YouSaid · the spoken record

Evstigneeva

lines on the record: 1,001
first: 2020-08-10
most recent: 2023-12-29
sittings or episodes: 153
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“We call on countries who currently experience economic difficulties, many of which have been created artificially, not to give in to anti-Russian slogans but rather to view the situation in terms of their own vital interests. In conclusion, we would like to note that we took note of the report of the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan, the Permanent Representative of Ghana, on the work of that Security Council subsidiary body over the past 90 days. We continue to believe that the restrictions imposed 15 years ago on the Sudan because of the situation in Darfur have done their job.”
2022-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9006 (2022) · source
“Make no mistake: a potential food crisis will be caused not by the Russian special military operation in Ukraine but by the illegal unilateral sanctions imposed by the West, which have decimated logistical and financial supply chains and fully excluded Russia, which is a producer of food and fertilizers, from the Swift system. The seizure of cargo carriers also poses a threat. Limitations have also affected their cooperation with humanitarian agencies of the United Nations. We do not know who believes the assertions of Western countries. It is definitely not the Sudanese, who have had the experience of being subjected to unilateral restrictions and are still being blackmailed with regard to economic assistance.”
2022-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9006 (2022) · source
“The imposition of dubious socioeconomic schemes and universal “democratization” templates on their leadership and the politicization of the provision of economic and financial assistance have already led to divisions in society, as well as a loss of civic trust in the transitional authorities, which in turn have led to general instability and new separatist trends in the country. We have also noted, in some statements of Council members and statements made by Western countries published in Sudanese media on 21 March, that blame has been placed on Russia for worldwide economic instability and price increases — in particular the prices of energy, provisions and food, including in the Sudan.”
2022-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9006 (2022) · source
“But we must not neglect the direct objectives of mobilization of international assistance to the Sudan and assistance for the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, as reflected in Security Council resolutions. The Russian Federation is categorically opposed to measures that exert political pressure, as well as the blatant economic blackmail that is still being used against the Sudan. We believe it could be counterproductive and unacceptable to engage in any external interference in the affairs of that country. We are convinced that the people of the Sudan can decide for themselves and solve their own domestic problems.”
2022-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9006 (2022) · source
“The functions of assisting and mobilizing assistance for the special political missions are being replaced by monitoring and observers. That does not promote the spirit of cooperation between the United Nations and the authorities of the host country. We support the concerns about the methodology of the report and its assessments expressed in the letter of 22 March from the Sudan to the Security Council. We call on the special political mission and Mr. Perthes himself to fully comply with that mandate and pay equal attention to all its components. It is important to work on achieving a lasting agreement among the different Sudanese political forces and social, regional and ethnic groups.”
2022-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9006 (2022) · source
“We continue to call on all Sudanese parties to be guided by the greater national interest, to be responsible and to refrain from taking steps that could lead to new clashes. We are in favour of addressing existing disputes through dialogue. We cannot agree with the biased and politicized approaches towards what is happening in the Sudan contained in the most recent report of the Secretary- General. Rather than focus on the tasks facing the transition period of creating institutions to ensure the preparation and holding of general elections in the country, the report focuses on important but secondary questions. Human rights topics, for example, are stressed, as well as the rule of law, and there is an excessive discussion of the gender dimension.”
2022-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9006 (2022) · source
“We welcome the creation in January of a committee with the mandate to find a resolution and identify candidates for the post of a new head of Government and the extension of the ceasefire regime in the entire territory of the country. We also welcome the military’s stated intention to hold general elections in June 2023 and its commitment to the Juba Peace Agreement of 3 October 2020. We further view in a positive light the involvement of the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in the political process of the country and their decision to create, jointly with the United Nations, a coordination mechanism to support intra-Sudanese dialogue. We hope those decisions will bear fruit.”
2022-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9006 (2022) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We would like to thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General Volker Perthes for his briefing on developments in the Sudan. We welcome the participation in today’s meeting of the Acting Chargé d’affaires of the Sudan. We read the most recent quarterly report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/172) very carefully. The situation in the Sudan remains complex. The political crisis has not subsided. There are acute humanitarian and socioeconomic challenges. The situation has been compounded by a near complete suspension of donor assistance. In those conditions, we note the Sudanese authorities’ intensive efforts to stabilize the situation and establish a constructive national dialogue, both in the centre and at the periphery.”
2022-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9006 (2022) · source
“We wish to note that the lack of progress on the political track — part of which could be served by the draft resolution I have just mentioned — would then threaten to further exacerbate tensions in the Korean peninsula, which is unfortunately what we have witnessed in recent months.”
2022-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9004 (2022) · source
“Unilateral restrictions undermine not only the sovereignty and legal interests of Member States, contradicting the norms and rules of international trade, but also the integrity of the limitations agreed within the Security Council. It is unacceptable to attempt to enshrine those restrictions through the Security Council’s authority or that of its Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006). In that connection, we call on all parties to exercise restraint and reaffirm their readiness to renew dialogue in line with the agreements that have already been reached and the commitments entered into. A Russian-Chinese political and humanitarian draft is still on the table. It would help provide the parties with the impetus to enter into negotiations.”
2022-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9004 (2022) · source
“The institutions and mechanisms of the United Nations and the Security Council should be utilized to support settlement processes and intra-Korean dialogue and should not be an obstacle to them. Only then would we be able to discuss the effective resolution of the problems that have accumulated in the region, including the nuclear issue, on the basis of dialogue and mutually acceptable agreements. Sanctions and pressure will hardly help to achieve that. Further resentment has also been caused by the so-called autonomous secondary sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and other States that have been imposed by Washington and its allies, in circumvention of and in addition to Security Council sanctions.”
2022-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9004 (2022) · source
“There is no point waiting for Pyongyang to disarm without conditions, when in return it receives only unsubstantiated promises as guarantees. The establishment of new military alliances in the region, such as the trilateral security pact among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, casts serious doubts about the good intentions of those countries, including from the perspective of Pyongyang. Such alliances do not help foster dialogue. We have repeatedly stressed that it is essential to create spaces that provide integrated and indivisible security. Lasting results cannot be achieved if the legitimate security concerns of the States of the region are not taken into account.”
2022-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9004 (2022) · source
“Therefore, to a large extent, the current developments are but the consequence of the short-sightedness of some colleagues present today, who are unable to move beyond the limits of a sanctions-based paradigm, which for several years has been unable to guarantee security in the region. We have seen no other viable initiatives from them. We believe that the further strengthening of sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would overstep the framework of measures that curb the funding of banned nuclear and missile programmes and expose the people of North Korea to unacceptable socioeconomic and humanitarian turmoil. We remind our American colleagues that negotiations are a two-way street.”
2022-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9004 (2022) · source
“We note with regret that, over the past four years, the Security Council has been unable to respond to the dismantling by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its nuclear test site, as well as to its compliance with the moratorium on nuclear and intercontinental ballistic testing. In each if its resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from 2006 onwards, the Council has expressed its readiness to review the restrictions, depending on the level of Pyongyang’s compliance with the provisions of the relevant documents. Regrettably, to date, the Security Council has only strengthened these restrictions, while ignoring the positive signals from North Korea.”
2022-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9004 (2022) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Ms. DiCarlo for her briefing. Russia stands against any military activity that poses a threat to the security of the Korean peninsula and the States of North-East Asia. We deplore the recent developments in the region. We are convinced that the quest for mutually acceptable diplomatic solutions is the only way to peacefully resolve the issues on the Korean peninsula and establish a stable security mechanism in North-East Asia. That should be our main goal, which, once achieved, will normalize the situation in the region.”
2022-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9004 (2022) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Russia supported the adoption of resolution 2627 (2022), extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. At the same time, we regret that the penholders were not able to consider our wishes and theproposals of our colleagues on preventing leaks of expert reports and on the investigation of such incidents. We hope that this question will be considered in detail at the Committee level, with the aim of adopting measures to put an end to that flawed practice.”
2022-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9004 (2022) · source
“We are also confident that it is now time to adapt the South Sudan sanctions regime to these new realities. It is regrettable that our American colleagues chose to ignore the majority of comments that were expressed by a number of delegations, including our own, and forced the adoption of an imbalanced draft resolution. These working methods are not compatible with what one would expect from the penholder for a country dossier that is on the agenda of the Security Council. We hope that the Americans will draw conclusions from this situation.”
2022-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8994 (2022) · source
“Most importantly, it must be smooth and transparent, and its conditions need to be acceptable for all political forces. Otherwise, the risks of destabilization would outweigh any positive intentions. Our view is that United Nations peacekeepers could, upon the request of the host country, provide technical and logistical assistance. However, their core function is to stabilize the security situation and assist the South Sudanese authorities in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. There needs to be an in-depth analysis of why the implementation of specific provisions of that agreement has stalled, and then targeted assistance should be given to resolve the respective disagreements.”
2022-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8994 (2022) · source
“Our view is that the Security Council and the peacekeeping mission do not have the appropriate resources to fulfil these functions. One gets the impression that this wording, which in its degree of detail is more characteristic of a Human Rights Council document, was included in the document in order to put pressure on Juba and impose external solutions, including the use of the mallet of sanctions. However, in our view, there is no path other than resolving these issues in the context of national efforts on the basis of sovereignty and political independence. The Russian Federation supports the focus of the South Sudanese leadership on conducting elections. We believe that the electoral process must be thoroughly prepared for and executed in accordance with the situation on the ground.”
2022-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8994 (2022) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation abstained from the voting on the draft Security Council resolution prepared by the United States of America on the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (resolution 2625 (2022)). We regret that the document did not properly reflect the positive developments in this young State that were noted in the most recent quarterly report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/156). Instead, the text has a negative slant. Perhaps South Sudan does need assistance in capacity-building to resolve problems related to the protection of human rights, combating sexual violence, defending the rights of women and fighting corruption. However, these questions are, first and foremost, an internal matter for the country.”
2022-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8994 (2022) · source
“The success of the special political mission depends on having a realistic, clear and achievable mandate, taking into account all regional specificities and nuances rather than abstract ideas. An important factor in that regard was and remains the consent of the new authorities to a new mission format and the changed modalities of its work.”
2022-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8984 (2022) · source
“We share the view that the special political mission in Afghanistan plays an important role as a coordinator of international humanitarian assistance to the country. We support the intention of its head, Ms. Lyons, to continue to monitor the situation and to provide the international community with relevant, objective information. We do not share the idea that we need to strengthen the human rights component of the mission or to link the human rights situation to humanitarian aid and recovery assistance. The desire to make UNAMA into an overseer to satisfy those who are not ready to help ordinary Afghans without preconditions is unacceptable. We are convinced that the key to the effective functioning of UNAMA lies in a good relationship with the host country and the trust of the authorities.”
2022-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8984 (2022) · source
“A descent into full-scale civil war is not in the interest of the Afghan people or of the region as a whole. We would again like to recall that it is counter- productive to attempt to communicate with the new Afghan authorities in the language of ultimatums and that it is important to learn lessons from past mistakes. Only a constructive dialogue that takes into account regional specificities and a proper analysis of current realities will make it possible to achieve a peaceful settlement in the country. An expanded troika and the Moscow format are examples of such successful and effective cooperation. Against that backdrop, we maintain regular contacts between UNAMA and the new Afghan authorities. We have taken note of the Secretary-General’s recommendations on the modalities for its future work in the country.”
2022-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8984 (2022) · source
“Further degradation only serves ISIL fighters and other groups, including the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Jamaat Ansarullah. We are all well aware that ISIL has plans to spread its influence in the region and then into Russia. The issue of drug manufacturing and smuggling remains acute. Afghanistan remains the largest supplier of opiates in the world. The risk of infiltration by terrorists and drug traffickers into Central Asia, including in the guise of refugees, is a cause of concern among our regional partners. We maintain a regular dialogue within the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In this context, we are also closely following the continued action of the Panjshir guerrillas within the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan.”
2022-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8984 (2022) · source
“Despite the tragic situation, we are still seeing attempts by individual States to use any pretext to postpone the unfreezing of the assets for as long as possible. The order by the President of the United States of 11 February to block the accounts of the Afghan central bank and to use these funds to pay compensation to the relatives of the victims of the act of terror of 11 September is nothing short of mockery. It is immoral to blame this tragedy on the innocent Afghan people. The consequences of a total collapse in Afghanistan will affect everyone and will be far more widespread than first thought. It will inevitably lead to a massive outflow of refugees, a spillover of terrorism, increased drug manufacturing and, as a result, even greater instability in the region and beyond.”
2022-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8984 (2022) · source
“It has been two and a half months since the Security Council adopted resolution 2615 (2021), which calls for a strengthening of humanitarian assistance through all channels in order to counter the growing crisis in the country. We note the efforts being undertaken by United Nations humanitarian agencies. We have also taken note of their preliminary plans to organize, on 31 March, another international donors conference to mobilize financial support and assess progress made in these areas. But these steps are not enough to ensure sustainable post-conflict recovery in Afghanistan. Given the paralysis of the banking system and unemployment, the people of the country remain on the brink of survival. They are selling their children, not to mention their own organs.”
2022-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8984 (2022) · source
“Billions injected into the country ended up in the pockets of the corrupt American puppets. As a result, the country has become an international dependent with no prospects for independent development. The 20-year United States presence in Afghanistan claimed thousands of lives of ordinary Afghans and American soldiers, as well as billions of dollars. The Afghan people were hypocritically left to fight ruin, poverty, terrorism and starvation alone. In this regard, we regret that some members of the international community are still not ready to extend comprehensive assistance, without reservations or preconditions, to normalize the socioeconomic and humanitarian situation in Afghanistan.”
2022-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8984 (2022) · source
“In addition to Al-Qaida and related entities present in Afghanistan, we saw the arrival of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the spread of its influence. At the same time, during the years in which the United States military was present in the country, it had many opportunities and time to eliminate terrorism in Afghanistan, including material, military and technical options. On many occasions, we have asked about unidentified helicopters that transported ISIL fighters and their weaponry to various regions in the country, including to the north, at a time when we were being told the Coalition forces fully controlled the situation. The growth of drug trafficking over these years also reached unprecedented levels. Against this background, the socioeconomic situation of the country remained deplorable.”
2022-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8984 (2022) · source
“I would like to underscore that we are raising all of these concerns in the course of our bilateral contacts with the new authorities. Our overall priority remains unchanged: maintaining stability in Afghanistan, which is a goal we share with Afghanistan, and the situation in the region overall hinges on it. It is impossible to effectively resolve old issues and take on new challenges when there is an absence of national potential or when there is an outflow of professionals and a lack of financial resources. Allow me to recall that 20 years ago the United States entered Afghanistan with a special mission to fight terrorism. However, its arrival in the country only strengthened Afghanistan’s status as a hotbed of terrorism and drug trafficking.”
2022-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8984 (2022) · source
“In February, public universities reopened their doors, and education for girls is already accessible in a third of the provinces of the country. We also note an improvement in the security situation in the country, which has allowed humanitarian workers to reach those regions that were inaccessible until recently. We still expect that the Taliban will undertake serious measures to implement the obligations they undertook, first of all, with regard to finalizing the process of intra-Afghan reconciliation and putting in place genuinely inclusive governance authorities that reflect the interests of all key ethnic and political forces in the country. It is important to continue making efforts to counter the terror and drug trafficking threats.”
2022-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8984 (2022) · source
“We read the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the country (S/2022/64) very carefully. The current situation in Afghanistan keeps changing. The new Afghan authorities demonstrate that they are ready to build a constructive interaction with the international community. We note certain efforts that they are undertaking to resolve the political, socioeconomic, humanitarian, and human rights issues. Among the positive changes, we can list the decree issued by the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, on the measures being taken to ensure women’s rights in marriage, property, inheritance and some other areas. Women can be involved in business in line with Islamic and Afghan values. Increased attention is being paid to educational issues.”
2022-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8984 (2022) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): At the outset of my statement, I would like to congratulate the delegation of the United Arab Emirates on the start of its presidency of the Security Council this month and wish you, Madam President, every success; you can count on our support. We would like to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Ms. Deborah Lyons, for sharing her views and the assessment of the situation on the ground. We also listened carefully to the opinion expressed by the Afghan civil society representative, Ms. Mariam Safi. We are glad to see that the representatives of countries of the region are given the floor to discuss topics of such great importance to them.”
2022-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8984 (2022) · source
“I thank Ambassador Kelly for his briefing. There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. The meeting rose at 3.10 p.m.”
2022-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8976 (2022) · source
“The Committee also received a preliminary report on the possible export of charcoal from Somalia from the Panel under its present mandate. Information was also received directly from Somalia on this case, which the Committee appreciates. I will now summarize the statistics with regard to arms embargo exemption requests and notifications. The Committee received and approved one advance approval request pursuant to paragraph 23 of resolution 2607 (2021). It also received three advance-delivery notifications pursuant to paragraph 24 of the same resolution, as well as one post-delivery notification pursuant to paragraph 32 of the same resolution. Furthermore, it received four notifications pursuant to paragraph 27 of resolution 2607 (2021).”
2022-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8976 (2022) · source
“The areas of focus include the structure of Al-Shabaab, the smuggling and trafficking of weapons and military equipment into Somalia, weapons and ammunition management within Somalia, investigations into Al-Shabaab finances, the implementation of the charcoal ban, as well as child recruitment and gender- based violence by the group. Committee members welcomed the continued improvement in the Panel’s relationship with the Federal Government of Somalia, particularly the cooperation extended by the Federal Government in connection with the implementation of the charcoal ban. During the reporting period, the Committee received three thematic reports from the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to paragraph 34 of resolution 2551 (2020).”
2022-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8976 (2022) · source
“On 10 December 2021, the Committee was briefed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Ms. Pramila Patten. During her briefing, she elaborated on patterns and trends of sexual violence in Somalia. She also presented recommendations to the Committee. Committee members expressed support for her important work and encouraged the continued exchange of information between her Office and the Panel of Experts. On 11 February 2022, the Committee met with the Panel of Experts on Somalia renewed by resolution 2607 (2021). It heard a presentation by the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on developments in Somalia relevant to the Panel’s mandate, on the Panel’s ongoing lines of investigations and on its areas of focus for the renewed mandate.”
2022-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8976 (2022) · source
“It further requested the Secretary-General to provide, following the completion of a technical assessment of Somalia’s weapons and ammunition management capability, recommendations to improve it further and to articulate options for clear, well- identified and realistic benchmarks that could serve in guiding the Security Council in its review of the arms embargo measures in light of progress achieved to date and compliance with resolution 2607 (2021), and requested the Panel to provide recommendations to the Committee on how to support the Federal Government in weapons and ammunition management. I would like to note that on 18 February 2022 the Committee included Ali Mohamed Rage, the spokesperson of Al-Shabaab, in its sanctions list. During the reporting period, Committee members met twice in informal consultations.”
2022-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8976 (2022) · source
“In resolution 2607 (2021), the Council also requested the Federal Government of Somalia, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Panel to continue to exchange information about Al-Shabaab’s finances and to continue to work with stakeholders to develop a plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab’s finances and exploitation of the licit financial system.”
2022-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8976 (2022) · source
“Allow me to recall that, under this resolution, the Council reaffirmed the partial lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia and the humanitarian exemption to the assets freeze, without specifying an expiry date; renewed and expanded the maritime interdiction of arms and charcoal, by including the maritime interdiction of improvised explosive device (IED) components, until 15 November 2022; reaffirmed the IED components ban; and renewed, until 15 December 2022, the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Somalia. On 16 December 2021, the Secretary-General appointed five of the Panel’s six experts. He will appoint the Panel’s regional expert as soon as possible.”
2022-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8976 (2022) · source
“The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. At this meeting, the Council will hear a briefing by Ambassador Jim Kelly, Chargé affaires, a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations, on behalf of the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia. I now give the floor to Ambassador Kelly. Ambassador Kelly: As mandated by paragraph 11 (g) of resolution 1844 (2008), I have the honour to brief the Security Council in my capacity as Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, covering the period from 21 October 2021 to 24 February 2022. This is the first Chair’s briefing since the adoption of resolution 2607 (2021) on 15 November 2021.”
2022-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8976 (2022) · source
“We agree with regional leaders that ensuring the adequate, predictable and sustainable funding of the Mission should be a priority. We support the Security Council considering various options for the international community to provide additional assistance to the efforts of the Somalis and AMISOM. We call on the United Nations and international and regional partners to continue to support Somalia, while fully respecting the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence and without interfering in its internal affairs. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I give the floor to the representative of Somalia.”
2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8965 (2022) · source
“We note some progress in discussions over the shared position of the African Union and the Federal Government of Somalia concerning the future security architecture in the country. We await the report on the outcome of the work of the international task force on preparations for the Mission’s new configuration, its updated concept of operations and the road map for logistical support. We call for a balanced approach to the reconfiguration of AMISOM. It is vital that the views and priorities of the host country be duly taken into account. The transfer of responsibility for security to the Somali National Army must take place gradually in line with the actual situation on the ground. We are convinced that in the current conditions of the ongoing terrorist threat it is premature to talk about the drawdown of the African peacekeeping mission.”
2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8965 (2022) · source
“We hope that all participants in the Somali political process will continue to work together to establish a stable federal structure in the country. The territorial integrity and unity of Somalia must be preserved. The security situation in Somalia remains tense. We are concerned about the significant increase in the activities of Al-Shabaab, which controls vast areas of southern and central Somalia. Its fighters continue to conduct high-profile attacks with large numbers of victims, including terrorist attacks in cities and attacks on AMISOM and Somali National Army positions and bases. We note the efforts of the Somali Government and other countries of the region in the fight against terrorism, which constitutes a cross-border threat.”
2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8965 (2022) · source
“Elections for the Upper House of the Federal Parliament were held in October 2021 and voting for the Lower House is in full swing. We trust that soon the country will be able to complete the electoral process in accordance with the Somalia-wide agreements of 17 September 2020 and 27 May 2021. We urge all branches of the Somali Government to resolve all disputes exclusively through dialogue. We welcome the contribution made by AMISOM and the Office of Mr. Swan in resolving tensions within the Federal Government of Somalia in late December and early January. We call on United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia to pay more attention to preventing such situations, including through engagement with regional administrations.”
2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8965 (2022) · source
“I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Russian Federation. We thank Mr. James Swan, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia; Mr. Francisco Caetano José Madeira, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for their thorough briefings. We listened to the information provided by Ambassador Olof Skoog, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. We welcome the participation in this meeting of Mr. Abukar Dahir Osman, Permanent Representative of Somalia. We studied closely the latest report of the Secretary General (S/2022/101). Somalia continues to move forward with the electoral process.”
2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8965 (2022) · source
“We believe that the Sudan sanctions regime no longer corresponds to the actual situation in Darfur. Moreover, it is hindering Khartoum’s implementation efforts in State-building and socioeconomic development plans for the region. As a matter of principle, we advocate that the Council’s sanctions should be justified beyond reproach and subject to regular review and modifications, until they are lifted entirely. It is unacceptable to use them as a punitive instrument. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. The meeting rose at 10.10 a.m.”
2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8964 (2022) · source
“I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Russian Federation. 22-25820 The Russian Federation voted in favour of resolution 2620 (2022), extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan. At the same time, we regret the fact that, under spurious politicized pretexts, a number of Security Council members prevented our reaching an agreement on benchmarks for lifting the arms embargo on the Sudan. In resolution 2562 (2021), the Security Council expressed its intention to determine such benchmarks by the fall of 2021. It therefore seems that the Council is undermining its own commitments in that regard. We trust that the new deadline set by resolution 2620 (2022) to complete that work by 31 August will be respected. The benchmarks must be clear, realistic and achievable.”
2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8964 (2022) · source
“The draft resolution received 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2620 (2022). I now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements after the voting.”
2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8964 (2022) · source
“In favour: Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America”
2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8964 (2022) · source
“The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2022/111, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by the United States of America. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2022/48, which contains a letter dated 24 January 2022 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) addressed to the President of the Security Council. The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. A vote was taken by show of hands.”
2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8964 (2022) · source