YouSaid · the spoken record

Evstigneeva

lines on the record: 1,001
first: 2020-08-10
most recent: 2023-12-29
sittings or episodes: 153
sources: un-security-council

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“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation abstained in the voting on resolution 2640 (2022), submitted by France, on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which plays an important role in the stabilization of the country. We sought to convey our views during the negotiations on the draft but deem it important publicly to reiterate them today. We firmly believe that the resolution’s intrusive language on the Mission’s human rights mandate will not advance the Malian people’s exercise of their sovereign right to protect their citizens and investigate incidents. Bamako is meaningfully committed to that.”
2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9082 (2022) · source
“That is particularly important in the light of the presidential elections planned for late 2023, which will represent an important stage in the stabilization of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We believe that the resilience and the strength of the country’s central authorities are key to surmounting the consequences of the country’s colonialist past, strengthening its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and ensuring its control over its wealth of resources and prosperity for the people.”
2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source
“At the practical level, we deem it important to fully leverage the tools offered by the Regional Monitoring Mechanism of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the implementation of the agreement. We also believe that there is an important need to focus efforts on the development and implementation of programmes for the disarmament, demobilization and social reintegration of former combatants. Such programmes would significantly increase the number of those willing to leave the ranks of armed groups forever. Our hope is that Kinshasa, with support from the United Nations, the States of the region and the international community, will be able to stamp out those heightened threats and ultimately refocus on meeting State-building and socioeconomic development objectives.”
2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source
“We also welcome the mediation efforts of regional organizations and subregional mechanisms, specifically those of the African Union and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, and we welcome and support the efforts made to resolve the situation by the leadership of MONUSCO, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Huang Xia, and the United Nations as a whole. We reiterate our principled support for the efforts of the United Nations. We believe that we cannot allow any recurrence of the violence of recent years or any backsliding into large-scale armed hostilities, the consequences of which we and the citizens of that country will have to grapple with for decades. We call upon those members of the international community that have influence to bear to spare no effort to stabilize the situation.”
2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source
“We welcome the proactive efforts of African States in facilitating the reaching of a settlement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Our hope is that the negotiations in the Nairobi Conclave will yield in agreement on measures and steps that will ultimately result in meaningful and sustained improvements. We believe that the key to progress towards a long- term resolution and reconciliation lies with transparent and constructive cooperation among regional stakeholders. There is an important need to refrain from hostile rhetoric and to overcome the persistent mistrust and conflict.”
2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source
“We thank MONUSCO peacekeepers, who have been valiantly discharging their duties, consistently risking their lives for the sake of peace in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A key priority now is the cessation of hostilities and the beginning a full-fledged dialogue, as military measures alone will not result in any meaningful normalization in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We call on illegal armed groups to cease their attacks, abandon violence and embrace negotiations with the Congolese Government. We note and welcome the increase in the number of those participating in consultations under the relevant track of the Nairobi process, including a growing number of armed-group representatives.”
2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source
“We see that the M-23 has qualitatively stepped up its capacity, which now allows it to mount offensive operations and effectively seize territories, as was the case with Bunagana, on the border with Uganda. Against the backdrop of the active hostilities and confrontation with the M-23, other illegal armed groups continue to terrorize local populations. There are internecine clashes for control over natural-resource deposits, the main victims of which are civilians. There have been hundreds of casualties. The humanitarian situation is deteriorating, and the number of internally displaced persons and refugees is rising. We hope that the Congolese armed forces, alongside United Nations peacekeepers and international partners, will manage to restore control over the security situation and prevent any further escalation of violence.”
2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We wish to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ms. Bintou Keita, for her briefing on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We were moved by the heart-rending statement of Ms. Julienne Lusenge. We welcome the participation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi at this meeting. We are greatly troubled by the ongoing hostilities in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We condemn attacks by illegal armed groups against civilians, units of the Democratic Republic’s armed forces and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). We emphatically condemn the actions of the fighters from the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23).”
2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source
“The excessive micromanagement of draft resolutions often observed is not helpful either. We are convinced that the final products of the Security Council should be concise, clear, understandable and, most important, action-oriented. In conclusion, I would be remiss if I did not mention the frequently raised issue of the number of open and closed meetings of the Security Council. Russia has consistently advocated maintaining a balance between the two. In that context, we can see that some Council members, while ostensibly advocating maximum transparency in the discussion of individual country- specific issues, in fact use them purely for propaganda shows, preferring to consider sensitive or awkward topics behind closed doors.”
2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079 (2022) · source
“We have consistently advocated expanding the pool of stakeholders, primarily by including non-permanent members. We are guided by the premise enshrined in the note by the President of the Security Council S/2017/507 that any member of the Council may be a penholder and more than one Council member may act as co-penholders. Revisiting the issue of informal penholdership would help to improve the effectiveness of the Security Council. We will continue to raise this issue in the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions. We continue to draw attention to the backlog of the Council’s documentation flow. The Security Council produces several hundred documents each year. Unfortunately, the value added of some of them is questionable.”
2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079 (2022) · source
“At the same time, countries that disagree with such an approach are subjected to unprecedented pressure. As a result, we have crude documents that do not take the concerns of the Security Council members into account and provide the Secretariat with unclear mandates. That approach is not conducive to the effective resolution of conflicts. In that regard, we would particularly like to highlight the delegation of the United Kingdom and its clearly biased handling of the Yemen and Libya dossiers. In particular, we note that the draft presidential statement prepared by Russia outlining the common position of the Security Council members in support of the stability and sustainability of the political transition in Libya caused an inexplicable outburst of anger among the British informal penholders.”
2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079 (2022) · source
“Against that backdrop, the issue of informal penholdership on certain dossiers is becoming increasingly critical. Currently, only three delegations act as penholders on most issues. Despite their long- lost national status, they consider themselves regional experts and patronize other States or even regions. The views of the host country, regional actors, which are often more familiar with the situation on the ground, and sometimes even representatives of the United Nations Secretariat are completely ignored. A clear example of misuse of the penholder role is the procedure for negotiating Security Council resolutions. The work is often carried out within an impossible time frame that does not allow for a comprehensive expert review of the documents.”
2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079 (2022) · source
“I note that the issue of the veto does not fall under the category of working methods, but it is the linchpin of the entire Security Council architecture and the key to achieving balanced outcomes in the Council. But that does not negate the need for working methods and approaches that are conducive to compromise. It is necessary to strive to negotiate, listen to and hear other fellow colleagues. On the contrary, indirect accusations, sabotage, diktats and manipulation are used. In some cases, for example, regarding Ukraine, it has even reached the point of absurdity. The Security Council has become an arena for Western countries to articulate fakes and propagandistic rhetoric. Moreover, the opinion of the West is presented in absolutes as the only correct one. Such a destructive trend only further divides the members of the Council.”
2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079 (2022) · source
“It is no longer possible to hide the fact that, in the case of the Central African Republic, South Sudan and the Sudan, sanctions are being extended with the sole purpose of maintaining external pressure on them. We note with regret the Council’s increasing lack of ability to engage in constructive debate and negotiation. Instead of finding solutions to complex problems, which, indeed, takes both time and a willingness to compromise, Western countries often take the easiest path. They encourage the use of the veto or abstentions on documents. Recent examples include the North Korean dossier, when the decoupling that we proposed with our Chinese colleagues, which would have allowed a consensus Council document to be adopted, was rejected.”
2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079 (2022) · source
“Yet the economic collapse and humanitarian disaster provoked by the United States of America and its allies is hypocritically left out of the discussion. We note the approach of Western colleagues to shift discussions onto a different track if the question does not correspond to their interests. A clear example is the discussion on reviewing and lifting sanctions from countries where restrictive measures no longer correspond to the current situation. Despite the fact that the reasons for which the sanctions were introduced are no longer present, new reasons are being found again and again to keep those sanctions in force. And instead of a presumption of innocence, Governments are forced time and again to prove that the accusations made against them are baseless.”
2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079 (2022) · source
“It is unfortunately glaringly obvious that the main aim of those efforts is to put pressure on disfavoured countries. Often the real reasons that led to the emergence of a particular conflict are intentionally hushed up and swept under the carpet. United Nations missions, including peacekeeping operations, are given functions that are not appropriate for them and that they cannot effectively implement. That leads to an increase in mistrust regarding their impartiality and effectiveness. We are also seeing attempts to shift responsibility for crises that emerge onto someone else. A clear example is the Council’s consideration of the situation in Afghanistan, when the consideration of a complex problem is intentionally narrowed down to simply a discussion of human rights.”
2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079 (2022) · source
“The traditional discussion of the Security Council’s working methods cannot be divorced from the substantive problems that exist in the Council’s action, which are particularly evident of late. Therefore, we cannot avoid a comprehensive and complex discussion here, just as cosmetic adjustments will not be enough. The practice of individual members using the Council to serve their narrow national interests or to expand the Council’s agenda through domestic, political, human rights, climate or other questions has recently increased from a trickle to a flood. Yet that absolutely ignores the fact that not only is the Security Council, under the Charter of the United Nations, not supposed to deal with those subjects, but also that it cannot help with the resolution of those problems.”
2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079 (2022) · source
“However, despite those difficulties, the Security Council was able to rapidly adapt to new realities. Special temporary measures allowed it to carry out its work without interruption. Yet the situation once again convinced us that there can be no alternative to in-person discussions and personal interaction among Security Council members, and we ae pleased to have returned to our normal way of working. I should like to take this opportunity to once again underscore the fact that we do not see any need to institutionalize those temporary measures. If such a crisis is repeated, we have a way of acting that is laid out in letters of Security Council Presidents, which can always be turned to.”
2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079 (2022) · source
“We see this now years-old discussion as an opportunity to increase the Security Council’s coordination with a broad number of Member States. Many of the ideas that were expressed during these discussions were later included in presidential note S/2017/507, which is vitally important as a compendium of the Security Council’s working practice and which is actively used by non-permanent members as a serious primary source of information. At the same time, we believe that any reforms must be focused on a genuine increase in the effectiveness and efficiency of the Council’s implementation of its primary functions of maintaining international peace and security. Restrictions caused by the coronavirus disease pandemic had an impact on the Security Council’s work.”
2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079 (2022) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): At the outset, we would like to thank the briefers, Ms. Karin Landgren and Ms. Loraine Sievers, for their thorough briefings. We also thank Mr. Ferit Hoxha for his leadership of the work of the Security Council Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions and for having organized today’s events. We are confident that this will help enrich the work of the Group with new ideas — of course, with the understanding that the working methods themselves and any steps to modify them are the preserve of the Council itself. The Russian Federation has consistently supported the Security Council discussing this subject in the open format with the participation of all interested States Members of the United Nations.”
2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079 (2022) · source
“Against that backdrop, the smear campaign, in particular as contained in the statement made by the United States, shows what Washington’s focus and main attention is on, and it is not the Central African Republic. It is not on the settlement of the situation in the country. It is not on improving the situation there, and that is very saddening. Many people throughout the world still expect the United States to have a responsible policy, but, unfortunately, we just do not see this at all.”
2022-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9074 (2022) · source
“As the three African States that are members of the Security Council noted, the African countries stand in solidarity with Bangui. The main role in achieving those results, of course, was played by the inhabitants of the country themselves. The leadership of the Central African Republic has also shown determination and consistency. Moreover, an important role was played by the assistance from the United Nations and bilateral partners. Russian assistance also made a significant contribution, and our friends in Bangui recognized that. That is the main point. Many problems remain to be tackled, and we are prepared to cooperate in that respect.”
2022-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9074 (2022) · source
“That situation runs the real risk of exacerbating the situation in the country and threatens the achievements made over recent years in the area of national reconciliation. We would like to touch upon a number of statements made by some Security Council colleagues who are using absolutely any opportunity to talk about Russia. In that regard, I should like to underscore that in recent years, the Central African Republic has managed to make significant progress in the area of stabilizing the country and helping it to emerge from an ongoing cycle of instability. That is a clear fact. The progress made is such that the issue of lifting the arms embargo is now more pertinent than ever. That request is made not just by the Central African Republic; it is also supported by the countries in the region, the African Union and others.”
2022-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9074 (2022) · source
“We furthermore do not deem it appropriate that there is a reference in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/491) to the events in Ukraine as the cause of the food and energy crisis in the Central African Republic. The negative trends of recent years in those areas are linked primarily to blunders and systematic mistakes in the macroeconomic, energy and food policies of Western States. Undoubtedly the coronavirus disease pandemic also played a part, disrupting food supply chains. Furthermore, the situation has deteriorated significantly because of the imposition in February and March of illegal unilateral restrictions against Russia. In the context of discussing the socioeconomic situation in the Central African Republic, we are concerned by the freezing of direct budget support from external donors.”
2022-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9074 (2022) · source
“From our side, we have been consistently assisting Bangui to strengthen the military capabilities of its official security structures. Having informed the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, we have provided to the Central African Republic several batches of military-grade equipment. Russian instructors are working successfully there at the invitation of the legitimate authorities of the country. Russia strictly complies with the restrictions imposed on it by the Security Council regarding the Central African Republic. We underscore that the choice of partner in any specific area, in particular in the area of security, is the prerogative of national authorities.”
2022-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9074 (2022) · source
“Russia is consistently trying to achieve an easing of the current arms embargo against the Central African Republic until its full lifting. Similar positions in the Security Council have been put forward by African representatives and representatives of the African Union and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. The most important thing is that the people of the Central African Republic themselves constantly discuss that issue, because those weapons are required by the country’s security forces to fight illegal armed formations, which, as we all can see, have regular channels for the supply of arms. On the whole, we are convinced that a sanctions regime should not hamper the efforts of the Government to counter armed groups; right now it is definitely doing so.”
2022-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9074 (2022) · source
“The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) must play an important role in providing security in the country, given the functions conferred upon peacekeepers, which involve, inter alia, encountering illegal armed formations in the protection of civilians. We are pleased to note the positive changes in the interaction between MINUSCA and Bangui. We have unfailingly underscored that constructive relations between a mission and host-country authorities are a prerequisite for the success of the work of peacekeepers. It is also important for the Blue Helmets to focus on their main tasks, which include assisting the reconciliation process, restoring State presence in the various regions of the country and protecting civilians.”
2022-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9074 (2022) · source
“We advocate the parties upholding the ceasefire announced in October 2021 by President Touadera. We welcome the holding in Bangui of another round of the republican dialogue, which adds organically to the Khartoum agreement. We urge those groups that are not on board with the peace process to stop the unnecessary bloodshed and to engage in genuine dialogue with the authorities. We are convinced that there is no option other than to settle the situation in the country through political and diplomatic means. An important stage in further improving the security situation in the country is the launch, on the initiative of the Government of the Central African Republic, of the coordination mechanism, with the participation of the United Nations. Its first meeting took place in Bangui on 14 April.”
2022-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9074 (2022) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ms. Valentine Rugwabiza, for briefing the Security Council and congratulate her again on her appointment to that post. We listened closely to Ms. Lina Ekomo and also welcome the representative of the Central African Republic to this meeting. We believe that the situation in the Central African Republic is relatively stable and largely under the control of Government forces. Work is under way in the country to ensure the presence of the State and to strengthen administrative structures. The Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic — the Khartoum agreement — of 2019 remains the basis for achieving stability and security in the Central African Republic.”
2022-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9074 (2022) · source
“The adoption of resolution 2620 (2022) on 15 February established a new deadline of 31 August of this year for formulating clear and realistic benchmarks with the aim of reviewing the measures regarding the Sudan. We hope that, in the course of the process and through constructive dialogue, the Security Council will make it possible to fulfil that task.”
2022-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9070 (2022) · source
“The sanctions are also hampering the Sudanese Government’s efforts in the region and preventing it from supplying the security force that is being established with the necessary weapons and equipment. It is no coincidence that the Government of the Sudan has repeatedly raised the issue of lifting the arms embargo against its country, but the Security Council has not responded to those appeals. The continuation of the sanctions measures against the Sudan and attempts to undermine the previous decisions of the Security Council regarding the benchmarks for reviewing the arms embargo strengthen our conviction that that is done in order to exert political pressure, regardless of the consequences for ordinary Sudanese people.”
2022-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9070 (2022) · source
“The situation in the country and Darfur has changed significantly since the adoption, 17 years ago, of resolution 1591 (2005), partly thanks to the work of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur from 2007 to 2021. Following the conclusion of the Juba Peace Agreement, which was initialled in August 2020, State-building and the social and economic development of Darfur have become the priorities. The establishment of a joint security force, composed of members of the groups that signed the agreement, is intended to bring lasting stability to the region, strengthen the rule of law and curb outbreaks of violence there. Against that backdrop, the Security Council sanctions have lost their purpose and no longer serve the political process.”
2022-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9070 (2022) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We took note of the report of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan covering the past 90 days, which was presented by Mr. Harold Agyeman, Permanent Representative of Ghana. We welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of the Sudan in this meeting. The sanctions against the Sudan were imposed by the Security Council to peacefully resolve the armed conflict in Darfur. The Security Council thereby sought to compel the Darfur insurgents and the Government of the Sudan to fully implement their obligations under the agreements reached in Ndjamena, Abuja and Nairobi in 2004 and 2005.”
2022-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9070 (2022) · source
“I believe it is important to emphasize that point in the light of the statement by the representative of the United States, who once again condescendingly lectured South Sudan, which is just as much a sovereign State as the United States. We see no justification for demonstrating that sort of superiority. The Security Council should help the youthful State of South Sudan overcome its problems, including those related to violence, and achieve real results. However, we must bear in mind every aspect of the country’s situation. The Russian Federation will continue to work based on the premise that United Nations mechanisms must act impartially and on a basis of verified information.”
2022-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9067 (2022) · source
“However, it will not be enough to meet Juba’s legitimate aspirations, which are fully supported by its African neighbours. The international community should place greater emphasis on assisting the authorities in implementing the Revitalized Agreement and building their capacity to resolve local conflicts. In conclusion, and separately, I would like to welcome South Sudan’s establishment of a National Human Rights Council. We hope that its efforts will be aimed at protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of the South Sudanese people, while strengthening relevant values and improving legislation, as well as communicating reliable information to the international community about the human rights situation in South Sudan.”
2022-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9067 (2022) · source
“In our view, the main objective of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan should be to stabilize the security situation and assist the South Sudanese authorities in implementing the Revitalized Agreement. The primary responsibility for addressing issues related to the protection of human rights lies with Juba. We firmly believe that the new realities demand that the sanctions regime on South Sudan be updated, including by easing the arms embargo in order to assist in training the armed forces and National Security Service personnel. We believe that the introduction of a notification regime to simplify the delivery of non-lethal military equipment to the country in support of the implementation of the peace agreement, in accordance with resolution 2633 (2022), adopted on 27 May, was an important step in that regard.”
2022-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9067 (2022) · source
“We support the intention of South Sudan’s leadership to hold the first elections in the history of the State in 2023. Like the Secretary- General, we hope that the Sudanese parties will soon be able to agree on an election timeline and a clear road map for completing the transitional period. The security situation in the various regions remains challenging. We are concerned about the outbreaks of violence in Upper Nile and Unity states. At the same time, we note the general decrease in the number of intercommunal clashes and the readiness of an increasing number of refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their permanent homes. We strongly condemn any violations of the Revitalized Agreement and acts of violence against civilians, including humanitarian personnel working in South Sudan.”
2022-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9067 (2022) · source
“The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan continues to work, and the ceasefire is largely being maintained. We believe that the agreement signed in early April by President Salva Kiir and First Vice-President Riek Machar on establishing a unified command of the armed forces to be a significant contribution to resolving those issues. We believe it is particularly important to speed up the process of forming a unified army. The gradual implementation of all the provisions of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan is essential. We welcome the particular attention that Juba has given to the reconciliation process. We note that a transitional Parliament has now been established and has begun working on key bills, including the preparation of a permanent constitution.”
2022-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9067 (2022) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General Nicholas Haysom for his briefing. We listened carefully to the briefing by Ms. Ghada Mudawi, Acting Director of the Operations and Advocacy Division of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and South Sudanese civil society representative Lorna Merekaje. We welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of South Sudan, Mr. Akuei Bona Malwal, at today’s meeting. We take note of the recent report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/468) on the country and the work of United Nations peacekeepers there. The Russian Federation supports international efforts to stabilize the situation in South Sudan and strengthen peace and security in that country.”
2022-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9067 (2022) · source
“We support the Secretary-General’s proposal to undertake an assessment of the modalities of MINUSMA’s work over the next six months, after which we could consider some modifications, if necessary. In this very difficult situation, it is essential to continue effective assistance to the Malian authorities while encouraging them to pursue a balanced and carefully judged policy for resolving the crisis in their country. We urge all of our Security Council colleagues in that effort. We are ready to cooperate closely with them in the interests of speedily normalizing the situation in Mali and achieving lasting peace and stability throughout the Sahel-Sahara region.”
2022-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9061 (2022) · source
“We are certain that results can be obtained if the African countries are allowed to find an effective response for themselves to the terrorist challenge through mutual respect and by rebuilding trust, without outside pressure. In conclusion, we support the work of MINUSMA and pay tribute to the Blue Helmets operating in the difficult conditions created by asymmetric threats and especially to those who have paid the ultimate price. The situation in the country remains volatile, with many issues still in flux and undefined. In that regard, we do not believe that it is appropriate or the right time to make any serious changes to MINUSMA’s mandate and to burden the Mission with new tasks, especially any that would go beyond the principles of peacekeeping and cooperative relations with the host country.”
2022-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9061 (2022) · source
“There is only one answer to this, which is that it is more important for the West to maintain its spheres of influence than to actually help Africans solve their problems. In that regard, we are sorry to see external actors using their influence to pressure the Malian side through multilateral mechanisms, including the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel). Unfortunately, as a result of its internal disagreements, Bamako felt obliged to pull out of it. But we in Russia firmly believe that the main role in maintaining peace and security in the Sahelo-Saharan region should belong to Sahelians themselves. We support the States of the region in pursuing genuine independent policies to resolve the relevant issues, based on the principle of African solutions to African problems.”
2022-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9061 (2022) · source
“Yet the situation has become even more unstable and continues to deteriorate. And what happened when Mali questioned that approach? We should point out that such attitudes are also gaining ground in other countries of the region. Sanctions have ensued, development assistance has been cut off, there have been accusations of human rights violations and vilification in the Western press. What is particularly sad is that neighbours have been antagonized as some have been portrayed in a better light than others. So apparently one country is fighting terrorism the right way, with the help of its so-called democratic partners, while others, it is claimed, are too harsh — and they cooperate with Russia.”
2022-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9061 (2022) · source
“For example, Mali had one of Africa’s great civilizations, a centre of learning and trade. The reasons largely lie in the colonial past, which unfortunately never completely disappeared even after the countries of the region won their independence. It was replaced by so- called domination by contract, whose main purpose is to maintain the levers of political and economic control. As a result, most States were never granted the ability to provide security and dignified living conditions throughout their territories. To be fair, we should point out that after the crisis in Libya that the West itself created, the international community has tried to help the Sahel. But how effective has that help been? Foreign troops came into the region, lofty announcements followed about helping in the fight against terrorism.”
2022-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9061 (2022) · source
“The fact is that many African States have agreed contracts with private military companies, which they have the sovereign right to do. We wish to reiterate a point we have made repeatedly at many Security Council meetings, which is that any and all States have the right to determine how they will provide for their own security. That is understandable given that there is no certainty that someone else will address it on their behalf. I would like to recall that Mali, and the entire Sahel region, is a victim of the irresponsible, unjustified and Council-unauthorized intervention in Libya in 2011. Those actions were the reason that the region became the target of banditry and terrorism. It is not only us, but also the countries of the Sahel, that say that. Why have countries in the Sahel become so vulnerable?”
2022-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9061 (2022) · source
“But ultimately no coherent information was provided, except for blurred photographs that show virtually nothing and a few social media posts. That is all the evidence that could be provided. We support the investigation conducted by the Malians into all the circumstances surrounding those events. In response to the remarks of our colleagues, I would like to reiterate the following points, which we have made on several occasions. Many private military companies operate in Africa, including West Africa. The market for military services in the region has long been the preserve of Western private military companies, many of which, according to media reports, including British mercenaries, have been involved in attempted coups and other sordid activities.”
2022-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9061 (2022) · source
“We would like to recall that Russian-Malian cooperation, including at the military level, has a long- standing history, as is the case with other African States ,and we have not received any complaints from our African partners in that regard. We note the very negative response of the West to strengthened Russian-Malian military cooperation, which we see as another manifestation of neocolonialist approaches and double standards. Unscrupulous insinuations have been made about so-called massacres perpetrated by the Malian armed forces, with the complicity of Russian military instructors, against civilians in Moura. Disinformation has also been spread about mass graves near Gossi. I would like to recall that Russia raised that issue in the Security Council, and we were promised evidence.”
2022-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9061 (2022) · source
“We fully support the current Malian authorities in their view that security is the absolute top priority for the transitional period. The withdrawal from Mali of both the French Operation Barkhane contingent and the European Takuba Task Force, without prior coordination with the Malians, has created an additional threat to internal stability. Mali’s intention to seek possible military technical support from other external players, including the Russian Federation, is fully understandable. Such cooperation has already yielded benefits. In late March, Malian armed forces conducted a successful military operation in the centre of the country, during which more than 200 Islamic fighters were neutralized. The northern and eastern parts of the country are also being gradually liberated from those armed groups.”
2022-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9061 (2022) · source
“We believe that the authorities and the people of Mali should maintain control over issues related to the transitional period. The hasty organization of elections, under external pressure and without taking into account the difficult security situation, would not result in the restoration of constitutional order but would instead lead to further destabilization. We support the commitment of Bamako to implement the 2015 Algiers Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, which is the bedrock for achieving lasting peace and national harmony. Recent pauses in the implementation of the Agreement, including the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, are linked to the need to address the top priority, which is to ensure security.”
2022-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9061 (2022) · source
“We note that the focus of the transitional authorities is on gradually and consistently resolving accumulated issues. The restoration of constitutional order is without a doubt a priority. We note the decision of the Government of Mali to establish a timeline for the transitional period of 24 months, beginning on 26 March. That step is an optimal compromise, which in our view should receive the serious consideration of colleagues from the Economic Community of West African States. We advocate the continuation of dialogue between Bamako and the Economic Community of West African States, since that will help to ensure the lifting of regional sanctions, which have caused suffering for both the population of Mali and the countries that have imposed the restrictions.”
2022-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9061 (2022) · source