Seema Malhotra
MP for Feltham and Heston · Labour (Co-op) · United Kingdom
“Public sector productivity is improving, with the latest Office for National Statistics figures showing output continuing to grow faster than inputs, and Departments being challenged to improve efficiency and modernise outdated processes.”
“I was proud to support the Feltham Convening Partnership’s young leaders summer programme last month. What struck me was their ambition for themselves and their community, as well as their call for more work experience opportunities.”
“We will be working to commence the socioeconomic duty on public bodies in section 1 of the Equality Act to require public authorities to put addressing socioeconomic disadvantage at the heart of their strategic decision making. There will be more on that to follow. Let me again thank my hon.”
“For generations, the message to those who want to enter public life or elite professions has been that if they want to get on, they must sound like everybody else. When Margaret Thatcher became leader of her party in the 1970s, she famously underwent intensive elocution lessons with a tutor from the National Theatre.”
“Whether a young person chooses a degree or a trade, their journey must be determined by merit and their potential—never by whether they have to change their voice or pretend to be someone else to fit in.”
“Interestingly, studies also regularly show that regional accents such as Welsh or Yorkshire are rated by the public as trustworthy, warm and honest. Yet when those same studies measure perceived intelligence or employability, standard southern English and received pronunciation invariably top the metrics.”
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“On the question of the relationship between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations, it is perhaps fair and reasonable that the whole of the UK operates under broadly the same rules, but there is then a subsidiary issue of whether the different tiers of government in the UK actually take advantage of those rules. That has always been the case. It was the case under the old EU state aid rules; we had rules about what you could and could not do, but the different parts of the United Kingdom put larger or smaller amounts of funding into different schemes to support businesses. As long as that was all within the rules, that was okay.”
“That sends an important signal to businesses in particular that if they were interested in investing in one of the less-prosperous parts of the UK, they might be able to draw down significant financial assistance. At the moment, the legislation does not rule out an assisted area map, but equally, it does not rule one in. I have to say, with due respect to the Minister, that that leaves a huge amount of discretion in the hands of the ministerial team. In the absence of any commitment in the legislation to defining how an assisted area map should be drawn up, I think it is perhaps taking the whole issue away from the scrutiny of Parliament. That is how the legislation should be strengthened on that point.”
“We had an assisted area map under the old EU state aid rules, but let me be quite clear: the whole idea of an assisted area map was not something that was imposed on the UK from Brussels; we had an assisted area map in the UK long before Britain even joined the EU. There were maps back in the ’60s and early ’70s defining the areas where it was legitimate to give additional aid to businesses to promote new jobs or protect existing ones. I do not think we need some after the event audit of how the geography of subsidies has worked out. What we need, in advance, are some clear criteria defining the places where enhanced subsidies can be given.”
“Does more need to be done for a stronger relationship between Westminster and the devolved Administrations and local government on the implementation of the measures? Professor Fothergill: Okay—there is quite a lot in that. Let me clarify the point I was trying to make about how an assisted area map would strengthen the levelling-up agenda, and how it might be incorporated into the legislation. An assisted area map would define the areas where you could give additional subsidies to firms to promote investment, to bring in businesses from abroad, and to strengthen existing businesses in the locality, for example.”
“Q Thank you, Professor Forthergill, for joining us today. I have two brief questions on your comments about the interface between the Bill and the levelling-up agenda. First, what more needs to be done to the Bill to strengthen the involvement and the achievement of the levelling-up agenda in relation to targets and policy? Should there be reporting on that? Should the Competition and Markets Authority’s report consider the geographical distribution of subsidies, for example? Secondly, do you think that the UK Government and the devolved Administrations will have a common way of delivering policy goals under the subsidy control principle—on market failure and equity rationales, for example? How might that be interpreted by different levels of government?”
“Let me illustrate how this might work in the context of an assisted area map, if we are to have such a map; I know from personal involvement that an assisted area map has been drawn up the last three times round, and a full consultation process has been undertaken. Indeed, there was a two-stage consultation process, in which the principles underlining the map were out for consultation first, because the map was largely drawn here in the UK, though parts of it were set by Europe, and then the draft map went out to consultation. I am also aware that the devolved Administrations largely drove the detailed drawing of that assisted area map within their own patch. There needs to be a commitment to undertake a similar sort of procedure.”
“That is only right and proper if we are to ensure that the system works in the long term. Equally, the new subsidy control unit in the CMA could benefit from the work of the devolved state aid units, which are not mentioned in the Bill or the supporting documents, but naturally these teams have a lot of experience working with local authorities, sorting out the practicalities of how to assign a subsidy. It would be a shame if all this knowledge was not properly used to design the system and rules that will emerge from the Bill. Professor Fothergill: May I amplify my remarks on the consultation and the involvement of the devolved Administrations? The crucial thing is to include a commitment to consultation and to their involvement in the drawing up of the detailed guidance, because the guidance really matters.”
“As I say, the intergovernmental review really goes in that direction, but that is a wider piece of work, and I think we should introduce those social provisions in the Bill. Likewise, because the Government committed to a consultation mechanism with local government a couple of years ago, there should be some provisions for that. That is what we had when the European Commission used to draft the guidelines. The member states had a special legislative committee, and there were specific procedures for local government. There was even a statutory procedure through the European Committee of the Regions. There was a whole infrastructure to help the Commission design the rules. We do not have to replicate exactly the same things, but at the very least we should have the same level of ownership as we had during our EU membership—or more.”
“It makes sense that whenever the competent authority is in a devolved part of the UK, the same consultation mechanism should be provided, mutatis mutandis, before the Secretary of State decides to call in a subsidy. That seems to be quite inclusive. I have to say that the intergovernmental review, which was updated in March this year, tends to go in the other direction, but as the supporting document suggests, we cannot wait for the intergovernmental review to happen, because it will take its time. Subsidy control is potentially a sensitive constitutional and political issue. We are already introducing provisions to make sure that the mechanism of consultation happens. It is quite consistent with the direction of travel in which we should be going.”
“There should be a provision that the Secretary of State must consult the devolved Administrations in a dedicated system that should also involve local law. There should be a duty to make sure that different parts of the UK have full ownership of the final outcome—it is true that the Secretary of State will issue the guidance—but also the intelligence and the local know-how about these ideas. It is very easy to see things in a certain way in Westminster, but when you are in different parts of the UK, they do not look like that. On the call-in powers, it is true that UK Ministers have responsibilities only for England on some issues, whereas other Ministers across the UK have responsibilities on the same issue in other parts of the UK.”
“Q May I follow up on how the guidance should be developed more inclusively? Where in the Bill are there gaps relating to the involvement of the devolved Administrations? Is it in the development of the guidance? Are there powers for the Secretary of State that the devolved Administrations do not have, such as the ability to call in and make challenges? I would be very grateful for your view on that. Dr Pazos-Vidal: You are absolutely right. Ideally, the Bill should be the framework of how this engagement should be done. Under clause 79, the Secretary of State should consult anybody whom they consider it appropriate to consult before issuing statutory guidance. In our view, that is too general and not reflective of the territorial constitution of the UK as it stands.”
“Q May I ask for some final clarification on that? Part of the question was about the reporting. If all the decisions have been made and the work has been done on a subsidy, reporting—putting an entry on the database—should not be an onerous matter. Are you objecting to that also? Professor Fothergill: No, I am not objecting to reporting. By the way, when I speak of reporting, I should clarify that the alliance has not taken a particular view on the issue. If I am speaking about reporting, I am expressing a personal opinion that it should not be too onerous. I would have to consult some of my local authority colleagues to clarify their precise views on that, but I know that their precise view on the de minimis threshold is that the increase is a good idea.”
“Finally, do you believe that the one-month challenge window is sufficient in the context of how the scheme is being designed and is likely to operate in order to make sure there can be an effective challenge to any subsidies? Thomas Pope: On transparency, as most of you know, there is the £315,000 de minimis threshold. If the subsidy is below that level, we need not worry whether it is complying with the system. There is then a higher £500,000 threshold. If a subsidy complies with a scheme that has already been approved, it need not be put on the database if it is below £500,000.”
“Q Thank you, Mr Sharma. I thank Professor Rickard and Thomas Pope for coming in today to give evidence. I will pick up on the issue of transparency first. What specific additions to the Bill might you recommend to increase transparency? I am also interested in your view on whether there should be some form of reporting for all subsidies under the Bill or whether there should be a threshold. Could that be done in a more streamlined way to allow for that transparency? Could I also ask for your view on whether the six-month reporting deadline is necessary? In your view, could that threshold be reduced if decisions had already been made about the subsidy? Those questions are for both our witnesses.”
“As we know, links break and information gets lost. I understand that there is this concern about putting a burden on granting authorities. One possibility may be to ask the recipients themselves to help to provide some of the information, so we could cross-reference and make sure that we had the correct information from the granting authority and the correct information from the recipients. Those are just some ideas that would help to improve transparency. Through transparency, we can get better compliance and better value for money, and we can help to ensure that the subsidies that are being granted meet the goals that we are setting out to achieve.”
“We need this over-time data, this long-time thing, to ask, is the regime working? Are we achieving what we want to achieve with our subsidies? Are we getting good value for money? Are we helping disadvantaged areas? Are we helping to create economic activity? To assess that, we need to have this information and we should not delete it after a certain time. I would ensure that certain types of information were reported. At the moment, the Secretary of State is given the discretion to ask for certain types of information, but I would want to see as much information as we could possibly get, while protecting commercially sensitive information. Finally, I would look to make sure that all the information was self-contained in the database, without having links to local councils or other information.”
“If it is a tax break for 12 months, after 12 months a competitor might be out of business, so I certainly think that there would be scope to shorten the time to reporting. I would increase the time to challenge. One month is too short, particularly if someone is learning about a subsidy only through the public reporting and the database. Remember, for subsidies not publicly reported in the database, how will we know about them? Where will we learn information about them? I would increase the time that people had, or people with interest had, to challenge a subsidy. I would maintain the information on the subsidy for longer than six years. Six years is mentioned in the Bill. I do not see a good justification for deleting information after six years, particularly if we want to analyse how the regime is working.”
“A level on the transparency database of around the EU level or a bit lower—about £175,000; I know that was in the original consultation as a possibility—would be a reasonable compromise between those two concerns. We could even have fewer things that needed to be put on the database if the subsidy was below £315,000, although we might want it on the database somewhere. Professor Rickard: I will give a few examples of things that could be changed to help to improve transparency. The first would be to lower that threshold and report subsidies even if they were below £350,000 over three years. Report subsidies that were included in a scheme, even if they were less than £500,000. Report subsidies even if they were subsidies for the public economic interest. I would shorten that time for reporting; I think six months is too long.”
“Likewise, with the £500,000 threshold for subsidies that are approved under a scheme, we want to understand how often a scheme is being used and how much public authorities are going down that route. Again, we want to know whether a £400,000 subsidy is being approved under a scheme. I do not think that means we should pull the transparency limit down to £500 or £1,000. Personally, I think a public authority also has to ask the question, “Is this a subsidy?” With quite big amounts of money, such as £100,000 or £200,000, they will be thinking about that. For £1,500 here or there, I imagine that would be quite a big additional burden. Realistically, we are never going to move the de minimis threshold down to £1,500 or £50,000.”
“There are a couple of reasons for that. First, I think we want to understand how the system is actually working and the impact of different decisions that we are making in the system. One of the big policy levers we are pulling in the system is the £315,000 de minimis threshold, and we want to understand how influential that is. Are lots of subsidies bunching at £300,000 or £310,000 so as not to comply with the system? That is not necessarily a problem, but we want to understand what impact the system is having on how subsidies are offered. If we censor everything so we see only the stuff above £315,000, we have a less good sense of how the system is operating.”
“Q Can I clarify one thing, because I want it to be clear? Being below £315,000 means that the subsidy does not need to comply with the principles—does not need to be checked against those—and does not need to be reported? Thomas Pope: Yes, that’s right. The purpose of having a de minimis threshold is that we are worried only about subsidies that are likely to distort competition or investment. The judgment has been made. It is quite hard to know exactly what the right level there is. I think a bit higher than the EU level, which was €200,000, seems about right, so £315,000 certainly seems reasonable. My view is that there is a benefit to more transparency. Therefore, it is worth having a lower threshold for publishing to the database than for someone having to think about whether they are complying with the regime and all its principles.”
“Q Can I ask for one quick point of clarification? Would that mean, Professor Rickard, that you would widen the definition of interested parties to include those groups explicitly? Professor Rickard: Yes. In my opinion, that would be a good strategy. The benefits of ensuring increased scrutiny of how these subsidies are being allocated and how taxpayers’ money is being spent would outweigh any potential costs.”
“Q Would that include the devolved Administrations? Professor Rickard: That is a good question. I do not have an opinion on that; I do not think I could say.”
“That may be a way to provide the necessary information to a potential challenger, but in a way that protects information that is potentially commercially sensitive. So I certainly think there are ways around it, and I think that it would be important to explore some of those mechanisms.”
“I think part of the point here is that a failure to comply with something like this could be challengeable, not directly, under the process set out in this Bill, but that is also a violation of public law. But as I say, it would be better to ask a lawyer than me on that. Professor Rickard: One possibility, potentially, when you are talking about commercially sensitive information is not to limit the amount of commercially sensitive information that would be in the database but, when you do get a public request, to do something similar to what they do with Nomis and the labour data, which is very disaggregated by firms. You have to sign a declaration saying why you are using this information and that you are not going to use it in a commercial way.”
“Q I want to follow up on a couple of points, starting with the duty to provide pre-action information—primarily, clause 76. There are ways in which a public authority may refuse or suggest that it would be difficult to give information based on a number of categories—commercial sensitivity, confidentiality and so on—without it seeming to be clear how that could then be challenged. I wonder whether transparency, and being able to bring a challenge with the information needed, needs to be stronger, or whether the role of the CMA might need to be stronger to support requests for information. Thomas Pope: I am not an expert on that, and you will probably want to ask other witnesses.”
“So you do want to make sure that you are providing accurate information here. But I completely agree about some role for the CMA or some other body in getting the information from recipients—it sounds like a very good idea to me—and checking that, subject to how burdensome that would be. Yes, that is a good cross-validation. I suppose the concern here would be that the CMA ends up a sinkhole of time, just looking through every single thing that goes on the database, but if you just have a flag to say, “Hold on, the information doesn’t match here,” and then the CMA looks further, they are two strategies that work together quite well, I think.”
“I am glad to see that the CMA has been tasked with doing five-yearly reports, but I really think that there is a lot of additional room for ex post scrutiny, not only of the regime but of individual subsidies, to say, “Did this subsidy achieve this goal? Was the subsidy successful? Did it engender jobs, business and economic opportunities?” I think that is a really important role for the CMA or another entity like that, but in order to be able to do this kind of auditing, this ex post analysis, we need more information, which means we need more transparency. Thomas Pope: I would agree with all of that. What I would say is that I think there is an incentive to get the information right, in that I think if you are found to have got it wrong, probably your 28-day time limit after you have offered accurate information does not apply.”
“And then you can confirm: do these numbers match? This happens in trade all the time: you say, “What is the export data? What is the import data? Can we match these data?” And if not, what is the problem; why do they not appear to match? One way to have a check and balance on the information that is being provided by the governing authority is to seek this kind of information from the people who received the subsidy. It could even be a condition of receiving the subsidy that you will report this information. The second suggestion, which is one that Mr Pope offered previously, is giving the CMA a bigger role for audits, and even beyond that.”
“Q May I ask one further follow-up question in relation to this? I am not saying that there would be, but there may be circumstances in which accurate information is not always reported. What mechanisms do you see in the Bill—or does there need to be more on this—in relation to potential audit and checking of the accuracy of the information being submitted, and who should be doing that? Professor Rickard: I think you are right that we are not only trusting the governing authorities to mark their own exams, but trusting them to provide accurate information about what they have done. So I think there are two possibilities—this is blue-sky thinking. One, as I have suggested before, is to collate information—get the information from the granting authority, but also request information from the body or entity that has received the subsidy.”
“The key for the SAU is to ensure that it is insulated from politics and that the decisions it makes are really not only economic logic but are consistent with the principles. Of course, there is a role for politics in that—people saying, “We want to achieve these particular outcomes”—but I think you really want the SAU to be a technocratic body staffed by experts who will review a subsidy on balance, in line with the principles. With those goals in mind, there may be scope for expanded membership, or certainly at least for ensuring some sort of feed-in from experts on the particular issues, subsidies or areas that the SAU happens to be investigating.”
“A particular concern could be that, because the regional economies of the UK can look quite different, you may need a different set of local expertise when the CMA or SAU were looking into a particular subsidy in Scotland from what you would need in the north of England, which has quite a different industrial structure. There are lots of creative ways that the SAU could do that. You could have regional panels that have that expertise. I would go further and have a real look at the governance of the CMA as well, because ultimately, while it is the SAU doing the subsidy control, those are the CMA’s powers. Professor Rickard: I was surprised to see in legislation that members of the SAU can only be employees of the CMA. There may be very good reasons for that.”
“Thomas Pope: I certainly think that the CMA and/or the subsidy advice unit should have a membership and input reflecting its four-nation role in the UK and the fact that, although subsidy control is a reserved matter, it affects devolved competence and the operation of policy in all four nations of the UK. I therefore think it is appropriate that there be better devolved representation. These statutory responsibilities go to the CMA and are then exercised by the subsidy advice unit and the Office for the Internal Market. I think it is time for a look at the CMA’s governance, although that is obviously slightly beyond the scope of the Bill. There could certainly be ways that the subsidy advice unit could get input.”
“Q I am keen to get your views on the subsidy advice unit and its role, responsibilities and powers as defined in the Bill. Do you think that the unit should have some further external voices on it, whether on the board or involved in its work? It seems to have a huge amount of responsibility, but its membership can only be drawn from within the CMA, from which panels might be appointed to undertake reviews. To give confidence, a process of review will need to be robust and have knowledge of devolved competencies, regional issues and so on. Do you think the unit will be strong enough, or do you think it needs some adaptation in order to make it the most effective it needs to be?”
“The subsidy regime will be part of that—the changes will not just happen spontaneously.”
“EU countries, the United States and Asian countries continue to use subsidies in a major way to encourage key areas such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence and quantum computing—the industries of the future. Despite the difficult historical experience that we had in trying to pick winners during the 1970s, we probably have to ask what it is that our more successful competitors have realised about the use of subsidies that we have not. From the IoD’s perspective, our view is that we should recognise that an effective subsidy regime does have an appropriate role to play for small and medium-sized enterprises to build a tech revolution in the UK, and a green industrial revolution. That will require Government and business to work together, as to some extent they have during the pandemic.”
“Q 44 It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Nokes. Thank you for giving evidence to us today, Dr Barker. I shall start with a more general question about your view of the Bill and the regime as a whole. Where do you see the opportunity for small businesses to work towards the Government’s objectives of levelling up and net zero that have been talked about? Dr Barker: I do think this is an opportunity. It provides a framework to undertake the type of policy approach that you describe, but as to whether it will actually be used for that purpose is still somewhat uncertain. Historically, the UK has granted subsidies to companies much less than the EU, for example.”
“There is a clear principle in the Bill that any subsidy should not displace investment or business activity from one part of the UK to another, but you can see that having some potential conflict with the levelling-up agenda, which is trying to promote disadvantaged regions of the UK. You can see the potential for legal challenges occurring as one region says “Well, actually, you are not creating new business here, with these subsidies; you have actually displaced business activity from our region.” I think we could benefit, within the Bill, from more clarity to prevent that type of conflict from happening.”
“Q You have said this week that grants—or subsidies—made under the global Britain investment fund should have more conditionality associated with them to ensure that they support long-term commitments into the UK as well as levelling up. Do you believe that that Bill does enough to set out those goals? Is even net zero sufficiently enshrined in how subsidies should be used and their impact evaluated? Dr Barker: I do not think it does. At the moment, the framework that is being described is like an empty husk that could be used in a variety of ways. It does not really indicate how it will be used in a more detailed policy sense. Some aspects of the structure of the framework could get in the way of some of the policy agenda. The particular area where we have some concerns relates to compatibility with the levelling-up agenda.”
“I do not have a very specific proposal on the wording of the legislation, but that displacement principle should certainly be qualified to the extent that it allows this kind of regional policy—or levelling-up agenda—to actually take place.”
“Q In your view, how and where do you think that could be strengthened in the Bill? We have also heard from other witnesses on whether there should be an equivalent, or a successor, to the assisted areas map, which is currently used in the EU, and which we also had, in some form, as a predecessor. Do you think that, at the very least, we need something tighter around areas of economic disadvantage, and a definition of what that might be—levelling up also may be within regions, as well as between regions—to provide some clarity for businesses that may be in smaller areas of disadvantage, but in a region that is more prosperous? Dr Barker: Yes. I think there should be scope to do that within the framework of the Bill.”
“That applies to all the different processes that one might go through to win a subsidy; there are different processes identified, depending on the nature of the subsidy, from those requiring quite a detailed due-diligence process from the Competition and Markets Authority to those that, as you state, are on a kind of fast-stream process to subsidy. Transparency is incredibly important. Competitor firms and other enterprises want to be able to see what sort of subsidy is being granted to their competitors; they want to see how that is justified and whether they might want to make some kind of legal challenge against that decision. If any of this process is seen as happening within a black box, where each subsidy decision is not properly justified and explained, that will simply create mistrust in the system and undermine it.”
“Q Do you have any concerns relating to transparency? There is a sort of de minimis threshold suggesting that under £315,000, those subsidies will not be subject to the controls in the Bill; they will not be reported. Do you have concerns about what that could mean for knowing whether subsidies have actually been implemented—subsidies that may be supporting particular enterprises without the visibility of that for other businesses? Dr Barker: We would like to see transparency throughout the system. It is important for everyone to have trust in the system.”
“Q Finally, on that point, do you think that £315,000 or £500,000 as a threshold for subsidies under a subsidy scheme is too high? Dr Barker: I would not say whether it is too high or too low. I think that there should be transparency at every level of subsidy, but I think it is reasonable to have a threshold in defining a faster-track decision-making process. That seems reasonable but, regarding transparency, I do not think that should be related to the size of the grant.”
“One thing that the CMA could be given the job of doing is, probably most easily, investigating on its own initiative, rather than necessarily in response to a complaint, cases where it looked as if there may have been a subsidy, but where a subsidy was not in fact placed on the transparency database. That would have to be on its own initiative because the whole starting point in the Bill is that things go on the transparency database, so if they have not other mechanisms do not really kick in.”
“You can certainly have such a situation, and these situations will arise fairly frequently when public authorities have to take a view as to what they are doing in granting a loan, or in the case of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs deciding on the tax treatment for a particular company, is a subsidy at all. They will quite often take the view that it is not, but that view will be contestable. Sometimes the view is completely wrong and the measure is in fact a subsidy. Those cases will not be placed on the transparency database, and it seems to me that there is a bit of an enforcement gap in dealing with them. We have an obligation under the trade and co-operation agreement to ensure that things that are subsidies are dealt with properly as subsidies, so I think that there is a bit of a weakness.”
“Two well-known examples are tax measures decisions by the tax authorities as to the tax treatment of particular corporations. If those are over-generous, they give rise to subsidies under WTO rules, EU rules and under the Bill. You also have situations where Government bodies enter into commercial transactions—loans, contracts or grants—that are over-generous. They are not the sort of transaction that a market operator would enter into, but the public authority wants to claim that they are the sort of transaction that a bank or another market operator would be prepared to enter into. You will appreciate that there is scope in both of those areas for considerable argument and for genuinely different views to be taken about whether what is being done is a subsidy at all.”
“Q Thank you for coming in. I have a couple of questions that I want to put to you. I want to understand your view of the CMA’s powers in the Bill, such as whether the CMA should have the power to instigate an investigation or report on its own initiative. Currently, it is able to act only on those that are referred to it. Would it be desirable for the CMA to have further powers and, in your opinion, why would that be beneficial? George Peretz: There is an issue about the position of subsidies that are not recognised by the granting authority as subsidies. It has always been true under EU state aid rules and World Trade Organisation subsidy rules, and it will be true under the definition of subsidy in the Bill, that there is room for considerable disagreement and argument about whether certain types of measures are subsidies at all.”
“He may or may not, but clearly politics will come into that in a way that might not be entirely desirable. There is a wider argument, which I think I have made elsewhere, that it might be worth widening out the category of people who can make post-award referrals and call in directions, at least to include the devolved Ministers, but that is a slightly separate issue. To return to your question, it seems to me that it is worth looking at the wording of clauses 55 and 60. Then there is the broader question of whether it should just be the Secretary of State who has that power.”
“The first question for the CMA in either case would be, “Is what we are dealing with really a subsidy?” The granting authority will be saying, “No, it isn’t.” If the intention is for the Secretary of State to have powers to catch things that are subsidies but have not, for one reason or another, been placed on the transparency database, it would better for the wording to say something like, “a proposed subsidy or subsidy scheme, or something that the Secretary of State considers to be a subsidy or subsidy scheme.” There is a second point behind both those provisions: whether it is right for that power to be held only by the Secretary of State, who is of course a politician. Realistically, politically, in what circumstances is the Secretary of State likely to be keen to scrutinise decisions of central Government?”