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Lacroix

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2006-08-31
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2023-11-14
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un-security-council

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  1. We look forward to continuing to work with all those present, troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and police-contributing countries (PCCs), as well as willing partners to address those gaps and ensure full operational readiness. To that end, we support and promote innovative solutions, such as equipment- contributing countries or joint deployments. We, of course, also increasingly need troop- and police-contributing countries to come equipped with vehicles that can withstand greater impact from improvised explosive devices, including mine-protected armoured personnel carriers. In MINUSMA, due to the continued threat, an additional 80 armoured personnel carriers with mine-protective standards are still required, in spite of the progress that I mentioned earlier.

    2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source

  2. In MINUSMA, capability gaps include one medium helicopter unit in Gao, two medium armed utility helicopter units in Mopti and Kidal and one intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance unit in Timbuktu. Further, specialized and high-performing capabilities for peacekeeping - particularly critical enablers, such as multi-role engineers; transport, signal, aviation and medical units; rapidly deployable capabilities; and French-speaking units - remain in short supply. Technology, such as unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles, sense-and-warn systems and remote sensors have equally become necessities for uniformed personnel.

    2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source

  3. In Mali, where MINUSMA is still the most challenging Mission for the security of peacekeepers, we are now much more effective in countering the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), resulting in fewer fatalities as a result of IED attacks and many more IEDs are being detected and neutralized. Our camps are better protected and our units are better equipped with mine-protected vehicles. Of course, much more remains to be done, and one peacekeeper being killed is still one too many. We are encouraged by the response of Member States in providing our missions with specialized assets and equipment. As members of the Council can see in the document before them, the number of units with significant equipment gaps has been significantly reduced; but we need to do more.

    2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source

  4. In the past few days, in response to tension between armed groups in the area of Birao, in the east of the country, MINUSCA was able to quickly deploy military reinforcements, while actively engaging in mediation, thereby significantly defusing the situation. We are also achieving results in our efforts to reduce the number of fatalities in peacekeeping. As shown in the document that has been circulated, the number of fatalities as a result of violent attacks was significantly lower in 2018, down to 27, and, after the first nine months of this year, stands at 21. That is significantly lower than when the action plan to improve the security of United Nations peacekeepers was launched. In 2017, we sustained, as those present will recall, a tragic 58 fatalities as a result of violent attacks.

    2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source

  5. Coming back from the Democratic Republic of the Congo just a few days ago, I can assure the Council that the new spirit of the rapidly deployable battalions reaches beyond the units themselves to the Mission a whole. But we need to do more, particularly in the areas affected by the most brutal armed groups, which are also affected by the Ebola outbreak. In MINUSCA, military units with high readiness and protection capacities were generated to mitigate the challenges to mobility imposed by the difficult terrain. In addition, the level of mechanization of the infantry battalions was upgraded to ensure enhanced protection. Readjustments of troop posture are also under way there, with a new basing plan that aims to achieve greater reactivity and operational flexibility.

    2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source

  6. Rapidly deployable battalions are capable of swiftly deploying to prevent, mitigate and address protection threats as they emerge. Those changes in footprint, posture and mindset have been complemented by other protection measures, including the establishment of community alert networks and support to national efforts to combat impunity. When a spate of horrific attacks against civilians broke out in Ituri province in 2018, MONUSCO's rapidly deployable battalions quickly sent out four temporary base deployments to the hotspots of the violence. Those deployments provided the necessary security space for civilian staff to conduct human rights monitoring and community engagement and provided a degree of confidence among the population to allow people to return to their villages.

    2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source

  7. The volatile political and security environments where many peacekeeping missions are deployed require well-equipped and capable military, police and civilian components, with the right mindset and posture to undertake flexible and rapid deployments. That is why we are changing our approach to peacekeeping. Our efforts are focused on adapting mission footprints and strengthening capacity to ensure a more mobile, robust, aware and integrated operational approach. MONUSCO, for example, has shifted away from static bases in many locations, replacing them with rapidly deployable battalions. Rapidly deployable battalions strengthen our mobility and robustness and, in MONUSCO, are part ofthe Mission's protection through projection concept.

    2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source

  8. For example, the instability in central Mali has led to the establishment of a second strategic priority for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), namely, to support the restoration of State authority and protect civilians in the area, but without the corresponding increase in resources. In addition, I take this opportunity to underscore the importance of united political engagement by Member States - Council members, as well as others that have stakes in the conflicts where our operations are deployed. A spirit of mutual and respective responsibility is at the core of A4P, and nowhere is that more important than in pursuing durable solutions to conflict and instability.

    2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source

  9. UNAMID and the United Nations country team have also pioneered an approach to joint delivery through State liaison functions, which provide context-specific support that responds to local needs and increases the capacity of the country team to support peacebuilding activities, while enhancing partnership with local authorities. The endorsers of the A4P Declaration of Shared Commitments on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations committed to pursuing clear, focused, sequenced, prioritized and achievable mandates matched by appropriate resources. We are grateful for the efforts undertaken by penholders, and the Security Council as a whole, to reflect prioritization in recent mandates. But we also urge Member States, as Security Council and General Assembly members, to ensure that new priorities be allocated consistent with resources.

    2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source

  10. In Darfur, for example, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) has continued to support the peaceful resolution of land disputes and intercommunal conflict, resulting in the adjudication and mediation of more than 2,000 disputes last year. Partnerships with regional and subregional organizations, as well as across the United Nations system, are critical in every country in which we work, particularly to facilitate transitions. In Darfur, we are working closely with the AU to plan for the transition of UNAMID from peacekeeping to peacebuilding with a view to preventing a relapse of conflict following the mission's eventual exit.

    2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source

  11. Similarly, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the support of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) for the implementation of the 31 December 2016 political agreement was instrumental in ensuring the necessary political space for the country's first-ever peaceful transfer of democratic power in February. As the Secretary-General noted when he was in the country a few days ago, there are now new opportunities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to advance peace and development. Our efforts to support the pursuit of peace at the national level are complemented by our contributions to peacebuilding at the local level.

    2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source

  12. With the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union, to whom I pay tribute not only as a friend but, more importantly, as a strong partner for peace, I visited the country twice this year, first in January to encourage the parties to reach an agreement and again in April to encourage the parties to continue implementation. Commissioner Chergui and I plan to return to the Central African Republic next month. Thus far, the positive effects of the agreement are evident, including in the marked reduction in violence from last year to today.

    2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source

  13. In the Central African Republic, for example, working in partnership with the African Union (AU) and the Economic Commission of Central African States, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) took advantage of its stronger political mandate and the robust security posture of its peacekeepers to create an environment that led the Government and the 14 main armed groups signing the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic in February. I have done, and will continue to do, what I can to do my part in bringing peace to the people of the Central African Republic.

    2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source

  14. I will also draw attention to areas in need of greater collective progress, and I look forward to hearing Member States' own plans for enabling us to advance the A4P agenda. Political solutions are a prerequisite to sustainable peace, and the pursuit of such solutions is at the centre of the A4P agenda. In every country in which we are deployed and our mandates permit, our missions are proactive maintaining space for political solutions to be pursued.

    2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source

  15. While we have made progress on addressing the challenges to which the Secretary-General spoke in March 2018, many remain. The countries and populations that we serve and the peacekeepers who risk their lives in the name of peace deserve only the best that we can deliver. The onus remains on each of us to do our part. I would like to take this opportunity to thank every Member State for its support to United Nations peacekeeping - as troop- and police contributors, financial contributors and members of the General Assembly and Security Council. Today I will speak about the results that we are achieving through our sustained and systematic effort to strengthen peacekeeping.

    2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source

  16. Mr. Lacroix: I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this debate on United Nations peacekeeping. A year and a half ago, the Secretary-General launched his Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative, which calls on all peacekeeping stakeholders - the Secretariat, Member States and intergovernmental organizations - to collectively address the challenges facing peacekeeping. We must all remember the stakes. Peacekeeping is an essential multilateral tool for preventing conflict, reducing the risk of relapse and reaching sustainable peace, and it has succeeded in doing that in many countries. Today, United Nations peacekeepers play a crucial preventive role where they are deployed, and they protect millions of vulnerable people around the globe.

    2019-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8612 (2019) · source

  17. With regard to the camps that need to be, but have not yet been, handed over by UNAMID, we also look forward to productive discussions with the Government. As I said, UNAMID is currently working on a road map regarding site-by-site arrangements in that spirit. I believe that the tripartite mechanism that is to be held in New York to which I alluded will also be very helpful for us to advance on this very important issue.

    2019-08-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8603 (2019) · source

  18. Mr. Lacroix: I will try to answer the question posed by the representative of the United Kingdom regarding the situation of camps in relation to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). I can say that the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) has not been in a position to verify that the RSF have vacated the camps that have already been handed over by UNAMID. That is essentially because its interaction with the Transitional Military Council has been quite limited over the past month. What we have, as I said, is a commitment by the Transitional Military Council, and I have just heard the Ambassador of the Sudan reiterating that commitment, that all camps that have been handed over will be used for civilian purposes. We certainly look forward to the Government of the Sudan delivering on that commitment.

    2019-08-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8603 (2019) · source

  19. Doing so will require both an irreversible transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and the engagement of those groups that have not been part of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in the peace process. Donor support will be more critical than ever to assist the simultaneous transitions in Darfur and elsewhere in the Sudan, particularly considering the economic crisis that triggered the political change. Commissioner Chergui and I plan to travel to the Sudan together in early October and look forward to briefing the Council again on the visit, which would also involve discussions with the new Government on post-UNAMID engagement.

    2019-08-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8603 (2019) · source

  20. We congratulate Sudanese parties for having navigated the unprecedented task of relinquishing a highly centralized rule that lasted for more than 30 years and enduring protracted negotiations that led to a civilian-military coalition Government. With the support of the African Union, Ethiopia, on behalf of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and other key partners, including members of the Security Council, the people of the Sudan demonstrated that they have chosen the path of inclusive decision-making, equality, equity, freedom and human rights for all. This is an opportunity to put a definitive end to the conflict in Darfur.

    2019-08-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8603 (2019) · source

  21. In line with the vision ofthe new Government to resolve all internal conflicts, and in close consultation with the Government, we would like to explore various options to support Sudanese interlocutors in addressing the remaining conflict drivers in Darfur. In that context, both the African Union (AU) and the Sudanese interlocutors have proposed a meeting of the Tripartite Coordination Mechanism to further discuss future AU-United Nations engagement in and on Darfur on the side lines ofthe General Assembly. As discussions with the AU and Sudanese authorities on the joint political strategy and post-UNAMID engagement in Darfur are likely to solidify through those initiatives in late September, the deadline for a special report on the subject, due to the Security Council by the end of September, might need to be extended by a few weeks.

    2019-08-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8603 (2019) · source

  22. The transition cell will be further supported by a liquidation team from Headquarters to provide a dedicated surge capacity, if the exit of UNAMID were to be completed by December 2020. As reported during our previous briefing, the Department of Peace Operations has initiated discussions with the African Union to develop a joint political strategy for post-UNAMID engagement. Commissioner Chergui will also address this subject. Once the new Cabinet is formed, we will engage relevant interlocutors on a range of issues, including the drawdown of UNAMID, planning for a transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, next steps for the Darfur peace process, and post-UNAMID engagement.

    2019-08-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8603 (2019) · source

  23. Adjustments have also been made to enhance information sharing, coordination, and duty of care for personnel embedded in the State liaison functions structures, based on lessons learned from the first phase of the process. To coordinate transition planning, UNAMID and the United Nations country team established an interim transition team in Khartoum earlier this year. The team relocated to Darfur after the change of Government in April and is continuing consultations with relevant mission sections and the Office of the Resident Coordinator. The team is expected to become a fully fledged and functional joint transition cell by early September, with a finalized staffing structure and associated terms of reference.

    2019-08-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8603 (2019) · source

  24. While most of the projects for the second half of 2019 built on activities already implemented during the first phase of State liaison functions implementation, from January to June of this year, livelihood support for return areas has received an additional $3.3 million to foster confidence between internally displaced persons and host communities. The military takeover of power in April posed some challenges to the implementation of State liaison function activities. For example, in relation to human rights and rule-of-law support, UNAMID and the United Nations country team shifted their focus from national institutions to a community-based approach to strengthen the capacity of local actors, including the National Human Rights Commission in Darfur, civil society and community-based organizations, to address protection concerns.

    2019-08-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8603 (2019) · source

  25. UNAMID and Sudanese officials agreed that those resources should be earmarked for the organizations supporting peacebuilding and community stabilization, in line with the overall transition concept. UNAMID and the United Nations country team continue working together to provide transition support to the State-liaison functions in four key areas: the rule of law, livelihoods, immediate service delivery and human rights. For the period from 1 July to 31 December of 2019, UNAMID allocated $17.2 million for State liaison functions activities out, of its total programmatic funding of $19.6 million. As of August, seven out of 10 memorandums of understanding had been signed with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes.

    2019-08-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8603 (2019) · source

  26. With the establishment of the Sovereign Council, the timeline for resuming the drawdown of UNAMID may be revisited after the end ofthe pause on 31 October. Decree 102, which demanded the transfer of UNAMID camps to the Rapid Support Forces has been rescinded, and the Transitional Military Council has confirmed that the end-use of UNAMID camps handed over to the Sudanese authorities will be civilian. UNAMID is in the process of developing a road map to articulate site-by- site handover arrangements. To that end, UNAMID held a technical-level meeting with the Sudanese authorities in Khartoum on 5 August. During the discussion, the Sudanese authorities reiterated their pledge to dedicate UNAMID camps to civilian purposes, while asking for the donation of other mission assets.

    2019-08-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8603 (2019) · source

  27. Peaceful demonstrations continue, particularly in the Kalma camp for internally displaced persons, where elements sympathetic to Abdul Wahid are opposed to the agreements made in Khartoum. Other Darfur armed groups are not yet part of the national political process, although there have not been signs of renewed military activities involving them. On 27 June, the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minnawi faction signed a ceasefire with the Transitional Military Council, facilitated by President Deby Itno of Chad. That illustrates that the strategic environment in Darfur has not shifted since the publication ofthe latest special report in June (S/2019/445). The remaining conflict drivers and armed groups outside the peace process still pose potential risks to sustainable peacebuilding.

    2019-08-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8603 (2019) · source

  28. Talks between the new Government and various armed groups in the Sudan are expected to take place, including with the Sudan Revolutionary Front, which includes some of the Darfur movements. In Darfur, the security situation remains largely unchanged. Intermittent clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces/Rapid Support Forces and the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid faction continue in J ebel Marra. Intercommunal tensions, particularly between farmers and herders, escalate during the harvest season. UNAMID has observed herders adopting a more aggressive posture during the current season and continues to work with State authorities to reduce those tensions.

    2019-08-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8603 (2019) · source

  29. The United Nations was also witness, with the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa representing the Secretary-General. Following the signing ceremony, the Sovereign Council, consisting of five military personnel and six civilians, including two women, was sworn in on 21 August. Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan assumed the presidency of the Sovereign Council, and the Transitional Military Council was formally dissolved. Later that day, a renowned economist and United Nations veteran, Mr. Abdalla Hamdok, was sworn in as new Prime Minister. The new Cabinet is expected to be sworn in by 1 September. Of note, the transitional agreements entail a pledge to end all outstanding conflicts in the Sudan, which could bring long-term stability to Darfur and other marginalized areas.

    2019-08-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8603 (2019) · source

  30. Mr. Lacroix: I thank you, Madam President, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council today, in line with resolution 2479 (2019), of 27 June, which extended the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 31 October 2019. Important developments have taken place in the Sudan Since I last briefed the Security Council, on 14 June (see S/PV.8549). Most notably, on 17 August, the Transitional Military Council and the Forces of Freedom and Change signed the agreements on transitional arrangements for the forthcoming 39-month period. The signing ceremony was attended by Heads of State and ministers from neighbouring countries, other ministerial representatives from the Gulf region and the European Union, and the Chairperson of the African Union.

    2019-08-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8603 (2019) · source

  31. My Department also stands ready to provide useful information, including on ongoing challenges, conflict analyses and risk assessments, and to discuss mandate options before an operation is authorized or renewed. I look forward to hearing today from our Member State partners about other ways that this cooperation, including on the Secretariat's side, can be strengthened further. We remain committed to working together with everyone here, both Security Council members and troop- and police-contributing countries, to ensure that mechanisms for triangular cooperation are robust and dynamic. In the spirit of Action for Peacekeeping, we look forward to a strengthened triangular cooperation that will contribute to the renewal of our collective engagement.

    2019-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8570 (2019) · source

  32. The open debates organized recently on cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union - for instance, most recently in February 2019 by Equatorial Guinea on the AU Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020 initiative (see S/PV.8456) - have been very useful to bring to light how this partnership can help tackle current challenges. Finally, on the Secretariat's part, we welcome the substantive engagement from troop- and police-contributing countries during our meetings, and the value of more meaningful dialogue between the Security Council and troop- and police-contributing countries. We commit to continuing our efforts to regularly brief TCCs and PCCs and provide information in a timely manner, related to developments on the ground and critical security incidents, for instance.

    2019-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8570 (2019) · source

  33. In many contexts, peacekeeping missions are likely to benefit from more consistent and closer engagement between the Security Council and the host Government. And, as the Council is very aware, partnerships with regional and subregional organizations are increasingly key for the efficiency of peacekeeping. For African Union (AU) operations authorized by the Security Council, we are in fact already seeing a form of quadrilateral cooperation - among the Security Council, TCCs, the Secretariat and the African Union, including its Peace and Security Council and its Commission. Security Council meetings on the cooperation with regional and subregional organizations are of particular value by fostering common analysis of situations and joint thinking on initiatives or actions to be undertaken.

    2019-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8570 (2019) · source

  34. Those Member States are naturally at the crossroads and at the heart of triangular cooperation. They can therefore play a vital role in its organization through such meetings or visits. (spoke in English) I also encourage representatives to consider expanding triangular cooperation on occasion, as required, to ensure successful mandate implementation. The A4P Declaration of Shared Commitments on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations includes commitments to "enhance collaboration and planning between the United Nations and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and arrangements", as well as "to consider options for further direct engagement between host Governments and the Security Council".

    2019-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8570 (2019) · source

  35. I am also referring to the activities of the Council's Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, and I would like to pay tribute to the work of Cote d'Ivoire, which has been at the head of the Working Group for the past year and a half. Under that country's leadership, the Working Group organized very useful exchanges on such central issues as the place of women in peacekeeping, the protection of civilians, and the relationship with host States, to name just a few. As a former host State itself, as a troop contributor and as member of the Security Council, Cote d'Ivoire brings a unique perspective to the Security Council. More generally, I would like to emphasize the pivotal role of Council members that are also troop and police contributors. There are many here, including the country you represent, Mr. President.

    2019-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8570 (2019) · source

  36. Such meetings are useful because they help to refine our common approach and understanding of the current challenges and priority actions to be taken, thereby helping to strengthen peacekeeping. I am referring, for example, to the debate held last May by the Indonesian presidency of the Security Council on training and capacity-building (see S/PV.8521), which has deepened our common analysis of this crucial issue for our operations. I am also thinking of the Security Council Visits to our missions, which provide significant opportunities for exchanges with our peacekeepers and our troop and police contributors. Such visits also provide an opportunity to review and report on progress in the implementation of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative and its concrete impact on the ground.

    2019-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8570 (2019) · source

  37. I am referring in that regard to the practice developed by New Zealand during its tenure on the Security Council, where a member of the Council organized informal and interactive consultations with the troop- and police-contributing countries, which proved useful and appreciated. In order to contribute to the success of such meetings, my Department will continue to participate actively in those consultations, to work with all interlocutors and to share its substantive expertise in the preparation and conduct of the consultations. I would also like to encourage Member States to continue strengthening triangular cooperation through the holding of Council meetings on cross-cutting peacekeeping issues, such as this meeting.

    2019-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8570 (2019) · source

  38. In the first place, the Secretariat remains ready to give its full support to a more institutionalized system of formal and informal exchanges among the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries, of course in accordance with the mandate of each. Such exchanges can be useful throughout the life cycle of the mission: at the time of mandate renewals, of course, but also at any time that the mission encounters particular challenges or problems or following strategic reviews. Such meetings should encourage frank, open and interactive dialogue among the partners of this triangular dialogue. The dialogue is most effective when it combines both formal and informal encounters.

    2019-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8570 (2019) · source

  39. Today's meeting is therefore timely, not least because the third Chiefs of Defence Conference, which is being held at the United Nations tomorrow, represents a further critical opportunity to realize triangular cooperation, involving TCCs and PCCs at the most senior levels of their uniformed forces to consult with each other and with the Secretariat. (spoke in French) Given the relevance of triangular cooperation to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, as I have just described, I would like to share some thoughts on how we can work together collaboratively to strengthen triangular cooperation. By building on each other's assets, strengths and contributions, we can work together to ensure that cooperation can realize its full potential.

    2019-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8570 (2019) · source

  40. They include the formal and informal consultations of the Council with troop- and police-contributing countries, the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations and the Military Staff Committee. Outside of the Council, the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations is of course an important forum of discussion involving Council members and troop- and police-contributing countries. The A4P Declaration of Shared Commitments, which has been endorsed by every Security Council member, calls on us all to implement existing intergovernmental commitments on triangular cooperation. As Member States decide to take up the role of A4P champions, their diversity and common work will provide further illustration of the relevance of triangular cooperation in each of the thematic areas of A4P.

    2019-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8570 (2019) · source

  41. In many areas critical to performance, such as training, mindset and equipment, a triangular approach can yield strong results. Mechanisms such as the light coordination mechanism and the Triangular Partnership Project are, to some extent, concrete manifestations of the spirit of triangular cooperation. Mandates can also strongly benefit from the perspectives and experiences of troop and police contributors present on the ground in order to make them more focused, adapted and achievable. Those are only a few areas among many where triangular cooperation is essential to the effectiveness of peacekeeping. A number of mechanisms exist today to facilitate consultations among the Security Council, troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat.

    2019-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8570 (2019) · source

  42. Those benefits apply as well to our efforts on performance, for which the mobilization of Council members has been significant. As we are working as a priority to implement resolution 2436 (2018), adopted last September under the United States presidency, continuous engagement from Council members, as well as TCCs and PCCs, will be crucial to achieve lasting progress. That is, for instance, the case with the comprehensive performance assessment system. As we continue to roll it out and implement it in an increasing number of our missions, we need the feedback, support and engagement of the Security Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries, so that it can best respond to the needs and be most efficient and useful to all.

    2019-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8570 (2019) · source

  43. It is particularly relevant today, as the Secretary-General's Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative is aimed at fostering collective solutions to deal with the challenges that peacekeepers face. The common work of the Security Council, the troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat, along with other stakeholders, will be key to ensuring continued progress. That applies to many areas of peacekeeping. Improving the safety and security of our peacekeepers is one of them. As we are continuously working to implement the action plan on the security of United Nations peacekeepers, such strong cooperation enables us to better identify gaps and define solutions to the challenges our peacekeepers face on the ground.

    2019-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8570 (2019) · source

  44. Mr. Lacroix: I thank members of the Security Council for providing me this opportunity to discuss ways to strengthen, sharpen andre-energize our approach to the triangular dialogue and cooperation among the Security Council, troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCS) and the Secretariat. We have come a long way since 2001, when the Security Council, in the wake of the Brahimi report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see S/2000/809), called for improving the relationship among the Security Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat "to foster a spirit of partnership, cooperation, confidence and mutual trust" (S/PRST/2011/17). Strong triangular cooperation is crucial to enhancing peacekeeping operations.

    2019-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8570 (2019) · source

  45. Finally, regarding peacekeepers' safety and security, we are also committed to continuing the implementation of our dedicated plan for improving that. We had encouraging results last year, with a decrease in the number of fatalities due to hostile attacks, and this year so far only one mission has had fatalities as a result of hostile attacks. We are aware that more must be done, and that has to do with training, equipment, performance and medical support. We are working very hard on all of those issues.

    2019-06-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8552 (2019) · source

  46. I have two comments to add in that connection, the first being that prioritizing mandates is also our responsibility as the United Nations, because we make recommendations to the Council that should be adequately prioritized. Secondly, our missions want the Council to decide their mandates so that their financial and human resources are allocated to the implementation ofthose priorities. That is easier said than done, because it requires constantly changing operations and seeing their structure evolve on a permanent basis. Last but not least, we are committed to continuing our efforts to generally increase the role and positions for women in peacekeeping, including in the senior leadership of both our military units and civilian components. The trend is encouraging, but we are certainly committed to doing more.

    2019-06-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8552 (2019) · source

  47. It is a multifaceted effort that includes putting in place various performance assessment mechanisms, including the military-unit and police-unit performance systems, along with the systematic investigation of cases where we believe we have not performed to expectations. We now systematically investigate those cases and I think that has resulted in a number of lessons learned and useful improvements. The issue of the prioritization of mandates was also raised. I believe that we still need the Council to focus on our mandates" key priorities, but those priorities are evolving, and situations where at least in some cases we might once have considered the extension of a mandate to be a routine procedure no longer apply. All missions are more or less in a situation of transition.

    2019-06-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8552 (2019) · source

  48. Our Force Commanders and Heads of missions make great efforts to address issues that have to do with clearances or freedom of movement, but in some cases we have to escalate those issues. My colleagues and I have done so on occasion when some of those issues needed to be addressed with representatives of the host Governments, and in some cases we do need the support of the Council in making sure that whatever difficulties we encounter can be resolved. I want to emphasize that it is a top priority of our missions to ensure the smoothest possible cooperation and interaction with host Governments. The issue of performance was also mentioned. In that regard, I want to comment on the efforts we are currently making to enhance performance.

    2019-06-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8552 (2019) · source

  49. The second part ofthe question was about financing operations in Africa, and the Council is no doubt aware of the position that the Secretary-General expresses regularly in support of providing those operations with predictable and sustainable financial resources, which we think is an important condition for their success. I want to reiterate that position here. With regard to the questions that had to do with the relations with the host Government, I want to say that this key principle ofpeacekeeping remains entirely valid and that it is incumbent on us to seek the best possible interaction and cooperation with the host Government. Sometimes that is challenging.

    2019-06-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8552 (2019) · source

  50. Ijust want to mention one, which is the challenge posed by the support of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to the Ebola response, which draws heavily on MONUSCO's resources in terms of logistical support, the use of our security and police and military forces to support our colleagues who are dealing with Ebola, and a number of other resources dedicated by MONUSCO to that support, including some of our colleagues, especially after the decision that was made to strengthen the Ebola response in Butembo. That is just one example of a case where an unexpected situation has an impact on the financial resources required by peacekeeping operations.

    2019-06-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8552 (2019) · source