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Evstigneeva

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1,001
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2020-08-10
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2023-12-29
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un-security-council

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  1. We are convinced that extending the Mission for three months will allow us to respond to developments in the situation in Libya during the pre-electoral period. Furthermore, the mention of the need for the Secretary-General to define a new head of the Mission will help to re-establish the full functioning of UNSMIL in line with its mandate.

    2022-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8961 (2022) · source

  2. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation voted in favour of resolution 2619 (2022), rolling over the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) until 30 April of this year, based, first and foremost, on our conviction that there is no alternative to reaching a comprehensive peace settlement to the Libyan crisis under the auspices of the United Nations. We encourage all Libyan players to make use of the unanimous support of the Security Council to, with the facilitation of UNSMIL, overcome existing disagreements, define deadlines and carry out presidential and parliamentary elections so that through joint efforts they can turn the page and open a new chapter in the life of the country.

    2022-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8961 (2022) · source

  3. Any further delay risks additional destabilization, more victims, an increase in migration terrorist activity and drug production. The Russian Federation continues to support the people of Afghanistan — not through words alone, but also through actions. In the current reporting period, we sent our second aircraft with humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. A third is being readied. At the same time, we understand that humanitarian aid should not be used by those linked to terrorists or by terrorist groups themselves, as designated in the sanctions list of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities.

    2021-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8941 (2021) · source

  4. We are glad that the new authorities understand the importance of this work and have demonstrated their readiness to cooperate in order to provide assistance more expeditiously to all those in need, especially women and children, who find themselves literally on the brink. We are convinced that, in the long term, without unfreezing Afghanistan’s assets, it will not be able to overcome the current crisis. For the past 20 years, the country has been completely dependent on international financial assistance and was ultimately unable to get back on its feet. Doctors, teachers and other workers need money. Banks too need money. Lack of liquidity in banks has led to a paralysis of the economy. We call on the United States and other Western donors to return funds to Afghanistan.

    2021-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8941 (2021) · source

  5. Humanitarian agents and donors can continue to provide assistance without fearing restrictions, and humanitarian assistance can flow through all channels to Afghanistan. For us, that was obvious even before. However, even a shadow of a doubt could have led to limiting the volume of assistance and to additional suffering for the people of Afghanistan. We expect that the adopted resolution will make it possible to significantly increase the volume of humanitarian assistance, with the participation of the United Nations humanitarian agencies, donors and regional organizations, as well as on a bilateral level. That assistance must be provided to Afghans quickly and without any kind of precondition.

    2021-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8941 (2021) · source

  6. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation supported resolution 2615 (2021), on providing humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan in the context of the sanctions regime of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011). We note that agreeing on this resolution was not an easy process. In the course of working on the text, we were guided by a single goal — to help the Afghan people to receive immediate humanitarian assistance, which is essential to preventing disaster in the country. Our premise was that the text of the document should be brief, but its contents should be pithy. Most important — and this is ultimately spelled out in the resolution — providing humanitarian assistance is not a violation of the 1988 sanctions regime.

    2021-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8941 (2021) · source

  7. I recall that the main driver of instability in the Central African Republic is the activity of illegal armed groups and that the country, just like others in Africa and elsewhere, has every sovereign right to choose its partners to combat security threats.

    2021-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8933 (2021) · source

  8. We draw the Council’s attention to the fact that all of the States that have spoken out and those that might touch upon this topic after me have a very sad history of destabilizing other countries — not only in Africa — committing mass crimes against entire peoples. Even today, they are far from being perfect in terms of human rights. As a result of their military interference, large numbers of civilians often die. Reports in the media on the topic are increasingly frequent. We therefore cannot consider the statements concerning the Central African Republic by those colleagues on the Council as anything but a hypocritical, envious and coordinated information campaign.

    2021-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8933 (2021) · source

  9. In addition, in October this year, a detachment of ships of the northern fleet was on active duty in the waters of the Gulf of Guinea to carry out antipiracy exercises. We note the successful operation carried out by our navy to prevent pirates from seizing the vessel MSC Lucia. Taking into account the very significant regional differences in manifestations of piracy and related criminal activity, we advocate the swift implementation of President Vladimir Putin’s initiative to establish a specialized universal entity under the auspices of the United Nations to address the entire range of issues of combating maritime crime in various regions. With regard to the accusations voiced by a number of countries against Russia, there is absolutely nothing new in those attempts.

    2021-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8933 (2021) · source

  10. We welcome the establishment in July this year of the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Collaboration Forum, a new platform for communication and coordination for antipiracy military operations. We are ready to take an active part in the work of this mechanism and provide assistance to our regional partners. We note the activities of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s Global Maritime Crime Programme, which has already made a significant contribution to collective efforts to normalize the situation off the Horn of Africa. This year, Russia plans to make a voluntary contribution to the Global Programme’s fund for technical assistance to Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, and, in 2020, Russia allocated a special contribution to provide technical assistance to the coast guards of Ghana and Nigeria.

    2021-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8933 (2021) · source

  11. Hundreds of thousands of people have been left homeless, the number of refugees and temporarily displaced persons is growing, and there is an acute shortage of food and drinking water. The coronavirus, which has aggravated the already difficult socioeconomic situation of the populations, continues to persist in the region. The safety of navigation in the Gulf of Guinea is also of great concern, in particular, the increasing number of cases of hostage-taking for ransom affecting merchant seamen. Establishing broad international cooperation, particularly for the purposes of regularly monitoring the situation at sea and creating a system for identifying and accompanying ships and providing early warning with regard to potentially hazardous objects on sea transport routes could help reduce the risks of pirate attacks.

    2021-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8933 (2021) · source

  12. One particular feature of the region is its porous borders through which both peaceful civilians and goods, on the one hand, and militants and contraband goods, on the other hand, move freely. In this regard, we believe it is necessary to step up States’ efforts to swiftly identify and block channels fuelling terrorists with ideological, logistical, financial and human resources. It is also necessary to strengthen cooperation with African partners on counter-terrorism issues both bilaterally and through international forums. For our part, we are ready to share our experience in this area and implement capacity-building projects to help the continent’s States fight terrorism and extremism. The socioeconomic situation of the local populations in the subregion is of grave concern. It can be described as close to critical.

    2021-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8933 (2021) · source

  13. Fighters are maintaining their capacity and continue to carry out attacks on the militaries of Nigeria, Chad, the Niger and Cameroon and terrorize local populations. They are using rear bases in hard-to-reach areas to conduct raids deep into the territory of neighbouring States. The low combat-capability of the armed forces of States in the region and insufficient military coordination, as well as a lack of reliable intelligence data, prevent them from effectively resisting well-organized criminal groups, which use guerrilla- warfare tactics and often enjoy the support of local residents, who are forced to coexist with the militants. The ideology of radical Islam is gaining more and more popularity, especially among youth.

    2021-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8933 (2021) · source

  14. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General François Louncény Fall for sharing his assessment of the situation in the Central African subregion. Russia has unfailingly supported the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, which it considers to be an important instrument of preventive diplomacy. We believe that the good offices of Special Representative Fall are extremely useful. The situation in Central Africa remains complex. The main threat emanates from the activities of numerous armed criminal groups and terrorist organizations, primarily Islamic State West Africa Province and Boko Haram.

    2021-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8933 (2021) · source

  15. We also note the need to strictly abide by the United Nations basic guiding principles for the provision of humanitarian assistance when carrying out humanitarian operations, as set out in General Assembly resolution 46/182.

    2021-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8932 (2021) · source

  16. However, practice has shown that pressure and accusations towards the parties with regard to blocking the implementation of the mandate is not something that can help solve those problems. We call on the leadership to continue efforts to establish constructive dialogue on those issues with Khartoum and Juba. The positions of the parties and the concerns they have expressed require careful consideration. The basis for the work of peacekeepers in Abyei, as well as any other United Nations peacekeeping operation, should be the basic principles of peacekeeping. We call on the mission to be guided in its work by the most recent report of the General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, including when it comes to civilian protection objectives in Abyei.

    2021-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8932 (2021) · source

  17. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation supported resolution 2609 (2021), which extends the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) for an additional six months. We believe that the work of the mission in the current context is important and much-needed. Nevertheless, we would like to express our regret in connection with the fact that the American penholder insisted on maintaining a stronger accusatory slant, blaming both States for the unresolved tasks before the mission. We cannot deny that issues indeed remain when it comes to staffing UNISFA’s police contingent, the appointment of a civilian Head of Mission and access to the Anthony airstrip.

    2021-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8932 (2021) · source

  18. Haysom, as well as the work of the African Union and the States members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development to assist the country in the implementation of specific provisions of the peace agreements. We are convinced that, as the situation in South Sudan returns to normal, a review of the sanctions regime in place against the country will be required. We hope that, in order to ease the arms embargo, the South Sudanese authorities will be able to make significant progress in implementing the benchmarks stipulated in resolution 2577 (2021). In conclusion, we would like to reaffirm the readiness of our country to continue to provide the necessary support to South Sudan in the establishment of its statehood.

    2021-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8931 (2021) · source

  19. Given those circumstances, it is important to ensure the acceleration of the formation of the Necessary Unified Forces. We call on the non-signatories of the revitalized peace agreement to join in the State-building process. It is necessary to continue the dialogue initiated with the Kitgwang faction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition, as well as the negotiation process through the Community of Sant’Egidio. We believe that only the swift and full implementation of the agreements reached will help the parties to increase mutual trust and avoid the repetition of past mistakes. We pay tribute to the mediation efforts of Mr.

    2021-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8931 (2021) · source

  20. The country has appointed state assemblies and a bicameral parliament has been formed. A draft law on the Constitution has been prepared for consideration. We also welcome the South Sudanese leadership’s commitment to holding elections in 2023. At the same time, we believe that the security environment — which, despite the general decline in violence, remains challenging — will play a decisive role in achieving further results. We are concerned by reports of ongoing local armed clashes between Government troops and opposition formations; of a split in the camp of the South Sudanese Vice-President, Riek Machar, against whom a number of influential field commanders have spoken out; and of sporadic intercommunal armed conflict in parts of South Sudan. The situation in both Equatorias is of particular concern.

    2021-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8931 (2021) · source

  21. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, for his briefing. We support his work and the activities of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. We listened to the representative of Viet Nam report on the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan and Ms. Wafaa Saeed of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on the humanitarian situation in that country. We also welcome the representative of the South Sudan to today’s meeting. We paid close attention to the most recent report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/1015). The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan continues to work.

    2021-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8931 (2021) · source

  22. Regarding the sanctions regime against the Sudan, we believe that any sanctions regime must be reviewed and adapted to the situation on the ground. We trust that concrete parameters for lifting the sanctions on the country will soon be drawn up. In conclusion, we are convinced that the Sudanese can, and should, resolve their domestic problems and determine the course of their country’s sovereign development on the basis of their national interests. We believe that the main task of the Security Council and the international community is to support such efforts.

    2021-12-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8925 (2021) · source

  23. The Russian Federation cannot agree with the political pressure and blatant economic blackmail applied against the Sudan. Attempts to undermine the Sudanese “street” risk further destabilizing the country. The external imposition of dubious socioeconomic solutions and universal democratizing templates on the Sudanese authorities, as well as the politicization of economic and financial assistance, has already divided Sudanese society. It has provoked instability and a new round of destabilizing trends. We also believe that the special session of the Human Rights Council held on 5 November at the initiative of a number of Western countries to discuss the situation in the Sudan was untimely. We oppose establishing a mandate for a Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the Sudan.

    2021-12-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8925 (2021) · source

  24. We trust that the interests of the Sudan’s provinces will also be taken into account. We believe that UNITAMS should continue to provide the necessary assistance to the Sudanese leadership in a number of key areas, including resolving the Darfur issue, carrying out the relevant economic reforms, maintaining internal peace and the rule of law and working with donors in order to ensure sustained financial assistance to the country. In the current situation, depoliticized communication with all sides, free of blatant external interference, remains essential. We cannot fail to express our regret regarding the terminology used in the Secretary-General’s report, which could undermine trust between the United Nations and the authorities of the Sudan. We call on them to engage in a mutually respectful and constructive dialogue.

    2021-12-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8925 (2021) · source

  25. The agreements reached with the Sudanese leadership are a significant step towards resolving the acute internal crisis in that country. We trust that their implementation will help to stabilize the situation in the Sudan and create favourable conditions for further progress during the transition period. We view positively the statement made by the Chairperson of the Sovereign Council of the Sudan, Lieutenant General Al-Burhan, declaring his intention to hold general elections in July 2023 and reiterating his commitment to the peace agreement between the transitional Government of the Sudan and a number of rebel groups signed in Juba on 3 October 2020. We await the outcome of the ongoing consultations on the formation of a technocratic Government in the Sudan.

    2021-12-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8925 (2021) · source

  26. We are convinced that the existing differences in Sudanese society can, and should be, addressed only through dialogue with the participation of all major political forces in the country in the interests of ensuring security and stability and achieving national accord. We welcome the signing of a political agreement on 21 November, which was the outcome of intensive negotiations between the Sudan’s military leaders and various civil groups and community and tribal leaders, with the effective mediation of a number of Arab and African countries and regional organizations. We believe the notion set out in the political declaration that a partnership between the Sudan’s military leadership and civil society representatives is a guarantee of stability and security in the Sudan to be particularly important.

    2021-12-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8925 (2021) · source

  27. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. Volker Perthes, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan, for his briefing on the situation in the Sudan. We welcome the participation of the Charge d’affaires a.i. of the Sudan at this meeting. We have taken note of the most recent quarterly report (S/2021/1008) on the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS). Russia is carefully following developments in the Sudan, which is going through a complex period in its current history.

    2021-12-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8925 (2021) · source

  28. We underscore that when it comes to joint action to oppose illegal armed groups, proper coordination is fundamentally important, including in the context of the presence of peacekeepers on the ground.

    2021-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8918 (2021) · source

  29. We believe that the evolving situation on the ground must be accounted for during the implementation of that document. We proceed from the assumption that lasting normalization in the Democratic Republic of the Congo cannot be achieved through military measures alone. We need to advance our work to ensure the full-fledged implementation of the fundamental Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework in the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region. We welcome the steps taken by President Tshilombo Tshisekedi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s neighbours aimed at normalizing the situation in the Great Lakes region. One of the key tracks is the extension of cooperation among the Great Lakes States in the area of security.

    2021-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8918 (2021) · source

  30. We welcome the launch of a joint centre with the Congolese armed forces in October, and the strengthening of the Intervention Brigade. We are concerned over reports about the humanitarian situation. The statistics indicating that the United Nations humanitarian response plan has been financed only by 34 per cent is particularly worrisome, especially given the increased number of internally displaced persons. Additional efforts are assuredly required to address the common calamity of the coronavirus pandemic and the sporadic outbreaks of Ebola. When working on the Security Council draft resolution on the renewal of the MONUSCO mandate, we take into account the transition plan for a step-by- step drawdown and withdrawal of the Mission that has been elaborated jointly with Kinshasa.

    2021-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8918 (2021) · source

  31. The illegal exploitation by the insurgents of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s natural resources, which are used by illegal armed groups to finance their activities, remains an acute problem. There is a need to regain control of the situation and to ensure transparency in this area. We highly appreciate the successful interaction of the security forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUSCO, to which the leaders of some other United Nations missions can refer as a role model when building relations with host countries. In that regard, we commend Ms. Keita’s efforts to promote the interaction of peacekeepers with the authorities and people on the ground, which creates a much-needed positive environment.

    2021-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8918 (2021) · source

  32. The situation in the eastern and north-eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains complex, and the increase in violence and the number of civilian victims is alarming. The Allied Democratic Forces remains a major threat to security. We are closely following developments in the provinces of Ituri and North Kivu, where a state of emergency has been in effect since May. We hope that the Government will be able to regain control of the security situation in the area. That will make it possible to ensure the strengthening of State institutions on the ground, improve the humanitarian and socioeconomic conditions, resolve intercommunal conflicts, and implement, together with MONUSCO, the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Reintegration and Stabilization Programme for former combatants.

    2021-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8918 (2021) · source

  33. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), Ms. Bintou Keita, for her informative briefing. We also thank the Permanent Representative of the Niger, Mr. Abdou Abarry, for his briefing on the activities of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We also thank Ms. Marie-Madeleine Kalala and welcome the participation in this meeting of the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2021-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8918 (2021) · source

  34. It is also important to avoid a security vacuum. Taking into account the complex humanitarian situation in Somalia, Russia will continue to provide assistance to the country and to Somali refugees in neighbouring countries through targeted contributions to earmarked funds of the United Nations World Food Programme. We also intend to continue to train Somali civilian professionals in this area. In conclusion, allow me to assure Council members of the readiness of our delegation to continue to focus on the topic of Somalia on the Security Council agenda while strictly respecting its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

    2021-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8907 (2021) · source

  35. We welcome the ongoing Mogadishu talks with all key international actors on the configuration of the future mission and the parameters for the transfer of responsibility for security in the country from AMISOM to the Somali National Army. We have taken due note of the reformatted version of the Mission approved last month by the African Union, transforming it into a hybrid United Nations- African Union operation. We expect that all participants in these discussions will manage to reach mutually acceptable decisions. In any case, we are convinced that any decisions on African Union peacekeeping missions must be taken with due account of the view of Mogadishu and with the objectives of making progress in training the Somali National Army and in building a single national security architecture.

    2021-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8907 (2021) · source

  36. We hope that, in the time remaining the country will be able to complete its electoral process, in accordance with its updated election timetable and the Somali agreements of 17 September 2020 and 27 May 2021. The security situation in Somalia remains tense. We call on the Somali Government and African peacekeepers to remain steadfast in the fight against Al-Shabaab and to continue to pay special attention to the security of the electoral process. The situations in Jubaland, Galmudug and Hirshabelle require particular focus, given that other extremist groups in addition to Al-Shabaab are becoming increasingly active and intercommunal confrontation is growing. Against that backdrop, we commend the work of the African peacekeeping mission in the country, which remains a key element of security in Somalia.

    2021-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8907 (2021) · source

  37. We note that, since the previous quarterly Council briefing (see S/PV.8833), the Federal Government of Somalia has been able to demonstrate new successes in shaping a sustainable model of federalism in the country. The conclusion of the Upper House elections was an important milestone in that process. We welcome the Somali people’s achievement of a 26 per cent quota of women in the Upper House. We also note the start of voting in the lower chamber of the Somali Parliament. We are grateful to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia and to Mr. Swan personally for his contribution to resolving differences within the Federal Government.

    2021-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8907 (2021) · source

  38. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, Mr. James Swan, as well as the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), Mr. Francisco Madeira, for their traditionally informative briefings. We also listened to the briefing by the representative of Somali civil society and Executive Director of the Somali Women’s Leadership Initiative, Ms. Asha Siyad. We welcome the participation in today’s meeting of the Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations, Mr. Abukar Dahir Osman. We have carefully studied the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/944).

    2021-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8907 (2021) · source

  39. With regard to the specific situation on the Belarusian-Polish border, resolving the issue in a lasting way can be done only by entering into an equal dialogue with Minsk. If Brussels is prepared to do that, we are ready to assist.

    2021-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8906 (2021) · source

  40. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We have to take the floor, since we regret the fact that some delegations are continuing to use the most inappropriate reasons for promoting their propaganda work. The important topic of conflict prevention is not an exception. The situation in Belarus is a clear example of the destabilizing external interference that we talked about earlier in our statement and a blatant example of double standards. That also applies to the situation concerning migrants. We believe that the European Union should refrain from resorting to such double standards in dealing with that issue and that it should bear the responsibility for its actions.

    2021-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8906 (2021) · source

  41. In particular, the Security Council should not be distracted from its main task of maintaining international peace and security. We need to step up our efforts in ensuring that all United Nations bodies work effectively, adhering to the principle of division of labour. All the building blocks of international cooperation will then be in place to form a solid foundation for conflict prevention and resolution.

    2021-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8906 (2021) · source

  42. We would like to note that, unfortunately, instead of focusing on pursuing political solutions and using existing tools, we have recently been paying more attention to topics such as coordinating the efforts of various United Nations bodies, identifying some kind of linkage among the different aspects of the Organization’s work and discussing significant issues of our time in all forums at once. It would seem that the Security Council is now well placed, if not to perform the functions of all United Nations bodies at once, then at least to provide its views on virtually all generic issues. The same trend can be seen in other United Nations bodies. For our part, we remain convinced that we should do justice to the founders of the United Nations and stop reinventing the wheel.

    2021-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8906 (2021) · source

  43. However, the issue of sustainable funding for peacebuilding efforts remains unresolved. We should also take a fresh look at the preventive capacities of regional and subregional organizations. The role of the Secretariat is clearly significant. Headquarters and field presences have amassed a huge potential of knowledge and expertise in monitoring and analysing situations in the regions and forecasting their development according to crisis scenarios. After all, when stressing a universal institution, with a unique legitimacy, playing a significant role in conflict prevention conflicts, we are talking about members of the Secretariat.

    2021-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8906 (2021) · source

  44. They must be ready to work impartially and independently, as well as to take innovative decisions that are not based on their previous roles or achievements. The responsibility for the effectiveness of the United Nations crisis-prevention toolkit lies, to a large extent, with the Organization’s peacekeeping operations. We have repeatedly said that we do not share the understanding of peacekeeping solely as the protection of civilians and the provision of humanitarian assistance. Without a political process, it is not possible to achieve peace or to significantly stabilize a situation, even with thousands of Blue Helmets deployed and $1-billion mission budgets. The Peacebuilding Commission, whose coordination and mobilization activities we fully support, carries out important work in assisting post-conflict countries.

    2021-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8906 (2021) · source

  45. However, we should also not forget that every situation has its own origins and, accordingly, sensitive, impartial approaches and tailor-made solutions should be found. Basically, there can be no one-size-fits-all formulas or set criteria. We firmly believe that early warning cannot be based on an arbitrary combination of conflict indicators, even if they are as important as the human rights indicators or those relating to the Sustainable Development Goals. Global trends show the increasing role of mediators in conflict prevention and resolution. Their work requires great skill and, importantly, patience. The good offices missions of the Secretary-General and his special envoys continue to prove their relevance.

    2021-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8906 (2021) · source

  46. Why are painstaking efforts undertaken with regard to some countries to establish a political process and allow time for quiet diplomacy, while in other countries the international community and the Security Council immediately start firing all guns, apply sanctions, including unilateral illegal measures, put pressure on national Governments and instigate opposition to confront them despite the fact that it has long been obvious that interference in domestic political processes, regardless of the position of the host parties, is far from being in the interest of long-term stabilization. Only the people themselves can determine the fate of their countries. Armed or other outside interference in internal conflicts only risks triggering a spiral of confrontation.

    2021-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8906 (2021) · source

  47. Unfortunately, crises are constantly recurring, and new hotbeds of conflict erupt. There are no swift or radical blanket solutions for solving such problems. Curbing conflicts successfully depends on the systematic application of early-warning instruments, tapping into the potential of preventive diplomacy and using mediation and good offices. However, for all of those efforts to be successful, in our opinion, a number of conditions must be met. We are convinced that there should be no place in our work for double standards dictated by political situations or the preferences of certain States.

    2021-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8906 (2021) · source

  48. That goal was enshrined as our main objective in the Charter of the United Nations in 1945. We remember how, upon assuming his role five years ago, Secretary- General Guterres began his work with a call for peace and for the efforts to achieve it to permeate all areas of our Organization’s activities, from the cessation of hostilities to negotiating political solution to conflicts. Over all those years, the United Nations, its Security Council and other principal organs, the Secretariat and regional and subregional organizations have carried out significant work to identify the root causes of and ways to prevent conflicts. Despite all of that, we keep coming back to the topic of preventive diplomacy, reaffirming it time and again as an overarching priority of the United Nations.

    2021-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8906 (2021) · source

  49. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We welcome the participation of Secretary- General António Guterres; the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Abdulla Shahid; the President of the Economic and Social Council, Mr. Collen Vixen Kelapile; and the President of the International Court of Justice, Judge Joan Donoghue, in today’s meeting. We are grateful to Mexico for drawing attention to preventive diplomacy and convening this unique event with the participation of the heads of the principal United Nations organs. I would like to endorse the statement to be delivered shortly by the representative of Venezuela on behalf of the Group of Friends in Defence of the Charter of the United Nations. The challenge of conflict prevention is 76 years old.

    2021-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8906 (2021) · source

  50. We believe that the aforementioned provisions are outdated and have nothing to do with the Somali sanctions regime. It would regrettable if their preservation in this text were to serve the bilateral aims of individual Council members or to pressure those they dislike. In that context, we also condemn the practice of using or threatening to use illegal unilateral sanctions. We also cannot agree with the wording of paragraph 38, which compels Panels of Experts to promote gender issues in all mandate areas without taking country specificities into account. We believe such actions to be artificial and politicized.

    2021-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8905 (2021) · source