Justin Madders
MP for Ellesmere Port and Bromborough · Labour · United Kingdom
“Friend the Member for Dunstable and Leighton Buzzard asked about, will consider the points raised in this debate and whether any of them can be put into future updates to guidance. As was mentioned, good passenger information is central to standards.”
“As the roads Minister, I of course recognise the importance of bus stops and the important effect they have on the streetscape. My hon. Friend the Member for Dunstable and Leighton Buzzard made clear that she is passionate and informed about the importance of bus journeys to everyone.”
“Where responsibility for highways or individual assets sits elsewhere, close and effective working between the relevant authorities is essential. We expect local plans to join up services, infrastructure and passenger information, rather than treating them as separate issues. That will no doubt be music to the ears of my hon.”
“Our guidance encourages authorities to take a strategic approach to stops and interchanges, including keeping an inventory of infrastructure, identifying priorities for investment and setting locally appropriate standards for facilities and maintenance.”
“She is absolutely right that the quality of a bus stop is about more than accessibility, although of course accessibility is vital. Passengers notice whether a stop is easy to find and use, whether it offers shelter or seating where appropriate, whether it is clean, whether the surroundings feel safe and well maintained and, as we have di…”
“That approach reflects a simple principle: local transport authorities know their areas and are best placed to plan improvements across the whole local bus network. That is why the Department’s vision for buses, within an integrated transport system, puts local transport authorities at the centre of delivery.”
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“The clause supports a co-ordinated approach to labour enforcement by integrating the functions of the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority into the fair work agency. We are amending the clause as discussed and introducing a new schedule so that the process of applying for and executing a warrant mirrors that in clause 79, to create a single system of enforcement across the employment rights landscape. I commend the clause to the Committee.”
“The clause is an essential measure that empowers enforcement officers to enter premises, including by force if necessary, when investigating unlicensed gang- masters activity under the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004. It carries over the existing powers of the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority and brings them together with the other enforcement powers of the fair work agency. It enables officers to gather necessary evidence when there is a reason to suspect illegal labour practices and is a vital step in protecting vulnerable workers from exploitation. It ensures that enforcement officers can conduct thorough investigations to uphold fair labour practices without delay. As at present, enforcement officers will need a warrant to exercise this power.”
“That is sensible flexibility: the more serious or systemic the breach, the longer an undertaking may need to be monitored. Clause 86 will also allow the Secretary of State to release persons from an undertaking, and require a release where the undertaking is no longer serving its purpose. That, again, is sensible flexibility, which will allow the fair work agency to cease subjecting persons to undertakings where they comply with the provisions of the undertaking and show improvements, so that fair work agency officers can thereafter focus on higher-risk employers. Clause 87 replicates section 17 of the Immigration Act 2016 and provides for how the Secretary of State should give notice to an employer about labour market enforcement undertakings. It replicates the existing law with minimal change—the current system works well.”
“Clause 85 largely replicates existing legislation in the Immigration Act 2016, although references to the enforcing authority are again replaced by references to the Secretary of State, in order to reflect the transfer of functions and powers to the Secretary of State. The clause, together with clause 72(4), will ensure that enforcement officers appointed under clause 72 will have access to the powers they need. Clause 86 closely follows section 16 of the Immigration Act 2016 and carries over elements of the labour market enforcement undertakings system, which has operated well since its introduction. The clause provides that the Secretary of State will be able to specify the time period for which an undertaking will last, with a maximum time of two years.”
“Turning to clause 85, the power to request labour market enforcement undertakings will be a key part of the fair work agency’s enforcement powers. Labour market enforcement undertakings are voluntary measures agreed between an individual business and the Secretary of State and seek to correct non-compliance to avoid the need for more extensive powers. Clause 84 gives the Secretary of State the power to request such undertakings, but clause 85 is crucial to ensure that the scope of the undertakings is clear. It does that by defining a “measure” in relation to an undertaking. It also specifies when those measures can be agreed as part of an undertaking and provides a delegated power for the Secretary of State to specify additional measures that may be included in an undertaking through affirmative regulations.”
“It gives the Secretary of State the power to request labour market enforcement undertakings, which are agreements made between the Secretary of State and a non-compliant employer. They outline measures that the employer will take to maintain compliance with the law and set out the prohibitions, restrictions and requirements with which the employer has agreed to comply. Labour market enforcement undertakings are important to ensure effective enforcement of the relevant labour market legislation within the fair work agency’s remit. They are effective in securing timely compliance, fostering collaboration, providing tailored solutions and improving conditions for workers. Labour market enforcement undertakings encourage persons to take responsibility for compliance while reserving more punitive actions for cases where voluntary efforts fail.”
“The labour market enforcement system was introduced by the Immigration Act 2016. It has proved an effective and flexible system to ensure that employers comply with the law. This set of clauses largely replicates the relevant provisions of the 2016 Act but replaces references to the enforcing authority with references to the Secretary of State, in order to reflect the transfer of functions to the Secretary of State. Clause 72(4) provides that enforcement officers may exercise any enforcement function of the Secretary of State. Clause 84, together with clause 72(4), will ensure that enforcement officers appointed under clause 72 will have access to the powers they need.”
“Clause 88 Power to make LME order on application Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Clause 87(6) specifies that notices or undertakings can be sent by electronic means only if “the person has indicated that notices under section 84 may be given to…an electronic address” and in a particular format, so there is already a safeguard in the Bill to ensure that those messages do not go missing. The whole purpose of an undertaking is that there is an agreement between both parties that there will be compliance, so it would not be in the fair work agency’s interest to send things to addresses or places where it was not confident that they would be received. It is all about encouraging compliance, and that is the purpose of the clauses we have just debated, so I commend them to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 84 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 85 to 87 ordered to stand part of the Bill.”
“I am grateful for the general support. The shadow Minister has raised some fair questions and articulated the frustration we all feel when trying to deal with certain organisations. I know it is a Thursday afternoon, but I could talk for some time about how my satellite TV provider has proven quite elusive when I have tried to speak to an individual. I think I can put the shadow Minister’s mind at ease on this issue. Clearly, the purpose of the undertakings is to encourage compliance, so an undertaking will not appear out of thin air, but will be the result of an ongoing conversation between the employer and the fair work agency.”
“I therefore commend amendment 189 and clauses 88 to 94 to the Committee.”
“A clear appeals process is a vital and necessary way to enable the effective operation of the undertakings and orders system. Let me turn to Government amendment 189. Schedule 6 outlines consequential amendments to other existing legislation and ensures consistency with the new provisions introduced by the Bill, which is important because it makes our legislative framework cohesive and functional. The amendment makes an essential technical addition to the Sentencing Act 2020, updating it to include reference to the labour market enforcement orders that a court may impose on someone upon conviction of a labour market offence. The amendment ensures that our statutory framework can function effectively. The labour market enforcement order system is an existing system that works well.”
“It also allows for courts, when making an order, to release individuals from undertakings for the labour market offence concerned, and from any other orders, to avoid individuals being subject to multiple undertakings and orders at the same time. Clause 93 replicates section 23 of the Immigration Act 2016 and allows courts to vary or discharge labour market enforcement orders. Clause 94 carries over the appeals process for labour market enforcement orders from the Immigration Act 2016. The Bill clearly lays out which higher courts will deal with the appeal and what orders those courts may make, which is unchanged from the current regime. Clause 94 ports over the appeals process for labour market enforcement orders from the Immigration Act 2016.”
“It lays out what measures may be imposed in a labour market enforcement order. It also carries over from the Immigration Act 2016 a power for the Secretary of State to specify such measures in regulations. That is an existing power, and it makes sense to keep it to allow for flexibility in enforcing employment rights legislation. The measures are specifically designed to prevent or reduce the risk of the respondent failing to comply with any requirement imposed by or under relevant legislation, thereby protecting workers. Clause 92 also carries over provisions from the Immigration Act 2016. It specifies that labour market enforcement orders can be granted only for a maximum period of two years and cannot be imposed on those under the age of 18.”
“That is a common-sense approach to enforcement, first allowing businesses to fix problems voluntarily, and ordering them to improve only if that does not work. That is the compliance-first approach we want the fair work agency to take. Clause 90 replicates section 20 of the Immigration Act 2016. It too grants the power to a court, where a person has been convicted of a labour market offence, to make a labour marker enforcement order. That is a reasonable measure, which protects workers by introducing an additional safeguard in relation to rogue employers. The labour market enforcement order may impose measures in accordance with clause 91 to ensure compliance with relevant legislation. This provision is substantially unchanged from the Immigration Act. Clause 91 largely replicates section 21 of the Immigration Act 2016.”
“Clause 88 carries over provisions that are currently in section 18 of the Immigration Act 2016. It gives the appropriate court the power to make a labour market enforcement order following an application by the Secretary of State. Labour market enforcement orders are a critical tool in the existing enforcement of employment rights, and it is vital that this system can continue to operate when enforcement is brought together under the fair work agency. Clause 89 sets out the circumstances in which the Secretary of State may apply for a labour market enforcement order, and largely follows section 19 of the Immigration Act 2016. The Secretary of State may apply for an order if an employer refuses or fails to enter into a labour market enforcement undertaking, or does not comply with the measures in an undertaking that it has entered into.”
“Let me deal first with the usual concern raised by the shadow Minister about why we have had to table an amendment. He has probably noticed that schedule 6 contains a considerable amount of other legislation. It is not that unexpected that not every piece of legislation affected by the Bill would be covered—that is really what this is about. The shadow Minister also sought reassurance, and my understanding is that the amendment does not change the current powers of the courts in any meaningful way. If I am incorrect about that, I will of course write to him. Question put and agreed to. Clause 88 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 89 to 94 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 95 Evidence of authority Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“The way in which we have drafted the clause is proportionate and reflects existing best practice. It balances having an important safeguard in place with ensuring that that does not create unnecessary operational burdens. I therefore commend clause 95 to the Committee.”
“For example, section 9(1) of the Employment Agencies Act 1973 requires inspectors of the employment agency standards inspectorate to show evidence of their authority “if so required”. We have mirrored that approach in clauses 95 to 97. Persons acting to carry out the Secretary of State’s enforcement functions and use the powers of enforcement officers will have to provide evidence of their appointment on request. That gives businesses the opportunity to satisfy themselves that an inspection, which is an inconvenience and costs time and money, is genuine. The fact that the clause requires officers to provide this evidence only on request reflects the fact that the fair work agency’s inspectors are likely to be in correspondence with businesses before their premises visit.”
“Enforcement officers need the powers to do their jobs effectively, and that is what we are providing through the Bill. Clause 95 introduces a key safeguard around carrying out the enforcement functions in part 5 of the Bill. It applies to any person proposing to carry out an enforcement function of the Secretary of State and to exercise any of the powers of an enforcement officer. It requires those persons—in practice, fair work agency inspectors—to provide evidence of their appointment when carrying out investigations or taking enforcement action. That evidence will be in the form of official identification, sometimes referred to as a warrant card, provided by the Department. Existing enforcement bodies provide such evidence currently.”
“For example, section 42 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 exempts from disclosure information subject to legal privilege. The fair work agency will have strong investigatory enforcement powers. Those are proportionate and justified, and it is important that, where investigations do happen, defendants are able to communicate frankly with any legal advisers representing them. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.”
“The same is true of documents or information a person is entitled to withhold in Court of Session proceedings in Scotland. No provisions in the enforcement clauses can compel someone to disclose information they could choose to withhold on the grounds of confidentiality of communications. The clause defines communications for this purpose as any communication between a professional legal adviser and their client or as any communication made, connected with or for the purposes of legal proceedings. Protecting legal professional privilege helps to protect the administration of justice and the rights of individuals and other legal persons. It is a well-recognised concept that appears in many other pieces of legislation.”
“The clause provides a safeguard to ensure the protection of any document or information that is subject to legal professional privilege. Such documents or information do not have to be provided in response to any enforcement action by the fair work agency. As Members will know, legal professional privilege is a well-established principle, and refers to a person’s ability to speak freely and frankly with their legal adviser to obtain advice. It is a key principle in the judicial system in this country. Practically speaking, the clause means that no provisions relating to the enforcement of labour market legislation —those in part 5 of the Bill—can require a person to produce documents or information they are entitled to withhold on grounds of legal professional privilege in High Court proceedings in England and Wales.”
“It provides that the protection does not apply where the offences under trial relate to any of the offences listed in subsection (4)—providing false information or documents under clause 103 of the Bill, or breaching other statutory provisions about false statements and statutory declarations. It is vital, in the context of someone providing false information, to ensure that the right evidence is presented to the court. That, in turn, is crucial to enable the court to come to the right decision. These protections and exemptions help to ensure the effective functioning and the fairness of our legal system. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.”
“Clause 97 provides for another standard safeguard in our legal system: protection against self-incrimination in criminal legal proceedings. The fair work agency has investigatory powers that enable the Secretary of State and the enforcement officers they appoint to require the production of documents and information to enable them to fulfil their functions. It is an offence under clause 104 for anyone, without reasonable excuse, to fail to comply with such a requirement. The clause protects individuals from self-incrimination by providing that any information they are required to provide under clause 78 is not adduced as evidence against them in criminal proceedings. However, the individual can still choose to voluntarily adduce this information as evidence in the proceedings. The clause disapplies that protection for certain offences.”
“Information will be able to be shared under clause 98 without breaching any obligation of confidence, or other restriction on the disclosure of information. Clause 99 ensures that information shared under clause 98 is shared in accordance with the relevant data protection laws and remains subject to relevant prohibitions on disclosure in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. It is crucial to safeguard the ongoing secure handling of information and to ensure that all parties can be confident that that information will be managed in the proper way.”
“The clause also allows for schedule 5 to be amended by affirmative regulations. That provides the flexibility necessary for the fair work agency to respond to changes in the wider labour market and regulatory landscape. Effective information sharing is crucial for successful enforcement of employment rights across agencies. Without the clause, the fair work agency would be unable to receive and share vital information, undermining its ability to effectively enforce those rights. Clause 99 ensures that the information sharing authorised in clause 98 is efficient and reflective of best practice. Although it is vital that the fair work agency can share information with other bodies, it is critical that personal information is protected.”
“On clause 98, regulators and enforcement agencies must be able to work together effectively to share information and pool knowledge. For example, if the fair work agency identifies issues with health and safety in the course of its investigations, it should be able to let the Health and Safety Executive know, and vice versa. Silo working is bad for workers, bad for businesses and bad for the taxpayer. Clause 98 is about preventing silo working. It authorises the two-way sharing of information between the fair work agency and other bodies. It introduces schedule 5, which lists the public bodies with which information can be shared to enable them to exercise their functions. We have tabled amendments to the schedule to add the Pensions Ombudsman, as well as certain authorities in the devolved nations.”
“The shadow Minister makes a reasonable point. Of course, this will all be subject to data protection legislation and the safeguards contained therein. It is also the case that, if the Secretary of State wishes to expand the list of bodies with which information is shared, there is a requirement to amend that list by way of affirmation regulation, giving parliamentary oversight. Question put and agreed to. Clause 98 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 5 Persons to whom information may be disclosed under section 98”
“I beg to move amendment 97, in schedule 5, page 130, line 22, at end insert— “The Pensions Ombudsman.” This amendment would enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of enforcement functions under Part 5 of the Bill to be disclosed to the Pensions Ombudsman for the purposes of the Ombudsman’s functions.”
“The amendments stand to benefit those bodies and the public by allowing the Secretary of State to share information with those bodies that is obtained by the fair work agency and that is relevant to its functions, where the disclosure is relevant to the exercise of those bodies’ own functions. The amendments have all been agreed by the relevant bodies, and on that basis I commend them to the Committee.”
“Amendments 171 to 174 are about where the fair work agency, in fulfilling its statutory duties, is likely to obtain information that would be beneficial to other statutory bodies. Clause 98(5) gives the Secretary of State the power to disclose certain information to the persons specified in schedule 5. Amendments 171 to 174 add additional public bodies in the devolved nations to schedule 5. Amendment 171 adds the National Crime Agency, amendment 172 adds Social Care Wales, amendment 173 adds the Health and Social Care Regulation and Quality Improvement Authority in Northern Ireland, and amendment 174 adds Welsh Ministers. The amendments will enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of part 5 enforcement functions to be disclosed to those bodies for the purposes of their functions.”
“This is a large grouping again, and I will turn first to Government amendments 97 to 100. Open, two-way information sharing with the regulator is what clause 98 and schedule 5 are all about. These amendments add Scottish health bodies to schedule 5, which will support those bodies in fulfilling their functions. This has been agreed by Scottish Government officials and the bodies themselves. Amendment 97 also adds the Pensions Ombudsman to schedule 5. Fair work agency inspectors may come across useful pension information that will help the Pensions Ombudsman in its duties, and it is right that they can share that information. The amendments stand to benefit the bodies concerned and the public by allowing the Secretary of State to share information obtained by the fair work agency that is relevant to the functions of those bodies.”
“Amendment 174, in schedule 5, page 131, line 23, at end insert— “The Welsh Ministers.” —(Justin Madders.) This amendment would enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of enforcement functions under Part 5 of the Bill to be disclosed to the Welsh Ministers for the purposes of their functions. Question proposed, That the schedule, as amended, be the Fifth schedule to the Bill.”
“Amendment 172, in schedule 5, page 131, line 20, at end insert— “Social Care Wales.” This amendment would enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of enforcement functions under Part 5 of the Bill to be disclosed to Social Care Wales for the purposes of its functions. Amendment 173, in schedule 5, page 131, line 20, at end insert— “The Health and Social Care Regulation and Quality Improvement Authority in Northern Ireland.” This amendment would enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of enforcement functions under Part 5 of the Bill to be disclosed to the Health and Social Care Regulation and Quality Improvement Authority for the purposes of its functions.”
“Amendment 99, in schedule 5, page 131, line 20, at end insert— “Social Care and Social Work Improvement Scotland.” This amendment would enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of enforcement functions under Part 5 of the Bill to be disclosed to Social Care and Social Work Improvement Scotland for the purposes of its functions. Amendment 100, in schedule 5, page 131, line 20, at end insert— “The Scottish Social Services Council.” This amendment would enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of enforcement functions under Part 5 of the Bill to be disclosed to the Scottish Social Services Council for the purposes of its functions.”
“Amendments made: 171, in schedule 5, page 130, line 29, at end insert— “The National Crime Agency.” This amendment would enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of enforcement functions under Part 5 of the Bill to be disclosed to the National Crime Agency for the purposes of its functions. Amendment 98, in schedule 5, page 131, line 20, at end insert— “Healthcare Improvement Scotland.” This amendment would enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of enforcement functions under Part 5 of the Bill to be disclosed to Healthcare Improvement Scotland for the purposes of its functions.”
“The shadow Minister lays down a challenge for me. On the Pensions Ombudsman—I will certainly write to him if anything occurs to me after consultation with officials—it is not unusual for an individual’s payslip or contract to indicate that pension deductions have been made, when they have not actually reached the appropriate pension funds. That may be one example of where such a reference could be made. The shadow Minister will be aware from the Low Pay Commission’s recent reports that health and social care are the sectors where some of the worst labour market abuses are ongoing, so it is important that we are sighted of particular issues in those sectors. I will take further advice on any other specific examples I might be able to give him, and I will write to him in due course. Amendment 97 agreed to.”
“I will not detain the Committee long. Schedule 5 is the list of bodies with which information can be shared, which obviously now includes the Pensions Ombudsman. As I have indicated, any further bodies would need to be added to the list by affirmative regulations.”
“The clause ensures information-sharing best practice across Government and puts in place an appropriate safeguard around the sharing of HMRC data.”
“Data from His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs will be crucial for the investigation and enforcement of many different employment rights beyond the national minimum wage, which HMRC is specifically tasked to enforce on behalf of the Secretary of State. However, much of HMRC’s data is understandably confidential, and it is therefore prudent to require an extra level of approval before information shared by HMRC is disclosed further. The clause restricts the disclosure of that information without authorisation from the commissioners of HMRC. If information is inadvertently shared without approval, section 19 of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005, on wrongful disclosure, applies. The result could be a fine and/or imprisonment for the individual committing the offence.”
“The shadow Minister raises some fair points. I commend him for the work he does on the loan charge, and that all-party group is important. Certainly, HMRC’s functions in terms of the fair work agency will be focused on national minimum wage enforcement. I do not think that that is an area where we have some of the difficulties the shadow Minister referred to, but of course we will make sure. The intention in the clause is to make sure that appropriate safeguards are indeed in place. Question put and agreed to . Clause 100 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 101 Restriction on disclosure of intelligence service information”
“I beg to move amendment 175, in clause 101, page 95, line 11, leave out from “person” to end of line 12 and insert “to disclose information to an enforcing authority where— (a) the person is serving in an intelligence service, or (b) the information is intelligence service information.” This amendment would provide that clause 98(2) does not authorise the disclosure of intelligence service information.”
“Amendment 176 inserts wording into clause 101(1) to clarify that the restriction on persons serving in an intelligence service from disclosing information under clause 98(2) does not affect disclosures that such persons could make under intelligence service disclosure arrangements. These amendments protect intelligence service information from disclosure. They are part of a series of amendments that aim to balance the need to preserve the work that the intelligence services do in protecting key national interests with ensuring that the fair work agency can exercise its functions where necessary. On that basis, I commend the amendments to the Committee.”
“Clause 101 therefore sets out restrictions on the disclosure of intelligence service information, to ensure that the Bill is consistent with those obligations. Clause 101(1), as introduced, refers only to persons serving in an intelligence service. After discussion with the intelligence services, it is clear that there is a need to ensure that intelligence service information held by third parties is also protected, so Government amendment 175 widens the restriction at clause 101(1) to ensure that clause 98(2) does not require third parties to disclose intelligence service information to an enforcement officer. Government amendment 176 is consequential on amendment 175.”
“When carrying out investigatory and enforcement activity, the enforcement officers will need to obtain information relevant to the Secretary of State’s enforcement functions. That is why clause 98(2) permits the disclosure of information to the Secretary of State or an enforcement officer if the disclosure is made in connection with an enforcement function. But there is a need to ensure that certain categories of information are treated differently, given their likely sensitive nature or content. One such category is intelligence service information. The chiefs of the intelligence services are under statutory obligations to make sure that information relating to their service is not disclosed unless to do so is in accordance with certain requirements.”
“The clause authorises a person serving in an intelligence service to make disclosures of information to an enforcement authority in accordance with intelligence service disclosure arrangements. It restricts the disclosure of intelligence service information by an enforcing authority without the authorisation of the appropriate service chief for the intelligence service from which the information was obtained. It is right that there are additional protections for this information, not least on national security grounds. I commend the clause to the Committee.”
“The clause ensures that intelligence service information is disclosed to the fair work agency only in accordance with intelligence service disclosure arrangements and cannot be shared by the fair work agency without authorisation from the appropriate service chief. In the course of investigating some employment rights abuses—for example, in cases of modern slavery or coercive employment practices—the fair work agency may make use of information provided by the intelligence services or come into possession of information relevant to the intelligence services. That information is likely to be highly sensitive in nature, and specific disclosure arrangements therefore apply.”
“The clause directly addresses this issue by establishing clear consequences for those who intentionally hinder enforcement officers in the execution of their duties. The penalties in the clause are proportionate but firm, with tailored limits across UK jurisdictions. This approach ensures consistent consequences for obstruction, reinforcing compliance with employment rights law and protecting workers’ rights, fostering a safer and fairer labour market.”
“Employment rights enforcement is generally a civil regime, founded on consensual investigations. That is right and proportionate, but it is important that there is a clear course of action when individuals block or stymie investigations. The clause creates a single offence for anyone who intentionally obstructs an officer or fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with their lawful requirements. In doing so, the clause consolidates similar offences in the predecessor legislation for the current enforcement bodies. Clause 104 is fundamental to ensuring that enforcement officers can perform their duties without interference, which is essential for effective labour market oversight. Obstructing officers’ work undermines these efforts, delaying investigations and weakening compliance.”