Damian Hinds
MP for East Hampshire · Conservative · United Kingdom
“There are moments in debates like the one we have had today that are difficult to sit through and listen to, but it is the most immense privilege to be a Member of Parliament and to hear some of these testimonies.”
“Today is once again a day of heavy responsibility for all of us to decide on what we in this House call “conscience issues”. Many of the people who we represent hold strong and immutable views, and we hear from them. However, we represent many others who hold much more nuanced views and we are less likely to hear from them.”
“Members who support the Bill should not have their motives questioned, Members who oppose the Bill should not have their motives questioned, and Members who have reached a different conclusion from one they reached at an earlier stage should not have their judgment questioned either.”
“We have heard from royal colleges and other professional bodies, many of whom have a neutral stance on the principle but raise significant questions about particular aspects. We know from Ministers that there would need to be some reprioritisation of NHS resources, but we do not know the extent.”
“If there is the prospect of the Parliament Acts being used, that would increase the importance and the salience of the text as it is now. Today, it is reasonable and entirely in order for hon. Members to consider information that is available now that was not available in those previous parliamentary deliberation.”
“The Government have said, rightly, that the time taken to implement other schemes is not directly comparable, because none are as in this Bill. This is a free vote on a matter of conscience—there is no party line on either side of the Chamber. No one, I suggest, finds this issue easy.”
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“We will work together in lockstep with our friends and allies around the world. I will not go into detail now about what future designations might be or the precise nature of them, but as I said earlier, Moscow should know that we will use these measures to their full effect.”
“It is vital in the fight against dirty money that we increase transparency in order to know who ultimately controls and owns a company or property, and the Prime Minister is committed to bringing forward new legislation to include reforms to Companies House and to limited partnerships, and to introducing the register of overseas entities beneficial ownership Bill. Last week the Home Secretary announced the closure of the tier 1 investor visa scheme—”
“Unfortunately we are overrunning, and I will not get through responding to the points made in the debate if I take a lot of interventions. I can do either, but I think it is important that I respond to the points made in the debate. Specifically in relation to Russian illicit finance, the National Crime Agency has increased the number of investigations into corrupt elites. Some of that response will be visible through law enforcement, policy and international engagement. Other options are less visible but that does not mean they are not impactful. We are going further.”
“Just a moment. We want innovators to invest in Britain, and the replacement visa programme will be about creating a positive economic impact, not just volume of cash. I was about to come on to responding to the points that the hon. Member for Wallasey (Dame Angela Eagle) made about the Intelligence and Security Committee report, but I will wait to hear what she has to say now.”
“Resolved, That this House expresses solidarity with the people of Ukraine, and supports their sovereignty and Ukraine’s territorial integrity; condemns Russian aggression and emphasises the UK’s commitment to NATO; resolves to end illicit finance that rewards and sustains the Putin regime in Russia; calls on the Government to introduce an Economic Crime Bill, an Overseas Entities Bill and a register of beneficial ownership by the end of March 2022; and further calls on the Foreign Secretary to make a statement to this House on the implementation of the recommendations of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Russia Report, HC 632, published on 21 July 2020.”
“We already have a register of beneficial ownership and will introduce a register specific to real estate, and we will further strengthen unexplained wealth orders. Those key economic crime measures are an urgent priority for this Government, as we recognise the collective threat that serious criminals, kleptocrats and corrupt elites present to our financial system and national security. Dirty money and kleptocracy are at the heart of the Putin regime, and they are not welcome. This Government will use all the powers at our disposal against individuals and entities that seek to harm our democracy and our people. Question put and agreed to.”
“The UK is an open economy, it is an attractive place to live and it has one of the world’s leading financial centres. That combination attracts many legitimate investors, but I do not underestimate the extent of the illegitimate, nor do I understate the imperative to clamp down on it. We have the global human rights sanctions and the anti-corruption sanctions. Building on the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, the Criminal Finances Act 2017 brought in account freezing and unexplained wealth orders. We reformed and have now ended tier 1 visas. We created the National Economic Crime Centre and set out the economic crime plan, and we are going further by increasing investment in law enforcement, reforming anti-money laundering alerts and embarking on a major reform of Companies House.”
“Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss), who speaks for the Scottish National party, that the Government remain committed to reforming limited partnership law and recognise the important role of limited partnerships. My hon. Friend the Member for Devizes spoke of the financial system’s critical role and the possible leverage effect. I reassure him that nothing is off the table. The hon. Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock) asked about the report on tier 1 visas issued between 2008 and 2015, and I confirm that we will publish that report. The right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Liam Byrne) asked, among other things, about the economic crime plan. Thirty-four of 52 actions are now complete, with good progress having been made on the remaining 18. We take illicit finance very seriously.”
“We are looking to bring forward legislation to strengthen our powers to counter threats from foreign states and to update our counter-espionage laws. This will provide the security services and law enforcement agencies with the tools they need to tackle the wide range of future threats and evolving tactics of other states. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) brings particular expertise to this debate, and he spoke about the range of ways in which other states may seek to harm us. I reassure him of our intent to bring forward legislation on precisely that range of state threats. My hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay spoke about the wider forces of history, the need to defend and nurture democracy and the twin role of defence and soft power, and I absolutely agree. I reassure the hon.”
“I am not making an announcement today on the programme of debates and legislation in this House. We are committed to these measures, and I will say a little more about them. The hon. Lady and others spoke about the ISC report. Since the Salisbury attack, we have made real progress in disrupting malign influence in the UK. At that time, as hon. Members will recall, 23 Russian intelligence officers in diplomatic roles were expelled from this country. The Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 strengthened the powers of our police to stop, question, detain and search individuals travelling through UK ports to determine whether they are involved in hostile-state activity, and we have strengthened our scrutiny of inward investment through the National Security and Investment Act 2021.”
“The amendment maintains the necessary deterrent to help ensure operators continue to meet their obligations to provide complete, accurate and timely information about individuals intending to travel to and from this country, the processing of which is a key component of our border security arrangements.”
“There have been several instances where the civil penalty regime has been invoked, formal enforcement action for non-compliance has been initiated, and formal notices of potential liability given, but so far, in all cases, that has been sufficient to secure carriers’ compliance, meaning penalties have not been required. Removing the sunset clause will also preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty regime which, alongside the passenger, crew and service information requirements, is a permanent and ongoing element of the UK’s border security arrangements. Extending the civil penalty regime to Channel Tunnel rail operators ensures parity in the application of both criminal and civil penalties to all carriers operating scheduled international routes and required to provide this information.”
“That criminal penalty remains in place, as it should for the most serious failure to comply with the requirements. The civil penalty was introduced because of the challenge of successfully prosecuting overseas operators in particular for failing to comply with a requirement to provide passenger, crew or service information where that information was being provided from the operators’ systems overseas. In practice, the approach to civil penalties has been, and continues to be, one of collaborative engagement. To date, no carrier has needed to be given a penalty notice under the 2015 regulations.”
“People wanted by police can be apprehended before leaving, while individuals who pose a security or other threat to the UK may be prevented from travelling here, through the no fly scheme, or detected upon arrival in the UK. The same capability enables the effective targeting of individuals carrying illegal drugs and criminal cash, and the disruption of organised immigration crime using scheduled flights. The 2015 regulations introduced a civil penalty regime whereby the Secretary of State may require a carrier to pay a penalty if the carrier fails to comply with these requirements; the maximum penalty is £10,000 for each breach. Before the introduction of the civil penalty regime, there was only a criminal offence under section 27 of the Immigration Act 1971, with a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment.”
“All carriers operating scheduled services to and from the UK are required to provide complete, accurate and timely passenger, crew and service information to the Home Office. Those requirements are made in accordance with paragraphs 27 and 27B of schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971. The same requirements may be made by a constable under section 32 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006. The information, known as advance passenger information and passenger name record data, forms a key component of the United Kingdom’s border security arrangements. Processing of these data allows Border Force and police to carry out border control checks before individuals depart from the UK, before individuals are able to depart to the UK, and before they arrive in the UK.”
“I beg to move, That the Committee has considered the draft Passenger, Crew and Service Information (Civil Penalties) (Amendment) Regulations 2022. I thank all right hon. and hon. Members for being here, and welcome the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Halifax, in particular. I look forward to our working together on matters of national security, and of course being scrutinised and held to account by her on behalf of the official Opposition. The regulations make two amendments to the Passenger, Crew and Service Information (Civil Penalties) Regulations 2015. First, they delete a sunset clause which would otherwise mean that the 2015 regulations ceased to have effect from the 31 March. Secondly, they extend the scope of the 2015 regulations to include channel tunnel rail operators.”
“Again, I thank all right hon. and hon. Members for their presence here today and for, I hope, their support for the regulations, which will ensure the continued provision of complete, accurate and timely information about individuals travelling to and from the UK, whether by air, rail or sea. I look forward to the hon. Lady’s letter. Question put and agreed to.”
“I am conscious of the statement to follow, but my hon. Friend is right that those are concerning matters. In truth, they are not restricted to a single British politician or a single party. The security briefings that he mentioned continue to play an important role.”
“My hon. Friend is right about the scourge of fraud and its prevalence online. We brought fraud into scope for the draft Online Safety Bill. I am conscious of the issues that she mentions about advertising and we continue to work with colleagues from DCMS on that.”
“It is essential that our counter-terrorism strategy enables us to tackle the full spectrum of activity. TPIMs have been endorsed by the courts and successive Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation, while the police and Security Service believe they have been effective in reducing the national security risk posed by those subject to the measures. Our message is clear: we remain steadfast in our determination to defeat terrorism and we will take every necessary action to counter the threat from those who hate the values that we cherish. The safety and security of the public is our No. 1 priority. I commend the order to the Committee.”
“The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021, which amended existing and introduced new TPIM measures, also reintroduced a requirement on the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation publicly to report on the operation of the TPIM Act. The Act has been extended once already, in 2016. Unless a new order is made under section 21(2)(c), the powers in the Act will expire at midnight on 13 December. Just as was the case five years ago, it is essential that we have now all the necessary powers to protect the public from terrorism-related activity. Having consulted as required by the Act, the Home Secretary has, due to the significant terrorist threat facing this country, decided to make this statutory instrument to provide for the continuation of TPIM powers for a further five years—the maximum period allowable in the legislation.”
“That is why the 2011 Act provides for broad judicial oversight, including: a requirement for High Court permission to impose the measures, except in urgent cases, where the notice must be immediately referred to the Court for confirmation; an automatic review hearing in each case, unless the individual requests the hearing be discontinued; and rights of appeal for the individual against the refusal of a request to revoke or vary a measure. The TPIM legislation also places a duty on the Secretary of State to consult on the prospects of prosecuting an individual before measures may be imposed, and a duty to keep the necessity of measures under review while they are in force.”
“If the TPIM powers are not extended, those five dangerous individuals will be at large without any measures in place to reduce the risk they pose to the public. TPIMs are imposed as a tool of last resort when the Security Service judges there are no other means, or that a TPIM notice is the only satisfactory means, to manage that risk. It may be helpful for me to provide some background on the TPIM powers. They are civil preventative measures designed to manage the threat posed by individuals who cannot be prosecuted for a terrorism-related offence—or deported in the case of foreign nationals. There is no question but that TPIMs are extraordinary measures.”
“The Act provides the Secretary of State with powers to impose a TPIM notice on an individual if the conditions set out in section 3 of the Act are assessed by the Secretary of State to have been met, namely that she reasonably believes that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity, and that she reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, to impose such measures on the individual. In addition to the power to impose a TPIM notice, the Secretary of State has powers to extend and vary a TPIM notice that is in force, and to revive a TPIM notice that has been revoked. Since the introduction of the Act in 2011, 24 TPIMs have been imposed. As of the last published set of figures on 21 October, five TPIMs were in force.”
“This is why we continue to require the powers conferred on the office of the Home Secretary in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. Section 21(1) of the Act states that the Secretary of State’s TPIM powers will expire at the end of five years from the date the Act was passed. Because of the continuing threat to the UK from terrorism, and following consultation with the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the director-general of the Security Service, there can be no doubt that TPIMs remain an essential component of our toolkit to manage the threat from terrorism.”
“I beg to move, That the Committee has considered the draft Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (Continuation) Order 2021. Good morning, Ms Rees. Thank you for that introduction and for your reminders to us all. The order provides for the continuation of the Secretary of State’s TPIM powers, or terrorism prevention and investigation measures powers, for a period of five years. The Government take all necessary steps to protect the public. The threat we face from individuals and groups who wish us harm is significant and enduring. It is vital that we have the tools necessary to keep our country safe. Although it is right that our first response to terrorism-related activity should be to prosecute or deport those involved, this is not always possible.”
“The TPIM Act provides the Secretary of State with the power to impose measures on an individual where she reasonably believes that that individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity. I urge all right hon. and hon. Members to support this essential order to keep our country safe. Question put and agreed to.”
“That is an incredibly important front of our resistance to terrorism and mitigating that threat. The draft Online Safety Bill is important landmark legislation that specifically contains important provisions to tackle terror content. Two categories of illegal content have been identified as priority legal harms to tackle through the legislation from the very start—there will be others—namely, child sexual abuse and exploitation and terrorism. The interim codes of practice have been published and are in effect. TPIMs give the Security Service and the police powerful and vital measures to help manage the risk posed by people of national security concern. They are used as a last resort when prosecution or deportation is not available.”
“That said, we cannot predict the future and we must retain the flexibility and agility to do what is required. The hon. Gentleman also asked about lone actors and how the terrorist threat has evolved and referred to the Opposition’s argument that one should look further into the development of lone acts. I reassure him that we are constantly looking at the evolution of the terror threat and its different aspects, part of which is the development of lone acts. We can make some of that analysis available to the Intelligence and Security Committee, if desired. The hon. Gentleman and my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings also referred to the online aspect of terrorist plots—pretty much every such plot has some sort of online angle these days.”
“I am conscious, however, that there is a different legal system and tradition in Scotland and we must always be mindful of that. The hon. Gentleman asked whether we are happy with the regime’s effectiveness, and referred to the relatively small number of TPIMs in force. He asked whether that would continue to be the case. We are content with its effectiveness. The Committee will understand that I cannot comment on individual cases, but when the courts have renewed the imposition of a notice, they have all ruled that the TPIM has been imposed lawfully. The system continues to have the support of the Security Service, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. It remains a tool of last resort and is not something that any Government would want to use extensively.”
“The 2011 Act was updated by the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021, as he mentioned, to improve our ability to monitor and manage the risk posed by terrorist offenders and individuals of concern outside custody. That allows for more effective intervention. As he also said, if the powers are not extended, those essential changes will not be effective and our ability to manage the risk posed by individuals will be severely compromised. Subject to the agreement of the Committee and the other place, the order will come into force on 13 December. In response to the points raised by the hon. Member for St. Helens North and the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, I reassure the hon. and learned Lady that officials are in regular contact, and rightly so. These are national matters of security that affect us all.”
“I thank all members of the Committee for being here today. I also thank the Opposition speaker, the hon. Member for St Helens North, not only for his kind words, which I reflect back at him, but more generally for his constructive approach and specifically for his and the Opposition’s support for this important measure. He is quite right that the Opposition’s most important role is to hold the Government to account and to make sure measures are subjected to scrutiny, whereby we end up with better laws and better public administration. We greatly appreciate that and we know it can be done constructively and co-operatively when it comes to matters of the utmost importance that affect our national security. The hon. Gentleman says he wants TPIMs to be robust, impactful and agile. That sums up the objectives well.”
“Public protection must be our No.1 priority and we continue to work very closely with counter-terrorism, policing and the intelligence and security agencies in pursuit of that vital endeavour. The Government’s position towards Hamas is well-documented.”
“I beg to move, That the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) (No. 3) Order 2021, which was laid before this House on 19 November, be approved. This Government are committed to protecting the people of this country, and tackling terrorism in all its forms is clearly a critical and central part of that mission. As the House will be aware, following the tragic death of our friend, Sir David Amess, last month, and the explosion outside Liverpool Women’s Hospital earlier this month, the independent Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre raised the threat level in the UK from substantial to severe on 15 November. A severe threat level means that an attack is highly likely. Terrorism poses a persistent and enduring threat to our way of life.”
“I will come to the reasoning for the proscription order in this case. As I was saying, we have a no-contact policy now with the entirety of the group, but we proscribe only the military wing.”
“Will the hon. Gentleman forgive me for a moment? I will give way, if that is all right, a wee bit later. We mirror the EU sanctions in our own domestic regime against Hamas, also in their entirety. The Government condemn Hamas’s indiscriminate and abhorrent rocket attacks and remain resolute in our commitment to Israel’s security. We continue to call on Hamas permanently to end its incitement and rocket fire against Israel.”
“I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention and for the support that he indicates for the measure. Our position on Hamas is clear and it is public. Hamas must renounce violence. It must recognise Israel and accept previously signed agreements. Credible moves must be made towards those conditions. They remain the benchmark against which intention should be judged.”
“Proscription is designed to degrade a group’s ability to operate through various means, including: enabling prosecution for the various proscription offences; under- pinning immigration-related disruptions, including the exclusion from the UK of members of groups based overseas; making it possible to seize cash associated with an organisation; and sending a strong signal globally that a group is concerned in terrorism and is without legitimacy.”
“Under section 3 of TACT 2000, the Home Secretary has the power to proscribe an organisation if she believes that it is currently concerned in terrorism. If the statutory test is met, the Home Secretary may then exercise her discretion to proscribe that organisation. The Home Secretary considers a number of factors in considering whether to exercise her discretion. The relevant discretionary factors for Hamas are: the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities; the specific threat posed to British nationals overseas; and the need to support other members of the international community in tackling terrorism. The effect of proscription is to outlaw a listed organisation and ensure that it is unable to operate in the UK.”
“Although we can sadly never entirely eliminate the threat from terrorism, we must always do all that we can to act against and mitigate the danger it poses, and to seek to keep the public safe. Some 78 terrorist organisations are proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. Thanks to the dedication, courage and skill of counter-terrorism policing, and our security and intelligence services, most of these groups have never carried out a successful attack on British soil. Proscription is a powerful tool for degrading terrorist organisations and I will explain the impact that it can have shortly. We propose to amend the existing listing of “Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem Brigades”, or Hamas IDQ, in schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000 to cover Hamas in its entirety.”
“The incident that my hon. Friend mentions is a timely reminder, and our sympathies are very much with the victims and their families and friends. I will come on, if I may, to the important point that he raises about the distinction, or lack thereof, between the so-called political and military wings. The threat posed by terrorist organisations varies depending on each group’s ideology, membership and ability to train members. Groups such as Hamas train members in terrorism, as well as preparing and committing terrible acts of violence against innocent members of the public. We have a duty to our allies, as well as to our own people, to tackle groups that inspire and co-ordinate terror on the international stage.”
“Its ideology is related to that of the Muslim Brotherhood combined with Palestinian nationalism. Its main aims are to liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation, the establishment of an Islamic state under sharia law and the destruction of Israel, although Hamas no longer demands the destruction of Israel in its covenant. The group operates in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.”
“That includes open source material, intelligence material and advice that reflects consultation across Government, including with intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The cross-Government proscription review group supports the Home Secretary in her decision-making process. The Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe is only taken after great care and consideration of the particular case, and it is appropriate that it must be approved by both Houses. Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary believes that Hamas in its entirety is concerned in terrorism and the discretionary factors support proscription. Although I am of course unable to comment on specific intelligence, I can provide the House with a summary of the group’s activities. Hamas is a militant Islamist movement that was established in 1987.”
“The signalling and messaging are important, as are the practical effects of proscription. I will come briefly to the middle east peace process, and our continuing hopes for a peaceful and sustainable future for all. It is a criminal offence for a person to belong to, support or arrange a meeting in support of a proscribed organisation. It is also a criminal offence to wear clothing or carry articles in public that arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation. The penalties for proscription offences are a maximum of 14 years in prison and/or an unlimited fine. Given the wide-ranging impact, the Home Secretary exercises her power to proscribe only after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence on an organisation.”
“We are of course greatly concerned with what happens in-country and in-region. We want to see progress. We want to see the Palestinian Authority extending its governance. But this measure is specifically about the entity of Hamas. It is a proscription of a body because of its involvement in terrorism, and this debate and vote must focus on that specific question.”
“In Gaza we have strong controls in place to monitor spending and ensure that aid sent into the region reaches its intended beneficiaries. To conclude, the enduring and wide-ranging nature of the threat from terrorism demands an agile approach and a comprehensive strategy. That includes confronting groups that participate in and prepare for acts of terrorism or unlawfully glorify horrific terrorist acts. We must use every tool at our disposal to prevent them from stirring up hatred and division in our communities. We will never be cowed by those who hate the values we hold dear. The safety and security of the public is our No. 1 priority, and I commend the order to the House.”
“This decision is based on the Government’s assessment that Hamas, in its entirety, is concerned in terrorism and that proscription is a proportionate action to take, and nothing more. Having concluded that the distinction maintained in the list of proscribed organisations is artificial, it is right that this is addressed. Hamas, in its entirety, is a terrorist organisation. We must be clear on this to avoid conferring legitimacy on any element of the organisation. It goes without saying that this Government do not provide any assistance to Hamas or the Government structure in Gaza that is made up of Hamas members. However, to answer the point made by the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra), this proscription will not prevent aid from reaching civilians in need.”
“In a press statement Hamas described the aim of these camps as to “ignite the embers of jihad in the liberation generation, cultivate Islamic values, and prepare the expected victory army to liberate Palestine”. This vile indoctrination of young people into the organisation’s violent ideology shows how diametrically opposed it is to our country’s core values. The action we are taking is not a commentary on the ongoing tensions in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, nor is it a departure in any way from the Government’s long-standing position on the middle east peace process. We continue to support a negotiated settlement leading to a safe and secure Israel alongside a viable and sovereign Palestinian state.”
“During the May 2021 conflict, over 4,000 rockets were fired indiscriminately into Israel. Civilians, including two children, were killed as a result. The rocket attacks also targeted airports and maritime interests. Hamas also frequently uses incendiary balloons to launch attacks from Gaza into southern Israel. There was a spate of incendiary balloon attacks from Gaza into southern Israel during June and July 2021, causing fires and resulting in serious damage to property. These attacks were likely carried out by both Hamas and by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which is already proscribed. Only last summer, Hamas launched camps in Gaza that focused on training groups, including minors, to fight.”
“It is clear that these constituent parts are not wholly independent of Hamas’s so-called political wing and that they take strategic direction from it. There is also movement of key individuals across the organisation as well as, of course, a shared ideology. It is clear that the current proscription listing of Hamas does not reflect its true structure, and that is why this order has been laid. The Home Secretary has a reasonable belief that Hamas, in its entirety, is concerned in terrorism. It is our assessment that the group prepares for, commits and participates in acts of terrorism. There is also evidence that the group promotes and encourages terrorism. Indiscriminate rocket or mortar attacks against Israeli targets are key examples of Hamas committing this terrorism.”