Sir Mel Stride
MP for Central Devon · Conservative · United Kingdom
“May I welcome the Chancellor to his position and thank him for his kind remarks earlier? May I also wish him every success, because I am afraid that under this Government we need some? He will know that if we are to fix the economy, we have to fix the welfare bill.”
“Given all that is going on, this could be the last time. The legacy of this Chancellor has been the highest taxes on record, a benefits bill spiralling out of control, and unemployment 300,000 higher than it was at the last general election. The right hon.”
“The right hon. Lady cannot bring herself to answer the simple question I asked. I will tell her: she is borrowing one quarter of a trillion pounds more than the plans that she inherited—that is her legacy. We hear that the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham) is considering borrowing even more.”
“May I begin by agreeing with you, Mr Speaker, and saying how disrespectful it is that this U-turn on fuel duty has already been released to the media earlier this week?”
“Today’s announcements will bring little comfort to the hundreds of thousands of people who have lost their jobs, the countless businesses that have folded and the high streets that are now hollowed out.”
“The Conservative party has been campaigning for a fuel duty freeze for months. The Chancellor repeatedly rejected those calls, creating unnecessary uncertainty for motorists and businesses. Why did it take her so long to realise that putting up fuel duty during an energy crisis is a bad idea?”
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“The new clause would put in place an additional parliamentary process for regulations giving preferential import duty arrangements to other countries. As I previously set out, for indirect tax matters, it is common to have framework primary legislation supplemented by secondary legislation. The Bill introduces a comprehensive framework for a new stand-alone customs regime. It ensures that the scrutiny and procedures that apply to the exercise of each power are appropriate and proportionate, taking into account the technicality of the regulations, the frequency with which they are likely to be made and how quickly the law may need to be changed. Clause 9 allows the Treasury to give effect to the tariff section of trade arrangements once they have been negotiated.”
“Although subsection (1)(a) of the new clause would do what is intended—that the first regulations to be made under clause 9 will be subject to the provisions of the new clause—the explanatory statement and the points made in his speech suggest that subsection (1)(b) should relate to instances where there has been a lowering of import duties. In fact, as currently drafted, subsection (1)(b) refers to “the effect of which is an increase in the amount of import duty”. I can only imagine that that is a drafting error or has been lifted from new clause 1, which does refer to the increase in import duties. However, I fully understand what the hon. Gentleman intended, and I will deal with new clause 2 on the basis of its intention and of the way in which he describes it in the explanatory statement.”
“The Bill refers to making arrangements to allow preferential rates of import duties to apply before an agreement is ratified. That is common when implementing FTAs and is the case under the comprehensive economic and trade agreement, which has been provisionally adopted but is not yet fully ratified. The clause will also enable the UK to continue to provide preferential tariff treatment to those British overseas territories, including the British Virgin Islands and the Falkland Islands, that currently receive that access under the EU via the overseas association decision. As I was looking through new clause 2 during the hon. Member for Bootle remarks, my eagle eye spotted what I think is an error.”
“Current trading partners and others. Obviously, as an EU member, we are bound not to enter into any other arrangements prior to our departure, but I am confident that we are having appropriate conversations at this stage of our withdrawal. In addition, as set out in the trade White Paper, after leaving the EU, the UK will have the opportunity to “look to forge new and ambitious trade relationships with our partners around the world”. Clause 9 provides a basis for those aims. The clause enables the UK to implement preferential import duties on goods originating in territories covered by a preferential arrangement. That will cover arrangements made bilaterally with a Government of another territory. A recent example is the comprehensive economic and trade agreement between the EU and Canada.”
“There are a couple of important points to make here. This particular clause enables the Government to put into effect the tariff-related elements of an FTA, for example. When it comes to the points that the hon. Lady understandably makes about treaties that we may enter into with other countries or with countries with which we already have existing arrangements that we wish to continue on our departure from the European Union, those kinds of debates and issues do not rest within this clause. As the trade White Paper sets out, they rest with the Government whose duty it is to make sure that we consult during the negotiation of those treaties so that we conclude them in an appropriate manner.”
“I do not think my response to the hon. Lady earlier suggested that there would not be any parliamentary scrutiny of the provisions in clause 9. Indeed there will be, as she knows. If we are going to change duties or introduce tariffs, such matters will be subject to secondary legislation and statutory instruments in the normal manner.”
“For the powers under clause 11, the negative procedure will apply, which the Government consider appropriate and proportionate. The procedure provides a sufficient level of parliamentary scrutiny while having regard to the technical and administrative nature of quota regulations. TRQs are an integral part of the UK’s existing customs regime, particularly for agricultural imports. Clause 11 sets out the necessary provisions to allow us to establish the UK’s quota regime post-EU exit. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.”
“The Bill introduces a comprehensive framework for a new stand-alone customs regime, which will be underpinned by detailed and technical secondary legislation. As I have said in relation to other, similar proposed amendments, the Bill ensures that the scrutiny procedures that apply to the exercise of each power are appropriate and proportionate, taking into account the complexity of the regulations. Tariff rate quotas are complex and varied in terms of how they arise and how they are administered. Regulations related to tariff rate quotas are lengthy. They will include, among other things, administrative provisions for the opening and management of quotas, conversion factors and details on import licence applications.”
“Any power to make regulations that make a quota subject to a licensing system are exercisable by the Secretary of State, and any other power to make regulations under clause 11 is exercisable by the Treasury, having regard to any recommendation made by the Secretary of State. As can be seen, clause 11 does not set specific quotas, but rather seeks to maintain the effect of the general framework by which quotas are set and administered under EU law. Maintaining the framework will help minimise any disruptions to trade as the UK establishes an independent customs regime. New clause 3 and consequential amendment 11 seek to put in place additional parliamentary procedures for setting the amount of duty applicable to goods subject to a quota.”
“Depending on the nature of the goods in question, TRQs may be administered in a number of ways, such as on a first come, first served basis, via a licence system or on a traditional/newcomer basis. Clause 11 establishes the general rule that a quota may be set only if arrangements, such as a free trade agreement, have been made with another territory outside the UK for that purpose, or if the Treasury has determined that it is appropriate that the goods in question be subject to a quota. In addition, clause 11 gives a power to make regulations concerning the administration of the quota, the conditions subject to which the quota has effect, how the amount of the quota is to be determined and conditions of eligibility, including, where appropriate, a requirement that the quota be subject to a licensing system.”
“Clause 11 makes provision for the purpose of establishing an independent quota regime for the United Kingdom. The clause specifies the circumstances in which a quota may be established and gives the Treasury the power to make regulations concerning the administration of the quota regime. A range of tariff and quota regimes currently govern imports into the UK. The EU currently notifies more than 140 tariff rate quotas to the WTO. TRQs allow specified quantities of a product to be imported at a lower or zero tariff rate. They are often used where the introduction of particular products to the domestic market raises specific policy sensitivities, for example in the case of agricultural produce.”
“That prompts the question as to where the quota itself originated.”
“The hon. Member for Aberdeen North rightly raises the issues around quotas. First, we have to work out what those quotas will be. We have existing arrangements through the European Union and we are currently in discussions regarding, as she has suggested, how the various quotas should be allocated, whether that be on the basis of consumption, or consumption and other issues that we might consider. The point I would make on that is that this Bill is enabling, in that sense, rather than prescribing or seeking to suggest any particular outcome to those discussions. In the hon. Lady’s second point she raised an example of 100 tonnes or 100,000 tonnes of beef, and a certain amount coming by way of a quota to the UK, and then circumstances of that changing not to our liking, and asked what we would do in such a situation.”
“If it was a so-called autonomous quota in which we had decided to implement a quota regime or quotas at the request of a third country, I imagine that we would be able to reverse or change that in some way through secondary legislation as well, depending on the precise nature of that agreement.”
“I think I have the gist of the point. In terms of the overarching point about what one would do if the arrangements come to be seen, in the way they are measured, as being inappropriate, that prompts the question where the quotas originate in the first place. If it is in the schedule of concessions at the WTO, I guess we would have to revisit that aspect of it. If it comes from provisions within a free trade agreement, I guess we would attempt to renegotiate that aspect, or perhaps trigger some provisions within that agreement to resolve the issue at hand.”
“I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for reasserting his arguments, but our arguments remain as I set out in my earlier remarks. Question put and agreed to. Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 12 Tariff suspension”
“In short, the clause is a crucial part of the overall import duty regime, allowing the Government to take action to support manufacturers in the United Kingdom. I therefore move that the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Delays in implementation of suspensions owing to the use of the draft affirmative procedure would only be to the detriment of UK manufacturers. I will provide an example that might be pertinent to our debate. The suspensions are likely to be numerous and detailed. For example, in the last round of EU suspensions, a UK business successfully applied for a tariff suspension on a specific type of gearbox with a hydraulic torque converter, with at least eight gears and an engine torque of 300 newton metres or more. It is the kind of gearbox I might have in my Rolls-Royce car, perhaps. It is not clear that such a level of detail would benefit from a greater level of parliamentary debate, despite the fact that we have debated Rolls-Royces, and by extension gearboxes, to some degree in this debate today.”
“Regulations made pursuant to the clause will be subject to the negative procedure. Amendment 5 and consequential amendment 9 to clause 32 change the proposed parliamentary procedure for regulations relating to tariff suspensions from the negative procedure to the draft affirmative procedure. The Government believe that the scrutiny procedures that apply to the exercise of each power in the Bill are appropriate and proportionate, taking into account the length and technical complexity of the regulations and the frequency with which they are likely to be made. For tariff suspensions, the negative procedure is both appropriate and proportionate. The power in clause 12 only permits the standard rate of import duty to be temporarily lowered and could not be used to increase the rate.”
“For example, under the current arrangements suspensions are generally granted only where the good is a raw material or unfinished product, which will be used by UK manufacturers; where no competing domestic product exists; and where the goods covered by the suspension are subject to a significant amount of duty. In other words, the suspension would have a material benefit for UK industry. A suspension of duty would apply for a given period of time that could be extended. Where a continuation of a suspension implies a lasting need to import a certain product at a reduced or zero rate, the Government would look to reduce the standard rate of duty. To be consistent with WTO rules, a suspension on any given good must be granted equally to every country and supplier.”
“Clause 12 provides for an exception to the application of the standard rate of duty as set under clause 8. It allows some or all of the import duty that would otherwise be charged on specified goods to be waived for a specified period of time. The primary purpose of a tariff suspension is to facilitate domestic production by ensuring that businesses have access to the supplies that they need. A similar exception to the application of the standard rate of duty exists under the Union customs code. A suspension could be introduced on the Government’s own initiative, or after a request for one: for example, from a business. Suspensions are usually applied to certain types of goods. Any goods that will be subject to a suspension will be specified by regulations.”
“Q First, thank you very much for coming. It has been a really helpful session. I have two questions, which you have two minutes to answer; if you can give me a one-word answer for each one down the line, that would be perfect. Would you describe HMRC’s engagement with yourselves—your own organisation, in the context of the discussions and the issues we have gone over today—as having been good, average or poor? Starting with Gordon. Gordon Tutt: Very good. Peter MacSwiney: I endorse that. Anastassia Beliakova: Very good. William Bain: Good, but we need answers on what is going to happen.”
“Peter MacSwiney: I think it probably is, but it needs to focus on implementation and people must have the attitude that they are using it to facilitate trade and not to inhibit it. Anastassia Beliakova: Yes, but more clarity on policy is needed, particularly on VAT. William Bain: We would advise that it also deals with the other issues we have spoken about today which affect the flow of goods in and out of the UK.”
“That is more than one word—you can tell who the former politician is. My final question has clearly been identified. Naturally, there are many challenges and uncertainties out there. Some come from the sheer fact that we have decided to leave the EU and the short time frame, for example, for decisions. Many of the issues we have described come out of the negotiations and the uncertainty about where we may land in that respect. However, what the Bill is doing and the focus of this Committee is to make sure that we are as close as we can be to existing arrangements and, secondly, that we have the flexibility to be nimble enough to move and adjust our configuration to accommodate wherever we land on day one. Very quick answers down the line: in essence, in broad terms, do you think the Bill is about right? Gordon Tutt: Yes, I do.”
“At the moment, the way that it operates on exit day is that the repeal in schedule 7 of the taxation Bill automatically repeals the effect of the withdrawal Bill, which would otherwise preserve the UCC as retained EU direct legislation. You would have to effect the taxation commencement provision. That would have to be amended, so that on exit day it no longer immediately repealed the UCC. Then the withdrawal Bill would operate. Clearly, we would identify some modifications that are required, some deficiencies, and we would have power under regulations, under the withdrawal Bill, to make regulations amending an unnecessary effect or remedying a deficiency. There would also be power under regulations under the taxation Act itself to make regulations. Those regulations would have to be enforced on exit day.”
“Q Thank you all for your evidence today, which has been really helpful. I have a specific question for Mr White regarding his assertion, which I generally agree with, that the simplest way forward would be to effectively take the UCC on board, but modify it as required. Is there anything in the Bill that would prevent us from doing that? If your thought is that we should be required to do it, given that we might not be prevented from doing it by the Bill, would bringing it into the Bill not just risk us tying our hands in a way that would be unhelpful, given that we do not know exactly where the negotiations are going to land in that respect? Jeremy White: Technically, I think you would be safe if you amended the commencement provision.”
“Q But would there not be provisions? The EU withdrawal Bill would annul the effect of the UCC, you are right, but what would stop us from bringing that in, using this Bill, on day one to achieve what you are attempting and would like to see as the outcome? Jeremy White: At the moment, I think it is schedule 7 of the Bill that itself does the business to repeal the effect of the withdrawal Bill.”
“We know that we will have to on the anti-dumping—we will have to employ our own police force to investigate in other countries; we will need reciprocal agreements. At the moment we benefit from the Community policing. There will be no police force—no OLAF. That is a serious problem we face on implementation in this area.”
“To pick up for a second or two on the preference agreements on replication, everything there that will be done will have to be proved. There will have to be proofs of origin. We have got a serious problem outlined, because of the Commission’s adoption yesterday of the road map to put back the information systems, which could have included common databases, as we have in other free trade agreements, particularly with China and Switzerland, that that computer system would not be available in the EU until 2025. In the earlier session you were told that a transition to 2025 is better, even legally technically for getting what we want by way of free trade agreements being replicated and being frictionless. If they are not replicated and not frictionless, then we have to be back to all of the paper certificates.”
“Q But, through various powers in the Bill, we could then bring in those aspects and elements that we wished to do so. Jeremy White: That is right. If you had a qualified commencement provision, so that schedule 7 did not take effect straightaway but had to have a commencement provision, so instead of Royal Assent you had a commencement provision, you would still have the flexibility, if sadly it became appropriate, in a no-deal situation, immediately to bring this into effect. That would be possible. Someone is still going to have to do the work. As Barbara outlined, someone in HMRC and the Treasury will have to do the work for all of these scenarios for the regulatory framework. Even if they wanted to have a recast, now is not a good time.”
“Q I am sorry to be a real dog with a bone, but I have one last quick question on this point. On the UCC, your contention is that you would have to amend the Bill under schedule 7 to stop it being switched off, to allow the time to bring it in to UK law and amend accordingly. Why could you not just continue with the provisions of schedule 7 and have secondary legislation that comes into immediate effect at the appropriate time, by way of a made affirmative statutory instrument, for example? Jeremy White: You could allow schedule 7, part 1 to take effect. That would repeal the UCC and you could have an affirmative instrument that applied it; yes. You could use that structure.”
“Q In that sense, the Bill as it stands does accommodate your desired outcome. Jeremy White: Except for the fact that the affirmative instrument, the SI, would have to repeal those parts of the Bill that make specific provision already. The trouble is that it is not just repealing the UCC. There are 33 pages of provision in the Bill that would have to be repealed by the affirmative statutory instrument, which will be messy. It could work, but it is better to amend the commencement provision, I would say, so that part 1 and schedule 7 do not commence as they do now.”
“For us to be going bargain basement on WTO is perhaps not the safest bet for dealing with a post-Brexit economy. We would like to see robust trade remedies that protect our industries from unfair competition, rather than working on the margins of the risk of putting good, competitive industries in the UK out of business.”
“Kathleen Walker Shaw: My union is of a school that believes that, in terms of remedies, we should be looking to a much broader assessment of what is taken into consideration, so we have welcomed the recent movement at the European level on trade defence measures and consideration of environmental and social issues. That is a bit of progress. We would have liked more of that progress. What we do not want to see is a narrowing of trade defence instruments that cut out the scope for that. Guaranteeing consumers good prices is one thing, but keeping the quality of good manufacturing in the UK is something very close to home for our members—obviously not just of our union, but all colleagues here. It is an issue of getting that balance. The EU trade defence mechanisms and its anti-dumping rules are still within the WTO rules.”
“Q Thank you very much for your contribution so far. In the previous sitting, we had a witness representing consumers—from Which?—and she made the point that she would be concerned if there were no lesser duty rule. She was concerned that consumers would be unduly damaged by any trade remedies that we might undertake under those circumstances. Do you recognise, as a panel, that there are risks to consumers in solely relying on remedial action, which takes a view on the dumping margin, which may be very significant but is equally in excess of those changes required to remedy the injury being incurred by producers? Or do you think that consumers are always going to be safe under an arrangement without a lesser duty rule?”
“Kathleen Walker Shaw: It goes back to the point that it is very difficult to assess that accurately.”
“Q I totally accept the argument that if a lesser duty rule is not fit for purpose, it is not fit for purpose—if it is not operating as you would want it to, that is a problem. However, setting that to one side, if you have a lesser duty rule that does what it is meant to do and the injury that producers have suffered has been remedied as a consequence of the lesser duty rule changes, I cannot understand why those producers should be concerned and why you would want to remove that—and, in certain circumstances, have additional remedial punitive tariffs or duties apply over and above those that would meet the injury suffered by the producer. That would be simply at the expense of the consumer, and indeed other companies that were relying on the use of those imports in their production processes. That is the bit I do not quite get.”
“If trade unions were asked honestly to assess the lesser duty rule—if we had that discussion and we were genuinely taken into the process—that would be a very different conversation. At the moment, through this Bill we are being given a compulsory lesser duty rule without having seen any evidence that suggests that we need it and it is desirable. I would flip it round and say, why do we need the lesser duty rule and how are trade unions involved in the assessment of its effectiveness? Consumers are also workers who are employed in some of these industries, and they will not benefit from having unfair trade practice disadvantage them and the quality of their goods. That is something we must bear in mind.”
“We have a concern about the parallel Bill to the one we are considering here: the Trade Bill, which sets out the provisions to create the Trade Remedies Authority. There is nothing in that Bill that indicates who will be on that authority. For trade unions, it is important that we have equal representation of trade unions and employer representatives, because we are directly involved in those sectors and we believe that trade remedies should be assessed using the insights of those directly affected in those sectors. It is unfortunate that from the Trade Bill we do not have confidence that we will have that representation, but we hope that we will see it developing in the legislation.”
“Q If we could assess it accurately and make it fit for purpose in that sense, you would not object to the lesser duty rule? Your objection is to do with how it is framed rather than the principle? Would that be right? Kathleen Walker Shaw: Our great concern with the Bill in its current form is that the provisions are not there to guarantee that. As our colleagues have said, the resources in terms of Government trade experts are not there to guide us through. For the best part of more than 15 years, we have not dealt with trade. You will need the resources to get those injury claims accurately assessed, and we have no confidence that the provisions are there in the Bill to guarantee that. Rosa Crawford: I think this links with the issue of who is making the assessment.”
“Q A final question to Rosa, which goes back to Mr Menzies’s question. What is the specific trade case you can cite where the application of the lesser duty rule has failed? Rosa Crawford: I refer to the specific case about solar panels, and I am happy to provide more information. The trade remedies alliance has done additional research that we can supply to the Committee, so there is evidence that we can supply that it has not been effective.”
“You would have to tweak Standing Orders to ensure that the debate was heard, but that is our view.”
“The Opposition wanted to debate those regulations but the 40-day period had ended, so they used Opposition day debates in another Session. They had to hold the debates on “revoke” motions, and there was the issue of whether those would be statutorily binding if the Government were defeated. It turned out that the Government did not vote at that point. So there is that limit. We think the negative procedure is fundamentally flawed, because in order to debate a negative SI, an MP has to use an early-day motion, for which no fixed time is allocated. That means that whether a negative instrument is debated is purely in the hands of the Government. We would like to see that changed. In “Taking Back Control”, we proposed that a new sift and scrutiny committee should be created, and that that power should be given to that committee.”
“Q Thank you for your evidence. The negative SIs, on balance, given that they do not necessarily get “called in”, for want of a better expression, are on average scrutinised less than affirmative SIs, but is there anything that would in any circumstances stop an Opposition party calling one in? Is there any reason why they would be out of the reach of scrutiny, should the Opposition decide that more scrutiny was appropriate? Joel Blackwell: A Member of either House who wants to pray against or seek to annul a negative instrument has to do so within a 40-day period. That is one of the restrictions: you have to do it within 40 days, otherwise you have the situation that arose with the personal independence payment regulations and the student fees regulations.”
“Q Given where we are with secondary legislation and Brexit, which means there is rather a lot of it, can I clarify that your position is not that we should not have negative-procedure SIs, but just that some of them should perhaps be affirmative? Joel Blackwell: Yes, absolutely. The negative procedure plays an important role. There is legislation that is extremely technical and almost administrative in nature, for which the negative procedure is appropriate. In our view, the scrutiny procedures in the Commons—not in the Lords—are inadequate. Our position is not that the negative procedure should not exist, but that something needs to be done to improve MPs’ ability to debate those SIs.”
“You would not necessarily have to clog up the system with things that are extremely administrative in nature, but there is the fact that Parliament is delegating a legislative power to the Government and if you can do what is done in regulations, it would make sense that they should be subject to the same level of parliamentary scrutiny as those regulations.”
“Q On that specific point: if, for example, HMRC was to produce a small amount of guidance on a small part of the customs process, why would it make sense to make that subject to potentially being a regulation, rather than having it as a public notice? Why would you want to clog Parliament up with all these additional items, which may be very insignificant in some senses—in a grander sense? Joel Blackwell: It is a good point. Specifically on this Bill, it is the fact that it says it can do what regulations could do and that would be an issue. In terms of guidance codes of practice, they are laid before Parliament and that is not the case for this Bill.”
“If we think of a luxury car that cost €45,000, because this is a European example, if the lesser duty rule was not applied in this case, it would increase the value of the €45,000 car by €16. We are not suddenly going to see runaway costs and the poor old consumer having to pay lots and lots more. We are going to have a robust system that ensures that we have free liberalised trade continuing as a safety valve. In that case, it increases the cost by €16 on €45,000.”
“We want to create strong links with the US in terms of trade, so that seems a bit odd. We could say yes, but I could not tell you that if we did not have the lesser duty rule, we would have seen less dumping in recent years. The lesser duty rule has not meant that new cases did not stop dumping. The point I would like to make is this: we are always told that the lesser duty rule ensures that the consumer is not ripped off—that prices do not rise significantly because tariffs are imposed at too high a rate. I have an example. In the hot rolled coil case recently—hot rolled flat is used for car bodies and washing bodies, but I am using the example of the car—the injury margin was 17.5% and the dumping margin was 29%. That is a difference of 11%. So the 17.5% was applied, not the 29%.”
“The argument from consumer groups is that that will then start disproportionately to damage consumers and those businesses that use those imports within their own production processes. Dr Laura Cohen : I am going to let Gareth answer first. Then I will come back and refer to what the unions were talking about; I have some evidence from the alliance. Gareth Stace : It seems that we are constraining ourselves in the UK when we do not need to. One of the aims of Brexit was to strip things away, make things more simple and have fewer people employed working on these things; much of what we have seen in both Bills seems to add layer upon layer that is probably not needed. The lesser duty rule is used quite a lot in various different regimes, but it is not used in the US at all.”