservations about the operational suitability and accessibility of the site, but we continue to explore options for its use in conjunction with existing bases at Tomping and United Nations House, in order to ensure that the land issue does not further delay the RPF's deployment, since that is still an important enabler for the political process in South Sudan. While we welcome the commitments made by President Salva Kiir at the swearing-in of the National Dialogue Steering Committee, we note with concern that the unilateral ceasefire he announced has so far not materialized.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“The commencement of the Kenyan troops' deployment remains subject to completion of the ongoing repatriation of Kenya's contingent-owned equipment from Wau and its subsequent refurbishment to meet the needs of its RPF contribution. Concerning the Government's allocation of the required second plot of land for the northern base site of the RPF, the Government informed UNMISS, in a letter dated 11 April, that it had allocated a site approximately 12 kilometres north of central Juba. On 19 April, an UNMISS integrated team, accompanied by community leaders and country and local Government representatives, visited the site to assess its suitability.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“Their proactive approach directly supports the South Sudanese people, giving them confidence that we are there to protect them, enabling us to report human rights abuses, and helping us to support our humanitarian partners in ensuring that assistance goes to those who need it most. In the meantime, we continue to press forward with the deployment of the Regional Protection Force (RPF). The advance parties of the RPF vanguard units have begun arriving, including those of the engineering and high-readiness companies. The main bodies of both contingents are on track to arrive by late July. Subject to cargo readiness, security clearances and final tax exemptions from the Government, the expected time for the Ethiopian advance infantry company to begin to deploy is July at the earliest.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“In the west, clashes between Government and Opposition forces around Wau have forced 22,000 people to take refuge with the Mission. And fighting in the South has left towns in the Equatorias with as little as 10 per cent of their previous populations. In the midst of those hostilities, displacements and human rights abuses, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has been doing its utmost to protect civilians. Our peacekeepers persevere in getting through checkpoints to reach vulnerable populations even when their patrols are threatened and sometimes shot at.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“It is the result of decisions by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Government, the SPLA in Opposition and various other entities to pursue and sustain armed conflict in order to achieve political goals. Extreme violence continues to create ever deeper divisions among the people of South Sudan and make it even more difficult for us to put the country back on a path to peace and development. Hostilities have persisted well after the ceasefire commitment made by President Salva Kiir and continue to unfold in various parts of the country. In the North, the SPLA has dislodged Opposition forces from their strongholds on the west bank of the Nile River. In the East, it has taken towns in northern Greater Jonglei.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“Mr. Lacroix: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the Secretary-General's 90-day report (S/2017/505) on the situation in South Sudan. I should state at the outset that the people of South Sudan remain desperate for peace. More than half of the country requires food aid, despite its tremendous potential for food production. One third of the population is displaced. Half of those displaced are refugees, who have been arriving in Uganda at a rate of 50,000 for each month of this year. Others have fled to the Sudan in record numbers, and Kenya and Ethiopia are also hosting thousands of South Sudanese. We must not lose sight of the fact that this tragedy is man-made. It is neither a meteorological phenomenon nor the result of traditional enmities between local communities.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“I want to briefly address the issue of transition. Although Major General Uba's statement was very enlightening in that respect, the support of the Security Council at all stages has been crucial. The inclusiveness of the transition process, in which host countries, stakeholders, civil society, agencies and bilateral and multilateral donors participated, was key to its success. Finally, to endorse what Major General Menon said about sexual abuse, the determination of the Secretary- General and the Force Commanders to doggedly combat those acts is evident, and I can assure everyone that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is also fully committed to do the same.”
2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source
“I think the same is true for the Security Council - just as our operations have robust mandates, they need the robust support of the Council at all levels, so as to hold accountable those who try to prevent us from fulfilling our missions. I also want to touch upon the periodic performance reviews of missions, an expectation that has been expressed by everyone - Member States, the Secretariat and, above all, the Security Council. In expecting more from the missions, we should not hesitate to call into question certain truths or demands that have hitherto been accepted as fundamental but are, perhaps, not quite so. The reference to troop numbers is a case in point, since the number ofpeacekeepers is less important than their ability to fulfil their mandate. In that regard, I believe we must also review our assessment criteria.”
2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source
“(spoke in French) Lieutenant General Keita alluded at length and very interestingly in his briefing to the use of robust and legitimate force as provided for in our mandates. Implementing a mandate is also about implementing the political processes that our operations support, and therefore a reaction to those who try to interfere with or prevent the implementation of those processes, in which case the use of force can be entirely legitimate. However, using robust force is not enough, and the Central African Republic is particularly instructive in that regard. It must be accompanied by similarly robust efforts in the political arena.”
2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source
“And we are working very hard to attain the specific types of capacity that we need for many of our operations. Just before today's meeting, in fact, we had a force-generation meeting for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, and I am grateful to the Member States that have committed to providing very important new capacities that I believe will make a difference to the force's ability to fulfil its mandate. In that regard, I would like to specifically point to our contingents' ability to use that capacity for training and the importance of bilateral cooperation for our TCCs, which need this kind of assistance in order to be better prepared to use the equipment that the operation requires. I will touch briefly on the robust use of force.”
2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source
“It is a willingness and determination to fully implement mandates and see that everyone interprets a mandate in the same way, as well as to ensure that the caveats and dual chains of command that have had negative effects on our operations are gradually terminated. In that regard, we are emphasizing and definitely expecting that we should be stricter and more demanding in our evaluations of operations. The fourth element is capacities. As has been repeatedly pointed out, in order to be more agile, responsive and flexible, we need the necessary training and the necessary capacity. Someone mentioned new technology, and that is indeed being gradually brought into our operations, particularly with regard to having better situational awareness.”
2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source
“The second, which was also mentioned by several Force Commanders and Member States, is the need for an appropriate framework within which troop- contributing countries (TCCs) operate and that can be affected by statements of unit requirements and memorandums of understanding that in some cases are not adequate to Force Commanders' needs. Those we simply have to review and revise where necessary in order to give Force Commanders the flexibility they need where the use of resources is concerned. The third element in this is mindset, for which all of us are responsible - Headquarters, Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, Force Commanders and troop-contributing countries.”
2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source
“Mr. Lacroix: I would like to thank all Member States for the comments and I will be brief, because we would also like to hear from the Force Commanders in answer to the questions raised. There were a number of mentions of what I think is a key expectation for our peacekeeping operations - that is, adaptability and responsiveness. I would like to highlight a few points in that regard that I believe are key to achieving that. The first is the issue ofrules and procedures, which were mentioned by some of the Force Commanders. The Council is aware that the Secretary-General has launched an effort for reform in this area aimed at making it much simpler for operations to discharge their mandates. That is a key issue in responding to the serious expectations of those on the ground.”
2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source